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EMINENT LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC MEN.

Biography.

EMINENT FOREIGN STATESMEN.

VOL. I.

BY EYRE EVANS CROWE.

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LIVES OF EMINENT FOREIGN STATESMEN.

CARDINAL AMBOISE.*

1460—1510.

The close of the fifteenth century is the most important epoch in modern history. It was one of universal change; and never was revolution more extensive or complete, than that which it produced or achieved. It left nothing untouched, from geography, the limits of which it extended by the discovery of a new continent, to literature, which it enriched with the precious remains of Grecian antiquity. The moral and religious mind of Europe then began to be agitated by those throes, which soon after brought forth the Reformation. Nor did the political world less feel the general impulse and movement of the epoch. Feudality fell, and gave place gradually to the more simple system of the uncontrolled authority of kings.

To describe this change, and to develope its causes, is the province of the historian rather than of the biographer. Yet it essentially concerns the latter also; since one of the most remarkable effects of the period, and of its general change, was to rouse from

* The chief sources from which the life of Amboise has been derived are, Vie du Cardinal d'Amboise, par Baudier; Id. par Legendre; Jaligny, Hist. de Char. VIII.; Claude de Seyssel; D'Anton, Chron. de Louis XII.; Hist. du Parlement, &c.

the hitherto slumbering mass of mankind, that host of individual talent and eminence, which stud, like stars, the whole of the sixteenth century. Previously to the time of which we speak, eminence and influence were denied to the non-noble altogether, and allowed to the noble only in war. The monarch, surrounded by jealous or usurping barons, was denied the privilege of delegating his authority. Statesmanship accordingly became possible only upon the throne; and royalty formed a school too narrow to allow of the progress, or even existence, of that important science.

Hence it is, that, in the early centuries of European history, the fortunes of a kingdom are found to depend wholly upon the personal character of its monarch. France triumphs under Philip Augustus; England sinks into shame under John: whilst the same countries, under Charles VI. and Henry V., exchange at once their respective stations of honour and disgrace. In later days, the feeble mind and almost feminine temperament of Louis XIII. proved no impediment to the grandeur of his realm, the sceptre of which he was enabled to commit to the vigorous hand of Richelieu.

This advantage of supplying the weakness of capacity in the hereditary ruler by the talents of the aspiring statesman, was forbidden to monarchs of old by the conditions of their feudal rule, and none calculated to act as ministers were therefore to be found. There were legists, indeed, such as those who, by decrees and chicanery, aided Philip Augustus to humble the pride of his nobility; there were warriors, eager to grasp the constable's sword, and earn it by doughty blows; there were plebeian financiers, who undertook to raise the state revenues as a matter of private speculation; there were churchmen, versed in the interests of their order, and prepared to defend them,—but minds, uniting all these various species of knowledge, and capable of binding their various interests into one, could not possibly be found except upon the throne, and there rarely — if ever.

As kingdoms enlarged their mutual connections and conflicting interests, diplomacy soon became the better part of government. Chancceries and secretaryships grew indispensable: but the use of the pen was beneath the dignity of the noble or the warrior; and the court of Rome, then the centre of all negotiations, took care to overload the new art with forms, to invest it with as much intricacy and mystery as possible, in order to insure a monopoly to its followers. In this it succeeded: the churchmen, who had been ousted by the legists from the judge's seat, recovered their pre-eminence in the profession of diplomacy and general politics. Some monarchs, indeed, found it necessary to oppose their ambitious views. Louis XI. found the allegiance of ecclesiastics to Rome to be incompatible with fidelity to him; and however much that monarch, so given to negotiation, needed their services, he was obliged, after one or two flagrant examples of treachery, to act in a great measure as his own secretary, and at last to repose his chief confidence in a barber.* The churchmen, however, overcame in the end all obstacles and repugnances. They first united the qualities requisite to form the statesman,—the science of diplomacy with those of the legist and the financier. Ximenes in Spain, Amboise in France, and Wolsey in England, may be considered the first prime ministers of their respective countries.

George d'Amboise, cardinal and minister of Louis XII., governed France and guided its policy from 1498—the date of that king's accession—to the year 1510. He was descended from a noble family, that of De Berrie, known and distinguished as far back as the eleventh century. The name of this house was merged, at the same time

* This mistrust proved inimical to the interests of Louis. On the death of Charles of Burgundy, the French king could select no more trustworthy envoy to the town of Ghent than Oliver le Daim, his barber. He reckoned, perhaps, that the good burgesses would not be scrupulous with respect to defects of birth or lowliness of profession. On the contrary, they proved more punctilious than an assembly of nobles. They hooted and spurned the barber envoy, who was obliged to make his escape ignominiously, leaving unperformed and unattempted the important errand of his royal master.

that its importance was vastly increased, by the marriage of a seigneur de Berrie with the heiress of the illustrious family of Amboise. This took place in the year 1206. The title received new lustre from the race which adopted it. One of the family fell at Crecy, another at Azincourt, whilst a third was made prisoner at Poitiers. In Charles VII.'s reign, the lord of Amboise joined the standard of the English kings of France, through which Amboise itself was forfeited and became crown property. This elder line soon after became extinct; its heiress carrying its vast possessions to her husband, La Tremouille. The subject of the present memoir was, however, descended from a younger branch of this great family, which bore the title of Chaumont. Pierre, his father, was chamberlain to Charles VII. and to Louis XI. This courtier had a numerous progeny—eight daughters and nine sons; and he enjoyed the singular good fortune of seeing almost all of them elevated to stations of eminence and power. The eldest, the count de Chaumont, was one of the few nobles whom Louis XI. trusted and enriched with unvarying favour, making him governor of the Isle of France, of Burgundy, and of Champagne. The third son became grand prior, and grand master of the knights of Rhodes. Several were churchmen, and of course bishops; one filling the no less eminent station of abbot of Cluni.

George, the youngest, or, according to some accounts, the youngest son save one, was born in the year 1460. Destined to the church, he became an ecclesiastic and a doctor in canon law,—by right of birth it should seem, since all his biographers make light of his proficiency in study, and at so early an age, that his friends procured him a mitre at fourteen. At that time the higher ranks of the church were still filled by election, although the freedom was in most cases merely nominal. Thus, the powerful family of Amboise having proposed their young brother of fourteen to the chapter of Montauban as candidate for the bishopric then vacant, the boy, supported by court influence, was successful against his

opponent, an old and learned canon of that church. Soon after, the young bishop of Montauban was appointed almoner to the king, Louis XI.; the functions of his place requiring his attendance at the monarch's court. George d'Amboise was thus early placed in a school more calculated to form an astute politician, than to communicate the habits, the learning, or the virtues of a churchman. Beneath the brow of that dreaded sovereign, the young prelate learned the humility and meekness which afterwards accompanied him even in his greatness; from the character and habits of Louis, he saw how power is best acquired and kept without the interference of pride, and how little the trappings of greatness are requisite to one who can appreciate its substance. Economy was another habit to be acquired in the court of Louis; who showed it to be the firmest support of despotic authority, if practised from a love not of money, but of its use, and if effected by parsimony and order. There, too, the future minister learned the mysteries of intrigue — how to court the friend, and how to soothe an enemy with a bribe. To his ample credit be it recorded, that in such a school he never came to prefer the atrocious means, from which Louis XI. did not shrink. Amboise preserved his prelate's robe unstained. He had that happy disposition and conscience, which enabled him to imitate and adopt the wisdom of his master, without his crimes.

Louis XI., beside the dauphin Charles, had two daughters, whom, in default of foreign suitors, he married to princes of the blood. The eldest, Anne, comely of person, possessed all her father's talent, and even more than his spirit. Louis dreaded to give such a consort to Louis duke of Orleans, collateral heir to the crown, whom his jealous temper sought by every means to depress. Instead, therefore, of bestowing his eldest daughter on the duke, he gave her to a younger brother of the house of Bourbon, who bore the title of seigneur de Beaujeu. To the duke of Orleans he married Jeanne, Anne's sister, who was so deformed, that nothing but

the dreaded menaces of the king could prevail upon the bridegroom to espouse her. As Louis XI. was then in declining health, whilst the dauphin was as yet but a child, a minority was of course to be expected. The suspicious monarch feared that a regency in the hands of Louis of Orleans might endanger his young successor: hence proceeded his anxiety and precaution in giving Anne to a prince of no pretensions in his own right, and of a family rival to that of Orleans. He destined his eldest daughter, the lady Anne, or the lady of Beaujeu, as she is indiscriminately called, to succeed to the regency, excluding altogether the duke of Orleans from power. Thus Louis on his deathbed pursued the habitude of his life, in sowing dissensions as if the maxim "Divide et impera" were to console him in his tomb, as it had strengthened him on his throne.

The conflicting interests of Beaujeu and of Orleans gave birth to two rival parties, in one of which the courtiers and men of influence soon found themselves obliged to enlist. Amboise flung himself into that of the duke of Orleans, to whose person as well as interest he became attached. He was of the same age with the prince, of the same mild temper and yielding character. A congeniality of disposition strengthened the connection into friendship and intimacy, which continued to subsist, with unswerving attachment on one side, and confidence on the other, until death severed the tie.

The demise of Louis XI., in 1483, came to try the strength of the rival parties. They were pretty equally balanced, and an appeal was made to the states-general of the kingdom to decide between them. The address of the lady of Beaujeu preserved to her by their decision the guardianship of the king, whilst the duke of Orleans only obtained the privilege of making one of the council. The latter was, in fact, tricked out of his advantages by the clever daughter of Louis XI., who, by influencing the elections and reducing taxes, had secured the good-will of the states. It was resolved by the friends of the disappointed duke to combat the lady

of Beaujeu with her own weapons,—those of address and intrigue. Their efforts were directed to win the affections of the young king. Charles, brought up in solitude and inactivity (such was the pleasure of his father), had taken a sudden ardour for martial exercises; he loved jousts, tourneys, fêtes, and the rude sports which then accompanied them. The duke of Orleans excelled in these exercises, which were frequently renewed at Vincennes, the residence of the young monarch. Charles became inspired with affection for his relative, and showed every inclination to throw off the yoke of his sister.

Lady Anne of Beaujeu was skilful in undermining these intrigues. At first she brought off the king from Paris. When Orleans joined the duke of Britany, who was in open opposition to the government, she surprised and forced him to submission. In the field or cabinet, this true daughter of Louis XI.—this "virago," as she is emphatically called by Jaligny—had alike the advantage of the gallant but unsteady duke of Orleans. During her absence from Paris, he in vain appealed to the parliament against her; accused her of making the king's guards swear fealty to herself, and of keeping the monarch in durance. The parliament refused to interfere; and the university, when applied to, acted with similar reserve. The hopes of Orleans centered in the exertions of Amboise, who still held his place of almoner, and thus enjoyed access to the king's person. He failed not to represent to Charles the ignominy of submitting to a woman, his sister, not many years his senior—one who obliged him to hold his court in remote places and gloomy castles; whilst, were he at liberty, or governed by the counsels of a gallant prince of congenial mind, such as his cousin of Orleans, he might reign in a manner more suitable to his royal dignity and tastes.

The young king approved of the advice of his almoner; but, unable of himself to throw off the yoke of his sister, he gave secret permission to the duke of Orleans to

concert with the duke of Britany the means of rescuing and carrying him away by force. Amboise was the chief medium through which these important communications passed. They did not escape the vigilance of the lady of Beaujeu. Dunois, son of the famous Bastard of Orleans, had returned from exile without leave. He shared with the bishop the confidence of the duke, and his re-appearance denoted fresh machinations. At length the lady Anne succeeded in seizing an emissary charged with letters written in cipher, and addressed to the duke, from Amboise and his other partisans at court. The consequence was the imprisonment of the bishops of Montauban (Amboise), and of Perigueux, of Philip de Comines (the historian), and of Bussy, the brother of Amboise. The bishop of Alby, another brother, made his escape. These arrests took place in January, 1487. Orleans raised the standard of civil war in concert with the duke of Britany; was beaten in the following year by La Tremouille in the battle of St. Aubin, and made prisoner.

Amboise suffered at this time a captivity of two years. At first, preparations were made for bringing him to trial, but were abandoned from the difficulties of then instituting a legal process against a churchman. The bishop himself did not disown the correspondence, but pleaded the express command of the king. In July, 1487, there was a petition from him to the parliament, praying to be removed from the great tower of Corbeil to Paris, on the plea of illness, which had been brought on by confinement. The parliament ordered him to be removed from the tower to a more commodious apartment in the *chastel* of Corbeil, where physicians might attend him. The pope at the same time interfered, but in vain. Anne of Beaujeu, with all her sire's tenacity, refused to let go her captive. At length, however, when the party of Orleans was completely crushed, the friends of Amboise assailed her weak side, and found means to inspire her with religious scruples as to the sin of keeping an ecclesiastic and a bishop in durance. "This

princess," says Legendre, "was like her father,—sometimes scrupling nothing, and at others scrupulous of every thing." In February, 1489, Amboise was liberated. Philip de Comines, his fellow-prisoner, did not recover his liberty for some time after, and upon conditions much more severe. The poor historian was without the protection of the churchman's gown, or of a powerful family.

Nothing daunted by his tedious punishment, and nothing slackened in attachment, the immediate use that Amboise made of his liberty was to work for the liberation of his patron. He put every means in activity to attain this end. He persuaded the princess Jeanne, —hitherto lukewarm in her husband's behalf, because neglected by him,—to exert herself for his release with the hope of winning his affections in the shape of gratitude. The admiral de Graville, who had great influence with the lady Anne, he gained, by holding out hopes that his nephew, the count de Chaumont, would espouse De Graville's daughter. But all attempts failed in making the lady Anne relent. Brantôme accounts for her inveteracy by an early attachment to the duke of Orleans, converted to spleen by his neglect. The aim of Amboise was attained in another direction. The heiress of Britany was then sought by many princely suitors. Maximilian of Austria had succeeded in espousing her by proxy. But the king of France resolved himself to marry her. The princess was averse: she was said to be attached to the duke of Orleans, who himself had been a suitor, and who certainly had influence with her. His soft temper made him universally beloved, and it also in this instance made him forego his own passion. It was Amboise who principally inspired the king with the idea that Orleans could best further his suit. The lady Anne was not likely to listen to this advice; and Charles was prompted to act without her cognisance. He rode to Bourges, where his cousin of Orleans was confined, and liberated him with his own hands. The duke was grateful: he hurried to Britany,

and overcame the repugnance of the princess to a marriage with the king of France.

The completion of these nuptials, in 1491, restored the duke of Orleans, and his follower Amboise, who had been instrumental in bringing them about, to influence and favour. Even the lady of Beaujeu, or duchess of Bourbon, as she had become, vied with Charles in good-will towards them. To the duke was given the important province of Normandy; the government of which he instantly delegated to Amboise, as his lieutenant. A short time previous, this prelate had exchanged his see of Montauban for that of Narbonne; and from this he was promoted, by the election of the chapter, indeed, but through the urgent recommendation and influence of the court, to the archbishopric of Rouen, in 1494. Possessed of both civil and ecclesiastical authority in the province, Amboise made his first essay of administration with a strictness and activity then uncommon, and productive of the most salutary effects. From being over-run with robbers and disbanded soldiers, Normandy soon became completely rid of them: so severe a *justicier* was Amboise, that it was then said of the province, as afterwards of the kingdom when under his rule, in the quaint language of the time, "that a fowl might walk the fields in as great safety as if it wore an iron cap."

Soon after took place the famous expedition of Charles into Italy. The duke of Orleans took part in it; and defeated, near Genoa, the fleet of the king of Arragon. Amboise accompanied his patron, and hoped to profit by it. He looked already for a cardinal's hat; but the duke of Orleans, being taken ill of a fever, was unable to accompany Charles to Rome, and the absent Amboise was in consequence overlooked. This occasioned some complaints and bickerings between the king and his cousin.

One of the blemishes in Amboise's character as a statesman is, that his attachment was more to the prince, his immediate master, than to the state. This, however, was the fault of the age, in which the feudal principle

of personal allegiance had not yet passed into the more noble one of patriotism. The house of Orleans, as heir of the Viscontis, possessed Asti, and had claims upon Milan, which the sage Louis XI. would never hear of its asserting. At the present time it was particularly requisite not to insist upon them, as such conduct would instantly convert the Sforzas into enemies. Orleans, however, by the advice of Amboise, quarrelled with Ludovic Sforza, and supported his claims; whence ensued a war in the north of Italy, fatal to Charles and to the French. The remittances of money necessary to the main army were diverted to the private purposes of the duke of Orleans. Though partly victorious at Fornova, Charles refused to renew the engagement, or serve the private views of the duke in seeking to conquer the Milanese. Amboise did his utmost to induce the king to fight another battle with this aim. He even bribed Briçonnet, Charles's favourite, with large promises of fiefs and titles in the Milanese, to second the advice. Charles refused; and a mutual pique from that period existed between the monarch and his cousin. This became aggravated, when the death of the infant dauphin left the latter heir presumptive to the crown. Distrust began to show itself, in complaints against the duke, and in multiplied accusations against Amboise for arbitrary government in Normandy. One of the schemes and ameliorations which the archbishop worked, was to deprive the nobility or their substitutes of their judicial privileges.* The legists had done much to this end, but in minor causes the *baillis* of the several seigneurs still exercised judicial power; this was a source of vexation to the peasant, and a screen to violence. Amboise, when he became minister, effectually put a stop to it, and obliged the nobles to employ lawyers as their substitutes; thus, in the French legal phrase, finally separating the *gens de robe* from the *gens d'épée*. His first attempts towards this in Normandy roused the nobility

* For an account of the legal reforms of Amboise, see Rœderer's work, entitled "Louis XII. and François I."

against him. The baillis made remonstrances and *doléances* thereon to the king, who showed himself eager to seize a pretext for anger against Amboise. The archbishop excused himself with all humility, but the king kept his resentment. "Those who brewed this broth for him," writes St. Gelais, "hoped to get him exiled to Rome or to Asti. But they imagined one thing, and there befell another." King Charles died suddenly of the effects of a blow; the duke of Orleans became Louis XII., and Amboise his prime minister.

All know the noble answer of Louis, when he was urged to take vengeance upon his captor La Tremouille: "The king cannot remember the wrongs of the duke of Orleans:" and the sentiment was echoed in the breast of Amboise, who displaced not a single minister or functionary. His first act was to honour the remains of the late king with a most magnificent funeral, the expenses of which were paid out of the revenues of the duchy of Orleans. "At that hour there was none to find elsewhere;" which proves at once the disorder of the royal finances, and the economy of Amboise. Relying on this best resource, the minister refused to levy the tax of the *joyeux événement*, due upon a new accession, and immediately diminished the subsidies by one tenth,—a reduction which he afterwards carried to two thirds of their amount.

The accession of Amboise to power was marked by reform, not only in matters of finance, but in every department of government. The same ameliorations, which had been tried in Normandy, were now extended to the entire kingdom. A parliament or fixed court of legists was established at Rouen, in lieu of the *échiquier*, or exchequer *, a mere baronial court, which sat but for a short time, and was otherwise objectionable. A great council, or council of state, was appointed, for the decision of such cases as concerned the royal rights or the church. But this institution, though

* So called, it is supposed, from the admixture of black and white flags with which the pavement of the hall was diversified.

much praised by French writers, was of doubtful benefit; sometimes, indeed, affording the people readier redress than the courts of law, but also subtracting from those courts what belonged to their jurisdiction. An assembly of notables was summoned, to propose such alteration in the law as time required and expediency pointed out; and their advice was adopted. The honour of these legal improvements is chiefly attributed to Guy de Rochefort, the chancellor; and there is on that account less need of specifying them here; but the presiding genius of Amboise is visible throughout. In days like these, the rigid observance, and at the same time mild enforcement, of existing law, was perhaps an amelioration more sensible than any alteration in its letter. The testimony of contemporary historians, that no one in this reign was put to death by "sudden justice," whilst at the same time all violence was put an end to, conveys the highest panegyric upon this part of the administration.

The chief opposition that Amboise encountered in his [illegible] of reform came from the university. This body, [illegible] aimed at being a second church, claimed all kinds of immunities; affecting, like the parliament, to be a power in the state. Its scholars were not amenable to the king's provost, or to any but their collegiate superiors; and were thus enabled to disturb the peace of the capital with impunity. Their numbers were formidable. The rector offered to attend Charles VIII.'s funeral with all the members of the university, amounting to 25,000. Amboise issued orders in reply, that of "lesdits graduez" not more than 5000 should attend. A subsequent edict rendering them amenable to the regular officers of police and law set the university in an uproar. The professors suspended their classes, and the preachers their preaching—imitating the effect of an interdict; the students prepared for resistance. The monarch and Amboise were obliged to advance from Blois with a little army, on which the students thought proper to submit; Amboise dismissing their deputation with a severe reprimand.

In the internal administration of the minister we

find every thing to applaud. In his foreign policy, Amboise was far from being so happy, so wise, or so upright. As, however, a history of his administration in this respect would be a history of France, we need but touch upon its leading points. Louis XII. not only succeeded to his predecessor's claims upon Naples, but had his own claim upon Milan to support. Wise policy might have prompted the adoption of Louis XI.'s maxim,—to extend the French territories towards the Rhine, and to neglect all aggrandisement beyond the Pyrenees or the Alps. But such was not to be expected from a warlike and spirited monarch, who would have considered it pusillanimity to abandon his heritage, and on whom his nobles called to take vengeance for their disgraces in Italy. War being resolved on, what minister or monarch is scrupulous in the choice of allies? Louis had the misfortune of finding a monster in the papal chair. He allied himself with Alexander VI., giving a dukedom and its revenues to the infamous Cæsar Borgia. This noted personage brought a cardinal's hat to Amboise in September, 1498; and a personage no less noted, the future Julius II., placed it on his head.

In the negotiations which preceded the invasion of Italy, Amboise showed consummate skill; and, what was least to be expected from an ecclesiastic of mild character, his military preparations were made with equal wisdom. Regular pay and strict discipline were the great secrets by which Amboise improved the French troops; the infantry of which first began to be respectable in this reign. The duchy of Milan surrendered to Louis; and Amboise purchased the surrender of the château, as he afterwards did from the Swiss the betrayal of Ludovic Sforza. It was, no doubt, from a wish to conciliate the inhabitants, and to take from before their eyes the appearance of a foreign yoke, that the cardinal gave the government of Milan to Trivulzio, whose arbitrary conduct chiefly produced the subsequent revolt. In his second conquest, Amboise showed himself merciful towards the lives, but not towards the wealth, of

the insurgents. After the second capture of Milan, "it is notorious," says De Seyssel, "that my lord cardinal spent two or three nights without sleep, in order to prevent the city and territory from being pillaged by the gendarmes." As the price of pardon, he, nevertheless, levied what Sismondi considers the "enormous sum of 300,000 crowns" upon Milan. The latter author, who seems to have looked upon Amboise with the feelings of an Italian, is indignant at this rapacity. But it is evident that the French minister was irritated by what he deemed the fickleness and obstinacy of the Italians; and that, although at first disposed to conciliate them, he at last looked upon them, and treated them, with the contemptuous and vindictive resentments of a stranger and a conqueror.

Milan being conquered, Naples remained. With respect to the latter, Amboise concluded that treaty of partition with the king of Aragon, by the aid of which the latter finally succeeded in obtaining entire possession of the country. In this, Amboise was the dupe of his love of negotiation, and also in some degree of his own private ambition. His aim was to be elected pope; a desire, the selfishness of which he might cover by patriotic motives; since, as pontiff, he might certainly work more benefit to France than as minister. This very reason was the obstacle to his elevation by the Italians. In 1503, Amboise passed the Alps with an army to reconquer Naples; but the popedom was the object uppermost in his mind. In an interview with the emperor at Trent, where that potentate had welcomed him with almost regal honours, the cardinal received his promise of support in his great aim. The friendship of the reigning pope, Borgia, was equally precious; but it was with difficulty that Amboise could dissuade Louis XII. from breaking with that monster and his nephew. To bring the cardinal's hopes to a proof, the tragic death of Alexander VI., poisoned by the draught which he intended for another, left the desired vacancy. Amboise hurried to Rome, secured the support of Cæsar

Borgia, and deemed himself certain of the majority of suffrages. The cardinals, however, refused to assemble, unless the march of the French troops were arrested. Amboise consented; thus sacrificing the success of the expedition against Naples to that of his own scheme. But this was equally frustrated; since the cardinals, freed from the terror of the French army, elected Francis Piccolomini as Pius III. The speedy death of the new pontiff restored Amboise to his hopes, and to confidence in the friends who had but just deceived him. The cardinals of the Borgia faction took an oath to vote for him, the simple words of these prelates not now sufficing. But the conclave again assembling, Amboise experienced the same desertion and bad faith, and witnessed the blasting of his high hopes by the election of Julius II.

Naples thus lost to Louis, and Rome to Amboise, an inglorious truce was followed up by an unwise treaty, which stipulated that young Charles (afterwards Charles V.), heir of the house of Austria and of Spain, should espouse Claude, the only daughter of Louis, and that she should have the duchies of Milan and Britany as well as Burgundy, for her dowry. There is no explaining the madness of such concessions on the part of France, but by reasons which history allows us indeed to conjecture, but does not explain. Amboise signed this treaty, and himself rendered homage to Maximilian for the duchy of Milan, in return for the investiture granted. But as he was most urgent afterwards to break off this dangerous marriage between the princess Claude and Charles, which once more dismembered the kingdom, it may be conjectured that Amboise, in signing the treaty, at first yielded to superior influence. This influence we know to have been wielded by the queen, Anne of Britany, who was anxious to secure a regal state, and above all her paternal duchy, to her daughter Claude; and who, detesting the countess d'Angoulême, mother of the future Francis I., objected to enrich that prince with her daughter's heritage. The bad suc-

cess of the Italian expeditions, and the fatal consequences of Amboise's aim at the popedom, had indisposed Louis towards his minister. The queen had taken advantage of this, to oppose to him a rival in the maréchal de Gié. Amboise, absent and unsuccessful, was obliged to yield to this new influence; and it was not until after his return, that a blunder of De Gié caused the disgrace of that favourite. It is well known how the king's illness, connected with the treaty, alarmed the kingdom for the loss of so many provinces. Amboise took advantage of the moment to summon the states, and overcome the queen's influence. They addressed Louis as the father of his people, pressing him to break off the marriage with Austria, and to bestow Claude upon Francis. This more happy arrangement took place, and acquits Amboise of the folly of having advised the original treaty. The memoirs of this reign are scant and unsatisfactory. M. de Sismondi attributes their reserve to the progress of printing, which, alarming the great for the inviolability of their secrets, rendered them doubly close in the communication of them. It is thus that we have few documents to prove any rivalry existing between of Anne Britany and the cardinal minister.*

The contemporaries of Louis XII. have left us equally in the dark upon a much more important subject. This is the celebrated league of Cambray, concluded against Venice by almost all the powers of Europe. Venice had been the ally of Louis XII.:—not, indeed, a very active

* Nevertheless there are some proofs. The following, from the correspondence of Louis XII. published at Brussels, was written by some one at court. "July, 1506. La royne garde tousjours la chambre (the chamber of the sick king) où il est, et a donné le bout au général de Beaune, et elle gouverne le roy tres fort; le légat (Amboise) s'en est allé chez lui à Rouan pour deux mois," &c.

The same writer, whilst he tells us that Amboise had the main hand in breaking off the marriage with Austria, also acquaints us that the cardinal had not given up his hopes of the popedom.

"L'on tient aussi pour vray que le roy d'Aragon a promis au légat en France de lui tenir la main en tout ce qu'il pourra avecques les cardinaulx qu'il a en Romme ses amys pour le faire Pappe veu l'indisposition de cestui-ce, qui ne seroit le bien des roys des Romains et de Castille, car ledit légat *seul et pour le tout* a été cause de rompre le mariage de madame Claude et de M. le prince de Castille."

one; but still she could not be accused of treachery, or of meriting in any way the French king's hate. That Louis and Amboise joined in the league merely from avarice and a greediness for plunder, is not likely, neither is it warranted by the character of either. Nor is it sufficient to account for the minister's pique against her, that she had thwarted his views upon the popedom. Julius II. was the originator and mover of the league: and his influence principally brought France to become a principal in the war against Venice. Amboise was too prone to listen to suggestions from Rome; and he was pretty certain to find Julius II. an enemy, if the latter found not in France an ally. When the league was decided, the cardinal proceeded, in October, 1508, to Cambray, where he arranged with Margaret of Austria the part that each was to take in the conquest and the spoil of Venice. Their discussions were not always pacific. "Monsieur the legate and I," writes Margaret, "were near taking each other by the hair." These differences proceeded from Amboise being the representative of the pope as well as the king of France in this interview;—another proof that it was the cardinal's obsequiousness to Julius which chiefly involved France in the league of Cambray. For, beside the hopes which he still entertained of the popedom, he was the papal legate in France, a great source of wealth and power. The arrangements of the treaty required six weeks to conclude. The measure was one so little within the range of probabilities, that the Venetians never suspected it. At length Condolmier, their ambassador, expostulated with Louis, not only on the score of justice, but prudence, asking "how he could think of attacking a country governed by such wise men?"—"Sir," replied Louis, "I shall send such an host of madmen against your sages, that all their wisdom will find it difficult to master." No answer could be more just in every respect.

Amboise suffered much, on his return, from gout

and fever. His ardour for the Italian war enabled him, however, to overcome disease. An army was got in readiness; and the cardinal set out in his litter, still suffering, to cross the Alps in April, 1509. It is evident that Italy had now become, with Amboise, an absorbing thought; his views were all centred there, and we hear at this time no more of his plans or works of domestic improvement. The only object that could draw the king from Paris was war, and the command of armies. This Amboise furnished him with; even inciting him to cross the Alps, whilst the queen, with all her influence, struggled to retain Louis at Paris. When Genoa revolted, in 1507, his minister pressed Louis to take the command against the Genoese: the queen remonstrated, that it was derogatory to the king's dignity to arm against rebels. Amboise, however, prevailed. Now, again, Anne would have retained her husband from his Italian journeys and conquests, and at the same time from the influence of Amboise: but the latter prevailed; and Louis, at the head of his army, soon defeated the Venetians. D'Anton bears witness to the activity of Amboise upon this occasion; and represents him as continually moving about in his litter at the head of the army, and, in all but actual combat, performing the office of general. After the Venetian defeat, he hastened, notwithstanding his malady, to meet the emperor at Trent, in the hopes of breathing some constancy and vigour into the feeble Maximilian. Amboise succeeded for a time, and but for a time. The emperor's zeal cooled; the Venetians drew breath and gathered courage. They pacified the pope; and the French minister soon found himself still far from triumphant over Venice, having at the same time Julius for his enemy. That pontiff, besides his hatred of extreme measures, was piqued against Amboise for his pretensions to the pontificate: he now receded from his alliance with France; so that the cardinal's obsequiousness to Rome had the effect of placing himself and his sovereign not only at enmity, but even afterwards at war, with the holy see;—an end directly

the contrary of what his policy had sought. Another successful campaign could alone overcome this new obstacle and enemy. Amboise prepared for it with his wonted alacrity. He set out for Italy, despite his never-relenting gout and fever, in the ensuing spring; but these ills increased so rapidly upon him, that he was compelled to remain at Lyons, where, his malady increasing, he expired on the 25th of April, 1510.

On his death-bed, Amboise was struck with remorse for those ambitious aims at the popedom, which had too much absorbed his thoughts and life. "Ah, friar John, friar John!" said he; "why was I not always friar John?" He displayed all a Christian's piety; expiring as he muttered the hymn of the Cross and the Credo. "Il est bien heureux, s'il a envoyé de bons fourriers devers le grand maréchal du logis, qui les depart a chascun selon ce qu'il a mérité, et leur baille lieu et degré en la cité perdurable." Such is the quaint reflection of Saint Gelais upon the cardinal's death. The king mourned his loss with sincere regret, and honoured his remains with a funeral of extraordinary magnificence; himself and the duc d'Angoulême, afterwards Francis I., walking as mourners in the procession. A magnificent tomb was afterwards erected to his memory in his cathedral church of Rouen. A warrior is there seen crushing a dragon, whilst in the background a shepherd is tending his flock,—a picture truly emblematic of the cardinal's administration, which weighed upon foreign lands and foes, preserving France in prosperity and peace.

Of the policy of Amboise with respect to Italy, something may be said in the way of excuse, nothing in the way of praise. Machiavel's censure of Louis XII. is known. "He ruined the weak, he fortified the strong; he introduced into Italy a new and overbearing power, that of Aragon." All, indeed, is blunder; but all proceeding from the original blunder on the part of the French, of seeking transalpine possessions. If the ancient historians accuse Amboise of impolicy,

the moderns, who justly estimate moral as superior to political character, convict him of injustice. Nor is the reproach less founded. The league of Cambray was a wanton aggression; and the abandonment of the small towns of the Romagna to the Borgias a most glaring breach of honour as well as of right. But it may be urged, that the Italians of that age, as by one accord, threw off, in public affairs, all respect for aught like justice or good faith. Machiavelli, as a luminous paper upon him in the Edinburgh Review has proved, was no originator of his system, but merely a frank and *naïf* expositor of prevailing sentiments. This consideration, though not acquitting Amboise, may certainly lessen our astonishment at a conduct so much at variance with his domestic policy and private character.

His reforms in the administration of justice have been noticed. Those which he attempted and effected in the church are equally praiseworthy; using all the influence of his station and his family to root out the dissolute monks, and replace them by others of a better life. We know that the disorders and ignorance of this class of the clergy mainly produced the Reformation; and although the anticipating reforms of Amboise may have tended to prevent this taking place afterwards in France, we cannot but applaud the foresight and piety which directed them. A modern historian observes of Amboise, that he "thought to compensate for the pomps and rejoicings of his own worldly life, in compelling monks to fast, and nuns to observe a stricter seclusion." Now, it may be good to do away with monks and nuns; but certainly it is also good, whilst they do exist, to keep them to the observance of those vows which they have chosen as their moral law.

Another accusation is conveyed in this censure,—that of the worldly and luxurious pomp of the churchman. No doubt, in Italy and abroad, the legate of the pontiff and the lieutenant of his sovereign though it necessary to use that magnificence which was the symbol of

power; but we learn that the same personage was in the habit of officiating in his cathedral of Rouen, clothed in the simple robes of a canon, and avoiding all the gorgeousness and pomp attending upon a cardinal's and a legate's dignity. The contrast in this between his conduct and Wolsey's is striking; particularly as Wolsey's rise, life, and ambition, were strongly marked by imitation of Amboise. The latter never excited the envy of the great French nobles, or showed, except in his aspiring to the popedom, any of the arrogance of the upstart Wolsey. Avarice is another reproach cast upon him by the same historian. "The cardinal," writes Sismondi, "left a scandalous fortune: he had accumulated, during his ministry, eleven millions of livres." To this it must be rejoined, that his pensions were considerable, and his economy great; that he was not likely to receive, like Wolsey, the pay of foreign princes. Neither Maximilian, nor Henry VII., nor Ferdinand, were monarchs to do this. Moreover, that he abstained from that obvious source of gain — ecclesiastical pluralities; resting contented with his archbishopric of Rouen, the cathedral of which he enriched by many presents. It would be far more just to say of Amboise, that his habits of life formed a just medium between the self-denial of Ximenes and the ostentation of Wolsey.

His management of the state revenues was equally wise. He lowered the taxes by two thirds, and never increased them, in spite of the war. He, in fact, made Italy pay the expense of what it cost; a patriotic policy, if not a just one, since it left the French peasant unvexed by these claims of his sovereign upon Milan and Naples, which nowise concerned him. "There was then," says Ferronius, "so much liberty amongst the French, that their comedians in Paris represented Louis himself on the stage, as ill, pale, asking incessantly to drink, and contenting himself with none other than liquid gold;" at which the king only laughed. Speaking of Louis as a youth, Jaligny writes, "Plus tune

illi prodigalitas, quam dein parsimonia profuit." We have a proof how the parsimony of Louis exceeded that of his minister, in the circumstance, that the pay which the latter had always allowed to the Swiss, was imprudently withheld by the monarch after the death of Amboise; which was a principal cause of subsequent defeats and misfortunes.

Even allowing a considerable part of these accusations to be just, what redeeming traits are to be found in the character of George d'Amboise? His tolerance alone, his defending the unfortunate Vaudois from their persecutors of the parliament of Grenoble, is a "charity that covereth a multitude of sins." Him the peasantry might bless, not only for the forbearance of the taxman, but for the order enforced amongst the royal troops. Before his administration, a lodgment of troops in a village was an injury greater "than a year's *taille*," or tax, says St. Gelais. The inhabitants fled from the national soldiery, "all as if they were their ancient enemies, the English." But now "a fowl might walk the fields unharmed."

The administration and political value of Amboise cannot be better estimated than from the account which Claude de Seyssel gives of the state in which he left France:—

"The kingdom is much richer in money and in all things, than in the time of Louis XI., despite the Italian wars, which some assert to have completely exhausted the country of money. As a proof, one has but to look at the quantity of edifices, both public and private, all full of gilding, not only the boards within, but the walls without; nay, even the roofs, the towers, the images that adorn the exterior. Then the furniture is marvellously richer; and plate in much greater abundance; so much so, that a sumptuary law is required to repress it. For there is nobody that has not cups, goblets, or, at least, spoons of silver. And as to prelates, lords, and great personages, they are not content with even silver, unless it be gilt. Dress is all as

magnificent. Not that all these things are to my taste," continues Claude de Seyssel; "but they are, at least, symptoms of wealth. The price of every thing is raised; dowries, heritages are larger. There are more buyers than sellers. And what is most apparent is the increase of revenue from land; so that a lord has more in one year's return now from his estate, than he would have sold it for out and out in the reign of Louis XI. The public revenue is augmented almost in the same proportion, more than two thirds; and, in many places, nine parts in ten. The intercourse of commerce by sea and land is inconceivably multiplied. For one merchant to be met with in the days of Louis XI., at Paris, or Rouen, or Lyons, you could now find twenty. And in little towns there are now as many as there used to be in great cities. So that now there is not a single house built streetward, without containing a shop for merchandise or artisanship. A voyage to Rome, Naples, and London, is now as little thought of as a trip formerly to Lyons or Geneva. The increase of the population may be seen easily in towns and fields: none are empty, all full of buildings. Suburbs have grown into towns; and prosperity has kept away even the plague from coming to diminish them. In the fields you see the progress of cultivation; woods and barren tracts converted into arable land, gardens, and habitations. It may be esteemed, that one third of the kingdom has been brought into culture within the last thirty years, without the price of provisions at all diminishing,—a sure sign and proof of the increase of population and prosperity."

XIMENES.

1457—1517.

The family of Cisneros is of great antiquity in Spain. Count Roderick of the name saved the life of his sovereign, Alphonso VI., in a battle against the Moors. He was the ancestor of the famous duke of Ossuno. But the honour of being descended from him is denied, by some, to the cardinal Ximenes de Cisneros. The latter came of a less illustrious race of Cisneros, which called itself noble, although the father of the cardinal had but a poor stipend as collector of the papal revenue. Gonzales Ximenes was born at the little town of Tordelaguna, in 1457. He was educated by his parents for the ecclesiastical state; studying first at Alcala, and afterwards at Salamanca, where the study of law seemed to attract his attention more than theology. He gave lessons in that branch of learning. But impelled by poverty and ambition, Ximenes at this time undertook a journey to Rome, with the hopes of bettering his condition. *Being twice robbed upon the road, the traveller was stopped for want of money at Aix, in Provence, until an old fellow-student benevolently helped him on his journey. Arrived at Rome, Ximenes employed himself as a pleader before the consistory; in which capacity he became distinguished enough to obtain a diploma, or brief, from the pope, entitling him to the first ecclesiastical benefice that should be vacant in his native province. With this as the fruit of his journey, Ximenes returned to Spain, having previously learned the death of his father.

* The life of Ximenes is principally derived from Gomez, Fléchier, and Marsallier (Lives of Ximenes), Mariana, and other Spanish historians.

It was the policy of the Roman pontiffs to advance such ecclesiastics as had been at Rome, or were connected with it. The provincial clergy, however, even in Spain, resisted these reversions granted by the pope. When the archpresbyter of Uceda died, Ximenes boldly took possession of his benefice. This no sooner reached the ears of the archbishop of Toledo, than that prelate sent a guard, and caused the intruder to be imprisoned in the castle of Uceda. It was customary with this prelate thus to treat his refractory clergy; not daring openly to contravene the pope's behests, but taking care that the persons benefited should not derive advantage from them, he kept them prisoners until they yielded up their briefs. Ximenes, however, was of less compliant temper. To aggravate his punishment, he was transferred to a ruder prison. But the archbishop practised cruelty in vain. He was at last obliged to yield, and liberate Ximenes; who, however, to escape from such a superior, exchanged his benefice for the chaplaincy of Siguenza.

There has been a sad neglect of dates on the part of the early biographers of Ximenes. At Siguenza he found a place and patron more to his mind, and he made use of his first influence to procure the foundation of an university in this town. "In Spain," says Gomez, "there was at that time a certain divine ardour for erecting universities;" of which he enumerates several; showing that the zeal for reviving letters was not confined to Italy, but had already passed the Mediterranean. Smitten with this prevailing taste, Ximenes turned away from his hitherto favourite study of law, declaring in emphatic language his disgust of it (*libenter evomiturum*), and gave himself to Hebrew and Chaldaic. His learning and character at length attracted the notice of cardinal Mendoza, bishop of Siguenza, who created him grand vicar, and intrusted to him the entire administration of his diocese.* This office, for which he was eminently fitted, brought Ximenes back again from his pious stu-

* 1483, according to Fléchier.

dies to law decisions and disputes; wearied and disgusted with which, he took the resolution of retiring altogether from active life, and shutting himself up in a cloister. He accordingly became a monk of the order of St. Francis, in the convent of St. John of Toledo, which had just been founded by Ferdinand and Isabella, changing, on the occasion, the name of Gonzales for that of Francis. We are here obliged to give the motives assigned by the biographers of Ximenes; but as these were, unfortunately, all ecclesiastics, their bias is of course to represent their hero as a saint. We have no means of controverting their account. It may, however, be stated as a possibility, that Ximenes, in removing from a provincial station to a new monastery in a great city, just established under the patronage of his sovereign, might have been actuated by motives of ambition.

However this may be, his fame as a monk * (how, is not very well explained) grew prodigious at Toledo. Crowds of both sexes came to consult him; and the pious cenobite was obliged, in consequence, to withdraw himself from the city to a little convent in the neighbourhood, called Castagnar, from the chestnut woods around. Here he built himself a hermitage, and practised study, seclusion, and contemplation; increasing so greatly his character for sanctity, that some of his brother monks predicted that friar Ximenes would inevitably come to be cardinal and archbishop of Toledo.

To this very dignity cardinal Mendoza, the patron of Ximenes at Siguenza, had in the mean time been promoted. In 1492, queen Isabella, standing in need of a confessor, having promoted her former one to the archbishopric of Granada, then just conquered, consulted the cardinal as to the choice of one. He, without hesitation, recommended Ximenes. The monk was called from his retreat, and presented to the queen, who was struck by his blended humility and dignity. On being

* De Rebus Gestis à F. Ximenes, &c., Alvaro Gomecio Toletano authore, 1569. It is dedicated to Philip II., and was written by order of the university of Alcala, which Ximenes had founded.

offered the confessorship, he resisted with all his might; but regal persuasion overcame his reluctance, and promoted him to that influential place. He accepted it, however, only on condition of retaining his monk's habit and life, and of frequenting the court solely for the purpose of confessing the queen. Soon after, he became provincial or chief of the Franciscan order in Castile. By virtue of this office he undertook to visit all the convents; and he performed his journey according to the rules of the saint, on foot, living by the alms which he procured on the road. He had chosen a companion for his journey, named Ruyz, who continued to be ever after his follower and friend. Friar Ruyz complained that Ximenes was a bad mendicant, and that they might perish for hunger, but for his own greater proficiency in begging. "Your reverence," said he to Ximenes, "is more fit for giving than asking." The new provincial showed his zeal, in rigidly reforming and correcting that dissolution of the monkish orders, which seemed at that time general throughout Europe. The cardinal Amboise, in France, at the same time laboured to the same effect, but with far less success, from his ministerial eminence, than Ximenes, making his tour on foot and in his friar's gown.

Mendoza, archbishop of Toledo, died in 1495. To provide him a successor became an object of great importance, difficulty, and intrigue. It was the first see of the kingdom, bringing enormous wealth and influence to its holder. All the nobility intrigued to procure it each for his family; king Ferdinand himself proposing one of his sons for the primacy. But Isabella, jealous of her authority, was determined neither to elevate any of her noblesse, nor yet a creature of her husband's, to such a dominant place. The poor monk, her confessor, appeared a man whose piety merited the elevation, and whose ambition was not to be feared. Ximenes accordingly was, upon Isabella's request, nominated by the pope. The queen placed the papal letter in the hands of her confessor, who, reading the superscription,

refused to open it, and fled to his solitude, where he refused for six months to accept the dignity. A peremptory order of the pope, however, at length prevailed. Some courtiers observed, that so pious a man might accept the charge and the office with a diminution of its enormous revenue. "A king could not be more offended at such suggestions" than Ximenes *: he declared he would never see the church despoiled; nor would he accept the first ecclesiastical dignity of Spain in aught diminished of its authority or revenues. Nevertheless, Ximenes shrank from assuming the luxurious life and magnificence of his station. He retired, and lived as before; had no servant save ecclesiastics; went on foot, or with a single mule, wearing his Franciscan habit. Pope Alexander VI. wrote to reprimand him for this abnegation of pomp; telling him that "the church, like the heavenly Jerusalem, had many grades and ornaments;" and that a hierarchy stood in need of those distinctions of dress and living which commanded respect. Ximenes bowed to this mandate *sub annulo piscatoris*, and put on silk and fur, but so as to allow his monk's habit to be seen beneath them.

The Franciscan order throughout Spain conceived great hopes of advantage from the advancement of one of their friars. They crowded around the archbishop, and began to intrigue even at court. But Ximenes checked their ambition, saying that he did not bring monks about him in order to make secular lords of them. They became his bitterest enemies in consequence; and the general of the order, when he visited Spain, was induced to make a formal complaint to queen Isabella against the severity of the new archbishop, who imposed upon every convent those rigid observances, which he himself had undergone. The queen repulsed all these attempts to injure Ximenes in her esteem, and gave him daily more of her confidence; consulting him in state affairs, and rendering him, by degrees, minister as well as prelate.

* Gomez.

The disappointment and hatred of his brother monks excited against Ximenes another enmity, which nearly proved fatal to him. His younger brother, Bernardin, had entered the church; Ximenes had resigned to him all his benefices when he became Franciscan. But Bernardin, perceiving that a convent was a more certain and short road to eminence than the secular habit, imitated Ximenes, and took the vows of a Franciscan. The archbishop received him into his house, and treated him with favour; but the light-headed Bernardin had neither the demeanour nor conduct becoming the brother and inmate of the pious prelate. The latter was obliged to expel him from the house. Bernardin returned to his convent, which was full of the enemies of his brother. From their tales, and from his own knowledge, he composed a libel against the archbishop, which he meditated presenting to the queen. Ximenes heard of the plot, seized his brother and his papers, and sent him to be confined in the convent of Guadalfara, where he remained two years. At the expiration of this time, Bernardin, it is to be supposed, made his submission, and was again received into the archbishop's house; where, however, he continued to conduct himself with little prudence. A suit, in which Bernardin had interfered to influence the judges, produced another quarrel. Ximenes threatened his brother with an imprisonment longer and more severe than the former; on which Bernardin in a rage flung himself upon the archbishop, who was at the time ill and on his couch, thrust a pillow on his mouth, and attempted to strangle or suffocate him. Having completed the murder, as he thought, Bernardin fled, warning the attendants not to disturb Ximenes, who slept; but one of them, whose suspicions were excited, entered nevertheless, saw his master almost dead, and called aid and physicians. These succeeded in restoring the archbishop to life. Bernardin was taken, and confined in the monastery of Turrigio. The archbishop never again saw or pardoned him; but in his latter days he had a

pension, and enjoyed his liberty. "I myself," says Alvar Gomez, "when a boy, saw Bernardin in extreme old age, enjoying ease and comfort. He was of tall stature, wrinkled front, face ruddy and fiery, nose long and hooked, eyes that looked inward (squinted), and a frame of body muscular though lean." Ximenes was said much to resemble Bernardin, except in the ruddiness of countenance; he being, on the contrary, extremely pale.

The same resistance that Ximenes met from the Franciscans, in his attempt to reform them, he experienced from the canons of Toledo. These despatched an envoy with their complaints to Rome. But the arch-b[illegible] aware, arrested the envoy, and sent him to pris[illegible] [illegible]ter this act of authority he was enabled to order his diocese without opposition; and the new regulations which he established amounted almost to a new political stat[illegible] He caused to be kept registers of births, of such as wer[illegible] pious, and of those who neglected religious duties; reformin[illegible] [illegible]he clergy, both regular and secular, in such a manner, that had it been imitated in Italy and Germany, it might certainly have prevented the coming Reformation. The cares [illegible] Ximenes were not confined to ecclesiastical abuses. The levying of the *alcabala*, or the tax of one tenth upon all sales, was the cause of great irritation and many quarrels between the people and the collector. He induced his sovereign to intrust the raising of it to the municipalities and local authorities, thus allowing the people to assess themselves. He at the same time founded two colleges at Alcala de Henares, after the model of the university of Paris.*

In 1499, Ferdinand and Isabella visited their new conquest of Granada, and summoned Ximenes to attend them. They were sorely perplexed how to treat the subject Moors, whom it seemed to them a grievous sin to tolerate. The archbishop undertook to convert them. He commenced by convoking the alfaquis or priesthood, and employing the most flattering arguments to

* Mariana.

bring them over to Christianity. Rich presents of silken garments proved the most powerful of these. The alfaquis consented to abjure Mohammedanism; and Ximenes enjoyed the triumph of baptizing 3000 Moors in one day. More numerous and more illustrious conversions followed; and had the same conciliatory measures been persevered in, history might have had to record one instance of a nation adopting without compulsion the religion of their conquerors. But Ximenes was impatient to terminate the great work; to hasten which, he ordered all the copies of the Alcoran to be publicly burned; and not only these, but every work of Arabic literature, some of medicine alone excepted, which he sent to the library of Alcala. Several of these volumes were not only valuable for their contents, but for their illuminations and ornaments of gold and precious stones. The archbishop had recourse to even more severe measures. Those who relapsed, he handed over to the inquisition, whilst he took away by force the children of the obstinate Mohammedans. The zeal of the Moors was excited by this persecution. One of the prelate's followers was insulted in passing through a suburb of Granada. This produced a riot, in which the whole city came to join; and Ximenes was besieged in his abode by the furious Moors, who demanded his life. The sedition lasted ten days, and was with great difficulty appeased. In the mean time, the messenger, whom Ximenes had despatched with the tidings, neglected his errand; and Ferdinand, learning the insurrection, was enraged with Ximenes. "There is your archbishop for you!" exclaimed he to his consort.* But tidings soon arrived that the troubles were for the time appeased; and Ximenes soon after joined the court at Seville.

Whilst the archbishop was at Granada, he was afflicted by the languishing fever common to the country; and he, on this occasion, experienced the skill of the Moors in medicine, — being cured by means of one of their popular

* Mariana.

specifics, when his own physicians despaired of him. Spain now enjoyed an interval of peace abroad and at home. Ximenes employed his leisure in the undertaking of his famous Polyglott Bible; he collected men of learning and of all nations for this task: the Greek, the Latin, the Arab, and the Jew. Manuscripts were procured at enormous expense: Leo X. sent all that could be found in the Vatican. The task took fifteen years to complete, and is said to have cost Ximenes 80,000 gold crowns. Nor was his care confined to the Bible. An edition of Aristotle was also undertaken; whilst works of piety, and such legends as might prove agreeable to females and younger readers, were printed and distributed at his expense.*

Queen Isabella's death, which took place in the latter end of 1504, brought new care to Ximenes. She appointed him executor of her will; and this proved a delicate and dangerous trust. Her daughter and heiress, Jeanne, was disordered in her intellect; partly owing to extreme fondness and jealousy of her husband Philip. The late queen's will, in consequence, appointed Ferdinand regent of Castile, until young Charles, her grandson, should be of age. A strong party rose up in opposition to this arrangement, preferring the archduke Philip's claim to that of Ferdinand. The latter depended principally on the support of the archbishop of Toledo, to whom he showed the utmost respect and obsequiousness. Philip came to enforce his pretensions, and landed in Spain in the commencement of 1506. Ferdinand was immediately deserted by his grandees, and despatched Ximenes to soften his son-in-law and bring him to terms of accommodation. In this the archbishop was not very successful. He, however, brought about an interview between the prince and king at Sanabria. The former was accompanied by don Manuel, his treasurer, the principal cause of the differences that existed. When the king and archduke retired into a little chapel, which Ximenes

* Amongst the latter was the life of St. Thomas of Canterbury, and that of Catherine of Sienna.

had prepared for their interview, the latter observed to don Manuel, that it would be more decorous to allow Ferdinand and Philip to communicate together without witnesses. "For my part," said Ximenes, "I shall act porter." So saying, he closed the doors of the chapel; taking care, however, to shut himself in, and don Manuel out. Ferdinand yielded with a good grace the government of Castile. Ximenes advised him to this concession; urging, that the grandees for the moment preferred a gay young monarch to an old and severe one; but that, in a little time, the Spaniards could not fail to grow jealous of the Flemish courtiers that surrounded Philip, whose fickle temper and worthless character must also, as soon as known, necessarily disgust them.

Ferdinand accordingly retired into Aragon; whilst Ximenes followed Philip to Burgos, the capital of Old Castile, where he was to be crowned. The archduke sought to leave his poor wife, Jeanne, behind him on the road; but a slight deceit of the archbishop indicating to the queen's guides the wrong road, occasioned her arrival at Burgos with Philip. The archduke's death took place soon after. This occasioned new divisions and discussions. The grandees who had opposed Ferdinand's claim, dreaded his recovery of power in Castile; and yet there seemed no competitor to oppose to him. That king, however, was absent in Italy; and Ximenes himself, instead of proposing him, advised that some other persons of weight should be appointed to govern the state. The archbishop was accordingly named, together with the constable of Castile and the duke of Najara,—the one a favourer, the other an opponent, of Ferdinand. But the inconvenience of this divided authority soon appeared; no one being pre-eminent enough to stifle the disputes that arose in the council, and threatened to produce civil war in the country. Ximenes, therefore, begged them to reconsider their opinion, and appoint some one personage to be governor of the state and guardian of the queen. Such was the mutual

hatred of the nobles, that the council could never have agreed in the choice of one of these: the supreme office was therefore conferred on Ximenes, together with a pension and guard. The latter honour he refused. The authority he professed himself willing to accept; but warned the council to reflect while it was yet in their power; for that, once chosen, he would admit of no opposition, but would show himself most severe against the froward or the violent. Several were staggered by this declaration; but it was too late to gainsay the choice.

Ximenes, thus possessed of the sovereign authority, resolved to wield it with effect. Accordingly, his first step was to summon to him Vianella, a Venetian officer in the service of Castile, whom, as a stranger, he might more safely trust. To him he gave funds, and orders to raise a band of tried soldiers or guards. These he caused to be disciplined, and formed into what Gomez not improperly calls "a prætorian cohort," charged with the guard of the palace and the queen's person. But Ximenes himself went escorted by them, as often as he deemed it necessary. He gathered arms, increased his standing force, and gave the command to don Alonso de Cardenas, who, as commandatory of the order of Calatrava, was necessarily attached to the church of the archbishop. These determined measures of Ximenes were at the outset little successful: they secured him and the queen from immediate violence; but the nobles were too powerful to be thus put down; and Ximenes was so embarrassed in various ways, as to find it impossible to carry on the administration. He endeavoured, at first, to make use of queen Joanna, especially in the nomination to vacant prelacies,—an act of prerogative which the nobles and the council did not think Ximenes qualified to exercise. Joanna could not be brought to act or interfere; and Ximenes was obliged to have recourse to Ferdinand. He wrote to that monarch, urging his return, and entreating his aid in the government of Castile. This threw the anti-

Aragonese nobles into a ferment; for Ximenes had been chosen for his impartiality; and troubles and insurrections arose, in consequence, throughout the peninsula. Some severe proceedings of the inquisition served as pretexts to excite the populace of several towns; and the most serious tumults arose at Seville and Toledo. The several grandees, imitating Ximenes, armed and raised followers, under pretence of preserving the public peace.* The duke of Najara on one side, the constable and the archbishop on the other, drew out their forces, and were near coming to action in the town where queen Joanna had been but lately confined. A new bishop arriving from Italy with offers from Ferdinand to his enemies, increased the confusion; and, able as Ximenes was, it yet must be allowed that his first attempts at governing produced a perfect chaos.

King Ferdinand, having arranged the affairs of Naples, and made peace with France, — a peace cemented by a new marriage, — at length relanded in Spain, in August, 1507. On his entering Aragon, all parties, even his enemies, hastened to his presence, weary of dissension, and despairing of resistance. Ferdinand did not show himself vindictive, and merely uttered some few piquant words. "How could you have preferred the service of the archduke Philip to mine?" asked he of one noble. "Who would have thought that an aged monarch like your majesty would have outlived a young prince like him?" was the apt reply. Ferdinand brought with him from Italy a cardinal's hat for Ximenes, as the reward or the price of his adhesion; and, at the same time, the office of grand inquisitor in Spain was conferred upon him by the pope.

Although the nobles of Castile had momentarily submitted to Ferdinand, those of Andalusia remained still turbulent. The inquisition had occasioned serious troubles at Cordova: its system of torturing those sus-

* The marquis de Villena told Ximenes, that formerly he looked up to him as a mediator and a man of peace; but that since he saw him surrounded by soldiers, he hated and would treat him as a grandee.

pected of heresy had drawn forth random accusations against the chief nobility of the town (*e nobilitate urbana*); and these, in consequence, had joined the people in their revolt. The marquis of Priego, nephew of Gonsalvo de Cordova, the great captain, was the most conspicuous of these malcontents. Ferdinand, whose aim and maxim was to humble the nobles, resolved to make an example of Priego; and Ximenes, who sympathised heartily with the monarch's feelings, and in his hatred to the nobles, urged him to severity. The archbishop had even raised a little army at his own expense, for the purpose of reducing Cordova*, so eager was he and so fond of supporting authority by arms. The marquis deprecated the king's wrath; his uncle Gonsalvo pleaded his own service; and finding Ferdinand inexorable, he sought Ximenes. But the prelate was equally peremptory; and said that fair and submissive words were idle, unless the marquis delivered up also his towns and fortresses. Priego did so; the great captain sending, at the same time, a petition, containing a register of the family possessions; to which was added—"These were earned by the valour of our ancestors; this property was bought by their blood: for their sake spare the family, since I may not plead my own services." Ferdinand persisted in exiling the marquis of Priego, and confiscating his lands,—a severity that rendered both Gonsalvo and the nobles indignant, and proved a great cause of their future disaffection.

The return of Ferdinand in the mean time released Ximenes from his political cares. That monarch felt by no means the same love and need of him that Isabella had experienced. He honoured him, indeed, and listened to his advice; but he was not sorry to see the prelate engaged in tasks that diverted him from interfering with government. It was partly with this view that, in a little time, he intrusted Ximenes with full powers, and forces and funds, for carrying war into

* Mariana.

Africa. Ere this was undertaken, the first use that Ximenes made of his liberty and leisure was to fly to his beloved Alcala, whose university was his uppermost thought. Its buildings were now finished, and ready for the reception of students and professors: he immediately peopled it with the most celebrated professors from Salamanca, from Paris, and the rest of Europe. He endowed all richly, with honours and benefices; appointing the king of Spain and the archbishop of Toledo to be perpetual protectors of his university. He employed himself in arranging its course of study, its administration, its ceremonies. It was governed by a rector chosen annually, and a chancellor, whose office was perpetual: Lerma, a Parisian doctor, was first appointed by Ximenes to the latter office.*

Some years after this, king Ferdinand visited the university at Alcala, and was received with great splendour by Ximenes, whom, at the time, the crafty king wished to conciliate. His coming was a flattering compliment; his conduct was no less so. When the college mace-bearers advanced, the regal attendants called to them to lower their maces. Ferdinand, hearing them, immediately reversed the order, and commanded his own ensigns to be lowered to the superior sovereignty of learning. Ferdinand, at the same time, took the liberty of criticising the rather perishable materials of which much of the university was built, saying, that they little accorded with the immortal conception and aim of the establishment. "So is it, O king," replied Ximenes; "but thus does it behove man to labour, who is in continual expectation of death: but my power of prophecy is false, if I be not yet able to cover these walls of earth and stone with marble."

The royal visit, however, did not conclude without

* Gomez, the biographer of Ximenes, executed his task at the request of the university of Alcala, to which he belonged; and he has devoted a considerable portion of his work to an account of the establishment, and of its lectures and course of study; forming a very interesting volume to those curious in academical history.

disturbance. It was arranged that the rector of the university should, in a solemn assembly, set forth to the king the studies and exercises followed in the institution. The rector, being a long-winded orator, had not concluded when evening fell. The royal pages, accordingly, lit torches; and, in the confusion of darkness, these youths of the court thought proper to exercise their wit upon the students: the latter retorted; and, from words, the youngsters soon passed to blows — the pages making use of their torches, and their enemies wielding sticks and throwing stones. The suspicious Ferdinand was in an instant passion, and deemed the affair to be a conspiracy. "These are the effects of lenity," said he to Ximenes; "were these students rigidly and severely ruled, they would not thus show such a flagrant want of respect to the royal person." Fortunately, however, the tumult was allayed. Ximenes excused his scholars, saying, "that even the ant hath its bile," and that study and studious discipline were as little exempt as ambition and worldly affairs from the influence of passion.*

After having modelled and established his university, in 1508, Ximenes turned his ardour towards subduing Africa, and expelling, or forcibly converting to Christianity, its Mohammedan population. Many years back he had attempted to join Spain, Portugal, England, and other powers, in a crusade for the re-conquest of Jerusalem. It grieved him to see small bands of his countrymen become the victors of mighty countries in another hemisphere; when, within a day's sail of Spain, and in sight of her shores, the crescent of the Saracens still raised itself. On this subject Gomez makes an admission as to the character of Ximenes, perfectly true, though singularly made by a churchman of a churchman. "You cannot decide to which his talents were more apt, and his nature more fit—whether for improvement of

* Francis I., when a captive in Spain, visited Alcala, when its founder lay there in his grave. "Your Ximenes," said the monarch, "has done more than I have: for our university of Paris has sprung from the generosity of many kings; whereas here is the work of one prelate.

education, administration, and the arts of peace, or for following the pursuits of war. For my part, when I compare all his actions, I think he was destined to be a conqueror." The fondness of Ximenes for raising troops, and appearing at their head on all occasions, corroborates this, of which the indecorum never seemed to strike either the prelate or his biographer: so satisfied does custom make us with even the grossest incongruity. At that time the armies of the church were always commanded by popes or cardinals. Julius II. and Leo X., when cardinals, both had acted as generalissimos. In those days of mercenary soldiership, few were to be trusted; and the prince himself, who paid the army, was obliged to command it. Ximenes did not shrink from assuming the military character adopted by the pontiffs and prelates of his time.

Vianella, the Venetian officer employed by Ximenes, chiefly prompted him to the African expedition. "The Venetians, from their commercial habits, and their intentness on all things useful to life, were best acquainted with countries, coasts, and harbours." Vianella pointed out to Ximenes the bay of Maçarquivir as the fittest place of disembarkation, and the town of Oran as the most useful conquest to make, on the coast of Africa. The archbishop instantly made the proposal to the king, who merely objected to the expense, his treasure being unable to meet it: whereupon Ximenes offered to lend money for the expedition from his private funds.* A small army, with the requisite number of ships, was accordingly collected at Malaga, and sailed under the command of Fernando of Cordova. It landed in the appointed bay, established a garrison in a neighbouring fort, but made at that time no further progress; being driven back in an attempt to approach Oran. The check provoked Ximenes to undertake a more serious expedition, to be led and superintended by himself. This

* "Ad id se pecuniam mutuaturum obtulit. Est namque uti nosti, Crasso Romano pecuniosior, quia thesauris cogendis inhiavent."—*Peter Martyr*, Epist.

resolution, as soon as it was known in Spain, gave rise to some criticisms and cavils. Ximenes was blamed for martial propensities unbecoming his station,—Ferdinand for favouring such schemes from jealousy and cunning. "Gonsalvo, the great captain," said the people, "is left in retirement to tell his beads at Valladolid, whilst the archbishop of Toledo undertakes the command of armies."

Heedless of censure, Ximenes bent his whole exertion towards the new expedition, which was prepared at Malaga. He had an infinity of difficulties to surmount. His own funds no longer sufficed; and, though he claimed from the church the old tribute paid for expelling the Moors, he found little readiness or obedience in paying it. Then Ferdinand himself grew suspicious or lukewarm; and Peter of Navarre, the general commanding under Ximenes, began to intrigue, to attach the mercenaries to himself and to attempt to alter the aim and plan of the expedition. Ximenes had stipulated that his own treasurer should pay the army, by which the general was deprived of the gain of the money passing through his hands. Peter of Navarre, in consequence, produced a kind of mutiny amongst the troops; and one of its unpleasant consequences was a quarrel between Vianella and another officer, in which the former received a desperate wound. By a distribution of pay, however, and fair promises, the soldiers were brought back to their duty; and at length the expedition sailed, about the middle of May, 1509. It consisted of from eighty to ninety sail, of which ten were large galleys, and of 14,000 soldiers. Ximenes reached the African shore in safety, and disembarked his army, in spite of fresh proofs of treachery on the part of Peter of Navarre. On the next day he led out his force against the Moors,—a religious procession leading the way; Fernando, a gigantic monk, bearing the huge silver crucifix of Toledo, with a sword slung over his monk's habit. The other ecclesiastics imitated him, to the great edification of the soldiers, according to Gomez and Flechier; but exciting

their raillery and mirth, according to Mariana. After a short march, Ximenes abandoned the generalship to Peter of Navarre, and retired to pray. Here, however, he was disturbed by the tidings that Navarre, after a short combat, had called off the troops. Ximenes countermanded this, and bade the assault to be renewed. The Spaniards obeyed the ardour of their archbishop rather than the caution of their general; and the town of Oran, the object of the expedition, was straightforth carried by storm. From 5000 to 8000 Moors perished, and the booty was immense. Ximenes took pleasure in ordering his new conquest, in dedicating the mosques to different saints, and in converting such Jews and Pagans as seemed willing to conform. In order to pursue the work of conversion, he appointed an inquisitor,—the worst method that he could have adopted for ensuring African conquest. Its effects were seen in the massacre of such Christians as inhabited the neighbouring Moorish towns.

Ximenes, though conqueror of Oran, had, in the mean time, little authority over his own army. He was exact in the payment of the troops, but little lavish of booty, or indulgent of licence. They preferred the command of one of their own freebooting captains to that of a hooded monk. Navarre shared these discontents; and, on all occasions, showed jealousy of, and opposition to, the cardinal. The latter had soon the means of learning that this frowardness of Peter of Navarre was not unsupported by king Ferdinand. He intercepted a letter from that monarch to the general, ordering him "to keep Ximenes from returning as long as was possible; to make him consume his person and purse in the unhealthy climate of Africa; and, with that view, to amuse and employ him in another enterprise." Ximenes, on making this discovery, instantly determined to return to Spain; and, setting sail soon after, landed at Carthagena. Instead of taking the road to court, he bent his steps towards Alcala. The university sent its doctors to congratulate him upon his conquest and his safe return. Balbas, one of them,

could not but take notice of his sallow and wasted looks. "My strength, Balbas," said Ximenes, "is of the mind; I tell you, that, had I had an army on which I might depend, not only Oran, but the proudest cities of Africa, should have owned this wasted and lean body as their conqueror." He brought back a considerable quantity of spoil and trophies to Alcala, which he entered in triumph: he was preceded by captive Moors, camels bearing gold and silver, Arabic volumes on astrology and physic (he scorned all others) to adorn his college library, the keys of Oran, the candlesticks of the mosques, and the red Moorish standards with their azure crescents.

The plans of Ximenes, with respect to his conquest, were, to people the town with a Spanish colony, and to garrison it with a military order similar to that of St. John of Jerusalem, which held Rhodes. Ferdinand, however, was too jealous of those orders to hearken to the latter proposition; and divers other causes and signs of difference arose between him and Ximenes. The first dispute was about the expenses of the expedition, which the cardinal had paid, on the king's promise of refunding them: but this Ferdinand now declined doing. Ximenes urged, that Oran ought to be given to him as his property, or as that of the archbishops of Toledo; and many of the courtiers advised the king to accede to this — arguing that an extensive conquest attached to the too powerful prelacy, would waste and distress Ximenes and his successors. Ferdinand, however, disliked this even worse than the alternative of paying; and still insisted that Ximenes and his soldiers had paid themselves sufficiently with the spoil of Oran. This was denied. Royal commissioners were sent to examine the prelate's furniture, — a great indignity; and, still more to hurt Ximenes, all those who had taken part in the expedition were forced to give back one fifth of their plunder. The Spanish grandees, equally hating the king and the cardinal, who had united to crush them,

were delighted at their dissension, which they stirred up and fanned to the utmost of their power.

Another cause of disquiet and contention was raised, at the same time, against the cardinal. A certain ecclesiastic had obtained, at Rome, the titular dignity of *Episcopus Aurensis*, or bishop of some indefinite place, *in partibus infidelium*. He now construed his bishoprick to be that of Oran, and claimed it from Ximenes. The latter protested, and even offered an abbacy to satisfy the claimant, but the titular bishop persisted in litigating the point, conscious of the support of Ferdinand.

Peter of Navarre had, in the mean time, extended his conquests,—taken Bugia and Tripoli; but, having sailed with the view of exploring the African coast eastward, a part of his troops, whom he sent ashore, were surprised and cut off by the Arabs. Amongst those who perished was don Garsias de Toledo, son of the duke of Alva, which rendered the defeat more signal and regretted. In 1511, Ferdinand collected a fleet, and prepared an expedition, nominally against Africa; he called together the cortes of Aragon, in order to have their support, and summoned Ximenes to Seville, that he might take advantage of his counsels in the new expedition. Ferdinand, however, had other views than the invasion of Africa. The successes of the French in humbling Venice had called forth the jealousy of pope Julius; and that pontiff now laboured to turn the members of the confederacy against the French. The king of Spain joined in this league, and found an apt pretext in taking arms for the church, against which Louis XII. had not only raised armies, but had convened a council at Pisa. Ximenes, ever an ardent supporter of the church, and personally attached to Julius, approved and gave his aid to the monarch's view: and that his aid was of importance, is proved by the solicitations of Ferdinand, still preserved in his letters, craving of Ximenes, not long after he had been at Seville, to come and attend the assembly at Burgos also. Ximenes pleaded illness; but, as soon as

his strength permitted, hastened to obey the injunction of his sovereign. Ferdinand had some difficulty in persuading the Castilian representatives that the new war was a sacred and a just one, undertaken from no crooked views of interest or intrigue. The support of Ximenes enabled him to persuade the assembly of this; whilst envoys, with submissive messages from the Moorish potentates, gave afterwards a manifest excuse for altering the aim of the expedition from Africa to Italy.

Ferdinand had an object of temptation nearer home, to bring him into the alliance of the pope against France: this was the opposition of the king of Navarre to Julius, and his consequent excommunication by the pontiff. The Spanish king, accordingly, first turned his forces against Navarre, and dispossessed John d'Albret of these paternal dominions, which his family have never since recovered. Soon after this last of the many and happy conquests of Ferdinand, that king was seized with the distemper under which he never after ceased to pine. A potion, intended to convey strength, proved so over-exciting, that he never recovered the languor it occasioned. The courtiers, and Ximenes himself, used their exertions to dispel his melancholy: a tournament was prepared at Valladolid, in which don Alphonso de Cordova, marquis of Coruña, both bore away the palm and incurred the expense. He had espoused, a little time previous, the favourite niece of Ximenes; the cardinal indemnified him for his expenses, not without rebuking his extravagance. Historians are amazed to find the austere Ximenes presiding at a tournament.

About this time occurred a circumstance which gave signal proof of the wisdom of that prelate. Leo X., who had not long ascended the papal throne, sent forth his bulls of indulgence, to be sold to defray the expenses of St. Peter's: Ximenes would allow none of them to be disposed of in Spain. Another order of that pope, however, he applied himself to execute with scrupulous zeal: it was that which lessened the number of years and lectures bestowed in colleges upon profane studies, to

the exclusion of theology. Ferdinand, in the mean time, journeyed from place to place in search of variety and health; and it was upon this occasion that he paid the visit to the university of Alcala, that has been before narrated. In these last lingering years of Ferdinand's life, Ximenes seems to have avoided his presence, and the weight of affairs, as much as possible; flying to Alcala or to Granada, in the execution of his inquisitorial duties. Ferdinand, on his side, seemed to place trust in none save Ximenes; and never ceased to summon him by letter when absent, and to repose on his counsel when present.

The Spanish king in vain endeavoured, by continual change of place, to avoid the death that now closely pressed him. At length, he was taken so ill at the village of Madrigalejo, on the confines of Portugal, that his attendants ceased to entertain hopes. He himself, however, still hoped; till the solemn voice of his physician advised recourse to the last religious duties of the Christian, as well as to the care of those necessary arrangements for leaving some kind of government behind him in the absence of his heir. Ferdinand the Catholic had never liked his Flemish grandson, Charles; every thing Flemish being odious to him, from the recollection of Philip: his second grandson, Ferdinand, born and educated in Spain, was his favourite; and him the monarch had appointed regent; he had also given him the commandery of the three great military orders. Now, however, his counsellors surrounded the bed of the dying monarch; and, representing the danger of thus sowing dissension between the brothers, persuaded him to draw up another testament. He did so, leaving Charles the entire government; he wished to reserve the military orders for Ferdinand. But this was considered as equally perilous and productive of quarrel, and, in consequence, abandoned by the king. Charles was appointed the sole inheritor of his authority and realms. But who was to be the governor and vicegerent in the absence of the heir?

Some one proposed Ximenes. "Know you not," said the dying monarch, "the austere humour of that man; his incapacity of yielding, and his stubborn will, that carries every thing to extremes?" Here he paused, and thus continued: "Still he is an honest man, with right intentions, incapable of either doing or suffering injustice; without family or party of high relatives; the public good his sole aim. Besides, as he owes his elevation entirely to queen Isabella and me, he cannot but in gratitude honour our memory and follow our maxims." Having, in pursuance of this opinion, left Ximenes as vicegerent during the absence of Charles, Ferdinand expired in the month of February, 1516.

Ximenes heard the tidings of his elevation with all the appearances of sorrow. Certainly he had not sought or intrigued for the promotion; but, as the task had fallen upon him, he undertook it at once with courage and firmness. It was his fate to pass from the exercise of power to the leisure of retirement and reflection. His pious principles told him that he ought to prefer the latter; but his active character and ambition always declared themselves, in spite of these monkish views, by the fresh ardour with which he re-entered the path of administration and public life. Some time previous to the late king's demise, Charles had sent Adrian of Utrecht, his former preceptor, and now dean of Louvain, to Spain as his representative. This personage now claimed the regency, showing Charles's missive to that effect; but Ximenes at once resisted the appointment as illegal,—offering, however, by way of conciliation, to Adrian, to share the authority with him. The latter agreed: he could not but see the necessity of a colleague more firm and versed in Spanish affairs than himself, when he beheld the difficulties and dangers that arose.

Ferdinand, brother of Charles, had been taught to expect the regency by the first will of his grandfather; he even took steps to assert and assume this right:

and the authority of Ximenes seemed alone capable of commanding his acquiescence. At the very outset, dissensions arose in the council. Charles had sent orders that he should be proclaimed king. His mother, queen Jeanne, was still living, though in a state of imbecility; and some objected to the irregularity of the crown descending to her son whilst she yet lived. In this dispute Ximenes took, as he had always done, the side of royalty against the nobles, whom he perceived to dissent for the sake of exciting troubles. He therefore caused Charles to be proclaimed king in the streets of Madrid,—the town which the cardinal chose as the capital of united Spain,—fixing there the seat of government and of the council.

The first attempt of the nobles was to separate from the king the commanderies of the great orders of knighthood, which Ferdinand, by a stroke of his wise policy, had united in his person. Gonsalez, the great captain, had entertained this scheme on seeing the late king's death approach; but his own death cut short his attempt. Don Pedro Portocarrero now took up the project of restoring to the orders the right of electing their chief. Ximenes sent one of his apparitors, or civil officers, to menace Portocarrero, and arrest him if necessary; and the nobles, aware that the cardinal supported all his measures by force, thought proper to desist.

Another of the nobility, don Pedro Giron, next stirred up a tumult, claiming to inherit the possessions of the duke of Medina-Sidonia. He asserted his right by arms, raised troops, and laid siege to San Lucar. Ximenes wrote instantly to the magistrates of Seville and Cordova to march part of their militia to defend the menaced towns; and ordered Fonseca to march with the "old troops," or paid army, against the young noble, whose partisans instantly abandoned him, fearing to face the troops and anger of the regent.

Despatches, in the mean time, informed Charles of the elevation of Ximenes, and of his conduct in disregarding

the claim of Adrian. The young prince had the good sense either not to entertain, or not to show, resentment. Adrian, by his acquiescence, had shown himself made for the second rank; and the services of Ximenes in having proclaimed Charles king, with his success in confounding the machinations of the grandees, spoke too loudly in favour of his influence and talents, for Charles to despise or set them aside. He therefore confirmed, for the present, the appointment of Ximenes.

The noblesse continued in their discontent and cabals. Giron came to brave the cardinal in Madrid; but the minister, contemning his youth, took no notice of his presence or absence; and this slight was considered the bitterest of insults. Giron united with all the enemies of Ximenes, — with his uncle, the constable of Castile; with Albuquerque, Medina-Cœli, and other grandees. They met at the country mansion of the duke of Infantado, who received and entertained them with all the pomp and prodigality of the house of Mendoza. The cabal despatched Alvar Gomez to Charles, to supplicate the removal of Ximenes. The nobles themselves resolved to wait upon that prelate, and demand the powers by which he ruled Castile and Aragon. Ximenes, aware of their intentions, was prepared for their reception. Two thousand well-armed troops were drawn out within view of the palace windows; whilst stores of money, the sinews to support or strengthen such force, were visible within. When pressed for his credentials by the grandees, who affected to disregard Charles's mere letter of approval, Ximenes pointed to his troops and resources, exclaiming, "These are the full powers that the catholic king has given me. With them I govern Spain, and shall continue to do so, till the monarch, *our* master, shall come himself to exercise his authority." *

* Gomez, after relating this story, adds, "But as I find nothing of all this in the letters, in which the intrigues and demands of the nobles are mentioned, I conclude that it is merely a common report, made up in imitation of a similar reply made by Scipio in Spain, as Roman writers have recorded."

Feeling himself not fully and frankly supported by Charles, whose confirmation of his power was informal, and conveyed merely by familiar letters, and at the same time pressed by the hatred and machinations of the nobility, Ximenes conceived a plan of resisting and humbling them, which is certainly his most important act of statesmanship. The cardinal's plan was the same in principle with that followed by the English nobles and French monarchs to humble the power most dreaded by them: it was, to call the middle or burgess class to his support. The mode of applying this principle, and acting upon it, was different in the three countries. In England, the citizens were called to their just and natural functions,— to aid the state with money, which they were to grant in assembly; thus securing the germ at least of legislative power. It was the nobles who effected this; for they wanted the *moral* aid and countenance of the middle class against the crown. In Spain, on the contrary, the executive wanted a physical armed force, to counterbalance the nobles and their followers; and Ximenes, instead of calling the citizens to a general council, besought them to arm, and muster, and acquire discipline.

The cardinal had tried mercenary troops; and had experienced, in his African expedition, how little dependence was to be placed upon them or their officers. "The collection of common vagabonds in armies," he said, "after the ancient manner, was a source of weakness rather than strength. They were fit merely to pillage the people, and drain the state. But if in every city certain citizens would enrol and equip themselves,— men who had wives, and property, and character,— then, indeed, there would be a force in Spain such as the domestic and foreign enemy might both shrink from." The suspicious Ferdinand would never hearken to this scheme of Ximenes. He now proposed it by letter to Charles; but without awaiting his approbation, the minister at once set about realising it. He issued an edict, addressed to the several cities, offering divers im-

munities and exemptions to those who voluntarily enrolled themselves. The officers were to be paid, and all the incidental expenses defrayed. The offer was grasped with delight by the greater part of Spanish citizens. "They saw the road to nobility laid open to them by this means," is the emphatic expression of Gomez. Thirty thousand citizen soldiers were enrolled in a short time, equipped, and employed in martial exercises. Ximenes took the greatest delight in these parades and manœuvres, and was fond of attending them. He could not, however, bring the nobles, even those who were his adherents, to relish this pastime. Walking outside the Moor's Gate at Madrid with the duke of Ascalon, to witness these reviews, the duke observed that this martial fury, this smoke and thunder of artillery, might prove in a little time troublesome and pernicious. "To me," exclaimed Ximenes, "this sulphurous smoke is more delightful than the most precious perfumes of Arabia." The grandees persisted in criticising this new and unfeudal species of army, which, they said, would throw back the towns of Spain into rudeness and barbarism. Then it offended grievously their pride to see "artisans desert their workshops for military exercises."

Although the project of Ximenes for arming the Spanish citizens was welcomed and adopted with eagerness by the greater number of towns, still there were some who detested the cardinal, or were influenced to resist his wishes. This opposition came chiefly from the towns of Old Castile, — a province in which aristocratic influence was of older and deeper root than in New Castile. Valladolid and Burgos were the principal cities that showed their aversion. The former had been the residence of the court in old times: Burgos also bore the name, and deemed itself entitled to the honours, of a capital. Ximenes, by transferring the seat of government to Madrid, necessarily incurred the enmity of these towns. Moreover, their municipal government was essentially aristocratic. Valladolid was almost altogether under the

influence of the admiral of Castile, and under that of its senate, presided by a bishop of the house of Roxa. This city, in obedience to the suggestions of the nobles, resisted Ximenes; imprisoned his officer; formed an alliance with Burgos, Salamanca, and other towns; and raised an army, such as the cardinal regent could not for the moment hope to subdue. The rebellion was only against Ximenes: the cities professed complete obedience to the king, and promised acquiescence in whatever Charles should declare to be his will. The nobles prompted this conduct, hoping to prevail at the Flemish court; but the letters and envoys of Ximenes proved more persuasive and influential than theirs; and Charles, convinced that his minister was but struggling in behalf of the royal authority, sanctioned his measures, and confirmed his power.

The factions in Old Castile found themselves unable to resist this declaration. The only pretext by which the nobles had won upon the commoners was taken away: the aristocratic party succumbed, and the refractory towns submitted to Ximenes. That minister refrained from inflicting any punishment or taking any vengeance upon the citizens, who had merely mistaken their true interests. In order, however, to curb and counteract the influence of the aristocracy, Ximenes appointed four popular magistrates, not unlike the tribunes of the people at Rome, who should be present in the assembly of the senate, to forbid whatever measures were contrary to the interests of the republic or of the king. If not listened to, they were to report the business instantly to the monarch.*

In the midst of these internal cares, Ximenes did not neglect the defence of the kingdom against the infidels.

* This bold approach to democracy, made by so imperious a monarchist as Ximenes, is of course represented by his ecclesiastical biographers as a concession to please the people, rather than, what it really was, a politic attempt to curb the nobles.

"Ximenius, ut illis gratificaretur, concessit ut populus Pintianus publicos quosdam procuratores haberet, qui quoties senatus cogeretur adessent; et ne quid adversus regis aut reipublicæ emolumentum à senatoribus fieret, vetarent: quòd si persisterent, illico regem admonerent." — *Gomecius.*

The famous corsair, Barbarossa, was then scouring the seas. The cardinal fitted out twenty new galleys, equipped and manned them. In the first expedition of this little fleet, it met some Turkish ships near Alicant, sank several, and made the rest captive.

The affairs of the Indies next attracted the attention of Ximenes. Don Diego Columbus, son of the great navigator, had been recalled, and was now at Madrid, demanding to be restored to the government of his father's discoveries. The cardinal sent out commissioners to Hispaniola to examine into the case and the facts alleged. He also charged them to examine and improve the condition of the natives, reduced to slavery as they were. But at this very period the Flemish court of Charles permitted a measure, without the knowledge of Ximenes, calculated to far more than counteract his humane interference in favour of the Indians, and which has proved the source of more misery and cruelty than any ill that ever befell human nature. The planters of the sugar-cane complained that the island natives were too indolent and weak for the labour required. They therefore begged permission of the council of Charles to transport to the islands "four hundred of those African slaves which the Portuguese were in the habit of bringing into Spain." The Flemish statesmen saw no objection, and granted the permission, which Ximenes failed not to deprecate as soon as he learned it; foreseeing the obvious evils likely to flow from so infamous a traffic.

John d'Albret thought the minority and absence of Charles a good opportunity for recovering Navarre, which Ferdinand had conquered from him. Ximenes, however, was no less vigilant than that monarch. His troops under Ferdinand Villalon occupied the passes of the Pyrenees; and in spite of the relations of D'Albret with the nobles, and with the constable of Navarre, he was defeated, and unable even to penetrate into the kingdom. The cardinal, in order to secure the conquest,

demolished all the fortresses of Navarre, except that of Pampeluna, which he strengthened and garrisoned.*

Scarcely was this province secured, when the town of Malaga rebelled; vexed by the pernicious privileges of the admiral of Castile, who had the right of jurisdiction over sea-ports and mariners. The admiral, unable to support his own authority, applied to Ximenes, although his political enemy, to restore him to his rights. The cardinal, from a sense of justice, and a wish to show that those nobles who trusted to the aid of government in preference to taking arms should receive protection, summoned the people of Malaga to submit to the demands of the admiral. On this the citizens, with the turbulent freedom of the day, appealed to the king's judgment, and sent deputies to Flanders, no doubt well provided with presents, which obtained them a favourable answer. Ximenes took no account of this proceeding, except to order the militia of Granada to march against the refractory town. This was the first occasion on which he employed his civic guard or levy; and he did so, perhaps, to mark its submissive spirit, in marching to suppress the sedition of other citizens. Cueva, at the head of this force, marched to Malaga, and the inhabitants submitted. Ximenes granted them an amnesty, excepting five of the ringleaders, who were capitally punished.

The claims of the queen-dowager, Germaine, last wife of Ferdinand, was the cause of troubles. Ximenes had procured her several towns in appanage, which at first resisted; afterwards their mistress was gained by the intriguing spirit of the nobles, and joined in disturbing the tranquillity of Spain. The cardinal curtailed her revenue and domain. His orders for the treatment of Joanna, the mother of Charles, are still more remarkable for their sagacity. That unfortunate queen, still mourning the death of her husband, could

* In this war we find a celebrated name employed,—that of Gonzales Pizarro, a brave officer, the father of the conqueror of Peru.

not be brought to consult comfort or even cleanliness in her mode of life. She preferred a cellar for her abode, boards for her couch, and dress insufficient to protect her from the rigours of winter. The governor or guardian could not devise any mode of prevailing upon her, or rendering her condition less pitiable. Ximenes himself visited and conversed with her, in order to espy that weak side by which the insane may be managed. In the midst of the gloom and frenzy of Joanna, he perceived that she still preserved her pride, and a sense of her regal condition. Working upon this, the cardinal, appointing another governor and more adroit attendants, directed them to flatter this feeling of Joanna, and to treat her as the queen. He surrounded her with a kind of mock court; and by representing to her the necessity of supporting her dignity before supposed ambassadors and grandees, she was brought to permit her person to be clothed, and her apartments put in order. The most approved treatment of insanity at the present day is but the system that Ximenes thus imagined and put in practice. It may be here remarked, how the traits of Joanna, saving her madness, were preserved in her son, Charles V.; the pride, the gloom, the asceticism, that produced his abandonment of power and of the world, singularly combined with that selfish and worldly cunning which had distinguished his grandfather, Ferdinand.

Amidst all the difficulties of his administration, Ximenes did not lose sight of what might be called his passion, the subjugation of the African Moors. At present, indeed, he was provoked by an adversary worthy of himself, though the name of Barbarossa suggests a different character. But that corsair, or captain, was valiant, enterprising, and a zealot like Ximenes; he roused up the African Mahommedans, in the name of religion and their prophet, to throw off the domination of the Christians. He made himself master of Algiers, infested the coasts of Spain, and deposed the king of Tunis, as an ally of Christians. The Tunisian had recourse to

Ximenes, who promised his aid. A land force and a fleet were collected; the former, however, composed of hasty levies rather than disciplined soldiers. An officer of experience having declined the command on this account, don Diego Vera led the army to Africa. His dispositions were bad. He divided his army; and being repulsed from the walls of Algiers, he was attacked in turn and utterly routed by Barbarossa, who thus took revenge for the conquest of. Oran. Ximenes is much lauded for the constancy with which he supported this reverse. He was engaged in a theological argument, when tidings of it were brought to him. "No great loss," observed he; "Spain is rid of a troop of audacious vagabonds." From this reply, as well as from his choice of such recruits on this occasion, whilst upon others no one took such care to have respectable levies — he acting upon the same system that Cromwell afterwards adopted, that substantial people made the best soldiers, — it is possible that he purposely got rid of those licentious spirits and mercenary soldiers, who were continually at the service of the nobility to create disorders.

These enterprises of the cardinal, together with the alteration which he had made in the administration, necessarily turned his attention to the finances of the state. Of old, the expenses or the burden of a war were borne by the nobility, or by that portion of them which entered into the great military orders. These, in fact, formed the great standing army of the kingdom; and in order to render them efficient, they had been endowed with lands and revenues, enabling each knight to raise a certain number of followers. Ximenes, however, had dispensed with this half feudal, half stipendiary force, in which he found the defects of both systems. He employed either troops wholly dependent on the government and paid by it, or else the citizen militia. But to support this new species of armament, he needed the war-funds, that had been of old given to the orders. He re-demanded them, with more boldness than justice; over-ruling their objections, making light of papal bulls,

and compelling them to give up funds and sources of funds, which they had not employed, as their laws directed, in the entertainment of armed followers. The orders, in fact, having neither war nor force capable of absorbing their revenues, had distributed them in pensions amongst the grandees and men of influence. Ximenes swept all these away into the public treasury, and by this act gave a more signal blow to the grandees than he had done even by reducing them individually to obedience. Had the Spanish aristocracy had the sagacity to preserve the military force of the orders complete and active, they might not have been crushed into mere courtiers, as they were by Charles V. and his son.*

All this hardy innovation and imperious rule of Ximenes, however beneficial to the state or to the monarch's authority, excited, it may well be imagined, the most grievous complaints and remonstrances against him. The Flemish counsellors who governed Charles, especially Chievres, showed from the first a wish to thwart and curb the power of the cardinal, whilst, sensible of the advantage of such a governor, they at the same time forbore to dispense with his services. But all attempts to lessen the authority of Ximenes, short of absolute dismissal, failed. Adrian, who had been at first sent to share his power, sank immediately into a cipher by his side. On one occasion Adrian chanced to intercept a messenger passing between the king of Portugal and the king of France, bearing letters in which an alliance and other projects were darkly hinted. Moved by what appeared to him so unusual and important, he instantly despatched a courier to his colleague, with orders to rouse the cardinal at whatever time of night he might arrive. Ximenes was roused, as it happened, at an untimely hour. But after reading the despatch, he merely sent back a verbal message to Adrian to be tranquil; and composing him-

* Amongst the pensions swept away on this occasion by that great reformer and economist, Ximenes, was that of Peter Martyr. His epistles, which heretofore shed honied praise upon the cardinal and his acts, from this date become vituperative and bitter.

self to sleep, as over an ordinary matter, made light of his colleague's agitation.

As gain seemed to Chievres the only end of power, Ximenes was soon able to compound with that favourite; and when the cardinal's authority was confirmed, it was arranged that Charles himself, that is, his Flemish counsellors, should have the appointment to all rich benefices and bishopricks. By these and other means they succeeded in drawing considerable sums from Spain to Flanders, to the great discontent of the Spaniards, who were hurt at being thus governed like a province of Flanders. Ximenes, as a remedy for their rapacity, urged Charles to visit Spain himself, and as speedily as possible. But Chievres was averse to a voyage that removed his sovereign from Flanders; and peculiarly averse to it, because the prince must necessarily come in contact with Ximenes, whose honest and rude advice might expose the rapacity and ignorance of the Flemings. To prevent Charles altogether from visiting his Spanish dominions, was, however, impossible. It remained to push Ximenes aside, ere he arrived, that there might be some other of equal power, who could give an account of affairs, and serve as a guide to the new king in local matters.* A personage named La Chaux was accordingly sent to be co-regent with Ximenes and Adrian. He had been one of the Flemish favourites of the archduke, Charles's father, and as such necessarily odious to Ximenes. On his arrival in Spain, however, he was received by the cardinal with all distinction, and indulged in every thing save power. The business of government, decrees and orders, went on and were despatched as before. In a few days La Chaux found himself as much a cipher as Adrian. These two, however, resolved on a particular occasion to assert their rights. A circular of some importance was to be despatched to the provinces. Anticipating their imperious colleague, they took and signed it first, and then sent it to Ximenes. Instead, however, of affixing his signature beneath theirs, the cardinal coolly bade the secretary tear the document,

and prepare another, which, when he had signed it alone, was despatched in the usual form.

When this failure of La Chaux was reported at Brussels, Chievres resolved not to relax or recede. Dutch phlegm, he thought, might be brought to cope with Spanish pride. He accordingly selected Amerstorf, a noble of Holland, and sent him to make the third colleague of Ximenes. But Amerstorf met with no more success than his predecessors: a stranger had no support whereon to resist the cardinal, long established and used to power. Charles himself seems rather to have admired than resented the indomitable superiority of his Spanish minister. The Flemish courtiers were, however, trebly indignant, and spoke of the necessity of sending some one of illustrious rank, capable of preserving his independence. The chancellor Sauvage, the count palatine, the emperor Maximilian himself, or young Ferdinand, the king's brother, were amongst those mentioned. Ximenes, informed what counsels were in agitation, conveyed to the court his resolve, no more to share with any colleague the power, that required to be single, in order to be efficient. He demanded even fuller power and jurisdiction than before; in default of receiving which, he declared himself ready to retire into his diocese, and leave the management of the state to whomsoever they might appoint.

This menace alarmed even Chievres, who was fully aware of the critical state of Spain, which was only preserved in obedience by the firmness of Ximenes, and the respect and awe that he inspired. The popular assemblies threatened to come together of their own accord, if their monarch delayed longer to visit the kingdom, or abandoned it to the rapacity of strangers. He therefore wrote instantly to contradict these reports, to allay the suspicions of Ximenes, and to assure him that his removal from power was never contemplated. The same letters conveyed assurances that Charles should soon visit Spain, although the Flemings threw every obstacle in the way of a journey, the result of which they

dreaded. Under pretence, however, of making the necessary preparations, they drew large sums from Ximenes, which were diverted to their own use by the Flemish ministers. On learning this the Spaniards lost all patience; the citizens of the principal towns, more especially of Burgos and Valladolid, had meetings. They demanded and proposed divers extreme measures; such as prohibiting the Flemings from holding places in Spain, the seizure of the host of bills which monthly arrived from Brussels and Antwerp; whilst others proposed to compel Ximenes not to transmit more money without consulting the Spanish cities. In order to enact a legal remedy, however, an assembly of the cortes was loudly called for. The cardinal, who knew the justice of all these complaints, could neither contradict nor repress them. He promised to convene the assembly of the national representatives; but fixed a period so distant, as to allow of the coming of Charles before the time.

The popular impatience being appeased for the time by this promise, Ximenes wrote a most pressing epistle to Charles, which had the effect of determining the young king to visit, without delay, his Spanish kingdom. This letter has been preserved by Gomez; and it is given here at length, as a specimen of the style and sentiments of its celebrated writer.

"Ximenes, Regent, and the Royal Senate, to King Charles. Health.

"For the ancient and loyal fidelity, in which towards your ancestors, and now towards you, we have been bound, it behoves us, as trusty ministers and good citizens, to counsel and admonish what may be best for your service and that of the republic. Great and exalted princes deserve power from God and reverence from man, as long as they govern in justice and wisdom the people committed to them. In order to do this, and support such a weight, they must choose worthy and respectable counsellors and ministers; no one head sufficing to perform the weighty task of government. For

those hundred-handed and fabulous worthies were nothing other than considerate and wise kings, who chose egregious and honest ministers to execute their great behests. Henry III., your ancestor, who, on account of the continued maladies of his youth, was sick and powerless of body, was still not unequal to the royal office, from the excellent counsellors, whom he knew how to select; men eminent in learning, in morals, and religion. He left behind him the character of a great monarch, and an empire pacific and strong. On the contrary, Henry IV., his great uncle, encountered nought but misfortune and disgrace, from the imbecile and impious advisers whom he persisted in keeping about him. But why go so far back for examples? Are not the catholic sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella, sufficient? It was their especial care to choose egregious men for their servants. Moreover, it was their habit, passing over all those of their court, however known and familiar to them, to select such as their own merits or public opinion had celebrated, for great and arduous offices. No one in their days was accused of intrigue, or of the sale of places, so frequent in the present time. Then men rose by degrees from an humble to a respectable station, from a respectable to an illustrious one, tried and matured as they advanced, reward keeping pace with their merits. By this conduct and counsel, having received a state, weakened and distracted by the inexperience and the guilt of predecessors, your grandsire was enabled to transmit it, freed from all these ills. To your majesty the great God has given talents, judgment, and prudence, even in your juvenile years, wherewith to weigh and consider these things. Examine, and you must perceive the imminent destruction of the state, if these warnings be disregarded; its felicity, if they be attended to. All things depend upon their commencement, and evils are then with the greatest facility remedied. Wherefore Spain, suppliant at your feet, demands your coming, that you may repress the avidity of the corrupt, and restore to it tranquillity and content.

This you can with ease effect, if this noble and extensive land, ever most devoted to its princes, be ruled according to its paternal laws and the established custom of our ancestors. Farewell."

This letter seems to have produced the effect intended, and to have awakened Charles to that prudence and independence that marked his future career. His departure for Spain was ordered to take place in the ensuing autumn.*

Ximenes had in the mean time lulled the turbulence of the citizens, by the promise of either the cortes or the king's arrival. One should have thought, that at his present extreme age, and in expectation of the coming of Charles, he might have left small matters to a future arrangement, and been contented with preserving tranquillity. On the contrary, Ximenes never showed himself more punctilious or imperious. There were divers processes in which the grandees were engaged; but as the courts feared to decide between them, they dragged on slowly or remained stationary. Ximenes ordered them to be brought to a conclusion; taking upon him to see the judgment put in force, whatever it might be.

Three of the greatest houses of Castile were those of Mendoza duke of Infantado, Toledo duke of Alva, and Giron count of Ureña. Ximenes did not shrink from an open quarrel with all three, and in each instance the grandee was obliged to succumb. The nobles of Spain had, in fact, lost the power of commanding a military force. [illegible] the regent had provided amply for his support in this respect, both by the town militia and by a stipendiary force. The aristocracy could not stand before him. The quarrel with the duke of Infantado rose out of a purchase which the marquis of Corunna, the relative of Ximenes by marriage, had made of some land belonging to a younger brother of Mendoza. Infantado claimed it. Judgment went against him: but the duke appealed to the Flemish court, and menaced Ximenes. He even sent his chap-

lain, a man with a powerful voice, to heap abuse upon the cardinal. The latter listened to his tirade, and then bade him return to his master, whom he would find ashamed of so rude and undignified an act. The duke himself, in a personal interview with Ximenes soon after, used terms of reproach equally strong; and to these insults, uttered by the grandee himself, the cardinal replied with equal haughtiness. Yet sinking from this tone to one of expostulation, Infantado was so won upon, as to give up his anger and crave a reconciliation.

The difference with the duke of Alva was about the priory of Consuegra, held, in the opinion of Ximenes, without right, by the duke's third son. The latter defended his priory, and put a garrison into it, whilst his father raised troops to enable him to stand a siege. The Flemish colleagues of the cardinal were in terror at the name of Alva, and some of his officers ventured to recommend more prudence than to attack so redoubtable a warrior. But Ximenes bade them lay aside their fears and march. They did so, and Alva and his son were forced to submit.

The family of Giron was by far the most turbulent of the noblesse. The eldest son, don Pedro, had occasioned serious troubles after the death of Ferdinand; pretending to the heritage of Medina Sidonia. Now he was in dispute with a noble named Quixada, for the lordship of Villafrata. The judicial court of Valladolid decided in favour of Quixada; and by the cardinal's desire sent some of its officers to execute the decree. Pedro Giron, with young Alburquerque and others of his age, seized the officers, maltreated, and sent them back in contumely. The militia of Valladolid was instantly armed. The young lords at first abandoned Villafrata, but afterwards occupied it with what force they could collect: and as the citizens were attached to Giron, he resolved to stand a siege. Ximenes, never recoiling, resolved to put them to the

proof. He declared the youths traitors, and with an army summoned Villafrata. For some time it resisted; but seeing the case hopeless, Giron and his companions cut their way out and abandoned the citizens. Ximenes, ere his troops entered Villafrata, ordered the walls to be battered with cannon, and levelled. He then caused some of those who favoured the revolt to be flogged; and, in fine, Giron was obliged to make his submission. In a short time after, hearing that the cardinal was on his bed of death, young Giron broke again into insurrection, and took possession, by force, of the duchy of Medina Sidonia. But notwithstanding his illness, Ximenes gave orders, and marched troops, which once more brought this young grandee to reason.

The Flemish advisers of Charles were well pleased that Ximenes should take upon him the trouble of these necessary and unpopular acts, to some of which they urged him one day, and sent dissuasive and deprecatory letters the next. The most delicate task was the treatment of young Ferdinand, who, urged by the officers around him, began to intrigue for power, and to meditate his escape from what he considered honourable durance. Charles wrote to Ximenes to dismiss all those at present about his brother, and to substitute more trustworthy persons. He directed the regent to prepare Ferdinand's mind for this harshness, and to reconcile him to it by adroitness and address. The letters, however, conveying these orders, were opened by Adrian, and conveyed at once to Ferdinand; and Ximenes, instead of executing the mandate gently and quietly, was obliged to dismiss the prince's household with peremptoriness and even menace. Chievres was in great fear lest Ximenes might be too rude, and lest Ferdinand might escape and raise a tumult in Spain; but the regent's authority smoothed all difficulties; and Charles was assured of finding his brother as submissive as the grandees of the kingdom. The advice of Ximenes was, that Ferdinand should be removed altogether from Spain to Ger-

many, and be provided there with an apanage, which he might govern without giving cause of jealousy or suspicion.

Charles at length landed on the northern coast of Spain, amongst the mountains of the Asturias; whilst Ximenes, borne down by years and exertions, was seized with a slow malady. It came so opportune to the wishes of the Flemings, that many attributed it to poison. The royal cortège advanced slowly from the mountains of the Asturias, the Flemings receiving daily accounts of the state of the cardinal's health; and they retarded or accelerated the journey as they had hopes or fears of his recovery. Their object was, that Charles should never meet Ximenes. That monarch by word and messages showed, indeed, every respect towards the aged minister; but he was then, and all his life, much more under the influence of those around him, than historians are accustomed to represent or admit. When Ximenes bore up under his malady better and longer than the Flemings expected, they persuaded Charles to pass into Aragon before he visited Castile. The cardinal protested against this; and, unable to reach the royal ear, he at least transmitted necessary advice to the young monarch, who was ignorant of the habits and character of his Spanish subjects, recommending him to receive the grandees with affability, to beware of profusion, and to occupy the nation with the project of an African war.*

Ximenes during this time was at Aranda on the Duero, but as winter approached he moved southward to Roa, on the road to Toledo, where he hoped to meet Charles. But that monarch first went to Tordesillas to visit his mother, Joanna, giving orders for his reception, and for the assembly of the states, at Valladolid. The cardinal had never been popular at this town. He deprecated altogether the assembling of the cortes so soon; and recommended Toledo as a place of meeting far more pacific, quiet, and loyal than Valladolid. But the Flemings loved the enemies of Ximenes, and preferred the latter town. Four officers of that country marked out the different

residences of the court, and purposely assigned the house which had been fixed on for the cardinal, to the queen-dowager. Accommodation for his servants they assigned in the suburbs. Ximenes felt this insult, and loudly complained, that in the days of Ferdinand and Philip he had never met with these indignities. The Flemings took advantage to aggravate these complaints, and to represent Ximenes as a disappointed and peevish old man, whose presence would but shed gloom and disorder on the court. The bishop of Badajos proposed that the cardinal should be ordered to remain at Toledo, and not to bring his haughtiness and ill humour to Valladolid. Charles was persuaded to gratify his courtiers by adopting this advice; and accordingly wrote to Ximenes, that he himself was about to depart for Tordesillas, and begged the cardinal to meet him at Moiados, which was on the road, in order to receive his advice and information respecting public and family affairs; that after this interview the king was determined to give his minister repose from his labours, which had been so great and praiseworthy, that God alone could sufficiently reward them;—that to God and to heaven, in consequence, Ximenes was henceforth to look for that reward, and to seek it in retirement;—finally, that he (Charles) would be ever mindful of his services, and honour his memory as that of a parent.

This letter of dismissal—it could be considered in no other light— acted as a death-blow to Ximenes; although some deny his reception of it till his disease had assumed a fatal aspect. Whatever was the case, Ximenes, displaying on his death-bed the same piety which had marked his life, expired, in the 81st year of his age, in November, 1517. He was buried in his beloved university of Alcala, amidst the tears of its professors. His tomb was opened a considerable time after; and it was said, that none of the common marks of division were discernible in his skull. He was tall and pale, grave in aspect, with small sunken eyes, full of fire, and surmounted by an ample forehead. The Spaniards were made to feel their

loss, when De Croy, a Flemish ecclesiastic, was appointed his successor in the archiepiscopal see of Toledo.

It is, indeed, a rare circumstance to see the same individual canonised as the saint in legends, and immortalised by history as a statesman. Piety, as a principle of public conduct, is so apt to be perverted by human passions into the ensign of tyranny or the cloak of ambition, that there is no crime of which well-meaning superstition may not and has not been guilty. Ximenes, however, was fortunate in the epoch and scene of his life and labours. There was in Spain as yet no court, that great corruptress of churchmen. Life was then rude, simple, and aboriginal. The monk converted into a royal confessor, and thence into an archbishop, still remained a monk,—a thing at the court of France, for instance, impossible. This allowed his talents to rise by another path than that of intrigue, and left — by a rare accident — his honesty to attend upon his fortunes. Ximenes had little to do with foreign policy, that trying and difficult task to a minister's sagacity, in which Amboise failed, and Wolsey showed but his venality. No one, however, was better fitted for that which he undertook — the internal administration of a troubled and aristocratic kingdom. Girt with his sanctity, as with a royal mantle, Ximenes encountered the pride of the grandee with that of the churchman; and where sceptre and sword might have proved inefficient, he swayed the realm, as he himself said, with the cord of St. Francis.

But the great stamp and proof of a superior mind in him appeared in this,—that, devout as he was, even to asceticism, he never depended upon supernatural aid or superstition for success. Prudence, activity, and economy, the force of men and money; such were the arms that he employed. If he was a monk in his chamber, he was a minister in his cabinet, pursuing in each different paths to different objects; here seeking heaven in prayer and mortification, there attaining human ends by human means. His public life was thus at variance with his original profession. Those who knew him, said

that he was born to be a warrior; and he himself confessed his delight in martial sights and sounds. He was pugnacious, inflexible, and if not born to conquer by the sword, he was at least formed to command by his aspect, for the proudest quailed before him.

His excellence as a governor consisted in his personal character more than in his views. He was an administrator rather than a statesman. His elevation of the middle classes by granting them arms, at the same time that he was jealous of their assemblies, was short-sighted. It completed, indeed, Ferdinand's task of humbling the nobles; but it also laid the foundation of that trouble and rebellion which afterwards broke forth, and which produced for its immediate result the destruction of Spanish liberty, and for its remote one the despotism and imbecility of the Spanish crown.* But it would be unjust to censure Ximenes for not seeing with the wisdom of a future day. His task was set clear before him; and never did minister perform it with more firmness, sagacity, and success.

Ximenes has been fortunate in biographers. None dare breathe aught but panegyric of the sainted cardinal; and we are thus left in ignorance of those failings, of which, in common with all men, he must have had his share. Benignity, indeed, we scarcely look for in him—his virtues were too austere for this soft quality. Yet his love and protection of learning forms a mild and pleasing light amidst the sombre shades of his character. He bequeathed all his wealth to the university of Alcala; thus crowning by his last act a life of munificence towards that establishment.

* The Spanish insurrection of the *communeros* was premature. In no country was the resistance of the lower and middle classes against the monarch and privileged orders attended with success, unless when all the lower and middle classes were united in a common bond of feeling. In Spain, as in France, the citizens attempted to recover their freedom without the aid of the peasant, who still remained feudally attached and enslaved: and hence the citizens succumbed; the agricultural population forming the true physical and martial force of a country. In England, fortunately, the great struggle was delayed until reformed religious principle formed a link to unite townsman and peasant together, breaking the bonds which tied the latter to his lord. To this union we owe our liberties: to the want of it, in 1520, Spain owes the loss of hers.

Cardinal Ximenes, in short, must ever occupy a prominent place amongst the great men of modern Europe. His name is sufficient to rescue the name of monk from the opprobrium and ridicule which it too often, with reason, excited.

LEO THE TENTH

1475—1521.

Of the different classes of society which history presents as in their turns predominant in the government of a state, the most adroit and prudent is a commercial aristocracy. Venice might be cited. Florence furnishes another example. In the latter city, the nobility of ancient blood, not being able to accommodate their habits and sentiments to a republic, were exiled or extirpated. The notables (if we may adopt that term) of commerce succeeded to their influence; and, as is natural, the aristocracy of wealth stepped into the place which that of birth had been compelled to vacate. In a very little time the new patriciate was found to be as inimical to liberty as the old, and far more dangerous. Wanting the daring violence of the old feudal noble, the citizen aristocrat supplied force by cunning, covered usurpation with the show and the form of liberty, and at length succeeded in making his ledger a symbol as potent and despotic as the sceptre or the sword.

Such is the history of the Medici; a respectable family, of plebeian origin, chiefs of the *popolani*, or popular class, of Florence, professing traffic rather than arms. Finding themselves advanced to the first rank by the destruction of the high-born class, and taking advantage of their position with a sagacity and selfishness which no abstract or generous love of liberty impeded, and with that unaccountable current of good fortune which, like a trade-wind, is sometimes found to impel the individual on the race to prosperity, Cosmo de' Medici established his ascendency over his native city early in the fifteenth century. His son, Piero, and grandson,

Lorenzo, succeeded to this influence as to a throne, which they continued to hold, with a few interruptions and perils. In the use which they made of their power, they kept true to the spirit of its origin. The glory of a feudal nobility consisted in arms and feats of hardihood and conquest. But the defect of a commercial aristocracy is want of enterprise and spirit. Unused to the field, it employs a mercenary force, and war is looked upon as a speculation in which the profits are supposed to overbalance the expense. It was this mean spirit that enervated Italy, and laid her at the feet of every invader. The distinction that was unsought by arms, was, however, attained in another and in a more lasting kind. Fame was purchased not by victories achieved, but by works of art and works of learning. In the field of intellect, the commercial aristocracy of Italy and nobility of Florence sought their trophies; and their zeal, thus directed simultaneously with the discovery of printing and the fall of the Greek empire, produced that revival of learning in Europe, which, setting our political sentiments aside, must ever excite gratitude and reverence towards the family of Medici.

Giovanni, or John, second son of Lorenzo de' Medici, by his wife Clarice, of the noble Roman family of the Orsini, was born at Florence in the year 1475. As Lorenzo, of course, destined his eldest son, Piero, to succeed him in the government of Florence, his second, Giovanni, was destined by him to the priesthood, we might indeed say to the popedom. The road to that eminence, through cabal and intrigue and family influence, was now generally known, and sought even by the first blood of Europe. In order that no time might be lost in this pursuit, Giovanni received the tonsure and the order of priesthood at seven years of age, the dispensation of pope Sixtus being obtained for this premature distinction. From that time benefices and mitres seemed to rain down upon the young churchman. Louis XI. gave him an abbacy, the pope another. At

nine years of age he narrowly escaped being an archbishop; and the disappointment, in this case, was soon compensated by his elevation to the cardinalate at the early age of thirteen. The assiduity and address of his father procured him this dignity, but with the proviso that he was not to wear the ornaments or practise the functions of his rank for three years after his promotion.

Thus much attained, the next important object was to fit Giovanni's mind and character for taking the utmost advantage of his station. All that art or masters could supply for his education was sedulously put in practice. The famed Politian had the chief direction of his studies. The most learned Grecians taught him their tongue. Michelezzi, an artist and a man of letters, aided Politian; and Bibbiena, the author of almost the first European comedy, attended, to communicate that elegance to his taste and conversation which he might be supposed to want amongst his more pedantic instructors. The mind of young John was thus overlaid with learning, and his talents and his spirit prematurely tasked and excited had perhaps no small effect in causing the epicurean indolence of his later days. Whatever his character may thus have lost in vigour, it certainly gained in cultivation. Having passed a great part of the three years of his probation at the university of Pisa, John de' Medici was publicly declared and consecrated cardinal in March, 1492; and he almost immediately set forth to take up his residence at Rome, as a prince of the church.

The death of Lorenzo soon followed the elevation of his son, who was recalled by that event from Rome. The first place and influence in Florence now fell to John's elder brother, Piero. This youth had given signs of talent, and made progress in learning. But Nardi informs us, that, unlike John, who was reared in the strict house of his father, where the plebeian traditions of sobriety and modest conduct prevailed, Piero visited his noble relatives, the Orsini, and was spoiled

by them. He grew fond of pleasures, horses, women, and abandoned the staid and learned pursuits of the mercantile prince for the thoughtless ardour of the noble cavalier. Hence he became unpopular with the Florentines; the Orsini, moreover, diverting him from the fair and prudent policy of his father with respect to the other Italian powers.* When Charles VIII. invaded Italy, Piero, incapable of decision, first inclined to resist, then truckled to the French, and was at last expelled from Florence by the contempt as well as indignation of the citizens. The cardinal, having in vain endeavoured to redeem his brother's folly, was obliged to follow him in his flight, not without danger, though in the disguise of a friar. He escaped with Piero to Bologna. The palace of the Medicis, with all its treasures of art, was abandoned to the plunder of the mob. This took place in 1494, and eighteen years elapsed before the Medici were enabled to recover footing in their native city.

At Bologna the brothers separated; Piero betaking himself to Venice, and the cardinal, first to Pitigliano, and afterwards to Castello, of which his friends the Vitelli were masters. The chief influence at Florence remained with Savonarola, the celebrated preacher, who first united ideas of religion with those of civil freedom. He had all the enthusiasm with more than the eloquence of Luther, whose powers of logic and reason and common sense the Florentine friar unfortunately wanted. Had Savonarola had less of enthusiasm, had he avoided the dangerous presumption of prophecy and miracle-working, he might have anticipated Luther as the great father of the Reformation. Such was the power of his eloquence, that he soon softened the enmity of Charles VIII. towards Florence, and counterbalanced the exertions of Piero de' Medici, who was in that monarch's camp. Disappointed in their hopes

* The contrast between Piero de' Medici's character and that of his father is sufficiently marked by the anecdote of the former's setting Michael Angelo to work on a figure of snow.

from the French, the Medicis, in 1496, set on foot a little army headed by their relation, Tirgolio Orsini. Piero and Julian entered Tuscany, while the cardinal remained at Milan, craving succours of the duke. The attempt failed; no ally appeared, and Piero was obliged to rejoin his brother at Milan. The following year they renewed the attempt; the Florentines being hard pressed by the Pisan war, and by the general enmity of almost all the states of Italy and Europe. Within their walls, Savonarola had excited a strong party against him, consisting of the more wealthy. These were indignant at the prevalence of democracy, and at seeing "artisans take their mantles from off their shopboard, to proceed to council."* Piero de' Medici proposed to surprise the city; but, being delayed by rains, and not arriving till daylight, he found the gates closed, and his passage barred, so that he was obliged once more to retreat, and abandon the enterprise. A third attempt, in 1498, after the death of Savonarola, made in concert with the Venetians, met with like success; and soon after the whole face of affairs changed in Italy. The Venetians gave up their enmity to Florence, and allied themselves with Louis XII. to attack the Milanese. The pope and the Florentines joined in the league. All either forgot or despaired of the hopes and claims of the Medici.

It was at this period that the cardinal John, now an unwelcome visiter at any court of Italy, even at Rome, resolved to travel. Associating himself with his cousin Julian, and ten friends, all disguised and similarly clad, each taking in turns to be guide and manager, they set out from Venice in 1499, and passed into Bavaria. Arrested at Ulm, they were sent under a guard to the emperor. He received them hospitably, and addressed them to his son, Philip, at Cologne. Hence, journeying to "Terouanne upon the ocean,"—a sad geographical blunder of Ammirato and Paulus Jovius;—they were terrified by the waves from passing into

* Paulus Jovius.

England. At Rouen they were again arrested and again liberated, and proceeded homeward by Mansilla and Savona, where John met his friend the cardinal de la Rovera, who had also quitted the court of pope Alexander. The year of the jubilee, 1500, recalled the cardinal to Rome, where no good tidings awaited him respecting the fortunes of his house.

Piero de' Medici had, however, not been inactive. He had attached himself to the infamous hero of the day, Cæsar Borgia, who, supported by the alliance of the French, had subdued the towns of Romagna. Piero, prompted and persuaded him to attack Florence; and Borgia desired no richer prey. He was successful against the [illegible], and reduced them to considerable peril, when the French king himself, alarmed at the progress of Borgia, checked his career, and again disappointed the hopes of the Medici.

The death of Alexander VI., and, after some time, the election of the cardinal de la Rovera, who became pope Julius II. in [illegible]03, made a most material change in the aspect of affairs. It restored the cardinal de' Medici to influence, at least in Rome. The death of the rash and unlucky Piero, in the same year, was also of advantage to the family, in placing the cardinal at its head. This prelate was enabled to see from time to time the principal citizens of Florence, whom business brought to Rome. With these he employed all the arts of politeness and conciliation, courting even the enemies of his party, confessing all his brother's faults and blunders, and representing himself as totally without any ambitious views. The life which the cardinal John led at Rome was calculated to give these professions the appearance of truth. He lived in princely style, surrounded by artists, men of letters, astonishing the city by his fêtes, and redeeming mere luxury by the charms of intellectual intercourse. Money, indeed, was often wanting to supply his prodigality; and " spoons and silver cups," says one of his biographers, " were often sent to pro-

cure credit with the butcher and the fishmonger." The chase was also another favourite occupation of the cardinal; who, by being foremost in these pleasures, drew around him a knot of illustrious friends, amongst whom was Galeotto, Julius II.'s nephew. It was this gay and prodigal life that secured to him those votes which were one day to raise him to the papal chair. Had he adopted these habits from calculation, as another cardinal affected infirmity, he could not have consulted his future interests with greater sagacity.

In the commencement of his reign, Julius II. did not show any intention of interfering with the Florentines. Although the ambition of this pontiff has become proverbial, it grew by degrees, and out of circumstances. Upon the death of Alexander, the Venetians had seized the opportunity of appropriating to themselves the conquests of Cæsar Borgia in Romagna. They took Ravenna, Cesena, as well as Faenza and other towns, to which the pope's title was undisputed. Julius expostulated with the aggressors, but received no satisfaction. He thought it best to commence by trying his fortune with less powerful enemies. Cæsar Borgia had reduced Perugia, and made Bologna tributary. Should not Julius do as much? He marched, and took the former town, and was equally successful in driving the Bentivoglios from Bologna. Success gave hardihood to Julius; he proceeded to humble the Venetians, and deprived them of the towns which they forcibly took possession of in Romagna. Through Amboise he prevailed on France to join in his scheme, which produced the league of Cambray. When by this the pope had recovered the object of his desires, he turned with rather inconsiderate haste against the French; and a war ensued, of more interest than those of Italy generally present, remarkable for its inveteracy, heroism, and varying fortune.

The aged pontiff himself appeared, armed with helmet and cuirass, at the head of his army, and took several towns. The French, under Trivulzio, drove

back the pontifical troops, recovered Bologna, and invaded Romagna. Louis XII. at the same time had resource to a churchman's weapon, while the churchmen wielded the sword. He caused a council to be summoned at Pisa, threatening Julius with deposition. The Florentines granted this town for the use of this council with great reluctance, alleging that they were wasted with war, and this would discover their hatred to the pope "too soon." Their objections were over-ruled; the cardinals in opposition to Julius met at Pisa; and, the anger of the pontiff being immediately directed against the republic of Florence, he was roused to undertake the restoration of the Medici.

Cardinal Giovanni had been already nominated to the government of Perugia in 1505. From this time he is almost lost sight of, until the year 1511, when Julius, resolving to make use of him against Florence, raised him to be legate of Bologna. This interval of neglect may have been owing either to the contempt of the active Julius for the soft and dilettante character of the cardinal, or his suspicions that the Medicis still retained their old friendship for the Bentivoglios, his enemies. Now, however, that Soderini, chief magistrate of Florence, openly leaned towards France, the Medici were allies too useful to be neglected. Julius, therefore, collecting an army, and reinforced by a body of Spaniards, gave to the cardinal, as his legate, a kind of supremacy over the captains of the several troops. He thus, in the novel quality of commander, marched to besiege Bologna: and, had his advice of instantly proceeding to batter the town been followed, it might have been taken. But the delay, perhaps the bad faith, of the Spanish officer, allowed Gaston de Foix to enter it, and the papal troops were obliged to fall back upon Ravenna. Here was fought, in 1512, the famous battle known by the name, in which the victorious French lost their young commander, and the pope's army suffered rout. The cardinal legate, not altogether adopting

the warlike habits of a churchman of the day, in riding armed cap-à-pie, was still upon the field, firm during the shock; and, refusing, his panegyrists assert, to join in the general flight, he employed himself in ministering spiritual aid to the dying. Thus busied, he was seized and menaced, but at length brought without harm to the cardinal San Severino, a prelate who had fought in the hostile ranks. The French finding it necessary to retreat after their dear-bought victory, de' Medici was brought a prisoner to Milan. Thither pope Julius sent him not powers to treat, but powers to absolve his enemies for bearing arms against the church; and crowds of the victorious soldiers besieged the lodgings of the cardinal, in order to obtain remission for the sin of their late valour. Julius also summoned the French king to liberate the cardinal: but the latter, as the French were transporting him from Milan, managed to make his escape, remaining behind amidst the confusion of passing a river. Having crossed the Po, and reached, in the disguise of a soldier, a castle belonging to Malespina, he was here kept prisoner, until an order of Trivulzio, who now despaired of the fortunes of the French, released him. From hence he got to Piacenza, and, reposing himself for a time with the Gonzagas at Mantua, he resumed his functions of legate at Bologna, once more reduced under the pope's obedience.

The task of expelling the French from Italy being fulfilled, it remained to punish the Florentines for the aid and favour shown by them to these invaders. A kind of congress for the pacification of Italy, being held at Mantua, Julian di Medici attended to plead the cause of his family. A Florentine envoy in vain protested. The confederates resolved to march against Florence, and enforce the restitution of the Medicis. An army, principally of Spaniards, commanded by their viceroy, and accompanied by the cardinal de' Medici, invaded Tuscany, in the month of August, 1512. It first besieged Piato, and, while the gonfalonier of Florence, Soderini, hesitated betwixt submission and active

resistance, Piato was carried by storm, and suffered all the attendant horrors. The cardinal and his brother opposed their excesses, and mitigated the violence of the Spaniards. Fresh envoys now came from Florence, offering large sums to the Spanish commander as the price of peace. The viceroy wavered, and refused; and the friends of the Medici within the walls of Florence, dreading alike the consequence of being conquered or abandoned by the Spaniards, took the revolution into their own hands, and, relying on the fears of the populace for sanction, seized the gonfalonier, and made him prisoner. At the same time, one bolder than the rest, Francis Albizzi rode to Piato, and, making Julian de' Medici mount his horse, hurried back, entered Florence with Julian mounted *in groppa* behind him, and conducted him to the Albizzi palace.

Thus did the Medici re-enter Florence after eighteen years of exile. The cardinal, as if in fulfilment of his old promises of forbearance, and not wishing to interfere in the state affairs of his country, at first abandoned all influence to his brother Julian. But, he acting too meekly, and making compromises to freedom incompatible with the firm ascendency of the family, the cardinal himself came to Florence, and established the old form of government; that is, a council composed of his friends and creatures. Julian, however, was declared head of the state. The restored family endeavoured to win over its enemies by caresses, and the body of the people by fêtes, in the midst of which, two noble Florentines, Boscoli and Capponi, conceived the project of acting the parts of Brutus and Cassius by slaying the tyrants. The plot was discovered by their imprudence, and is chiefly remarkable from the circumstance that the celebrated Machiavel, secretary of the republic, was implicated.

The death of pope Julius, in February, 1513, drew off the attention of the cardinal to a greater object of ambition. He proceeded to the conclave at Rome,

and was obliged to make the journey in a litter, owing to a painful malady.* "On the seventh day," says Guicciardini, "they elected with one common consent John, cardinal of Medicis, who took the name of Leo X., and was but thirty-seven years of age; which was wonderful, and against all precedent, and which the young cardinals principally brought about, having a long time previous entered into an agreement together, to elect the first pope of their number." The new pope, indeed, offered the character most desirable to the electing prelates. His temper was easy, his disposition generous; he loved pleasure, without the scandal of the Borgias; his talents as a statesman were eminent, without the furious ambition of Julius II. How much the friends of Leo counted on his liberality appears from the anecdote, that their demands on his accession were so exorbitant and numerous, that he replied, "Ye had better take my tiara at once, for I do not see aught else that ye would leave me." All the ceremonies attendant upon his elevation were performed with unrivalled magnificence. In going to take possession of the Lateran, he was mounted on the same superb Turkish steed which bore him at the battle of Ravenna, and which he exempted ever after from service.† Among the nobler traits of his character were his pardons to all the enemies of the church, to the schismatic cardinals, amongst the rest to San Severino, whose prisoner he had been, and also to the minor conspirators of Florence. His patronage of letters was at the same time announced by the appointment of Bembo and Sadolet to be the papal secretaries.

Historians are fond of attributing vast political designs to several pontiffs. They dwell with pleasure on

* The nature of this malady has occasioned some scandal and controversy. Bayle construes it in the worst light; and Roscoe does not refute this with his usual felicity. The words of Paulus Jovius evidently indicate that it was a fistula, or the milder disease which leads to it.

† This chevaleresque custom of proceeding to take possession of the popedom on horseback has proved inconvenient to the monkish pontiffs. Poor Ganganelli fell from his steed in descending the Capitol, an event that was looked upon at the time as a very evil omen.

the contrast betwixt the vows of the ecclesiastic and the ambition of the sovereign; exaggeration, both of praise and blame, have upon no occasion been more lavishly employed; and the efforts of the Italian historians of that day somewhat resemble those of certain poets of our own, in exalting the intellectual power of their hero at the expense of his moral character. Thus Julius II. is represented as actuated by the wish to expel foreigners from Italy: yet, closely examined, his policy seems directed by no such great or general maxim. All his wars grew out of a very simple, and not over-ambitious aim,—that of restoring to the papal dominions the towns of Romagna: to recover them, he leagued with France against Venice; to keep them, he leagued with Venice against France. Leo, in succeeding to the throne, succeeded to the policy of his predecessor. Louis XII. had been for some time threatening Milan. Julius had fully arranged an alliance to oppose him; that of England and the emperor, the king of Aragon and the Swiss. The sum that was to be the price of these last auxiliaries was already stipulated. Louis, deeming Leo less firm than Julius, procedeed nevertheless in his enterprise; but the Swiss, having received their stipend, defeated at once the army and the hopes of the French king at Novara.

Fortune thus crowning his policy, Leo turned to that exercise of power which he most loved. He founded an university; an academy for the arts; schools for the Greek; and a printing press for the Oriental tongues. He sought out learned men, and enticed them to his court by persuasion and favours; proving, by his munificence and taste, that he inherited the dispositions as well as the name of his father Lorenzo. Homage poured in upon him in proportion to this display of high and regal qualities. The sovereigns of Europe seemed to vie in respect and deference towards the personal character, as well as the lofty position, of the new pontiff; and Leo became so intoxicated with the incense, that he lost sight of the vigilance and prudence

which his situation demanded: he affected supreme grandeur; he summoned kings to decide their differences by reference to his "then fit tribunal;" and prevented a general union of Europe against the Turks. At the same time he meditated a more selfish but not less difficult scheme, — that of transferring the crown of Naples to his brother Julian, whilst his nephew Lorenzo governing Florence, and himself Rome, would secure to his family such a preponderance in Italy as might eventually lead to sovereignty. To attach Naples to the pontifical states was a dream of pope Julius; it had, however, been but a dream. Leo so far forgot his sage predecessor's policy as to act upon this wild scheme; to abandon that proud alliance framed by Julius, which had effectually closed the Alps against the French; and to draw near to these very French, whose only aim was Italian conquest and domination.

Roscoe has proved that Leo completely forsook the maxim of "driving foreigners from Italy;" that he pressed Louis XII. to re-invade the Milanese; and that he brought about the agreement betwixt him and Henry VIII., which overturned the entire policy bequeathed by Julius. A greater blunder could not have been committed, as consequent events proved. Francis I. succeeded to Louis, and followed up the latter's project upon Milan. Leo's blunder and supineness enabled him to secure the neutrality of England and of Flanders, whilst Venice renewed its old alliance with France. The pope was roused, by the preparations of Francis, from his dream: he armed for his safety; he sought to restore the broken ties of the original alliance of Julius. The Swiss and the Spaniards alone answered his call; and these, together with the troops of Rome and Florence, took the field. Yet even here the irresolution of Leo — the double contradictory policy — interfered, and marred every effort. He negotiated with Francis, and vacillated: the allies, filled with distrust, would not act; the Spaniards held back on one side, the pontifical troops withdrew upon another, and the Swiss were left to

withstand alone the brunt of the numerous army of Francis. The consequence was, the defeat and slaughter of these valiant mountaineers at Marignano, and the re-establishment of the French in Milan. The conduct of Leo on this occasion is attributed to depth and duplicity, by Italian historians; to cunning and laudable policy by Roscoe: neither could allow their vaunted statesman to be capable, as is the truth, of a very mad scheme of policy in the first case, and then of most deplorable irresolution.

However unfortunate or culpable Leo had been, in thus bringing about French ascendency in the north of Italy, he redeemed the blunder with infinite address. The papal envoys found the young king of France satisfied with the glory of his victory, and inclined not only to grant peace, but to ally himself with the pontiff. Accordingly, an agreement took place. Leo ceded Parma and Placentia, which the French arms already threatened, and Francis, in return, took the family of Medici under his protection, ensuring them Florence, and giving a title and estates to Julian. A personal interview was at the same time arranged betwixt the monarch and the pontiff; it took place at Bologna, Leo passing through Florence with great solemnity on his journey thither. No sooner did the young conqueror find himself in the presence of his only superior in dignity, than he seemed to lose all the advantages of his position. When Francis demanded the pope's alliance in furtherance of his views upon Naples, the latter gently eluded the question. Other demands he peremptorily refused; and Francis gained nothing from the interview except a fallacious reliance upon the friendship of the pontiff. The latter profited better by the opportunity, and succeeded in redeeming his political losses by an important addition to the ecclesiastical supremacy of the holy see.

In the early ages of the church, ecclesiastical benefices and dignities were filled, as the popedom itself continued to be, by election. This free custom was infringed on

by feudal lords, who usurped the power, until the popes arose as chiefs and champions of the church, and wrested the privilege of naming to ecclesiastical places, with more or less success, from the temporal power. The French kings and their clergy had resisted these pretensions of the Roman pontiff with more spirit and independence than perhaps did any nation. The ordonnances of St. Louis and Charles VII. established the freedom of ecclesiastical election, and set bounds to those pretensions by which the popes raised a considerable revenue from foreign kingdoms. These statutes, which protected the freedom of the Gallican church, were known by the name of the Pragmatic Sanction: they were most obnoxious to the popes, who never ceased to demand their abrogation. Louis XI. had promised it; but the resistance of the judicial courts rendered the monarch's order and the churchman's will of no effect. Leo now, in order to conquer the resistance of the French, offered to give up to the king the appointment to all benefices, provided the annats, or first year's revenue, was restored to the holy see. Francis consented, although he gained much less than the pope; for royal and lordly influence almost always prevailed in the chapters which elected, as we have seen in the case of Amboise. As to the pope, he conceded what he could never acquire, and secured at the same time a fruitful source of revenue. In this bargain of the two potentates respecting rights and property that belonged to neither, it is curious to remark how the lay sovereign becomes endowed with the ecclesiastical privilege, whilst the pontiff grasps the worldly advantage of a monied revenue. This agreement, made betwixt Francis, through the agency of his chancellor Duprat, and Leo, is known by the name of the *Concordat*, and is considered as one of the greatest achievements of the latter's policy and address.

On the pope's return from Bologna to Rome, he passed through Florence, where fêtes and munificence as usual marked his passage. At Sienna his attention

was otherwise employed, and he found means to create a revolution in that town, which placed its government in the hands of one attached to the Medici. Scarcely had the pontiff returned to Rome, than tidings reached him of the death of his brother Julian, whose aggrandisement formed part of the stipulations of the late treaty. Leo retired in grief to the sea shore, where (such was the insecurity of the time) he narrowly escaped being carried off by a band of Moorish pirates.

The death of Ferdinand of Aragon, in the commencement of 1516, re-awakened the views of Francis I. upon Naples, and the solicitude of Leo. It proved, however, that the precaution of Ferdinand could preserve his heritage even after his death; for a sum of money, conveyed from Spain to the emperor Maximilian before Ferdinand's decease, sufficed to arm the emperor, and to bring him down with an army into the Milanese, where, though not very successful, his efforts still sufficed to thwart any expedition against Naples. The pope, on this occasion, as before, was irresolute; equally afraid of the French and the imperialists; and incurring by his backwardness the resentment of both. He, however, profited by the occupation of the French to advance his private interests; to conquer the duchy of Urbino from La Rovera, a relative of the late pope, and to confer it upon his nephew Lorenzo, who ruled, in fact, at Florence, but under no particular title.

The tergiversation of the pope produced an effect that alarmed him considerably; this was the conclusion of a treaty, not only betwixt Charles of Spain and the king of France, but also the accession of the emperor Maximilian to it. Had Leo not been moved by selfish views, such a league ought not to have terrified him, since it prohibited Francis from aiming at Naples, and balanced the French power in the north of the Peninsula by the Spanish power in the south; but Leo trembled for those towns in Romagna which, by making the popes conquerors and possessors of disputed interests, proved so

fatal to the peace of Europe. He endeavoured to excite a hostile league, and failed; whilst the duke of Urbino was enabled to muster forces, and recover his towns and duchy. There ensued eight months of war betwixt the pope and the duke, France and Spain looking on, as it were, and enjoying the ambitious struggles, the distress of the perfidious pope, with the scandal that the war afforded. Lorenzo de' Medici being wounded, his cousin the cardinal succeeded him in the command. A secretary of the duke was taken prisoner, sent to Rome, and put to the torture, in order to extract from him the secrets of his master. At length the monarchs of France and Spain, satiated with their own sport and the pope's torment, withdrew their troops from the duke, who was thus obliged to succumb, and cede his duchy to Leo's nephew.

This war, raised by one pope to dispossess the nephew of his predecessor, in favour of a nephew of his own, took place in the fatal year 1517, the year of Luther's first protest and stir in the Reformation. The campaign of eight months is computed to have cost Leo 800,000 ducats; so that the revenue raised by those indulgences that were to sever half of Europe from the holy see was more than anticipated by the effort of the pope to acquire the temporal sovereignty of a small town and duchy. This papal war, in the midst of the peace of Europe, with its loss of life and its devastations, together with the shameful fact of a prisoner taken therein being put to the torture merely because he kept his master's secret, offered not the only scenes of scandal. A conspiracy against the pope's life was discovered at Rome. The chief plotters were amongst the cardinals, his fellow-guests and boon companions; for not even the convivial virtues of friendship and good faith were communicated, as it seemed, by the orgies of the Vatican. Its chief contriver was a young man, the brother of the exiled chief of Sienna. His plan was to bribe the pope's physician to poison certain sores which he was in the habit of dressing for

his holiness.* Petrucci (the name of the rash young cardinal) openly spoke of his intentions to several of the sacred college. It has been observed, that Leo was raised to the pontificate by a faction of the *young* cardinals. These, after his election, were disappointed by what they considered to be his want of gratitude. The *old* were hurt, and jealous of the trick which deprived them of their chances of succeeding in turn. Petrucci addressed himself to these, who, either by favouring or being silent as to his project, incurred the vengeance of Leo. It is difficult to ascertain how far they were guilty. The pope had recourse to the summary process of arresting the suspected, and charging them with their crime before the assembled consistory; after which Petrucci was strangled in prison. Two of his accomplices suffered death. Another young cardinal (Sauli), a boon-companion of the pontiff, considered guilty, was pardoned. Three aged members of the sacred college, accused by the same irresistible impeacher and judge, implored mercy, where defence was idle, and were mulcted in enormous sums as the price of their liberation. Immediately after this catastrophe, Leo, in order to break up, for ever, the cabal of the *aged cardinals*, promoted at once upwards of thirty persons to that dignity. The number chiefly consisted of his friends and followers. To reconcile the opinion of foreign courts to this full exercise of his authority, many of their princes were included. A prelate of the family of Bourbon was one; a son of the king of Portugal was another. Each influential Italian town and family had also their ambition gratified in this way; whilst the humble virtues of sainthood were sought to be illustrated in the advancement of Adrian of Utrecht, preceptor of Charles V.

Whilst this year was passing at the pontifical court amidst alternate wars and fêtes, crimes and comedies, the atrocities of torture and the magnificence of pro-

* Paulus Jovius here expressly states that Leo's malady was a fistula. See note *, page 80.

digal and yet tasteful luxury, the papal taxmen, who, in Germany, were levying contributions to supply all this expense by bartering *indulgences* for gold, met with unwonted resistance from an obscure monk. The history of indulgences cannot here be given, though few subjects could afford a more entertaining chapter: they were of all kinds; and, though originally intended to be but remissions of canonical penance, they had long been sold as remissions of the pains of purgatory, of sin, and of all that a vicar of Christ could be supposed to remit. This dispensing power of the head of the church had not passed without blame or question. A bull of indulgence issued by pope Innocent, offering the liberty of eating butter and cheese during twenty Lents to the faithful, in return for the twentieth part of a Rhenish florin, had excited previously considerable resistance from the German doctors. The dispute raised by it had even occupied the attention of Albert duke of Saxony, and of his son and successor, George, uncle of Luther's patron. The protest, therefore, of this prince, in 1517, against Tetzel, did not come to the ears of the Roman pontiff as an alarming novelty. For the same reason, the public mind of Germany was prepared to hail and to welcome the bold voice that questioned the indulgences. "In fifteen days," says Luther, "my propositions were all over Germany." Had Luther been merely a preacher, his resistance would not have been so serious. But public disputations in a university were then imposing things, and awakened instantly the attention of the Roman literati. Luther offended these by his contempt of Aristotle and the schoolmen; and the petty vanity of the doctors fanned a flame that might have smouldered, if left to itself. Leo was at first amused at the controversy, and is said to have called Luther a clever fellow. He had seen in his youth an example of similar frowardness in Savonarola; and the facility with which that eloquent monk had been put down made Leo think lightly of the consequences of Luther's

controversy.* The submissive conduct and words of that reformer confirmed the pope in this slighting view of the affair. "Behold me prostrated at your feet," wrote Luther to the pope, "with all that I am or can possess. Revive or slay me; approve or condemn me, as it pleases you. In your voice, presiding and pronouncing, I acknowledge the voice of Christ. If I have merited death, I will not refuse it at your hands."

In the course of the following year, 1518, the pope was roused from his apathy by learning the prevalence of the Lutheran opinions in Germany, and their support by Frederick of Saxony, the oldest elector of the empire. He summoned Luther to appear within sixty days at Rome. The reformer, supported by Frederick, demanded a more secure tribunal in Germany; and Leo obsequiously appointed the cardinal of Gaëta to hear him. Luther repaired to Augsburg, where he had first an amusing interview with one of the officers of the legate.† It may be safely asserted that Luther was completely undecided as to his conduct, before his interview with the cardinal; but that, struck with the absurd and irrational dogmatism of this prince of the church, a sense of his superiority awakened at once the reformer's pride and obstinacy. He firmly refused to recede, and, stating his resolution with all moderation, left Augsburg. Leo showed himself equally moderate, but equally indisposed to yield; and, in truth, his position was difficult: it was one of those in which retreat or advance was equally perilous. The pontiff published a bull in November, 1518, pronouncing the doctrine of indulgences orthodox, without alluding to the reformer; who, on its receipt, nevertheless took the bold and decisive step

* Luther afterwards published Savonarola's Meditations, with a laudatory preface.

† This officer asked Luther how he would treat the pope and cardinals, if he had them in his power? "With all reverence and respect," was the reply; on which the Italian "bit his thumb," and cried "*hem*," in token of incredulity. The readers of *Romeo and Juliet* will be struck with the *biting of the thumb*, which Roscoe erroneously renders by "snapping the fingers."

of calling the pope fallible, and of appealing from his judgment to that of a council.

The death of Maximilian, a few weeks after this, in January, 1519, directed the attention of the pontiff, as well as of the German princes, from Luther to the more interesting question of who should be the new emperor. Since the general peace, Leo, in order to divert the rival potentates of Europe from Italy, had endeavoured to engage them in a crusade against the Turk, then triumphant from the conquest of Egypt. Their ambition was, however, more interested than chivalrous. Charles, king of Spain and lord of Flanders, already aimed at succeeding his grandfather in the empire, and, at the same time, demanded the pope's investiture of Naples. For this year, however, Leo was in the French interest. Cardinal Bibbiena, whom he had sent to Paris, accomplished in raillery and wit, had ingratiated himself with Francis, and had brought about a marriage between Lorenzo de' Medici and a French princess. This superinduced a league; and Leo showed himself averse to the solicitations of Charles. In 1519, however, when Charles and Francis openly sought the imperial crown, the pope showed himself equally hostile to both. He was unable to prevent the election of Charles, whose consequent preponderance proved equally destructive to France and to Rome.

A blow still more seriously felt by Leo assailed him at this time: this was the death of his nephew, Lorenzo, the last of the descendants of Lorenzo the Magnificent. The pontiff, who had revolved so many schemes for the aggrandisement of his family, could not fail now to be struck by the vanity of such ambition. His brother Julian, whom he had destined for the throne of Naples, had perished; his nephew now, for whom he had procured the duchy of Urbino by a cruel war, was taken away also; whilst his plans for maintaining a balance of Europe were defeated by the election of Charles V. A disgust of political activity and ambition accordingly seized on

Leo. "He became," one of his courtiers wrote, "just what it was expected he would have been by those who elected him." He became moderate, placable, more attached to his pleasures, to conviviality, to the arts; and he may be said to have scarcely meddled with the affairs of Europe during the year 1520.

Luther's increasing popularity forcibly called the pope's attention to ecclesiastical matters. Conciliation and mild measures were still those that he preferred. Seeing now that the churchman whom he had sent as envoy had aggravated matters, and kindled Luther's zeal instead of allaying it, Leo sent a soldier and a courtier—a personage named Miltitz, a Saxon, too—to recall the reformer to his duty. He gave this envoy, as his credentials, a consecrated rose to present to the elector. Miltitz acquitted himself of his mission with mildness and address. He won upon Luther, prevailed on the angry reformer to write a submissive letter to his holiness, and to promise that he would no more stir the question of indulgences. Could this accord and this silence have been preserved, it certainly would have been the wisest plan, and the only measure capable of preventing the schism; but the flame had gone forth throughout the land. An object of argument and zeal had been given to the host of university doctors, whose ambition was awakened by the general progress of mind and letters, which, nevertheless, had not till now afforded them aught of interest to dispute about. When opinions and supremacy are to be supported or overthrown by words, who would not be a logician? An hundred tongues avowed Luther's doctrines, and were prepared to demonstrate their truth. The Roman theologians grew indignant: they met, and showed a zeal proportioned to all that was at stake; and Leo was compelled to issue a bull, in June, 1520, declaring Luther's writings to be heresy, and pronouncing excommunication upon all that preached or professed them. The heresiarch himself, whom the pontiff professes to have treated as the prodigal son,

with tolerance and kindness, is at length anathematised: all princes are forbidden to harbour him, and he is to be treated as the general enemy of mankind.

Miltitz was mortified on hearing of this bull, which overthrew all his pacific endeavours. He sought, however, to obviate its ill effects, by persuading Luther that a submissive letter from him would cause it to be revoked, for which there was yet time. Luther, in obedience to this advice, seconded as it was by the entreaties of the monks, took the pen, and wrote that epistle to Leo which Roscoe wrongly supposes to have preceded and provoked the bull. He lashes the cardinals and the pontifical court with too much truth, though too much violence; rather sparing Leo himself, as a "Daniel among the lions, or an Ezekiel among scorpions."* "But what is one, or three, or four, virtuous cardinals," asked Luther, "amidst the monsters of the sacred college? You may be *poisoned* by them, and carried off, ere you could remedy their disorders." This allusion to the conspiracy of Petrucci and the whole tone of the letter, instead of being ironical, as Roscoe supposes, stamps it as the production of a mind enraged against the Roman doctors and cardinals, but not despairing as yet of the impartial judgment of Leo.

On the receipt of the bull, however, the rage of the reformer knew no bounds. In his reply, the pope is styled a tyrant, a heretic, an apostate, and, finally, antichrist. He, moreover, burned the "execrable bull," in public, at Wittemberg, together with the decretals and other books, worthy of being the fagots on the occasion. The secular power could now alone decide the difference; and both the pope and Luther paid court to the emperor, — the one that he should show himself orthodox, firm, and severe; the other, that he should find a lenient and impartial judge. Summoned to appear before the diet at Worms, Luther obeyed, was baited by his ene-

* See the Edinburgh Review, vol. vii. p. 351., for a complete and able detection of Roscoe's mistake.

mies, and cheered by his friends. This only tended to fortify his already stubborn spirit. The emperor and the diet condemned him; but, being allowed to depart, the reformer was seized by a band of horsemen, under the elector's order, and carried away to a place of momentary concealment and security.

It may be remarked how fortunately chosen was the spot which was to be the birth-place of a reformation. In the dominions of an absolute monarch,— in Spain, in France, even in England at that early period,—resistance would have been smothered. Had the monarchs of those realms been favourable to the new opinions from conviction, their constant need of the pontiff's friendship would have bound them to orthodoxy. But Frederick of Saxony was of too small consequence in the general politics of Europe to care for the pope's support. He was a petty prince, not absorbed in ambition, but with leisure to take an interest in his university, in its professors, in the opinions and happiness of his people. As a subject, though an illustrious one, he had an interest in freedom which then existed in Germany more than in surrounding countries. Moreover, it may be added, although to some the remark may appear fantastical, that the Teutonic race seems to have been most peculiarly adapted to embrace the Reformation. Where-ever the Latin or Celtic race prevailed, no matter in what juxtaposition with the Teutonic, there the population remained firm to the traditional doctrines of Rome.

In the year 1521, Leo X. awakened from that state of disgust or lethargy which had kept him, since the death of his nephew, estranged from the quarrels of foreign potentates. Guicciardini professes himself utterly at a loss to conceive what could have moved the pope to stir up war at this time. Francis possessed of Milan on one side, Charles holding Naples on the other; the pontiff, by a vigilant neutrality, might have kept the balance even, and preserved Italy in peace. Then the pope "of his nature was given to ease and pleasure,

and at that time was exceedingly angry at any approach to talk to him of business, spending the entire day in listening to music and looking on at farces and buffoonery." Such was his prodigality, that he had no surplus of treasure; nor had he a relative remaining to provide for. Considering this, Guicciardini concludes that it was merely "his too great prosperity that rendered Leo impatient of himself, overflowing with licence, bold to do ill, and desirous of troubling his own peace by novelties." Such is the reason given by the historian, who was at the time a commissary-general in the pope's service, for the commencement of a war which devastated Europe from north to south, and produced, amongst other ills, the sack of Rome itself.

Thus moved by the mere restlessness of his spirit, after having drawn and deceived France into a hollow treaty, by which the passage of a papal army across the Milanese was procured, Leo formed a serious alliance with the emperor for the re-conquest of the Milanese,—an event, the fulfilment of which must have left the pope, as it afterwards proved, completely at his mercy. This mad policy was pursued for the sake of restoring Parma and Placentia to the holy see, together with a Neapolitan principality for Alexander de' Medici, illegitimate son of Lorenzo. Roscoe, indeed, pretends that his hero was actuated by the maxim of "driving foreigners from Italy." But his policy had neither this tendency nor this effect. The imperial and pontifical troops were successful in their expedition, the French being unprepared, and their funds intercepted. The cardinal of Medicis headed the army as legate. Milan was taken, as also Parma and Placentia. Leo X. heard, while at his villa in Malliana, the tidings of the success of his scheme. He forthwith returned to Rome, in order to hold a consistory, and take the necessary steps for securing and ordering his conquests. But, becoming indisposed with what was considered merely a cold, the consistory was put off, and the pope, growing of a

sudden more seriously ill, expired most unexpectedly on the 1st of December, 1521.

The suddenness of the pope's death, which did not even allow him to receive the sacrament, gave rise to the rumour that he was poisoned; and there are also some suspicious circumstances in the conduct of Malespina, his chamberlain or cupbearer. While some said that he died for joy of his victories, others deem him (Roscoe is of the number) to have been the victim of a conspiracy. But few princes died in this age without exciting the same suspicions. Guicciardini says that the king of France was suspected of causing his death; and that, to hush up the truth, the cardinal of Medicis stopped investigation. But France was incapable of such an act. That Leo died otherwise than by a natural death is, at least, very problematic.

Leo X. has now been presented to the reader as a sovereign and a statesman; in the latter character by no means in so favourable a light as general opinion, influenced by his panegyrists, is disposed to view him. That to keep up the balance of power was his maxim and aim, cannot be denied; but how often did petty and individual ambition lead him to run counter to it? As to his acting on the more daring principle of expelling foreigners from Italy, this appears more a dream of historians than aught else. Guicciardini seems to have taken the just estimate of Leo's merits as a politician, in considering him far superior in personal address and diplomacy to Julius II., but inferior to that pontiff in soundness and loftiness of view, as well as in steadiness of conduct. His interference with the affairs of Europe was, except in his first act, — the following up the treaty of Julius, — always dishonest and perfidious, seldom happy. Yet for this Leo has been lauded, whilst for his conduct with respect to Luther he has been outrageously censured. The extension of the scope of indulgences was certainly both a crime and an imprudence; and to have given up the absurdity, as soon as

it was resisted, would have been the best course next to having never issued them. But here censure ends: in his subsequent treatment of Luther, Leo showed himself mild, placable, adroit. Rational and fair he could not be. He was the high-priest of abuses,— living by them, breathing them, sworn to support them. Conduct other than that pursued could not be expected of him; nor is it probable that earlier severity could have produced any better effect. The combustibles were laid, the spark had fallen, and the explosion was inevitable. No address, no feeling, no power could then have long delayed in Europe a general protest against the usurpations of the popedom.

Leo is, however, criminal in having offered by his private life ample causes of accusation against the church and the creed which he represented and ruled. On ascending the papal throne, he seemed to have thrown off all the restraint of morals, of decorum, of justice. His elevation communicated to him even the vices most foreign to his character. By nature mild and easy, he became cruel and sanguinary; he tortured and murdered men whom he entrapped by promises of safety. Generous and prodigal, he became avaricious, seeking money by the most criminal means. It has been remarked, that those who have been kept over-strictly in their childhood are apt to make themselves amends by licentious manhood. This was the case with Leo. He "was never a boy," says one of his biographers. His very growth was passed in hypocrisy, the natural spirits and gaiety of childhood being kept down by the necessity of supporting the gravity of the cardinal. He reached the pontificate through years of discipline and restraint; and no sooner did he reach it, than he looked upon his task as concluded, and his hours of pleasure come. From that day, says Sismondi, he "regarded life as a continued carnival," its chief duty being enjoyment. Hunting, of which he was passionately fond, gave him excitement and exercise. Then feasts, excess

of conviviality, and all species of buffoonery, filled up the remaining hours of the day. But he most delighted in what the French call *persiflage*, for which we have no better name than *quizzing*. To persuade a poor amateur that he was an accomplished musician, a wretched poet that he rivalled Dante and Petrarch, and then to dash the cup of delusion from the lips of the victim whilst in the full intoxication of ridiculous vanity, was the supreme delight of Leo and his court.

The pontiff, however, had other and redeeming tastes and pursuits,—a love of literature and of the arts, which has tended more than his exploits to render his name illustrious. Never, certainly, did taste make such progress as in the first twenty years of the century. Too much of the credit of this has, no doubt, been attributed to Leo; but much remains still due to him. Not to re-enumerate his founding of colleges, professorships, printing presses, academies, the favour and consideration which he showed to letters, and to their cultivators, raised a spirit of exertion and emulation, less manifest in epics or works of genius than in the improvement of the Italian tongue, and of the good and sound sense that came to give it dignity and strength. All Leo's patronage did not produce a great poet; the pontiff could not appreciate Ariosto. But Bembo wrote under his eye, and Guicciardini was formed in his school. The arts, however, are departments of taste more under the influence of the great than letters; and Leo possessed Raphael. It is singular that a pontiff who so prided himself on his discrimination and patronage should have been unfortunate enough to slight two such men as Ariosto and Michel Angelo. That he did so, is too true. His predecessor, Julius, without Leo's talents, was more fortunate. He fostered Michel Angelo, and brought his powers forth, as he did those of Raphael. He commenced St. Peter's church, too, on its present magnificent scale; anticipating Leo in those rich sources of glory. The characters of the two pontiffs are,

indeed, truly seen, and nicely contrasted, in their favourite artists. Julius preferred the impetuous, soaring, gigantic spirit of Michel Angelo, whose temper and powers of mind were congenial to his own: Leo loved more the graceful and delicate Raphael.

CARDINAL GRANVELLE, AND MAURICE OF SAXONY.

1517—1586.

Nothing is more easy than to be liberal and wise in politics at this advanced time, and to smile with mingled pity and resentment on the folly and bigotry of our ancestors. The virtue and the wisdom of toleration, for example, in religious matters has been so fully demonstrated by experience, that few remain, even in the darkest corner of the globe, to uphold or avow the contrary principle. Three centuries, however, have not more than sufficed to teach the world this truth; and the judgment to be passed on the sovereigns or statesmen who preceded that time ought to be mitigated by this recollection.

The Reformation may, indeed, appear to us Protestants, still heated by the controversy, and in possession of much of its benefits, as an unmingled blessing. The sovereign of the sixteenth century could not have so regarded it. Schism was to him not only heresy, but he fertile source of rebellion and civil war. It was realising the dreadful words of scripture, sowing division in lieu of peace, and arming the brother against the brother. Events both past and present strengthened this feeling. The ravages which Germany had suffered from the Hussites were still remembered, and the extravagant crimes of the anabaptists came to render the reproach of corrupt morals pretty equal on both sides between popery and protestantism. In a political light, the Reformation appeared equally menacing. The disunion of the empire seemed likely to throw Europe open to the warlike Turks. On every ground of policy, Charles the Fifth was driven to attempt the destruction

of the reformers. As to toleration, it was impracticable in Germany, where the sovereign, without any other independent support than his title, was obliged to lean on either party, in order to exercise his most trivial prerogative.

Notwithstanding this palliation, the persecuting kings and ministers of the sixteenth century will never be absolved by mankind. It were vain to argue that circumstances and ignorance made them what they were. The astute Charles, the ferocious Philip, must ever remain objects of censure and hatred. Granvelle, the minister who served both, draws down upon him those feelings concentrated; so much so, that we care not to examine or take into account the merits or talents which he might have had. Maurice of Saxony, at the same time, who rescued the cause of reform from the fangs of Charles, is the object of the warmest admiration, and for the sake of his one great act we are inclined to consider even his crooked and selfish policy as wisdom, and his treachery as virtue.

Cardinal Granvelle, and Maurice elector of Saxony, are names that come together in some of the most interesting pages of history: the unusual liberty is here taken of uniting them in biography also. The strong connection, and at the same time strong contrast, betwixt them warrants the juxtaposition. Whilst Maurice was the hero of the Reformation, Granvelle was its arch-enemy, "immortalised," as Schiller says, "by the hatred of his contemporaries." He is the statesman whom the inquisition might call its own, one whose principles were severity and persecution. In his master, Philip, this conduct proceeded from bigotry and religious gloom; in Alva, from a ferocious soldier's habits and temperament; but in Granvelle it was policy, — a weighed and adopted system. Foiled in Germany by the superior artifice and active power of Maurice, the cardinal applied his system to its full extent in a new field, and where he had uncontrolled power, — in the Low Countries. The experiment is one of the most

notable in the records of history. It alone suffices to stamp religious persecution not only as one of the worst of crimes, but the most egregious of blunders, — its impolicy equalled only by its injustice.

The grandfather of cardinal Granvelle was the seignorial judge of Ornans, in Franche-Comté. The profession of the law was at that time hereditary in the families possessed of it; and the Perrenots were, in fact, the legists of that little town.* Nicholas Perrenot, father of the cardinal, from being a college acquaintance of the celebrated Gattinara at Dôle, was recommended by him as secretary to Margaret of Austria, regent of the Low Countries and countess of Burgundy. He was employed by her in negotiating or arranging the terms of the treaty of Cambray. In process of time the secretary obtained a judge's, or, as it is called, a counsellor's place in the parliament of Dôle, and in 1519 became attached as master of requests to the imperial chancery. His salary at this time allowed him to ennoble himself by the purchase of the estate, and with it the title, of Granvelle. In 1521, at the conferences of Calais, where Wolsey and Duprat met as representatives of England and France, cardinal Gattinara attended as envoy from the emperor, and he called in his protégé Granvelle to assist. From this time forth the last was distinguished by Charles V. He accompanied the emperor in all his expeditions, and was sent to France during the negotiations for the liberation of Francis, on which occasion he was detained prisoner. At length, in 1530, he was elevated to the high station of chancellor of the empire, succeeding his friend and patron, cardinal Gattinara.† By his office he was now engaged on all important affairs of state. The chancellor presided at the diets of Worms and Ratisbon, assisted at the opening of the council of Trent, and died,

* Schiller and De Thou are mistaken in calling Nicholas Perrenot the son of a blacksmith.

† The title of chancellor, though given to Nicholas Perrenot almost universally by his biographers and by history, has been disputed. He was, at any rate, keeper of the seals and first counsellor of the empire.

after a long life of labours and honours, when at the diet of Augsburg, in 1550. Charles V. has himself written his chancellor's character in the secret instructions which he drew up with his own hand for the use of his son and his successor: — "No one understands state affairs better than Granvelle, especially those of Germany, Flanders, and Burgundy, as well as our relations with France and England. He has always served me with advantage. He has some failings; amongst others, a strong desire to enrich and elevate his family and friends. I have remarked this, and told him of it. But this defect, it must be owned, is common to great men, and is recompensed by great qualities and rare talents. Wherefore I advise that you should keep him about your person, have him in the council of Flanders, and take his advice upon foreign affairs. I know also," continued the emperor, "that Granvelle has taken great pains to form his son, the bishop of Arras; and I reckon that his labour in this respect will not have been thrown away."

Anthony Perrenot, this son, and the second of the chancellor's children, was born at Besançon in 1517, and by his vivacity and promise excited the hopes and called forth the attention of his father, more than did either of his brothers. He was in consequence set early to study, and sent, as soon as his years admitted, to the university of Padua, then the most renowned in Europe. The high station and influence of his father, as well as his own talents and taste for study, soon procured for young Granvelle, then but fourteen, the friendship of those distinguished men of letters, Bembo and Sadolet. The epistles of both bear witness to the connection. Bembo, on one occasion, writes, in the querulous tone of a ruined and despairing man, to crave the aid of Granvelle in some difficulty. The epistle is dated 1539, which was also the year of Bembo's appointment as cardinal. It might have had some reference to his elevation.

Granvelle was but fourteen years of age when appointed apostolical prothonotary by Clement VII. His father,

then at Antwerp, recalled him from Padua to finish his studies at Louvain. He was soon after presented to the emperor, and promoted by him, at the chancellor's solicitation, to the abbacy of St. Vincent at Besançon, and to the bishopric of Arras. A great impediment to the advancement of the rising prelate and statesman — terms then nearly synonymous — was his want of high birth. His father had purchased and procured his title only the year after that in which his son was born. Nobility was requisite for some new place to which the bishop aspired; and he sought to procure this qualification by subterfuge. He demanded to be made canon of Liege: this implied noble birth; but proofs were requisite. He promised documents setting forth that his grandfather was châtelain, or lord, of Ornans. In fact he had been but *juge châtelain*, or lord's judge; but the word *judge* was erased or omitted. By this trick he did become canon of Liege; but, as the story got wind, it tended merely to render more notorious that the ancestors of Granvelle were not altogether what he would have had them.

The young bishop of Arras having ennobled himself by church dignity, turned himself henceforth exclusively to state affairs. He accompanied his father to the diets of Worms and Ratisbon in 1540 and 1541, and made his first essay as a public or political personage in the following year, when charged to address the council of Trent in the name of the emperor. His harangue threw all the blame of the war just excited upon the French king, who was accused of "disturbing the peace of Christendom at a time when the present council was called for the purpose of religious concord; and of allying with the Turks, those enemies of the Christian name." Granvelle showed the petulant temper of youth in the acrimony of his address, which was highly applauded for its eloquence by the imperial party.

When hostilities broke out, the bishop repaired to Flanders, where his diocese was situated. But his chief

employment here was to carry on negotiations to induce Henry VIII. to prefer the alliance of the emperor to that of France. In this he succeeded. Henry promised to invade France with an English army; and, simultaneously with an imperial one from the north, march boldly upon Paris. But neither monarch had the hardihood or constancy to execute this scheme. Henry sat down before Boulogne, and pressed the siege; upon which Charles despatched the bishop of Arras to reproach him for this breach of their stipulations, and to urge the English monarch to march southwards, as had been agreed. Henry VIII. returned a rude answer, and refused to raise the siege of Boulogne. Soon after, in 1544, the peace of Crêpy, was concluded between the emperor and Francis; the chancellor Granvelle being the imperial plenipotentiary, his son attended, and assisted him throughout the negotiation. The Granvelles were considered friends of peace, and were accused, on this account, of having made too many sacrifices to Francis. But from the articles it appears, that they made none, except vain promises never to be fulfilled. The French had every way the disadvantage in this peace.*

The efforts of Charles were now turned to subdue the protestants of Germany, which he could only hope to effect by united artifice and force. To deceive, to divide, to lull and weaken them at the same time, was his object; and certainly never was dissimulation more profound and treacherous than that made use of by the emperor. The Granvelles were his agents and ministers in the forming and furthering of his project. It was now that they first met the person destined to counterplot and deceive the deceivers. This was Maurice of Saxony, of whose family and early life it is necessary to give some account.

Frederick the Good, elector of Saxony, left two sons; Ernest, who succeeded him in 1464; and Albert, who

* "Quand on promet une province ou une autre, il est clair qu'on ne donnera aucune des deux." — *Voltaire.*

inherited from his uncle a portion of the ancient Thuringia, narrow in extent, although now one of the most important parts of Germany, containing Leipzig and Dresden. Albert left two sons, George and Henry; the former of whom fixed his court at Dresden, whilst the latter, with a very limited authority, and domain, fixed his residence at the little town of Freyberg, famous for its mines. Henry was surnamed the Pious, from his devotion, displayed in pilgrimages to Compostella and to the Holy Land. To him was born, at Freyberg, in 1521, Maurice, whose memoir the reader is about to peruse. The younger son of a younger son, his hopes of hereditary fortune were feeble. On this account, as well as from the thoughtful disposition of the boy, his father destined Maurice to the church. With this view he was despatched to the court of Albert, archbishop of Magdeburg, in 1533, with the hopes of his acquiring the tastes and habits requisite for an ecclesiastical life. This court, although a prelate's, was one of the gayest and most dissipated in Germany. Albert, it may be remembered, charged with the sale of indulgences by Leo X., had entrusted them to Tetzel; and by this imprudence was instrumental in producing the Reformation. This bishop was a licentious spendthrift, reduced to employ every expedient for supplying his expenses. In this school young Maurice imbibed little love for the church or respect for catholicism. An event soon occurred to divert him from both.

This was the conversion of his father to the reformed creed. Duke George, the elder brother of Henry, was a most zealous catholic, and, by consequence, a bitter enemy of the elector of Saxony, the head of the family, and the chief of the Lutherans. As George, however, had no children except an idiot boy, the elector hoped to win over Henry, the heir of the duchy, to his opinion. For this purpose, he sent Schenkius from Wittemberg, in 1536, to the little court of Freyberg, in order to make converts of the prince and his court to protestantism. His zeal at first produced dissensions.

The reformer was silenced. He renewed his exertions; and duke Henry, at last shaken, began to avow his preference of the reformed doctrines. As soon as this took place, his son Maurice of course left the court of the archbishop Albert, and went to reside with his uncle, duke George, at Dresden, in 1538.* Here young Maurice found himself in an embarrassing position. His father and uncle were at variance; and Maurice, incited to become a protestant by the advice of the one, and taunted on account of his parent's heresy by the other, was kept in that state of uncertainty, and indifference to either sect, which adhered to his character, and allowed him afterwards to consult prudence and ambition, without being turned aside by bigotry or zeal. The hospitality and protection which he received from duke George were less cordial and kindly on account of these differences, whilst the spirits and talents of young Maurice were rather excited than crushed by the state of dependence in which he was placed. An anecdote bears witness to his early ambition. On the death of the last count of Leisning, he asked his uncle for the fief, and was refused with the following taunt, —"Oh, Maurice, Maurice, it appears as if all Saxony would suit you well." The future proved duke George's penetration right.

Duke Henry upon his conversion sought to enter the Smalcaldic league. He needed this protection against the enmity of his brother. The members of the league hesitated to admit Henry, doubting that he enjoyed independent sovereignty in his small states. However, he was received, and requested by the league to remove his son Maurice from Dresden to some other court where he might imbibe "purer doctrine." The prince was accordingly recalled from Dresden, and sent to reside with the elector, John Frederick, who favoured the youth, and developed his talents. Maurice, here, also

* Arnold, in Vita Mauricii, makes Maurice reside with his uncle George, and then with the cardinal Albert; but it is evident from Seckendorf that the prince was recalled from George's court, in 1558, at the instigation of the Smalcaldic league.

displayed his vivacity and ambition, so much so, that Luther, being asked by the emperor what he thought of the prince, is said to have bade John Frederick beware "lest he was nourishing a young lion."

Duke George died soon after, and was succeeded by the father of Maurice. The young prince, in consequence, returned to Dresden. But, seeking to meddle with the government, he incurred the enmity of his mother, and of the nobles of the country, and was obliged to leave his father's court. He took refuge at Cassel with the landgrave of Hesse, and married Agnes, the daughter of this prince, in 1541, without the knowledge or consent of his parents. They showed their resentment for the neglect by stopping his allowance. There seems to have been two parties at Dresden: one composed of old duke George's counsellors, who of course were zealous catholics; the other of duke Henry's friends, zealous protestants. The latter were for introducing the reformed doctrine by force, and in consequence committing much injustice, and exciting serious enmity. The nobles, especially, felt aggrieved by having the daughters whom they had thrust into nunneries, and so provided for, thrown back upon their hands. Maurice, though a protestant, recommended more moderation and tolerance, and on this account was repudiated as lukewarm by his father and his counsellors; whilst the catholics and partisans of the last duke rallied round him, though protestant, as the future heir of the duchy, and as a tolerant prince. They accordingly advanced him funds in his distresses, and had not long to wait in order to experience his gratitude: duke Henry died in 1541.

Maurice now succeeded to the duchy. His first act was to eject from power the members of his father's council, taking in lieu those of his uncle. The preference of catholics on the part of this young and protestant prince, although he was led to it by the private feuds of the duchy, had, nevertheless, the effect of estranging Maurice from the Smalcaldic league and the general cause of

the reformation. It also excited enmity betwixt him and the elector of Saxony, his relative. The latter interfered, and expostulated on behalf of Schomberg, and others of the protestant party, whom Maurice felt himself driven to punish and to crush. The present advisers of the young prince, too, were old enemies of the elector, and their artifices and suggestions fanned the rising enmity and jealousy of Maurice towards the elector, which has unjustly been considered as the effect of mere selfishness and grasping ambition.

Report assigned the enmity of Maurice to his having been formerly punished for gambling by the elector. But history affords sufficient cause for quarrel betwixt them. The elector, soon after Maurice's accession, supported Phlug, a counsellor of the late duke, in his pretensions to the bishopric of Naumburg, which Maurice claimed to dispose of himself. He also took possession of Wurtzen, alleging that the taxes for repelling the Turks had not been paid. Maurice resolved to protect Wurtzen from the elector, and raised forces for that purpose. The campaign lasted but a few days, the landgrave of Hesse and Luther himself interfering, to prevent a civil war between the two princes of Saxony. A reconciliation, however, never took place between them.

The great reproach made by the emperor to the protestant princes was, that their dissensions and suspicions gave impunity and victory to the Turks. When Ferdinand, therefore, sent an army into Hungary in 1541, Maurice, impelled by martial ardour and love of fame, resolved to wash away from himself at least this reproach. He led in person a considerable force against the Turks. "One day," says Sleidan, "he sallied forth from the camp with a single follower, and met some Turks with whom he began to skirmish. But, his horse being killed under him, he was thrown senseless on the earth. Therefore, his follower (Von Reipitsch) flung himself across the body of his master, and beat off a crowd of enemies, until time was allowed for some Ger-

man knights to come to his rescue. The brave follower of the duke was brought to the camp covered with wounds, and died soon after."

On his return to Germany, Maurice ruled his little territory in moderation and wisdom, endeavouring to avoid the heats and extremes of contending parties. Thus, being again invited to join the Smalcaldic league, he refused; professing, nevertheless, his undisturbed attachment to the protestant doctrines. To advance the cause of the Reformation, Maurice employed the true and only justifiable means, the care of education and the extension of learning. With this view he founded three large schools in different towns of his dominions, endowing professorships and teachers with the ecclesiastical funds. To complete the education of the youth here instructed, the duke founded a hundred scholarships or stipends at the university of Leipzig, giving them a mansion and allowances for poorer students. All the ecclesiastical property, that in other reformed countries became the prey of the nobility or the crown, was assigned by Maurice to the sacred purpose of education. In addition to these regulations, his laws for preserving purity of morals were rigid, and of antique severity. According to Sleidan, he punished adultery with death, and, by enacting that marriage should not legitimise children previously born, he checked the licentious manners of the time.* There was some need of this, in order to rescue the cause of protestantism from the stain cast upon it, not only by the anabaptists, but even by its most respectable supporters.

Thus wise in his internal administration, Maurice was no less prudent in his view of German politics. His enmity with the elector, as well as his dislike to play an inferior part, alienated him from the Smalcaldic league, and attached him to the emperor. Charles, bent on dividing the protestants, and winning at least one of their chiefs, had at first, through the elder Granvelle, directed his compliments and promises towards the

landgrave; but since duke Maurice had displayed his valour, his talents, and his freedom from bigotry, it was to him that the emperor transferred his attention. Hence, Maurice aided the emperor in the war with France; he was in person at the siege of Landreci, in 1543; and also accompanied the emperor in his invasion of France during the following year, the ill success of which brought on the peace of Crêpy.

The progress of the Reformation (the archbishop of Cologne having lately become a convert) had no small influence in compelling Charles to this peace. His whole care and arts, aided by those of the Granvelles, his ministers, were now turned to combat this more formidable enemy. Open force was no longer efficient, and the most profound dissimulation was necessary in order to quiet the suspicions of the protestant princes, whilst the emperor was secretly preparing a force to crush them. The letters of Granvelle breathed cordiality and peace; and when the landgrave expressed his suspicion to their statesmen, their politic replies removed his doubts. One of the manœuvres of Charles was the armament and expedition of Henry of Brunswick at this time against the Smalcaldic league, which he would not have undertaken without the emperor's secret acquiescence. The landgrave, as well as Maurice, armed against him; the latter, however, with the purposes more of an arbiter than a partisan. When Henry was beaten by the landgrave, Maurice interfered, and prevented the landgrave from crushing him altogether. Maurice in this year made overtures to his father-in-law, the landgrave of Hesse; proposing an alliance between him and the elector of Saxony, which would be more manageable, and less obnoxious to the emperor, than the Smalcaldic league, yet, at the same time, in his opinion, an equal protection to reform. In this, he offers to settle his differences with the elector; and one part of his proposal is, to march their united forces against the Turks. A variety of opinions may be formed respecting this proposal. It may be con-

sidered as honest and sincere, with a view to reconcile the cause of reform with the interests of the emperor. A mind like that of Maurice may be easily conceived to be weary of the petty squabbles of theologians, and angry that their sophistical distinctions and arguments should cause mutual hatred and the spilling of blood betwixt Christian princes; whilst the Turks, the natural enemies of the Christian name and European race, offered a worthy foe to the warrior, and their frontier the worthiest field for the exercise of military and heroic ambition. Others, however, may look on the proposal of Maurice as the effect of intrigue and crooked policy, or an attempt to draw the landgrave away from his alliance and connection with the elector. In this he may have been serving and obeying the suggestions of the emperor and his wily council, without being made wholly cognizant of the designs of Charles.

According to Arnold, Maurice entertained the elector and other princes in the castle of Schellenberg; but the visit ended in nothing more than a hunting and drinking party, to the excesses of which young Ernest of Schomberg fell a victim. John Frederick himself, in spite of his grave character of chief of the Reformation, felt also the consequences of intemperance; and Maurice had a fit of illness from which the care of physicians alone recovered him. Arnold, the biographer of the latter, seeks to excuse these great men for their intemperance, alleging how largely the Greeks drank; but owning that drunkenness was the peculiar sin "with which the devil afflicted Germany." A better and more probable excuse would have been the effort to drown animosities existing between the parties in the fumes of convivial excess. This, however, did not succeed. Seckendorf says merely that the elector rejected the proffers of Maurice, and refused to confide in him.

Maurice was certainly confirmed in his enmity towards John Frederick, although the relations of civility still existed between them; the latter announcing Luther's death to the duke, and receiving, in return, protestations

of fidelity to the faith of the reformers. Charles, too, professed his anxiety to accommodate the differences betwixt the relatives, although his plan for subduing the protestants was chiefly based upon their disunion. The depriving princes of their states for treason or heresy had been often practised in Germany. The late duke George had, by will, disinherited Maurice if he refused to re-adopt catholicism, appointing the emperor as his heir in that case; and this was one potent cause in impelling Maurice at first to ingratiate himself with Charles. Henry of Brunswick had claimed the duchy of Saxony on account of the resistance of its prince to Rome, and had taken up arms to support his claim. Charles determined upon the same plea to strip the present elector of his dominions, and to offer them as a bribe to secure the co-operation of Maurice. That ambitious personage acceded to the proposal, and the terms seem to have been arranged betwixt him and Charles at Ratisbon, in June, 1546, on which occasion they had long and secret conferences. Maurice, from Ratisbon, betook himself instantly to Prague, where Ferdinand, Charles's brother, resided. The emperor then marched against the Smalcaldic league, issuing against the elector an edict of exile, which he sent to Maurice at Prague, requiring him to take upon himself the guardianship of his relative's territories, lest they might fall into discord, or into the hands of some adventurer unconnected with the family.

Maurice seemed now to entertain considerable qualms on entering upon his course of treachery; and, as it was customary with the kings of England, when they had any signal act of murder or injustice to perform, to obtain the sanction of their parliament for that purpose, so now Maurice assembled the states of his little duchy. To them he represented how grieved he was at the war which had taken place, whilst the Turks offered themselves as the only worthy foe. He affected complete indifference and neutrality on the present question; but, as the emperor had prayed him to occupy the electorate, and as, in default of his doing so, the undisciplined

Bohemian soldiers of the archduke Ferdinand's army would invade and infallibly ravage it, were it not better for him to take possession of these the family territories? There were mines, too, within their limits, half the produce of which belonged to him. Besides, his own duchy and the electorate were so intermingled, that foreign soldiers could scarcely be brought to recognise the sacredness of the frontiers, and refrain from pillage. The assembly returned to Maurice for answer, that he should warn the elector and landgrave of the approach and menaced invasion of Ferdinand's Bohemian troops, and beg of them to permit him to occupy and guard the electorate. Maurice followed this advice; writing principally to the landgrave, and begging him to persuade the elector: he at the same time entreated both to submit to the emperor.

Before the letters of Maurice arrived at the elector's camp, the latter had heard that the Bohemian army threatened his territories. Not wishing, however, to write himself to Maurice, he engaged his son to do so, and beg Maurice to defend the lands of Saxony: that prince instantly replied by a refusal to declare war against the emperor. On their side, the landgrave and the elector refused to agree to the proposition of Maurice, whom they suspected: but he determined to act without their sanction, and invade the electorate forthwith, in company with the very Bohemians and Hungarians whose invasion he deprecated. No sooner was the conduct of Maurice known, than a burst of maledictions assailed his name and his treachery. He was the Judas, the betrayer of the protestant cause. "Crowds of books and rhymes, very bitter and poignant, were published to his dishonour," accusing him of that depth of hypocrisy and ambition from which it would be very difficult to clear him. Maurice published an exculpation of his conduct, and sought to disprove the host of accusations, professing himself merely obedient to the emperor, though firm in protestantism; determined, he said, "to give, indeed, to God that which was God's,

but also to Cæsar that which was Cæsar's," — his temporal obedience and support.

The conduct of Maurice was the ruin of the reformed cause and league for the time: their army broke up, the elector being obliged to lead the greater portion of it to recover the electorate. Arriving there in December, 1546, he defied Maurice in an angry manifesto, likening that prince to Doeg. The latter could not stand in the field before his more powerful adversary, and lost immediately not only the electorate, but his own duchy, Leipzig and Dresden alone resisting. The emperor at first sent troops to his assistance; and these being beaten, Maurice was obliged to fly for aid to Ferdinand, who had promised to support him with his Bohemians. These were protestants, and refused to crush their brothers of Saxony. The emperor himself was obliged to march his army into Saxony, which he was enabled to do by the submission of Wurtemberg.

The events of this campaign are well known. In the battle of Muhlberg, the elector of Saxony was defeated and taken. Maurice had been already declared elector in place of his relative, and at the same time first marshal: he fought in the emperor's vanguard at the battle of Muhlberg, and was, of course, after it, confirmed in that dignity, the great object of his ambition. The landgrave of Hesse was not yet reduced; but, being without hopes of resistance, the emperor demanded his unconditional submission. To this his son-in-law, Maurice, advised him; reckoning upon his own services to the emperor as the pledge that he would be leniently treated.

There is no circumstance more curious, or more often exemplified in history, than the facility with which the most accomplished and habitual deceivers place confidence in others. Maurice relied perfectly on Charles; and, as he could not perceive that it was that sovereign's interest to affront him, he reckoned on his compliance as certain: Maurice, therefore, persuaded the landgrave to submit. When the latter insisted upon certain conditions, Maurice overeruled his objections and suspicions,

promising, on his own responsibility, fair treatment, liberality, and tolerance. Relying on this, the landgrave put himself into Charles's power, and a treaty was put before him to sign conformably to what had been promised, but rendered null by an article declaring that the emperor should interpret it as he pleased. He objected: Maurice, as his friend, urged him not to insist on mere details; whilst Granvelle asserted that the objectionable article was but a matter of form; and the unfortunate landgrave yielded. The emperor received his submission, and then ordered him to prison. This seemed done by Charles on purpose to mortify Maurice. The emperor esteemed the elector sufficiently paid for his treachery: his Austrian and Spanish pride was jealous of the assumption of Maurice; and, deeming he might do so now with security, Charles did not shrink from humbling and mortifying that prince. Never was the slight on one side, and the consequent pique on the other, productive of more important consequences.

Granvelle is accused by some writers of a most culpable piece of treachery towards the landgrave,—the substituting the word *ewiger* for *einiger*,—words very similar in appearance and sound,—thus stipulating that the elector should not suffer *perpetual* captivity; whilst he imagined that not *any* captivity was guaranteed. But however he may have over-reached the landgrave, this species of circumstantial deceit is not proved against Granvelle.

The ceremony in which the unfortunate landgrave humbled himself before Charles, in expectation of complete pardon, is well called a "mystery" by Sleidan. He was asked, along with Maurice and other guests, to sup at the duke of Alva's; and there, after a game of dice, the duke and the bishop of Arras informed him that he was a prisoner. Maurice remonstrated with Granvelle and with the emperor, but could gain nothing beyond fair words, although he persuaded the landgrave to follow without resistance the emperor's court, in the hopes

that such obsequiousness might abate the rigour of Charles. But the conqueror was inexorable; and Maurice, though dishonoured and hurt, was obliged to dissemble his resentment.

The new elector, in establishing himself in the dominions of his unfortunate relative, sought to conciliate the protestants, whose cause his treacherous conduct had so lately destroyed. He received with great cordiality, at Leipzig, Melancthon and the other divines of Wittenberg, assigning them pensions, and intrusting to them, as of old, the control of education and of the church.

Both Maurice and the bishop of Arras were at the assembly of Augsburg, in August this year. The former held out for some time against the council of Trent; but the cajoleries of Charles at length obtained his consent; whilst the arts of Granvelle equally prevailed on the deputies of the imperial towns to desist from their opposition. Maurice, on this occasion, again received promises of the landgrave's liberation; but Charles, as usual, found means to evade the engagement: his public investiture with the electorate of Saxony in the diet of Augsburg was a favour granted to Maurice, that took away all the bitterness of his remonstrances. Sleidan describes this ceremony at length. The emperor's seat, raised and covered, was erected in the market-place of Augsburg. Thither Charles came in his imperial robes, attended by the electors. Some of the nobles then advanced, and asked the electoral arms for Maurice. It is remarkable that Henry of Brunswick, Maurice's old rival, was the chief of these demanders. "Let himself make the same request," replied the emperor, by the mouth of the elector of Mentz. Maurice then came forward with all the ensigns and escutcheons of the country that he claimed. The grant of the electorate was then read. The emperor presented the new sovereign with a sword and with the armorial flags, which he afterwards threw amongst the people. What was most cruel in the ceremony was, that John

Frederic, the dethroned elector, beheld it from the window of his lodging. "May he and his descendants enjoy their dignity!" was all the reflection of the pious prince.*

Whilst Maurice thus, as the price of his new dignity, gave his support to the emperor in his arbitrary measures, the bishop of Arras thought it better that he should not meddle in the affair of the *Interim*, which might ruin his interest at Rome. A plan of reforming ecclesiastical morals and discipline was, indeed, drawn out by him; but he wisely refused to meddle with dogmas. Leaving the emperor and his warriors to their ecclesiastical cares, Granvelle sought and obtained an employment more to his taste, and which removed him from the scene: this was, to reduce the town of Constance to the imperial dominion, and to orthodoxy. Constance offered a large sum as the price of its freedom and choice of creed; but Granvelle was bent on reducing it by force. A considerable number of the inhabitants were ready to favour any attempt that he might undertake. Accordingly, he employed Vives, a Spanish officer, brother of Ludovicus Vives,—a name famous in the early literature of Europe,—with 5000 men, to surprise the town. The design was discovered; Vives was defeated and slain. Granvelle was grievously mortified at this blow given to his reputation. He instantly re-commenced his preparations and intrigues, and, on a second occasion, was more fortunate; his troops forcing their way into Constance, and making themselves masters of this stubborn city. From Constance, Granvelle was despatched to Rome to make excuses to the pope about the affair of the *Interim;* and from thence he returned to join the emperor in Flanders. When Philip arrived in the Low Countries, it was the bishop of Arras that the emperor sent to welcome and conduct

* It may not be known to every reader that the present king of Saxony is descended from Maurice's brother, and is a catholic; whilst the elder and ousted branch still survives in the families of Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, and Saxe-Coburg.

him to Brussels. He also acted as spokesman for the young prince, and asked the Flemings, in Philip's name, for their hearts. Granvelle took the utmost advantage of his position, by ingratiating himself with Philip, whose good opinion and confidence he gained, and ever after preserved.

Granvelle is accused by De Thou of a criminal complaisance towards his masters, and of the adoption of opinions which he knew to be pleasing to them. It was probably in order to win Philip's good-will irrevocably, and that of his courtiers, that he now adopted those extreme principles of bigotry and severity which Philip had acquired from nature and education. To Philip's and to Granvelle's influence over Charles were attributed the harsh edicts now published in Belgium, proclaiming and establishing the inquisition and its principles. The resistance of the people of Antwerp, and the menaced retreat of all English and German merchants from Flanders, suspended, indeed, the execution of a decree which, however, must be noted as the first symptom of that feeling of which Granvelle was the origin, and the independence of the United Provinces the final effect. Soon after, the emperor and Philip journeyed from Brussels to Augsburg, accompanied by the bishop of Arras; who, about this time (1550), succeeded to all the influence and dignity of his father. The chancellor had been for some time declining in health, and had retired to his native air of Franche-Comté. The assembling of the diet of Augsburg, however, attracted the old minister, who loved the bustle of affairs. He came there; but died soon after his arrival. "The emperor," writes Marillac, the French envoy, to his court, "so honoured the elder Granvelle, that he made all the states of the empire assist at his funeral. The duke of Alva and his suite led the procession, all habited in black cloth. But De Retz and La Chaux, Burgundians, attended merely in silk, to testify their enmity to the deceased. In spite of the magnificence of the funeral, the Germans drank more

wine than they shed tears, alleging the avarice and rapacity of the defunct.* Charles gave the seals of the empire to the bishop of Arras, son of the late chancellor, who, however, did not assume the title.

The elector Maurice seemed in the mean time to pursue the difficult aim of pleasing and conciliating all parties. On his return from Augsburg, he held an assembly; and having induced his divines, Melancthon among the rest, to draw up a list of such articles of faith and ceremony as might be considered indifferent, a formulary was agreed on and received, which, though not so catholic as Charles's *Interim*, was still a kind of compromise betwixt the zealots on either side. For this he was furiously reproached by the inveterate protestants, especially by those of Magdeburg and other free towns. Melancthon, who was included in these censures, replied to this, that "some compulsion might be submitted to, provided it did not amount to impiety." Maurice, to pay his court to the imperial family, went with a large suite to meet the infante Philip at Trent, and accompanied him to Mantua and Venice, where he was honourably received by the senate. He took this opportunity of beseeching the prince's interference in behalf of the landgrave; and Philip promised to speak to his father on the subject. It appeared, however, that Maurice did not succeed so well as Granvelle in ingratiating himself with the Spanish prince and his court. The influence of these with Charles, together with the jealousy and dislike of the Saxon prince, is said to be one great cause of his subsequent defection.

It is very uncertain at what time Maurice began to entertain the project of turning against the emperor. From a passage in a letter to Marillac, the French envoy, to his sovereign, written from the diet of Augsburg, it appears that there were secret communications betwixt the French court and the Saxon prince, who is called in the correspondence "an old friend of the French crown;" and it is recommended to concert

* Letter in Ribier.

with Maurice, by means of "a certain Italian," how best to thwart the views of the emperor in the diet.* Without seeking to deny the gross dissimulation of Maurice of Saxony, the accusations of gratuitous treachery against him may, in some degree, be met by proofs that his enmities, however made to harmonise with his interest, were still conceived upon just grounds, and not feigned, or undertaken from mere ambition. Thus legitimate and long-existing causes of difference existed betwixt him and the captive elector whom he had ruined; and Charles now gave him ample ground for enmity in his still retaining the landgrave prisoner. Maurice, too, had hoped to have had some influence with the emperor, and to persuade him to that tolerance and moderation which had guided his own conduct. Now, however, Charles had fallen under the influence of the Spaniards and of Granvelle, who made himself their organ and their echo; and in the late edicts, establishing the inquisition in Flanders, Maurice saw enough to make him tremble for the protestants, and for himself. The elector, alarmed in consequence, and abandoned to his own counsel, took his measures independently of Charles. He turned for support to the French king and to the protestants. But these whom he had betrayed were averse and slow to trust him. Prudently, therefore, awaiting an opportunity of showing his sincerity, and in the mean time not to fall betwixt the enmity of both, he dissembled, made court to Charles, and affected his habitual zeal for the imperial interest.

Germany had been placed at the feet of Charles by the victory of Muhlberg. Not a prince resisted him. The free towns of the southern portion of the empire had been compelled to submit. Two or three in the north still held out in the cause of protestantism. Magdeburg was the principal of these. Charles urged the

* See in Ribier the plausible reasons and inducements held out by the French envoy to Maurice and the refractory towns to assist the emperor, tom. ii. p. 282.

duke of Mecklenburg to reduce it. He made an attack during the diet of Augsburg; and the elector, Maurice, ever seizing, like the great Ximenes, a pretext for raising and entertaining troops, marched also against Magdeburg. But it was only to witness the check received by young Mecklenburg. The emperor then pressed the diet to send a sufficient force against Magdeburg. He had himself (so much was Charles already ruled by the avarice that beset him in his advanced years) dismissed these troops, and even sent away the artillery which had subdued the protestants. The diet acquiesced in his demand, and proposed Maurice to command the army. There can be no doubt that the members had reason to suspect Maurice's yearnings after independence, and that they wished to raise him up as a counterpoise to the emperor, whose aim of procuring the succession of the empire to his son they were at this very moment struggling against. But Charles divined neither the artifices of Maurice nor the views of the diet, and he, in consequence, acquiesced in the elector's appointment to the command.

Maurice, by this elevation, obtained funds. He laid siege to Magdeburg in November, 1550, and at first carried on his operations with vigour. He did not cease to demand the liberation of the landgrave; thus providing himself with a pretext for his future conduct. Maurice had spent a part of his youth at Magdeburg, at the court of its archbishop. He must have been known to many of the citizens, and must as a protestant have sympathised in their distress. Parleys became frequent between the besieged and besiegers, and an understanding must have existed betwixt them and Maurice. In a sortie, made by the besieged, the troops of the duke of Mecklenburg suffered rout, and the duke himself was taken prisoner.

This relieved the elector from a troublesome colleague. When a body of auxiliaries marched to reinforce the garrison of Magdeburg, Maurice surprised them, and persuaded the greater part of them to

join the besieging army. Even their commander, Heidec, an officer banished by Charles, was taken into the confidence of Maurice, and intrusted by him with the command of Leipzig. The elector, too, withheld their pay from the imperial soldiers, seeking to disgust, and drive from the service such as were not attached to him. The siege of Magdeburg lasted a twelvemonth: it at length surrendered on fair conditions, granted by Maurice, he himself retaining for his purposes the chief authority in the town.

The council of Trent had in the mean time commenced its sittings, and absorbed the attention of Germany. Charles fixed his residence at Innspruck, in the vicinity, in order to be near to the council and to Italy, where he had lately raised a war on account of Parma. The French king took part in this, and a secret alliance was formed against the emperor between Henry II. and Maurice. The latter had grown exceedingly urgent with Charles for the liberation of the landgrave, and proposed to place himself in the hands of the landgrave's children until he should be liberated. But Charles merely replied, like another pope, by releasing Maurice from his engagement. The elector now hastened to mature his scheme. His alliance with Denmark, with Magdeburg, Strasburg, and other German powers, as well as with France,—the latter country supplying him with a subsidy,—rendered his party strong. But there was still necessity for dissimulation, in order to take Charles by surprise.

The emperor could not have been without suspicions of Maurice. His conduct not only at Magdeburg, but his demand in behalf of the landgrave, as well as before the council of Trent, would have opened the eyes of a less wary politician. But Charles had no disposable force; and he therefore affected unshaken confidence in the Saxon prince. He sent to him to come to Innspruck, promising him the command of the army which was to invade France from Flanders.* Granvelle, the

* Ribier, tom. ii. p. 355.

confidant of the emperor, was at the same time heard to declare, in answer to those who breathed doubts of Maurice's fidelity, "that such profound schemes could never enter the heads of stupid Germans; and that, if any thing was dangerous, it was the utterance of such suspicions which might put such projects into his head." It is certain, however, that Maurice took infinite pains to deceive the emperor. To some of his counsellors whom Granvelle had bribed to betray their master's secrets, he affected his habitual confidence. All his measures and negotiations were taken with the utmost precaution; and Charles, whatever doubts he may have had of the designs of Maurice, had certainly no idea of the state of maturity to which they had been brought.

Maurice kept up his dissimulation to the last. He gave plausible excuses for the troops which he retained under arms. His theologians and envoys proceeded to the council. He himself set out to follow them, and engaged lodgings for himself in advance upon the road. Allowing the news of his coming to precede him, and allay every particle of suspicion for the time, Maurice suddenly turned bridle, reached home, and began to gather his army. The league against the emperor was immediately announced by manifestoes from the different princes. That of Maurice chiefly insisted upon the danger to religious liberty, and the landgrave's unjust captivity. The manifesto of the marquis of Brandenburg was more angry and general. It accused Charles of destroying the freedom and ancient constitution of Germany; of corrupting the diets of the empire, and rendering their independence illusory; of oppressing the country by foreign soldiers, in addition to the great grievance of seeking to crush the Reformation by force. After minutely recapitulating his persecution, tyranny, and maladministration of every kind, the manifesto of the marquis charges the emperor's minister, Anthony Perrenot, bishop of Arras, as the great counsellor and originator of all these ills. He complains first of all of

the iniquity of placing the interests of a great nation under the guidance of one man, and he, too, of a base and foreign extraction. The seals of the empire were committed to the keeping of this man, who did not even understand the German language, much less German habits or German liberty. Finally, the marquis's manifesto accused Charles of having adopted from his ministers the nefarious maxim, often in the mouth of the latter, that the edicts of princes must change according to the exigencies of the time, but the last should always command obedience under pain of death. Granvelle certainly possessing the influence here attributed to him, wielded it alike arbitrarily and imprudently. It was he, De Thou informs us, who precipitated the war to dispossess Farnese of Parma, whilst the storm was gathering in Germany, and allowed to burst without prevention upon his sovereign's head.

In the beginning of March, 1552, Maurice decidedly threw off the mask. As usual, he assembled the states of Saxony, and procured their sanction to the measures he was about to pursue. He lost no time in marching south, joined by the troops and princes of Brandenburg and Wurtemberg. Early in April he took Augsburg, and summoned all the towns of Germany to send reinforcements thither, restoring to all their municipal freedom. Those which resisted, such as Ulm, were severely taxed, and their lands wasted. The emperor's brother, Ferdinand, now intervened as a mediator, and proposed an accommodation. Maurice went to meet him; but his terms were little likely to be accepted by Charles. However, a fresh interview, and a truce in the mean time, were agreed upon. Maurice seems to have been won upon by the French envoy to anticipate this truce, and to push on, with the hope of surprising Innspruck. He had, indeed, some reason to fear that Ferdinand's negotiations were undertaken merely to gain time. He, therefore, began a sudden march across the mountains of the Tyrol. Defeating the imperialists, small in number indeed,

but most advantageously posted, Maurice took Ehresberg, overcame every difficulty, — a mutiny of his own soldiers as well as the resistance of the enemy, — and succeeded in reaching Innspruck a few hours after the emperor had quitted it. The escape of his prey was vexatious; and yet the triumph of routing the imperial court, and driving Charles before him, was advantage sufficient. When asked why he had not taken the emperor, he replied, "that he had no cage for so noble a bird." Nothing could exceed the mortification and anger of Charles. He let loose the ex-elector, to raise a competitor to Maurice — a part that John Frederic refused to [illegible] — and told the Venetian senate that if his [illegible] [illegible] not b[illegible] long [illegible]ugh to avenge the insult, he [illegible] [illegible]queath that task to his successor. Granvelle accompanied Charles in this panic flight by night. The unlucky minister was alarmed and mortified at the disaster [illegible] his counsels had brought on, and is said to have [illegible] the retreat from Innspruck mounted and ar[illegible]d ca[illegible]

The co[illegible]p[illegible]ts of Maurice were chiefly directed against Granvelle. That prince soon after met king Ferdinand at Passau, and professed himself the civil as well as the religious [illegible]ator of Germany, which he represented as ignominiously trodden under foot, not so much by the emperor himself, as by his foreign ministers, Granvelle and Alva. The demands of Maurice were moderate, — the equality of protestants with catholics in all privileges, and the liberation of the landgrave. Charles hesitated, and made use of his usual delays. But Maurice laying siege to Frankfort, Charles yielded, and the treaty of Passau was signed. This peace does Maurice immortal honor, and is indeed sufficient to counterbalance every appearance of falsehood in his conduct. True to his unfortunate relative, he liberated him at every risk, vindicating the independence at once of Germany and of protestantism. Had Maurice been merely an ambitious prince, he might have followed up the war, in conjunction with

Henry II., and carved out for himself an ample kingdom. His associates were so enraged at his taking no more advantage of his success, that they almost all abandoned him, and continued in arms. But Maurice at Passau seems not to have had a selfish wish, and to have been actuated by purely patriotic and German feelings. He showed a proper jealousy of the French king's conquests; and, though firm in compelling the emperor to his own terms, those terms were moderate and just. To procure them, he even volunteered to march into Hungary himself against the Turks; a chivalric war with the infidel being, in the midst of all his necessary dissimulation and policy, the uppermost thought and project of his mind.

It may be supposed, however, that one reason of Maurice's preferring the war in Hungary was reluctance to find himself opposed to his late ally, the French king, on whom Charles seemed determined especially to avenge his late affronts. Maurice returned for a time into his electorate, and there collecting an army of 16,000 men, conducted it down the valley of the Danube into Hungary. The season was advanced when he arrived there; and it being the policy of king Ferdinand not to hazard a battle, Maurice, sharing the command with another general, and at the head of but inconsiderable forces, was able to achieve no exploit worthy of his name. The operations, trifling in themselves, were interrupted by negotiations; and the Hungarians, as much harassed by their German auxiliaries as by the Turks, persuaded Ferdinand to make peace. Maurice returned with his army into Saxony.

The emperor, in the mean time, had been repulsed from before Metz; and ill fortune did not diminish his resentment against Maurice. To gratify his hatred, he excited Albert of Brandenburg with a numerous army to harass the princes and prelates of Germany whom the treaty of Passau had restored to independence. The chamber of the empire at Spires called on Maurice once more to defend them, and to chastise this rapa-

cious adventurer. Maurice readily consented, seeing that he himself was principally aimed at. The old elector was renewing his claims: in his letters he assumed the title of elector, and coined money with the stamp of two swords across, the ensign of the electoral dignity. The emperor supported him, and gave John Frederick permission to fortify the castle of Gotha.

Maurice, finding his title thus challenged, and aware that many of his subjects were inclined to the side of their ancient master, resolved to anticipate the war. Albert was already advancing in haste into Saxony. Maurice marched to meet him in the name of king Ferdinand and the imperial chamber, and ordered him to lay down his arms. Albert replied by forwarding the defiance to the emperor. The armies met on the 9th of July, 1553, near a small town in the duchy of Luneburg. Albert, who was intemperate, had rudely refused an accommodation; and both sides rushed into action with inconsiderate fury. The troops of Maurice were at first thrown into confusion: but he succeeded in rallying them, frequently bringing up his cavalry, in which force he was superior, to the action. His efforts secured the victory; but, in galloping from one squadron to another, he received a dangerous wound in the side. Reclined, nevertheless, against a tree, he urged his followers to complete the victory. In this they fulfilled his wish. Albert was finally defeated. But Maurice had received his death wound. He expired in two days after, at the camp, in the thirty-second year of his age. The protestants, many of whom had not forgiven his first treachery during his life, now forgot their resentment. He was extolled as the hero and the saint of his party. Portents and wonders are recounted by Sleidan as forerunning his decease.

Albert was frank, headstrong, prodigal, imprudent: Maurice reserved, cautious, economical, and sage. Albert had more talents and more taste, and more proficiency in learning; yet he despoiled the clergy, and reviled the learned: whilst Maurice, less cultivated himself,

was a patron and protector of letters. In person, Maurice was slender, of sanguine complexion and yellow beard: fiery eyes and close-cut hair, in addition, do not form a very engaging picture. He was passionately fond of hunting, and cruel in the preservation of game, being reported to have tied a man, who had slain a stag, between the horns of one, and sent him adrift into the forest. His country formed great hopes of his future career of heroism. Even his rival, John Frederic, forgave him; and Charles is said to have regretted him in the words of David lamenting Absalom.

To the address of Granvelle, Charles is said to be indebted for the acquisition of Albert of Brandenburg to his side. The bishop is said to have been seen in disguise in the marquis's camp near Mentz. If so, the minister found a fit instrument to avenge the reverses of his sovereign upon their author, Maurice. It was but revenge, however, not retrieval. That statesman and soldier had executed his designs fully and solidly, and had freed Germany, for the time, irrevocably from the tyranny and bigotry of Charles. The latter, in consequence, retired into the Low Countries after his disaster at Mentz, and, abandoning the empire as a region wrested from him, turned his views to the aggrandisement and subjection of Flanders, as more peculiarly his own. At first he vented his spite in arms, attacked Terouanne, took it, and rased it to the ground. But finding himself powerless to make any impression in France, he retired again to Brussels, and fell into a kind of syncope of mind, the consequence of his disappointments. Those around saw in him the symptoms of his mother's insanity. He occupied himself all day with the mechanism of clock-making rather than state affairs. Such reports were spread, that his sister was obliged to show him to the public at the end of a long gallery.* These symptoms of a decayed mind and body did not escape Charles himself; and they suggested the

* Ribier, tom. ii. p. 485.

necessity of abdicating supreme power in time.* His great object was to bequeath to his son Philip as large an empire as he had himself swayed. Germany, however, resisted, and had escaped him. But the death of Edward VI. of England at this time inspired Granvelle with the hope of redeeming this loss by Philip's espousing the queen of that country, and thus adding England and Ireland to his dominions. Charles entered into this project with such ardour that it roused him from his apathy. Granvelle was the negotiator; and he spared neither pains nor secret promises to effect the match and overcome the antipathy of the English. He even renewed a stipulation made by himself of old with Henry VIII. to aid him in re-conquering Normandy and Guienne.

After succeeding in this project, Granvelle aimed at a peace with France; in which design he was crossed by Albert of Brandenburg, who had taken refuge in that court, and who filled Germany with complaints against Anthony Perrenot, as he called Granvelle. Henry II. was too elated by the affair of Metz, and too incensed by that of Terouanne, to listen to peace. He invaded Flanders; and Charles was roused by the necessity of putting himself at the head of his army. Granvelle here followed him, and narrowly escaped being made prisoner. In the commencement of a partial engagement, the imperialists had routed the French; and word was sent to the emperor, who immediately rode with his minister and the papal nuncio to the spot. Before they arrived, the French had retaken their position; and the latter party were obliged to scatter in flight, making the best use of their horses. As to Granvelle, he lost his way in the woods, and remained out all night, to the delight of the mockers and the envious of the court. Granvelle soon after suc-

* When Charles did abdicate the empire in favour of Ferdinand, the pope declared this and all his acts null, "it being notorious to all that the emperor was *impos mentis*." — *Ibid.*

ceeded in negotiating the five years' truce at Vaucelles: it was somewhat disgraceful to Charles. The ministers appointed others to negotiate with the French envoys, and threw upon them the blame of the unfavourable conditions. But Charles, at this time, would not permit Granvelle's absence for a moment. He had retired to a small house in the park of Brussels, and held communication with his council, and even with his son, through the medium of the bishop of Arras. Soon after this, towards the close of the year 1555, Charles resigned his states of Flanders to his son Philip in a touching discourse. The latter unable to reply in any language understood by the assembly, charged Granvelle to reply for him, which the bishop is reported to have done with consummate eloquence.

"Granvelle changed masters three times," says Schiller, "and each time succeeded in obtaining the highest degree of confidence and favour." There could not, indeed, be a more adroit courtier From the moment of Philip's arrival in Flanders, he made court to him; and Charles, who had long ceased to be ambitious except for his son seemed more flattered than hurt at this preference of Granvelle for Philip. The total ignorance of the latter in all the languages of his northern dominions left him irrecoverably at the mercy of some one minister. Granvelle spoke all the tongues of Europe, and was a man of extraordinary assiduity and knowledge. His usefulness alone was a permanent source of favour, which, however, he took care to aid by his address. "He penetrated with admirable sagacity into the character of his master; he seized in the expression of Philip's countenance the course of his thoughts. Coming to the aid of Philip's slow conceptions, he developed the ideas of his master yet but in the germ, and avoided studiously any share in the credit of having produced them. Granvelle possessed miraculously the difficult and useful art of being able to descend to the level of an inferior mind,—to render his genius the servitor of another. He ruled

by concealing his influence and superiority,—the only way in which Philip II. could be governed. By these merits and arts, Granvelle continued the guiding spirit of Philip; obsequious, indeed, to the congenial bigotry of his master, but suggesting and employing his own chosen means.

War with France occurred, to interrupt the plans of both the minister and the prince; for they were pacifically inclined towards foreign powers, and seemed to waive all ideas of glory and ambition. Absorbed as they were in the great object of crushing religious dissent, and, by consequence, civil and religious liberty; victory and [illegible]y fell unexpectedly to them by the battle of St. Quentin, which neither knew how to take advantage of. Granvelle's object was to unite the court of France with Philip in a crusade against protestantism. In this he succeeded. He took the opportunity of accompanying the duchess of Lorraine to Peronne, where she was to meet the cardinal of Lorraine and the duke of Guise his brother, personages of the first influence in France. To these Granvelle communicated his views. They were too congenial and advantageous to them not to be approved. At this meeting was laid the foundation of that most memorable holy alliance, well known as *the League*. The honour or the shame of originating it is due to Granvelle. This cordial understanding produced the peace of Château-Cambresis in 1559. England paid for it by the loss of Calais.

Peace thus procured, Philip turned to reform the heresy of the Low Countries. He proposed simply to establish the inquisition; but Granvelle disapproved of so extreme a measure, the threat of which had formerly almost banished commerce from Flanders. To proceed by degrees was his plan; and the first part of this was the establishment of new bishoprics. The clergy of the Low Countries were chiefly abbots, deriving their dignity from elections, and, consequently, independent.—Then the clergy were subject to foreign archbishops,

some of whom had embraced the reformation, such as the archbishop of Cologne. In truth, there was some call for alteration in this respect. But the Flemings clamoured against this act, arbitrarily resolved on, as much as against the inquisition, seeing the same spirit and aim in both.

Philip, from disgust and weariness of a country of whose language and character he was equally ignorant, resolved to quit Flanders for Spain. The care of fulfilling his behests he resolved to leave to Granvelle as minister, with Margaret of Parma, his natural daughter, as his viceregal representative. Granvelle impressed upon his master the necessity of complying, in appearance at least, with the habits and laws of a free country, and promised that all the ends of tyranny might be attained with a show of freedom. Philip, in obedience to this, called the states together to take leave of them, and to impart his plan of government. Their complaints and demands bespoke a free government; but the Spanish prince understood little of these. Granvelle, charged to address them in the sovereign's name, showed himself supple and conciliatory. He demanded a subsidy. The states affixed as a condition that the Spanish troops should be sent out of the country, and that strangers should be removed from office. This last condition was aimed partly at Granvelle himself; and the minister saw, in the very outset of his administration, that the plan of conciliating the Flemings was irreconcilable with the king's views and his own hold of authority. He persisted, however: the nobility were intrusted with commands; the fairest promises were made; and Philip continued to dissemble his resentment, until, upon the very point of embarkation, his spleen vented itself against the prince of Orange.

The policy of Granvelle, at this time of his entering upon the sole administration, was well conceived. Without some support, he could not hope to preserve his

master's authority: to gain the nobility of the country was the obvious mode of obtaining this, which might have been done by frankly joining them, giving them a real share of power, and preferring them to the Spaniards. No doubt, by greater condescension on the part of the minister, they might have been brought to sanction even measures of religious repression. But Granvelle had not the experience or knowledge requisite for ruling a free people. To please his master was his first aim; and this could be done only by trusting Spaniards and introducing the inquisition. He thus fell short of gaining the chief nobles; and they soon formed a cabal against him with the prince of Orange at its head.

This prince was the leading noble of the Flemish court. Bred under the eye of Charles V., education had not been wanting to his talents. In these, as well as in character, he much resembled Maurice of Saxony; and Granvelle was doomed to be twice thwarted by men of the same stamp. Both were reserved, deep, dissembling; observant of religion, but setting it aside for political considerations; ardent for fame; impatient of superiority. Granvelle made an egregious mistake in hoping to gain him by a place in the council, of apparent, not real, influence. William was a man to be either crushed at once, or won by an ample share of power.

In vain did Granvelle seek, by subterfuge, to hide his influence. He held his consultations with the majority of the council in secret. He affected to have rare interviews with the regent, conveying to her his advice by means of letters, and that even when they inhabited the same palace. The prince of Orange was not to be deceived: he saw the mockery of a seat in council with a majority hostile to him; which majority held secret consultations previous to meeting him. He leagued with his brother nobles; threw all the blame of an odious administration upon Granvelle, and de-

clared that this minister enjoyed the sole and secret guidance of affairs.

The public acts of Granvelle were equally impolitic. He persisted in establishing the new bishoprics, and endowing them with the abbey lands. He thus, whilst at war with the people, who detested him as a stranger and a favourer of the inquisition,—and with the nobles, who had stronger and more selfish reasons of hate,—also alienated the church. Even the university of Louvain became his inveterate enemy. Thus situated, his only support was the Spanish and foreign troops; but the pay of these depended upon the states of Flanders; and the minister was consequently at the mercy of the latter. Granvelle did not see the ground thus hollow beneath his feet.

The minister had himself been appointed to one of the new establishments—that of Malines. The pope, in 1560, created him cardinal, at the solicitation of Margaret of Parma, who reckoned that this eminent dignity would render the ecclesiastics more obsequious to him. Granvelle here gave a striking proof of his subjection or attachment to Philip, in refusing to accept the hat until Philip's permission could be procured. According to Strada, he already foresaw the necessity of his abandoning the Low Countries, and had sought the place of cardinal as a refuge after his statesmanship should be shipwrecked.

It was about the time of his obtaining this dignity that the Flemish government was obliged to yield to the clamour of its subjects for the removal of the Spanish troops. They sailed; and, from that moment, the hold which the regent and her minister held of power depended more on the sufferance of those ruled than on any power to keep it. But yet, as if the object had been to push the people to revolt, the inquisitorial laws were enforced, and condemnation and burnings awoke the zeal and indignation of the reformers in every province.

The huguenots, in France, now took arms to defend themselves. The flame threatened to reach the Low Countries. Granvelle, though not very successful in pacifying his own government, conceived a plan for removing the disorders of France, by giving to Anthony of Bourbon, Sardinia in exchange for Navarre. Philip, whilst his dominions of Flanders were preparing to liberate themselves from the yoke, directed his whole care and attention to crush the French huguenots. He wrote to the regent of Flanders, to send troops to reinforce the army of Catherine of Medicis. The prince of Orange opposed this in the council, and took the opportunity of demanding the convocation of the states. He had scarcely uttered the word, when a sign from Granvelle warned the regent to break up the council. There was great sympathy betwixt the correspondent parties in Flanders and France. Positions and leading personages were both alike. Strada compares Condé with Orange; Catherine of Medicis with Margaret of Parma, and the cardinal of Lorraine with cardinal Granvelle: "*eadem fermè omnia,*" he concludes, "*nempe ex eisdem causis: nisi quod arma celerius a Gallo, pertinacius a Belga, et perniciosiùs, retenta.*"

Tumults now arose at Tournay and Valenciennes. Condemned heretics were rescued by the people from the stake, and liberated from prison. These troubles were for the moment repressed; but Granvelle, foreseeing their issue, and knowing the weakness of the government, asked for his recall. "King Philip sent him word, in answer, to have patience until he should himself return to Flanders, promising Granvelle a splendid recompense for his pains; in the mean time giving him 450 florins yearly charged upon lands, and a present of 2000 at the moment."*

Encouraged by Philip's favours and approbation, Granvelle renewed his measures of vigour. He in-

* Vita Viglii.

sisted on establishing some of the new bishops in their sees, the consummation of which had been postponed. The people of Brabant made determined resistance to this. They congregated, they discussed, they collected money, and sent envoys to Rome and to Spain, charged principally with accusations against Granvelle, and reproaching him as the cause of every disorder. The malecontent nobles joined them: of these the principal were the prince of Orange and count Egmont, avowed enemies to the cardinal.

The following are the characters of the prince of Orange and count Egmont, as given by Strada: —

"Egmont was of a gay, open, confident disposition: Orange of a sad, unsociable, unobservable nature. In the one you might expect sagacity; in the other, trustworthiness. Egmont was an Ajax, a better warrior than senator; Orange, an Ulysses, more stubborn and to be feared in council than in the field. The latter, provident, anxious, meditating the future in his mind, and thus never unprovided for sudden events: the other void of all cares except such as pressed; unprepared, indeed, in an emergency, but never insufficient. One would hope more from Egmont, fear more from Orange; and thus choose the count for a friend, the prince for an enemy. Lest they should agree in any thing, Egmont was beautiful of countenance, strong in person, noble in aspect; whilst Orange was slender, tawny, and bald. Both were equally looked up to by the people; but towards the one this feeling was respect, towards the other, love."

This is not a bad specimen of Strada, an historian whose reputation amongst us is not equal to his merits.

They demanded that a governor should be appointed in Brabant, with the further title of protector. Granvelle opposed vehemently this ambitious demand, the aim of which was too obvious. "Who can ask for such a station," said he, "without knowing that he demands to become, in fact, prince of Brabant and associate in the sovereignty of Belgium?" Orange then demanded

the convocation of the states. The regent, unable to resist, imitated the policy of the French kings, in calling, on similar occasions, an assembly of notables or nobles. She convoked a meeting of the knights of the order of the Golden Fleece.

Even this concession was against the advice of Granvelle, who saw to what it tended. The nobles met, and instantly came to a mutual understanding to obtain, as a preliminary, the cardinal's recall. The regent could not resist the peaceable means which they proposed, namely, sending an envoy to Spain to represent to the king the necessity of removing this minister from the Low Countries. Montigny was despatched on the errand, and acquitted himself of his mission zealously. But Philip would not allow such a triumph to the enemies of his government; and Montigny returned with an evasive answer, whilst Granvelle privately received another letter of encouragement. Letters were of little use without force or funds, and Philip sent neither. The party of the nobility were dominant; and Margaret of Parma could keep them in even apparent subjection only by affecting to indulge them. She hoped to divide count Egmont and the prince of Orange, men of very different characters; and flattered both with this view. But as both demanded the recall of Granvelle with equal impatience, and as the cardinal's remaining in power was, in fact, a bond of union betwixt the two puissant nobles, the regent was obliged to consent to that recall, and endeavoured herself to obtain it. She sent Armentières, one of her counsellors, to Spain, in 1563, with this errand, and bade him state to Philip the impossibility of supporting the cardinal any longer against the universal odium which he excited. Armentières was also charged to acquaint Philip that Egmont alone had protected Granvelle up to that moment from the violence of his enemies, but that animosities had now reached such a pitch that the count must henceforth abandon his defence, and leave him to such protection as the authority of the regent was able to afford

him. Philip listened to the representations of Armentières, but, being occupied in holding the states of Catalonia, he delayed, or could not make up his mind, to give an answer. The Flemish grandees, in impatience, abandoned the council, declaring that they would never again enter it with Granvelle, and formed themselves into an open cabal of resistance. It was the signal for a burst of licence against the cardinal. The cabal gave liveries to their servants of black cloth, on the hanging sleeves of which were embroidered a kind of fool's cap, in resemblance and mockery of the hood worn by Granvelle. Libels and caricatures appeared in profusion, on one of which he was represented as hunted by devils, who whipped him with foxes' tails.

It was time for Granvelle to consult his personal safety. He dreaded imprisonment, took precautions against it, and is said to have built himself a strong and secret place of retreat within the precincts of the palace, in case of any attack by the mob or the Orange party. Philip, at length, was made sensible of the necessity of yielding; and in the commencement of 1565 he gave Armentières an order for the recall of Granvelle. The minister read it by anticipation in the countenances of his very followers. He could scarcely regret to be removed from his perilous situation. He had hoped, however, to be recalled to Spain, and had written to his friend, the duke of Alva, to procure him once more access to his sovereign's person. Alva, at first, hesitated to introduce a rival, but afterwards furthered to the utmost the wish of Granvelle. It was considered imprudent, however, to recall him to the royal council as yet, lest fresh excuse should be given to the turbulent Flemings. Philip, therefore, bade him visit his native country of Franche-Comté, where, no doubt, the missive said, he had affairs to arrange after so long an absence. Granvelle obeyed, and quitted Brussels and his ministry in March, 1565.

The Flemish nobles and their party acted, says Viglius, " like schoolboys when their master is gone,"

on the departure of Granvelle. They made use of their new power to raise funds; levying money by lotteries, sale of places, and all kinds of maladministration. It soon appeared that Granvelle had been an honest, strict, and conscientious administrator, praiseworthy in all respects, except when religious opinions interfered and made him the author of severe and inquisitorial measures. His removal answered none of the views of the duchess of Parma. The nobles, though conciliated by the act, were not rendered more obedient or less turbulent; and Philip, though he constrained his nature long, in seeking to win the Flemish nobles, receiving the count Egmont with cordiality, and dismissing him with munificence, was soon obliged to recur to Granvelle's maxims of severity, and to appoint the duke of Alva, who represented them, to command in the Low Countries.

Cardinal Granvelle had in the mean time retired to his native country, and settled at Besançon, where he displayed that amiable temper and taste which render his private such a contrast with his public life. He founded colleges, he opened his house to the learned, and showed his sagacity in the selection of youths who afterwards became famous in letters. Justus Lipsius was his secretary at this time. The reprinting of the famous Polyglott of Ximenes, with improvements, was one of the projects to which Granvelle gave his attention and aid. It was completed by the printer Plantin of Antwerp. Whilst living at Besançon, Granvelle had his friends and creatures at Brussels, with whom he corresponded, and whose conduct he regulated by his advice. One of these was Belin-Cherney, a Burgundian like himself, whom he had advanced, and whom the duke of Alva called to Flanders in 1567. A letter of the cardinal, taken from his MSS. to Belin, will throw some light on the characters of both.

"Monsieur l'avocat," it commences, "I address this to Brussels, to express the satisfaction I feel at your advancement, and at seeing you in the road to fortune.

I pray you to conduct yourself for the service of God and your master, without being too forward to think of the interest of yourself and family. These things should come by degrees. For God's sake forget these partialities of a Burgundian, and cease talking of *queues* de Renard *, and Renardistes, as if you were still at Vesoul, but do as you see me do since I have been in Burgundy. Keep your eye, indeed, upon Renard, but cease to vapour about him or seek to wrong him; and what you do, do without writing to me about.

" It appears to me that you have already forgotten what I told you in my hall at Besançon, that we must not resent every thing, and that injuries are like pills, which we ought to swallow without chewing, in order to avoid the taste of the bitter. I have often heard the emperor praise the late prince of Orange, René, because, whatever employment he was put upon, great or small, he undertook it at once, without remonstrance or remark: and this, depend upon it, is the surest road to take at court. My object, in getting you summoned to Brussels, was, that you might afford the information requisite as to our country, and in this capacity fill a place in the private council, which might lead to something better. But if, from being too sensitive, or from not accommodating yourself to the humours of others, you halt in your march, it is not my fault. I have done my best for you. What business have you to complain so, or be jealous of the Spaniards? That is not your affair. How strange are these passionate humours of Burgundy! What can people say who see them, but that we are impracticable folk? I tell you, whoever wishes to rise must suffer, especially at the commencement, without pusillanimity or tenderness. Had you been in my place when in Flanders, you would have been daily menaced with poniards. Whoever would rise, must not fear for his skin. Do

* Renard was another Franche-Comtois or Burgundian, a great enemy of Granvelle, whom his correspondent, in consequence, thought proper to ridicule.

not talk to me of libels. Look at all those written in Flanders against me, in Germany, on the confinement of the landgrave, on account of the marquis Albert and other causes — I swallowed all that as if it were milk. Paper is easily scribbled; and, after all, a pen is not a poniard.

"You speak of the fiscal being my mortal enemy, and that, as such, he ought not to be in place. Upon my faith, you marvellously displease me in this. Why mix me up with their affairs? I have always acted and professed to hold no one for my enemy, in spite of their inclination, unless I had given them cause to be so. I abhor petty partialities and grudges. You are wrong in showing yourself dependent on me, and dragging me into your enmities. Pray make no more mention of me, else you will work me serious harm. You tell me in your letters that these men want to shut the door against me. If you talk to me any more of this, I must cease to correspond with you. I do not charge you to solicit for my recall, nor do you know either my wishes or my aims. I do not want to return to Brussels. My wish is to stand well with my master, and I am no more a Fleming than an Italian. I am of any country, and can employ myself any where for the good of my master and the public, just as far as he wishes, and no farther, or to repose myself in retirement, which is, perhaps, the most preferable." *

Towards the close of 1565, Granvelle quitted Besançon for Rome, for the purpose of attending the conclave, after the death of Pius IV. His journey was made

* Granvelle was in the habit of preserving all papers, with copies of his innumerable letters, even of his complimentary notes. They were conveyed to Besançon, and neglected in the *greniers* of the house. Children and servants took away quantities. Six chests were sold to the grocers. At length a certain abbé appreciated their value, and collected such as he could find. Another, the abbé Brissot, took still more pains, and succeeded in saving eighty large folio volumes of manuscript letters, that still exist in the library of Besançon; precious materials, still very little known, for the history of that age, especially of the war of independence of the United Provinces. The abbé Brissot meditated a life of cardinal Granvelle drawn from these sources, but he never executed it. He has developed his design in a letter to Pélisson, published in Desmolets' *Continuation des Mémoires de la Littérature*, tom. iv. part. 1.

at the request of the regent of Flanders, in order to contradict the current reports that the cardinal had only been removed for a time, and would soon resume the administration. Nevertheless, he returned, after the election of the new pope, to Besançon, soliciting in vain to be more actively employed by his sovereign. Granvelle himself says, in one of his letters, that, in order to be well treated, and richly remunerated by Philip, it was necessary to serve him ill. Gonzalo Perez, whom he had placed in the confidential situation of private secretary to Philip, could never obtain even an abbacy from him, and spun out his years in labour and want. He was thirty-six years in his service, and had but 2000 crowns revenue. "The king is persuaded," writes Perez to Granvelle, "that, as long as I remain poor, I must serve him from pure necessity." But the neglect of both Perez and Granvelle proceeded, probably, from the same cause, the jealousy of the duke of Alva, who, though sympathising in the views and state maxims of Granvelle, still dreaded him as a rival near the throne. Hence, when the cardinal applied for the archbishopric of Seville, it was refued him. It was not until the duke was for some time absent in the Low Countries that Philip again employed Granvelle: one of the effects of their enmity may be seen in the opposition of Viglius, the cardinal's friend, to the duke of Alva's proposition in the Flemish council.

The importunities and address of Granvelle succeeded in procuring from Philip an employment of importance. This was the reversion of the government of Naples, at that time held by the duke of Alcala. In order to take possession of this as soon as the vacancy should occur, — and, perhaps, Philip meditated other arrangements ere that time, — the cardinal removed to Rome, where he was charged with negotiating the proposed league betwixt Spain, Rome, and the Venetians against the Turks. These warlike infidels were then in the full tide of conquest. Each year they fell upon some new fortress or island, and added it to their dominions. They now me-

naced Cyprus, after which Sicily or Italy must become the next object of conquest. Philip, however, at the time, engaged in suppressing the insurrection of the Moors in Granada and the Flemings in the north, had not funds wherewith to equip a fleet; and the task of Granvelle was to excuse him from contributing materially to the alliance, whilst he pressed the other powers to arm. The Venetians, however, resolved to make peace, and submit, rather than fight the Turks single-handed. An intrigue was set on foot for averting the meditated expedition of the infidels, and inducing the sultan to make Spain its aim, with the view of aiding the Moors. This was a just retaliation upon Philip. But Granvelle seized it as the occasion of a vehement discourse which he pronounced in the consistory, in which he revealed the plan, and made it the subject of the most violent complaints against the Venetians.

Pius V. then filled the papal chair: he was one of the few pontiffs whose exertions were zealously employed in behalf of the Christian faith and commonwealth exclusively. He appeased the quarrel, and undertook to soothe the anger of Philip himself, who, warned by the intrigue how his backwardness might militate even against his interests at home, sent Granvelle powers to conclude a league with the pope and the Venetians, in which Spain was to employ a considerable fleet. A whole season passed away in discussions betwixt Philip and the Venetians, during which time Cyprus fell into the hands of the Turks. This roused the Christians once more to unanimity and serious preparations for defence.

The duke of Alcala, viceroy of Naples, died during these negotiations, in the month of March, 1571. Granvelle instantly hurried from Rome to Naples, to take possession of the government of the latter kingdom by virtue of the reversionary appointment which he held from Philip. Here the cardinal received the famous fleet of Don John of Austria, to whom as legate he handed in great ceremony the bâton of generalissimo. Don John sailed in August from the port of Naples,

and soon after won the famous battle of Lepanto, which checked the naval enterprises of the Ottomans.

The government with which Granvelle was now charged was difficult and invidious. He succeeded to a viceroy of pre-eminent merit, the duke of Alcala, whose name was revered at Naples, and must still be remembered for the improvements which he effected; amongst others, the beautiful road from the capital to Puzzuoli. Granvelle had first of all to guard the kingdom against the force of the Turks, and against the encroachments of the pope, and to satisfy the everlasting demands of the king for money, without exciting the Neapolitans to actual insurrection. Philip was obliged to have recourse to the meanest expedients for money. In Naples he had sold all his revenues, salt-tax, land-tax, customs; so that it was necessary to lay on more taxes, or break faith with the old creditors. The interest of a viceroy was to pass through his temporary administration without exciting serious troubles. Granvelle flattered the citizens and nobles, granted them such privileges and favours as were in his power, and took advantage of the presence of don John of Austria, and his victorious armament, to draw from the general zeal against the infidels a considerable donation. This he effected in 1572, convoking a general parliament, which voted 1,100,000, ducats. In 1574, on the tidings of the loss of Tunis, he obtained as much more.

The most difficult task of a Neapolitan viceroy was to oppose the pretensions of the popes, who, having so often given the investiture of Naples, considered themselves suzerains of that kingdom, and entitled to exercise temporal as well as spiritual supremacy. These claims were never put forward more arrogantly than by Pius V., the issuer of the famous bull *In cœna Domini*, which renewed the old pretensions of Gregory VII., treated kings as subjects, and proclaimed the universal sovereignty of the pontiff. One of its hundred anathemas was pronounced against any obstruc-

tion in the way of provisions reaching Rome. The duke of Alcala, viceroy during the promulgation, incurred the penalty in both cases. Granvelle was compelled to follow his example. All the provisions that Naples could spare were employed for the victualling of the fleets against the Turks and of the fortresses of the Mediterranean; Goletta amongst others, which, the Neapolitans used to say, devoured more of their substance than a viceroy. To these causes of quarrel were added the tenths which the pope shared with the king, and also the ecclesiastical immunities which the bull *In cœna domini* was loud in re-asserting. Granvelle, a cardinal, was awkwardly placed in supporting these disputes against the head of the church. But he who considered himself as a statesman and a loyal subject first, and an ecclesiastic but in the second place, was no less firm, and in some cases still more firm, than even the duke of Alcala had been. On one occasion, a noble, seized in a church, was retained for judgment by the ecclesiastical authorities. Granvelle sent and seized him by the royal sergeants, and insisted on having him executed by the civil power.

In 1572 took place the death of Pius V. Granvelle hastened to the conclave, and, as the representative of Spain, had considerable influence in the choice of the new pope. He successfully resisted the pretensions of cardinal Farnese, whose elevation would lead to a renewal of those family quarrels which signalised the pontificate of the last of that family. Cardinal Buoncompagno was chosen, under the name of Gregory XIII.

The whole weight of the war against the infidels had fallen upon Philip, the Venetians having concluded a treaty with them. But don John, supplied with the contribution and provisions of Naples, still kept his fleet afloat, and meditated some brilliant conquest. Granvelle advised him not to be rash, but to remain on the defensive, and even refused to ask from the Neapolitans a sum which was to serve as the personal remuneration of don John. Such an act could not but

have awakened the jealousy of Philip. Don John at the time meditated obtaining for himself the sovereignty of Tunis, and, on this account, had refused to adopt the counsel given him by Granvelle to demolish that town, or, at least, its fortifications, and defend only the adjoining fortress of the Goletta. The Turks soon learned that the Spanish garrison was unequal to the defence of Tunis. They attacked, accordingly, and thus retook, the famous conquest of Charles V.

Animosity was now declared betwixt Granvelle and don John, — the cardinal accusing his negligence and ambition. That prince, however, boldly sailed to Spain, and braved the presence of Philip. The monarch always shrunk before audacity of this kind: and, indeed, the hero of Lepanto was not to be treated ungraciously by the most catholic king. He was received, as Egmont had been by Philip, with flattery, and was not denied what he asked; viz., to be made the king's lieutenant in Italy. But, as he departed without the commission being actually prepared, he never received it.

Granvelle's viceroyalty lasted four years, and forms the most honourable and praiseworthy portion of his public career. His strict enforcement of the laws was here of advantage. The opposite of what he had been in Flanders, he was here the asserter of the independence of the civil power against the encroachments of the clergy. The habitual policy of the kings of Spain towards Naples had been to exhaust it of wealth, and of all men of influence, lest it should throw off the yoke. The administrations of the duke of Alcala and of cardinal Granvelle were wiser. They raised money by the representatives of the nation, instead of pledging the revenue, and selling titles with profusion, in order to degrade the nobility. Never before had the defence of Naples been intrusted to a national force. The soldiers there were always either Spaniards or Germans. But these were now too expensive to transport; whilst the menaces of the Turks required that the citizens should be armed.

Alcala and Granvelle formed a national militia, receiving pay only in war, and with privileges such as induced the respectable class to enroll themselves. Giannone speaks in terms of high admiration of cardinal Granvelle's administration:—"He left forty new *prammatiche*, or laws sage and prudent, and that will continue to draw respect towards his memory. Among these were prohibitions of the servitors of the palace to go out to seek gifts, or of ministers to ask places or benefices for their relatives. He forbade ecclesiastics to exercise baronial or royal offices; in other words, to meddle with the jurisdiction." This is a singular contrast to his enforcement of the inquisitorial régime in Flanders, and proves how much of his monkishness proceeded from his master's commands. Having thus placed the kingdom in a tranquil and well-ordered condition, "the cardinal," says Giannone, "was taken from us by an order of king Philip, who recalled him to Spain to his court and to greater honours, creating him counsellor of state and president of the supreme council of Italy. It was reported that don John of Austria had procured his recall, in order to get a friend promoted to his place. But the king, suspicious of don John, took Granvelle to himself, and sent to Naples the marquis of Mondejar, who was ill disposed to the prince. The cardinal left Naples in July, 1575.

It is remarkable that Granvelle and the duke of Alva, the most successful and popular viceroys of Naples, both incurred the same odium, and disgrace in the Low Countries. This shows how much the character of the statesman depends upon his task. Granvelle, however, had the good fortune to misgovern at first, and to redeem his conduct after; whereas Alva's fury in Flanders was final both for himself and for that country. His arrogance in erecting his own statue in the square of Brussels completed his disgrace with his sovereign, and opened the way for Granvelle's return to favour. The removal of Antonio Perez from Philip's person was another release from rivalry. All

have read that the disgrace of this favourite was owing to his rivalling Philip in the good graces of the duchess of Eboli. Granvelle, in addition to being president of the council of Italy, became president of the council of Castile, and, without the name, soon came to exercise the influence of prime minister.

One of the first effects of his policy was to turn the attention and arms of Spain from those conquests in Africa which, since the days of Ximenes, had been the favourite wish of the monarchs of that country. Jealousy of don John might have had some share in this counsel of Granvelle; but, in truth, it behoved a country so exhausted in resources to limit the sphere of her exertions and ambition. The cardinal directed his views to Italy, thinking it advisable to make the north of that country secure against a possible invasion of France; a new king, and one by no means so catholic as Charles IX., having just mounted the throne of that country. The Spanish government, with this view, interfered in the dissensions of Genoa, where the old and new nobility were at war; the latter aided by the people. An envoy was despatched thither; don John, with his fleet, also appeared; and Granvelle at length succeeded in his view of rendering the king of Spain, in fact as well as title, protector of Genoa. The duke of Savoy's alliance he also secured.

The course of events in the Low Countries was too rapid, too much impelled by their own force, for a minister in a distant land to direct or control them. So many governors had failed, that public opinion pointed out the hero of Lepanto as the fittest to save Flanders. He hastened thither; but merely added one more to the number of examples of commanders and governors reaping glory in the south and disgrace in the north. He died; showing his sagacity in the choice of a temporary successor, Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma. Philip, however, was somewhat jealous of this prince; and, by Granvelle's advice, ordered Margaret of Parma to repair once more to the Nether-

lands, and to participate in the government with her son. The latter, however, protested so indignantly, and at the same time gave such proofs of his military talents, that the power was left exclusively to him. It is very remarkable, and not a little to Granvelle's honour, that, during his hold of almost supreme power in Spain, his three great rivals, who had formerly supplanted him, were all restored to command. Don John of Austria and Margaret of Parma were both appointed to the government of Flanders; whilst the duke of Alva, in the enterprise we are about to speak of, was intrusted once more with the command of an army.

This enterprise — the annexing of Portugal to the Spanish crown — was the principal achievement of Granvelle's statesmanship. It is well known that Sebastian, king of that country, perished in a fierce battle fought with the Moors, where their king, Muley Moluc, also fell, in 1579. Sebastian, dying without children, was succeeded by an uncle, who died in the following year. The competitors for the succession were many. The rights of all were derived from king Emanuel, grandfather of Sebastian, who had left four sons and two daughters. The house of Braganza claimed in right of a daughter of these sons. Philip II. claimed as descendant from one of Emanuel's daughters. By the laws of Portugal, females may succeed to the throne in default of males, provided they marry a native Portuguese. Considering this as a fundamental law, the right of Braganza was paramount. But Philip was too powerful a competitor; and there were many others, — Catherine of Medicis, the duke of Parma, the pope himself, — all were prepared to dispute the title of the weak.

Granvelle was intrusted with the support of his master's claim, but found the states of Portugal decidedly averse. He applied himself, however, to gain the nobles with promises, with bribes to such as would receive them; whilst the clergy could not but hail with joy the success of a monarch so devoted to

them. The grand inquisitor of Portugal was Philip's most useful ally; but as the middle classes were attached to the duchess of Braganza, and the populace to don Antonio, a royal prince of illegitimate birth, Philip found it necessary to support his claim by arms, and a Spanish army was in consequence collected on the frontier of Portugal. The command of it was given to the duke of Alva; but the presence of the monarch himself controlled his natural severity and arrogance.

The administrators appointed by the states of Portugal remonstrated with Philip, and entreated him to await their decision: he repulsed them with indignation, saying that he cared not for their protest, and wanted not their confirmation. Granvelle, more conciliating, made large offers to the duchess of Braganza and to don Antonio, as well as to the states. But the aversion of the people to Spain was too inveterate to allow of their submitting without compulsion; Philip's army, in consequence, invaded and soon reduced the country. Don Antonio made a gallant though a vain resistance; whilst the family of Braganza, bending to the storm, and accepting the conditions offered by Granvelle, obtained the confidence of Philip. The duke was created hereditary constable of Portugal, and preserved his rich domains: the family held their rights, and that station which enabled them, in the reign of Philip IV., to obtain possession of the Portuguese crown and assure its independence. Granvelle's lenity to the house of Braganza has been greatly criticised: Olivarez afterwards threw all the blame of the loss of Portugal upon his memory. He should have at least transported the house of Braganza from Portugal, it was said, and, by giving them estates and establishments in Spain, have removed them from temptation, and secured their allegiance. The cardinal, however, could but play one competitor against another; as the union of all classes of Portuguese might have produced Philip's defeat: unless, indeed, he be reproached with keeping that faith towards the Braganzas which he promised.

The exertion of royal power with respect to Flanders was, as usual, far less glorious. Farnese, indeed, supported the cause and his own reputation in arms; but a decree of the Spanish council, proscribing the prince of Orange, and offering 25,000 crowns for his head, was a disgrace to Granvelle and to Philip. The election of the duke of Anjou to the sovereignty of the Low Countries had exasperated both to so unworthy an extravagance. In return for this, the town of Mechlin, the seat of Granvelle's archbishopric, was ravaged by the Flemings; and, soon after, the United Provinces solemnly and finally threw off the yoke of Spain. Le Laboureur says that they owed a statue to the memory of Granvelle, as the minister whose severity and arrogance had, of all causes, most contributed to their freedom.

In 1584, the archbishopric of Besançon becoming vacant, the chapter elected Granvelle, their countryman, to fill the chief see of his native Franche-Comté. Breaking in health, the aged prelate and statesman hoped to retire to this honourable retreat; but Philip, and the still increasing exigencies of the time, forbade it. England had come forward to be the open protectress of the Low Countries: a war with that country demanded all the activity of an experienced minister. The last act of Granvelle was, however, the knitting firm the alliance betwixt Spain and Savoy. He saw Flanders escape from his master's power, and feared lest Italy should be the next aim of the enemies of Spain: for this purpose he designed securing the friendship of the potentate who held the keys of the Alps. Philip's daughter, the infanta, was with this view now offered to the duke of Savoy, who visited Spain for that purpose. Granvelle himself solemnised the nuptials at Saragossa in 1586. He soon, however, sickened. Philip showed great kindness towards his minister whilst the latter was on his deathbed. Granvelle expired in September of the same year at Madrid: his remains were

transported to Besançon, and deposited in a splendid mausoleum.

Cardinal Granvelle was precisely the minister that a despotic monarch should prize; as humble and faithful in bending before the throne, as he was firm and rigid, in ruling over the people. All parties unite in enumerating his various and great talents,—his activity, his sagacity, his learning, his knowledge of affairs, his imperturbable temper. He was of that cosmopolite school of statesmen bred by Charles V., who had no country and no patriotism, and have no principle except the will and interests of a master. The great moral, indeed, to be drawn from the history of these times, is the absurd and pernicious consequences of an extended, above all, of a separated empire, which must be fraught with oppression to nations, and must produce tyranny in sovereigns as well as guilt in ministers. Had Philip II.'s rule been confined to Spain, he might have been a great, and, possibly, a useful, sovereign. Rebellion, its successes and its identity with religious reform, made him a tyrant and a bigot. His maxims were unfortunate, but accordant with the religious doctrines of the age; nor could he have been so fully aware as we are of the expediency of religious toleration, which he had been taught to consider as a sin.

Granvelle represented the system of his master,—that of persecution. Maurice of Saxony is the fairest representative of toleration,—of the separation of religion and politics. In his actions as a prince, he was ever indifferent to dogmas; and in this he may be said to have been some centuries in advance of his age. If, in morals, he was of the lax school of his time, he was so of necessity; for a petty prince with a few miles of territory, to raise himself up to counterbalance and defeat the lord of half Europe, required, it is to be feared, other arms than those of good faith. John Frederick had these, with talents and courage; yet in his hands the civil and religious freedom of Germany might have perished: Maurice saved it from shipwreck.

BARNEVELDT.*

1547—1619.

John Van Olden Barneveldt, or, as he is more generally styled, Barneveldt, was born at Amersfort, in Holland, on the 14th of September, 1547. His family were more than respectable, having for upwards of a century inhabited that town, and being entitled to have *ridder*, meaning knight or squire, attached to their name. His father, Gerard, married a lady, named Van Weede, also of the same class, which might not erroneously be designated as a kind of burgess-nobility. Their son, John, was, from the first, destined to the profession of the law. His early studies were made at the Hague, the seat of a high court of judicature. At the age of twenty he went to the college of Louvain, and from that to Bourges, celebrated as a law school. In this year was renewed the war betwixt the huguenots and the court; — that in which the battle of St. Dénis and the death of the constable took place. Young Barneveldt, in consequence, found France to be a country both unquiet and unsafe for a student, more especially of the reformed persuasion: for the doctrines of Luther had already made proselytes of the burgesses of Holland. To return through Paris, however, was to run into danger; and he, therefore, set off south, with several companions, passed through Burgundy into Switzerland, and from thence to Basil. From this town he descended the Rhine to Cologne, and was there about to renew his

* The principal sources referred to for the life of Barneveldt are his "Apology to the States of Holland,"—a work in a great measure auto-biographical, originally written in Dutch, but translated into Latin. The "Warachtige Historie [illegible]ven, &c. van Wyler Heer J. van Olden Barneveldt, Ridder, Heere van de Tempel," &c. author unknown. His life, also, in Kok, Vaderlandsch Woordenboek; Hooft, and the Dutch historians; Le Clerc, Grotius, Jeannin's Negotiations, Brandt's History of the Reformation, and Grimstone's History of the Netherlands.

studies, when a letter from home directed him to re-repair for that purpose to Heidelberg.

Our student found Heidelberg much more occupied with theology than law. Disputes ran furiously high on the controverted points of predestination and free-will. Barneveldt was, of course, carried away by the polemic frenzy of the time and country, and gave himself up to those theological studies and pursuits which afterwards had so important an effect upon his conduct and fate. At that time, however, he came to a wise conclusion. He felt his mind to be so much more perplexed than enlightened by polemics, and by the disputes on such subjects, that he resolved to abandon them altogether, and content himself with the liberal maxim, that all men might continue to lead a virtuous life in this world, and reap the reward of happy immortality in the next, by a simple, and, as far as this controversy was concerned, by an indecisive, belief in the doctrines of the Bible. Thus, at least, his biographer records his notions at that time.*

In the years 1568 and 1569, Barneveldt continued his studies in Germany and Italy, and returned to Holland with the grade of master-at-law. In 1570 he was (what we would style) called to the Dutch bar at the Hague, and soon obtained an ample share of practice. The political troubles of the times —Holland had just burst into insurrection against the duke of Alva — were such as not to permit professional men to remain strangers to party. Every Dutchman was now called upon to decide for the cause of Spanish rule, or for revolt and independence. Alva was advancing with an army. He had already subdued and severely punished the Flemings. It required stout hearts in the Dutch to resist. The members of the bar at the Hague were, for the greater part, in favour of submitting to Spain. The president of the law court, together with almost all

* These particulars of Barneveldt's life are derived chiefly from a Dutch life of him, author unknown, under this title: — "Wærachtige Historie van Leven, &c. van Wylen Heer J. van Olden Barneveldt, Ridder, Heere van Tempel, Advocaet in Groot, &c. van Holland."

the counsellors, abandoned the Hague in consequence, that town being in open revolt against Spain, and repaired to Utrecht. Only three advocates remained behind, and one of them was Barneveldt, who openly adhered to the prince of Orange in the assertion of national independence.

There was now little room or leisure for pleading. The lawyer became lost in the politician or the reformer (Barneveldt appeared in all the meetings for settling religion); and even in the warrior. He was commissary at the Hague, to superintend the arming of the citizens and the levying of voluntary contributions, and at this post he remained, unshrinking, when the attack of the Spaniards was hourly expected. The Hague, however, being no longer tenable, Barneveldt retired to Delft, where the prince of Orange had fixed his residence and quarters. The Spanish army, then under the command of the duke of Alva's son, had now for six months been engaged in the siege of Haerlem, which bravely resisted all their efforts, aided, as these were, by the possession of Amsterdam and its resources. Continual attempts were made to relieve them. But, as their distress increased, the prince of Orange, in 1573, proposed a last effort to throw succours into it. The expedition was sent from Delft; and Barneveldt, in the ardour of military zeal, volunteered to march with it. It was commanded by the *heer*, or lord, Van Batenberg, and proved most signally unsuccessful, being intercepted and utterly routed by a Spanish force. Van Batenberg himself was slain; and Barneveldt escaped (how, or with what difficulty, is not told) in the adventure.

The Spaniards next laid siege to Leyden, equally remarkable with that of Haerlem for the miseries endured. The prince of Orange, however, was more successful in relieving it, although he was obliged to have recourse to a strong measure for the purpose. This was the opening of the dikes of the Meuse and the Yssel, which abandoned the larger space of country betwixt Delft,

Leyden, and Rotterdam to the ocean. Barneveldt was one of the commissaries charged with the execution of this project, in 1574.

Notwithstanding these public employments, expeditions, and affairs, the biographer of Barneveldt tells us that his business as a lawyer was immense. But very few lawyers were left in the court, owing to the secession of the majority to the Spaniards. At first there were but three or four, till those who fled from Leyden and other beleaguered towns increased the numbers. Barneveldt is represented as employed by all the chief nobles: amongst other clients was the widow of the count of Egmont.

If the Spaniards and catholics, on their side, were cruel, there were not wanting, as is too often the case, partisans in the ranks of the independents and reformers, who were equally savage in their retaliation, In short, there were protestants in Holland at that time who rivalled their foes in cruelty. One of these zealous personages was Diedrich Sonoy. As governor of West Friesland, he had shown his activity, patriotism, and hardihood. But he made arbitrary use of his authority in Holland. He persecuted such catholics as remained there, and, superseding the legal and established courts of justice, erected a new tribunal, which, from its cruelties, was called the *bloedraat*, or inquisition. He sought to tempt Barneveldt by the offer of a place in this high court, but the lawyer steadfastly refused, though Sonoy solicited him more than once.*

He married early in 1575, says his anonymous biographer, who does not mention even the name or family of the lady. Yet the heroic wife of Barneveldt, whom from another source we know to have been called Maria of Utrecht, surely deserved more notice. In the beginning of 1576, he resided in Zealand, being in public employment, and, soon after the pacification of Ghent,

* Hooft, 412—417, and Kok. The circumstance is not mentioned in the Leven van O. Barneveldt.

was chosen pensionary of the town of Rotterdam. It was not without considerable hesitation that he accepted this place, the undertaking of public functions in Holland being a sacrifice, more especially on the part of a great lawyer, of his private interests and fortune to the public service. But this does not seem to have been the cause of his hesitation. The states assembled at Haerlem in 1577, and from this year forth Barneveldt was continually employed. He proposed the articles of the famous union of Utrecht, in 1579, which formed the basis of the independent government of the United Provinces. In 1583 we find him in Antwerp, negotiating with the duke of Anjou, and conducting himself with so much ability as to merit the special thanks of the states.

After the treachery and death of Anjou, the Hollanders became naturally weary of renewing the attempt to procure foreign aid at the price of giving themselves a foreign master. They resolved to choose, at last, the native hero of their country, and raise William of Orange to the pre-eminence which he alone deserved. Barneveldt was employed to draw up the conditions of his sovereignty, which the assassination of the prince at Delft most unfortunately rendered a dead letter. The Spaniards gathered confidence from this event. The Dutch were stricken with despair. Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, made several important conquests, and at length laid siege to the town of Antwerp. The states immediately had recourse to their old policy of begging a leader and succour from a foreign power. France was deaf to their entreaties; and a deputation, in the summer of 1585, was sent to the court of Elizabeth. She was at first too sparing of her treasure to consent; but Antwerp falling, and the states agreeing to reimburse her expenses, a treaty was concluded, by which the queen of England was to despatch to Holland an auxiliary army under the earl of Leicester; several Dutch towns being placed in the power of Elizabeth as a guarantee. Bar-

neveldt made one of this solemn embassy; but, not being its chief or spokesman, the terms cannot be considered of his framing. Indeed, it is more than probable that they were not approved by him. He had had ample experience in the duke of Anjou how little foreign princes or nobles were likely to forget their own interest in the government of Holland; and he early suspected * Leicester.

Queen Elizabeth herself seemed to have formed a nearly similar opinion of her favourite. She was very indignant on learning that the Dutch had intrusted him with sovereign power over them.† In this, indeed, she was mistaken, as he was intrusted only with that power which the governors-general had wielded in the time of Charles V., and which did not extend to the violation of their habits and privileges. Barneveldt did not deem this to be a sufficient barrier to the new governor's ambition. "He proposed, in the assembly of the states of Holland and West Friesland, to name, previous to Leicester's coming, the young prince of Orange stadtholder. At first the proposal met with nothing but opposition; but Olden Barneveldt knew how to render his plan so palatable, that Maurice, a prince of eighteen, was declared stadtholder, captain general, and admiral of Holland; the province of Zealand following the example, by passing the like decree."‡

We have now arrived at the period of Barneveldt's elevation to the first civil office of the state. It is thus described by sir William Temple: —"The pensioner of Holland is seated with them (the nobles), delivers their voice for them, and assists at all their deliberations before they come to the assembly. He is properly but minister or servant of the province, and so his

* Gerooken, *smoked*, says Kok, which, as synonymous with *suspected*, must be the origin of the vulgar use in English of the same term.

† Le Clerc lays strong emphasis on the word *absolute*, and upbraids the states with giving such powers to a foreigner; but the word *absolute*, though employed in this decree of commission, has reference merely to warlike affairs and administration.

‡ Kok.

place or rank is behind all their deputies; but he has always great credit, because he is perpetual, or seldom discharged, though of right he ought to be chosen or renewed every fifth year. He has a seat in all the several assemblies of the province; and in the states propounds all matters, gathers the opinions, and forms or digests the resolutions, claiming, likewise, a power not to conclude any very important affair by plurality of voices, when he judges in his conscience he ought not to do it, and that it will be of ill consequence to the states."

This important office was held by Paul Buys, who had been the chief of the embassy to England, and to whom Leicester now showed his gratitude by nominating him superintendent of Utrecht. Whether from his own act, preferring the service of Leicester to that of the states, or from his having lost their confidence in his talents or intentions, Paul Buys ceased to be pensionary of Holland, and the place was offered to Barneveldt, who was but pensionary of the town of Rotterdam. He again hesitated ere he would accept this new promotion, which he knew to be a place of difficulty and peril. Patriotism would not allow him to shrink back. But Barneveldt made his conditions: one was, to enjoy the unlimited confidence of the states, and to have no communication refused; another, that he was, to be allowed to give his undivided attention to his office, unemployed on foreign embassies. The third stipulated, that he should never be required to bring about or negotiate any reconciliation with Spain. This last condition showed his determined temper and uncompromising love of independence. Indeed, his past life proves as much. In the congress of Cologne, and in all other attempts to arrange the differences betwixt Spain and Holland, Barneveldt's name never appears; whilst in all acts or unions for the great end of independence we find him ever the leading and most active person. He took the oath as pensionary or advocate of Holland

on the 8th of March, 1586. He was allowed a yearly salary of 1200*l*.*

Barneveldt entered upon office at a most critical and dangerous period. Every thing was in confusion; the provinces at variance one with another, Holland with Zealand, on account of the quota of contributions, and even one town with another; the provincial states denied the authority of the states-general to raise funds. Religion was a source of dissension even more fertile than finance: and Leicester's coming, and appointment to the supreme command, was another cause of confusion and discord. Leicester was unfortunately surrounded, even before he departed from England, by certain intriguing Dutchmen, determined to make the most of his favour, and interested, for this reason, in rendering his power independent of the states. The principal of these his flatterers and advisers was Reingout, once a creature of Granvelle, and attached to all successive governments that would tolerate or employ him. Leicester, by the advice of these persons, affected the most extravagant zeal for religion for the purpose of ingratiating himself with a kind of puritanic party, opposed to the milder and more tolerant notions acted upon by the states. The Dutch puritans exclaimed against the states as Episcopalians, "envying the greater freedom of the Helvetic churches." Designing or fanatic preachers in most towns obtained influence over the people, and made use of it to oust the ancient families from the magistracies and other municipal employments, elevating new and inexperienced men, who had no other recommendation than their zeal. Leicester most foolishly attached himself to this anarchical party, by which he was extolled as a saint, and as the saviour of the country. One of his Flemish creatures was chosen deputy for Utrecht. The states refused to admit him. Leicester, in revenge,

* So Kok says; although sir William Temple states the annual salary of pensionary to be only 200 pounds sterling. During Barneveldt's life, the chief minister of the states of Holland was styled high advocate, the word pensionary being of later date.

exiled several of the respectable inhabitants, and the ex-magistrates, in fact, of Utrecht. Barneveldt took upon him their defence, and showed himself the inveterate opponent of Leicester.

In every other way the English governor displayed his rashness and arrogance. In spite of his affectation of puritanism, he garrisoned many of the Flemish towns with Irish troops, whose want of discipline and love of catholicism produced disgust and discord. Their leader was William Stanley *, a catholic, who had served under the duke of Alva, yet to him Leicester intrusted complete authority in Overyssel. It was to such men that Leicester gave confidence and commands, in lieu of bestowing them, if not upon the Hollanders, at least upon such gallant and honourable men amongst the English, as Norris for example, whom the Dutch respected.

The office of treasurer Leicester bestowed upon the infamous Reingout, who discovered a ready way to mulct the Dutch. These, however patriotic they had shown themselves, were merchants before aught else. They did not scruple to traffic even with the enemy, and with the provinces and forts in his power. Leicester, through his agent Reingout, not only forbade the continuance of this, but made enquiries into past faults of the kind, which he presumed to consider as treason, and punished accordingly. He forbade all communication, not only with the forts occupied by the Spaniards, but even with some that were neutral, such as Embden, Bremen, and Cologne. This prohibition of the commerce on which the Dutch lived, raised the discontent of the Dutch merchants and of the states. They declared that 30,000

* This William Stanley is not to be confounded with the gallant Edward, or sir Edward, Stanley. Leicester attacked a little fort, near Zutphen, where sir Philip Sidney was killed.

"It is confidently said that an Englishman, Edward Stanley, performed, on this occasion, a feat so hardy that it is scarcely to be matched for rashness even in antiquity. As he advanced against the fort, those from within put forth a pike to slay or keep him off. He grasped it with his two hands, and drew it towards him, the besieged endeavouring to withdraw it. Their force prevailed; for they drew not only the pike back into the fort, but Stanley who held to it, and who instantly laid about him with his sword, so briskly, that his soldiers were enabled to follow him, and capture the fort."

families, employed in the herring-fishery alone, would be deprived of the means of living. "If we do not feed the Spaniards," argued the Dutch, "the Germans will: by ceasing to trade with them, we ruin ourselves, without starving the foe. Nay, we starve ourselves; for our land produces no corn, and we can only procure bread in exchange for our commodities." Leicester was deaf to these arguments; nay, to increase the distress, he ordered all crops and provisions in the vicinity of the enemy, or liable to his incursions, to be destroyed. Lastly, he meddled with the coin, and, in short, did every thing to gall, insult, and ruin the commercial republic which he had been called to govern. It was a complete exemplification of the fable of the frogs and the stork.

Nor was Leicester true even to his partisans. Paul Buys, the old pensioner, who completely adopted his party, having ventured to expostulate, and to oppose Reingout, Leicester caused him to be seized, together with his family, and thrown into irons. Barneveldt, in the mean time, was showing his opposition chiefly by pleading the cause of the Utrechters whom Leicester had exiled. The earl sent for the pensionary, pretending that he had business of importance to consult him on or intrust him with. But Barneveldt, justly fearing the fate of Buys, excused himself from obeying, and incited the states against Leicester. They drew up a list of their complaints. Leicester, to meet this remonstrance, came in person to the Hague, and was compelled to hear them from the mouth of Barneveldt. But the earl made only evasive answers or arrogant replies, and persevered in his arbitrary conduct. Discontented as the states were with him, they still feared to alienate him altogether, or to offend Elizabeth. When Leicester, therefore, mentioned that he was recalled to England, they were alarmed, and entreated his stay. Even when he departed, intrusting his authority during his absence to a council of state, the Dutch government sent over some of their body as a kind of

council to confer with him in England, and to receive his commands.

All this timidity was highly displeasing to Barneveldt, who conceived, or at least thought proper to give out, suspicions, then, indeed, generally entertained in Holland, of Elizabeth herself, whom he represented as merely seeking to make peace with Spain, and ready to sacrifice her Dutch allies. This accusation the queen thought necessary to repel in a letter to the states. Meantime, Holland was filled with complaints of the English, and broils betwixt them and the Dutch. Petkum and Norris quarrelled; and count Hohenlohe, in endeavouring to reconcile them, received a blow. The prosecution of the war was itself neglected by their allies; it success was, indeed, despaired of, and each of the mercenaries thought only of his private advantage. Stanley sold Deventer to the Spaniards. York, another English officer, committed the like treason at Zutphen.

"On the Sunday morning, the 1st of February, the council of state were assembled to provide for their affairs, and to prevent the alterations which the loss of Deventer and the forts before Zutphen might cause. Thither came the states-general and the advocate Barneveldt: words grew high on either side. Barneveldt asked, 'Is this the way to serve the country?' The lord of Brederode answered with considerable heat. Barneveldt then proceeded to accuse the English. The counsellor Loogen answered, that they ought not to condemn a whole nation for the offence of some individuals, instancing the bad conduct of the French under the duke of Anjou. Barneveldt replied, crying out, that they had never been so deceived by the French as by the English."*

Barneveldt now induced the states to bestow the power of governor of Holland on prince Maurice of Orange, nominally,—indeed, in subordination to Leicester. They ordered the troops, however, to take an oath of fidelity

* History of the Netherlands, by Ed. Grimstone, Serjeant-at-arms. Grotius has expressed the same opinion of the English here avowed by Barneveldt.

to the prince; and this naturally excited the indignation of the absent earl. Queen Elizabeth, not trusting altogether to either Leicester's representations or to those of the Dutch, sent over lord Buckhurst to ascertain the true state of affairs, and the causes of their animosities and dissensions, which he was commissioned to allay. Barneveldt, on the part of the states, drew up a formidable statement of their grievances and of the arbitrary conduct of Leicester. His nominal authority they were still willing to allow, but they refused to cancel their appointment of Maurice, or dispense with the new military oath. Buckhurst did every thing in his power to conciliate. He induced Hohenlohe to be reconciled to Leicester, and to drink his health. Norris refused this convivial pledge. The pensionary Barneveldt remained in unmitigated hostility to England; he even charged Buckhurst with having a commission to treat with Spain. The English nobleman was, however, supplied with a strong argument in proof of his mistress's fidelity to the Dutch cause, in one of the naval feats of sir Francis Drake which had been just achieved.

The prince of Parma had opened the campaign of 1587 by the siege of Sluys. Leicester hastened with reinforcements from England to succour it. In this he was unsuccessful. He then met the states assembled at Dordrecht, who, as usual, were loud in their remonstrances, — the louder, on account of this last ill success. Leicester, on his part, threw all the blame upon them, upon their parsimony, and on the opposition which they raised against his authority. Recriminations passed; and if Leicester was, on his side, unfortunate and arrogant; the states and Barneveldt gave credence to unworthy and unfounded suspicions. The earl had brought with him a body of English soldiers for the relief of Sluys. The states wished to keep the services of these soldiers, yet feared to admit them into important towns. They were cooped up on board ship. Leicester, giving the states warning, landed them at Delfshaven, and at another point. It was instantly reported that he had a design of

seizing upon Barneveldt and the prince of Orange, and conveying to England, or imprisoning them. Barneveldt, warned of it, took flight, and afterwards came to induce prince Maurice to take the same or similar precautions. But the prince disdained the advice, and remained. Leicester, on his side, provoked by their suspicions and the remonstrances of the states, wrote to them at much length, advising them to consider well whether they were able of themselves, and unaided, to carry on the war; and stating that, in case they considered themselves unable, he counselled them to make peace; for that, in the disposition they were in, it was impossible for him or his troops, or for the queen of England, to be of any effectual service to them.

This roused the fears as well as the zeal of the low-church party in opposition to the states. The magistrates of Utrecht, elected, as has been seen, by this party, sent remonstrances to the states, as did the assembly of the clergy, who bade their high mightinesses "be more godly, and less worldly-minded, in quarrelling, from their private resentments, with a governor so zealous and so powerful as the earl of Leicester. Some met this insolent petition with mild or evasive answers; but Barneveldt, disdaining compromise, bade the churchmen not abandon the task of saving souls for the worldly one of state affairs: the states of the United Provinces, he said, wanted neither strength nor courage to save the country themselves, or at least conduct its administration and defence better than it could be conducted by the generalship and the despotic principles of Leicester." From accusations and mutual reproaches, written as well as spoken (for libels abounded), the parties proceeded to open violence. Some of Leicester's followers made an attempt upon Leyden, the states endeavoured to possess themselves of Neppel; and at length Elizabeth, wearied with these scenes, ordered the earl of Leicester to quit Flanders, and resign his government.

His departure did not restore tranquillity. The authority of the states was still disputed, as it had

been before his arrival. Diedrich Sonoy held himself independent, and would not obey prince Maurice; mutinies and quarrels broke out in each town. Barneveldt, on the part of the states, was the universal manager and negotiator throughout these troublesome periods: he succeeded in inspiring his countrymen with a greater jealousy of the English than even of the Spaniards; so much so, that, when an English fleet appeared off the coast of Zealand, prince Maurice, infected with the old alarms of the pensionary, instantly took flight as from an enemy. Barneveldt succeeded at this time in overturning all that Leicester and his party had done in Utrecht. The puritanic party were again ousted from the magistracy, the exiles restored, and the town once more returned to its unity of government with Holland.

The surprise of Breda, in 1590, by prince Maurice, was one of the most singular and gallant feats of the war. He concealed his soldiers at the bottom of a turf-boat, which was towed into the town. It being very cold weather, and the bottom of the boat not free from water, one of the soldiers, taken with a violent cough, entreated his comrades to kill him, rather than his cough should betray them. The town was happily taken without the loss of a life. Barneveldt was most instrumental, being then at Rotterdam collecting provisions and ammunition for the war. The Dutch government was so elated by the success, that they gave medals and rewards to all concerned. Barneveldt obtained a fine gilt cup, with an account of the affair engraven upon it. Soon after, the states of Holland gave him more ample testimony of their gratitude on the birth of his son, William, afterwards lord of Stoutenberg. They stood sponsors at the font, gave the father a cup with six hundred florins, and presented the child with an annuity of two hundred florins.*

In 1592, Barneveldt was employed in ecclesiastical affairs, rendered difficult by the differences of the church parties; one allowing church government to the civic

* Kok.

sovereigns, the other seeking to preserve it to the ministers. In the direction of the war, too, he almost had as much authority, as chief commissioner of the states, as prince Maurice himself; being at the taking of Zutphen and of Deventer, and relieving that commander of all the administrative regulations necessary after these conquests. The fatigue occasioned by these multifarious labours and journeys caused Barneveldt a serious illness. In 1594, a priest was executed for coming to Breda, by his own confession, for the purpose of assassinating prince Maurice, as well as Barneveldt and St. Aldegonde, as the leaders most obnoxious to Spain. The archduke Ernest of Mansfeldt was accused of having suborned the assassin; which accusation, however, he repelled in a letter to the states.

Philip II. of Spain at length seeing his end approach, and wishing to leave affairs in a state of tranquillity for his young and inexperienced successor, made overtures for peace. He ceded the Netherlands to prince Albert of Austria, who for this sovereignty divested himself of the cardinalate, and obtained the hand of the Spanish infanta. Giving this proof of his desire for peace, Philip commenced by negotiating with France. The states of the United Provinces instantly resolved to send, ambassadors to the French court, to dissuade Henry IV. from concluding a separate peace. Barneveldt was of course fixed on. He endeavoured to excuse himself, pleading the stipulations which he had made, on his acceptance of office, not to be employed upon foreign missions. But in this he was over-ruled, and sent, in 1598, with prince Justin of Nassau to the court of France. On this occasion he took Grotius with him. The deputation found Henry at Angers, and accompanied him to Nantes, where they met with the young Cecil, sent by Elizabeth. All their efforts were vain: in spite of all that the warmth and eloquence of Barnevelt suggested, the French king avowed that his necessities obliged him to make peace. Seeing his efforts thus thrown away,

Barneveldt at last demanded the continuance of the secret assistance from Henry, even though he should make peace with Spain. In pressing this, and proving its necessity, the pensionary was so successful, "that the king of France, who was as given to keep as to get money, was still more generous in aiding the states afterwards to defend themselves, than his predecessors used to be towards those nations whom they hoped to oppress."

"It was now easy to perceive," writes Grotius, "that the Spaniards, contented with having disarmed France, were resolved not to grant peace to England except upon advantageous or reasonable conditions. It was for this reason that the ambassador of the states, Justin of Nassau and Olden Barneveldt passed now into England, which country the preceding Dutch embassy had just left. They resolved to limit their demands to this point, that, if the queen was inclined to imitate France in making peace, Holland would prefer to yield also, rather than bear alone the burden of the war. In making use of this artifice, they hoped to meet feint with feint."

Elizabeth, however, was too cunning even for the wily diplomatist. She interrupted Barneveldt with an exclamation of surprise, when he mentioned that Henry had promised the states support in money; and declared that, in lieu of imitating him, she required to be paid by them the sums advanced on their behalf. Barneveldt soon again returned to Holland. Elizabeth, notwithstanding the advice of the dying Burleigh, did not conclude peace with Spain, and renewed that with Holland. "Nevertheless, in the present negotiation," says Grotius, "Elizabeth, by new conditions, so changed the spirit of the former ones, that, remaining free herself from all ties, she effectually bound those with whom she treated."

The war continued with Spain; and Barneveldt returned to his active functions as war commissioner. The efforts of the Dutch were crowned with success.

The enemy were completely driven from their last posts in Zealand, and it was resolved to carry the war into Flanders, and get possession of the sea-ports held there by the Spaniards, from which the latter molested the Dutch trade. Prince Maurice accordingly led an expedition into that country, and Barneveldt went as commissioner to aid and superintend. He also accompanied the naval expedition against Ostend, whilst Maurice advanced by land. On this occasion was fought the battle of Nieuport, won by prince Maurice; although the English auxiliaries blamed his remissness, and claim much of the credit of the victory to themselves.* It was the first victory in the open field that prince Maurice had gained, and it made him and his immediate followers or courtiers more than ordinarily elate. They for the first time threw off that respect which they had hitherto thought it necessary to wear towards the states and their commissioners, and indulged in open mockery of those civilians who had remained trembling in Nieuport whilst the troops were fighting. "The courtiers," a crafty race for sowing animosities," says Grotius, "from this time especially began to represent the authority of the states as obnoxious to the prince and ridiculous to the people." Barneveldt, the chief of the commissioners, the most active of those in leading and interfering, and hot tempered also, was, of course, most aimed at in these attacks: and it is allowed that from this action dates the enmity that afterwards grew so extreme betwixt him and prince Maurice. Indeed, it must have been somewhat galling to the prince to find that no sooner had he conquered a town, than his authority was superseded in it by the commissioner of the states, who arrived to take the administration into his hands.

These events took place in 1600. Next came the siege of Ostend by the Flemish archduke, and his able

* See the account of the battle in Grimstone's History of the Netherlands, "taken out of sir Francis Vere's owne relation, and the supplements of other officers."

general, Spinola. The death of queen Elizabeth in 1603 changed the aspect of affairs. All the interested and belligerent powers sent embassies to London. Barneveldt, with others, went from the states; but in vain endeavoured to make James persevere in the spirited and warlike resolutions of the queen. The Dutch statesman gave the monarch proofs that his merely delaying to conclude peace might procure that blessing for Holland, together with the indispensable one of independence.* But James liked not republican emissaries; and but for the influence which the address and eloquence, as well as the aristocratic pride, and the pedantry (affected aptly for the occasion) of the great Sully had upon him, the reconciliation of England with Spain would scarcely have been even delayed.

In 1604, prince Maurice undertook another expedition into Flanders, with the hope of relieving Ostend. Nor were Barneveldt and the states' commissioners deterred, by the growing jealousies of the soldiers towards civil interference, from accompanying the expedition. It even appears as if Barneveldt and his colleagues wished to disprove the imputation of their skulking behind walls whilst the armies were in action. Here it was his especial advice that directed the capture of the forts Philippine and Catelyne; and he seems to have taken part in all the enterprises of the compaign. It was at the commencement of the siege of Sluys that Barneveldt quitted it for Holland on some pressing business, and returned in time to be present at the surrender of the town. Disgusts, however, thickened upon him in the exercise of his functions. He met no longer with obedience or aid, but with jealousies. The intrigues and contradictions of enemies and rivals were now added to the fatigues of travelling and campaigning in an unhealthy country. He resolved, therefore, to attend the armies no more, and to allow himself more repose for

* "Docebatque idipsum Olden Barneveldius arcana Fœderatorum tractare solitus prolata ducis Brunsvicis manu, quem Cæsar Rudolfus ejus rei conscium fecerat."—*Grotius*, *Hist.* lib. xii.

the future. He complained to the states that, except from the officers of Holland and West Friesland, the states' commissioners met universally with frowardness and opposition, more especially from the chamber of reckoning and the chiefs of the provincial courts of justice. He even vented some complaints against prince Maurice himself, and lamented the disunion that was breaking forth, and was likely to prove so detrimental to the common interests.

The predictions of Barneveldt were soon verified; for in 1605 the exertions of the states were so relaxed in the essential points of levying funds and collecting forces, that Spinola, returning from Spain, and commencing the campaign of 1606, found them utterly unprepared. It was in consequence marked by severe losses on the part of the Dutch. They lost the town of Groll, that of Rhinberg was besieged, and prince Maurice seemed totally unable to cope with his active enemy. Whilst Rhinberg was besieged, an assembly of the states took place. They determined to send, as of old, commissioners to attend the operations of prince Maurice; and Barneveldt was appointed. But he stoutly refused to accept the office, showing the deficiency in funds, and in all preparations, which rendered all efforts useless. In fact, Rhinberg was soon after obliged to capitulate; and Spinola was only prevented from more serious successes by a mutiny in his army.

Hitherto the most courageous heart and most unbending spirit amongst the Dutch had been that of the states' advocate or grand pensionary. His voice was ever for war, ever opposed to all considerations of peace. He had stipulated, on accepting office, not to be employed in a task so odious to him. By this time, however, his opinions on this point had become greatly modified. He saw that Spain, exhausted as she was, might be brought to acknowledge the independence of the northern provinces; that, in the mean time, private interests had come to mingle with and influence the views of the chief military officers, those of prince Maurice

especially; and that a continuance of the struggle would but increase the difficulties and debts of the states, and merely liberate Holland from one master in order to bestow it upon another. Personal disgusts, no doubt, led to his adoption of pacific sentiments; and age, which was stealing fast upon him, must also have had its natural effect in inclining his mind to repose.

Accordingly, when, in 1607, the archduke sent envoys to treat of an accommodation, the voice of Barneveldt recommended attention to their offers. Prince Maurice, indeed, exclaimed against them, using the old argument that these offers merely covered insidious designs. But Barneveldt, in answer, represented the state of Dutch affairs and of Europe; "that Britain sat an idle spectatress of the war; that France meditated some great design, to which the interests of Holland were, of course, subordinate: and if the states of Holland could show, by negotiation, that there was a prospect of obtaining and making peace, that then those powers whose interest it was to keep the quarrel raging might be induced to come forward and aid the Dutch with something more than empty benevolence."* Prince Maurice is represented by Grotius as a convert to these arguments; and, indeed, the latter, offering a prospect of aid to carry on the war, rather than the means of terminating it, could not have displeased him.

Barneveldt, by these representations, won upon Maurice to consent to the opening of a negotiation; which soon produced the effect foretold; for the French king instantly sent ambassadors, who began by pressing the war. Barneveldt frankly confessed to the president Jeannin the enormous exigencies of the war, and his wish to make peace upon honourable terms. Then burst forth the great dissension betwixt the war and peace party: prince Maurice, for obvious reasons, at the

* Grotius.

head of the former; Barneveldt at the head of the latter. A matter of contention occurred at the very opening of the negotiation. Spain demanded the recall of the Dutch fleet. This the grand pensionary pressed, whilst the prince opposed it. The latter had on his side almost all the lower orders amongst the Dutch, being sailors or men finding lucrative employment in war. With Barneveldt was a majority of the burgesses and upper classes. All the states were of his opinion, except Zealand, where the house of Orange was predominant*: so that the influence of Barneveldt prevailed. Henry IV. was not a little displeased at the Dutch statesman's headlong propensity to peace. The monarch's suspicions, in his latter days, went so far as to doubt his disinterestedness: this is evident from Henry's letters. But the president Jeannin corrected these unjust views of his master respecting Barneveldt, as the only man of capacity in Holland, and one whose patriotism and integrity were indubitable. Jeannin laboured to bring about an agreement between him and prince Maurice, to whom great promises were made, and who seemed not at all so disinterested as Barneveldt, saying that the enemy had made him great offers—a million of money and all his lordships in Germany. Through the French envoys, however, and the count of Nassau, a reconciliation took place betwixt Barneveldt and the prince. They spoke together without disguise; yet, in seven days after, Jeannin writes of the prince's abhorrence of aught that the pensionary favoured.

The king of France, seeing Barneveldt's strong inclination for peace, and knowing the impetuosity of his temper, feared that the Dutch might be induced to make disadvantageous concessions, or to barter their independence for tranquillity. But the minister of Holland was as firm in withstanding the insinuations, the

* "In Zealand, the nobility having been extinguished in the Spanish wars, and the prince of Orange possessing the marquisate of Flushing and Turveer, his highness alone makes that part of the states in the province by the quality and title of first or sole noble of Zealand."—*Sir William Temple.*

delays, and the tergiversations of Spain, as he was in resisting the interested patriotism and warlike zeal of prince Maurice. In an early stage of the negotiations, a Spanish agent presented a diamond of great value, with bills of exchange for a considerable sum, to the secretary of the states. Soon after, a kind of half acknowledgment of independence of Holland was sent from Spain, as the basis of the future treaty. Barneveldt returned both the state paper and the diamond to the Spanish envoy at the same time, observing, as to the bribe, that "he was not surprised if monks judged of other people's integrity by their own." But one may be permitted to doubt Barneveldt's having spoken this gratuitous insult to the Spanish monarch, which Grotius puts into his mouth.*

The difficulties of bringing about a peace were numerous and almost insurmountable. There was not only the pride and enmity of Spain, supported by subterfuges unworthy of that pride, and also the opposition and intrigues of prince Maurice and the war party in Holland to overcome; but there were the manœuvres of the French king to guard against. Throughout the negotiation of Jeannin, the prevailing sentiment of Henry IV. seems to be suspicion, and, indeed, more trickery than suits that great soldier's history. He was insuperably distrustful of Barneveldt. "Say what you will to me," writes Henry to Jeannin, "Barneveldt leans more to the English than to me; because he knows I am on terms of friendship with Maurice." In this Henry was mistaken; for the pensionary ever leaned from England towards France. "Propose the matter in the provinces and towns rather than in the council of the states," writes Henry again; "for these last only hear and see by the ears and eyes of Barneveldt." The huge volume containing an elaborate account of their negotiations is, indeed, a monument to the memory of Barneveldt's consummate ability, integrity, and

* "Nec mirans adeo, si monachi, avarum imprimis hominum genus, alios ex se æstimarent."— *Grotius Hist.* lib. xvi.

labour.* Although despising James I., and disliking the nation that he ruled, still the pensionary played off the English against the French; made both concur in his own great object—that of peace, with Dutch independence: and although the wisest statesmen of both these countries believed that the latter could not be wrung from Spain, yet Barneveldt did wring it at the last.

The first difficulty, about the form of acknowledgment of independence, having been got over, the next that occurred was respecting religion. The king of Spain insisted on tolerance, and more than tolerance, for the catholics of Holland; and Henry IV. thought himself bound to support this demand. Barneveldt himself was for tolerance; "he thought it advisable that the said exercise (of the catholic religion) should be re-established in such towns as Utrecht, Haerlem, Amsterdam, and others where the number of catholics was great." The English, however, were opposed to such concessions, the states themselves feared to waken the factious zeal of their ministers, and the article was not ceded. India was the other point in dispute; Spain wishing to stipulate, as her only advantage in the treaty, that the Hollanders should refrain from Indian commerce. But the states of Holland and Zealand could never consent to an exclusion that would be ruin to their trade; and such a consummation as a treaty being despaired of on all hands, a truce was thought on.

On many occasions Barneveldt was considered to have pushed his efforts for a pacification too far. The event exculpates him completely on this point. But it is necessary to mark how opinion began to turn against him, and from what causes he lost his great popularity which his services and patriotism fully deserved. Jeannin writes to Villeroy, complaining of Barneveldt's (or Le Charme's) obstinacy in this respect. "I expostu-

* In this correspondence, divers names are given to the personages mentioned, to answer the end of a cipher, or of concealment. Thus, the king of Spain is styled *Le Poulain*, the English are *Les Asperges*. Barneveldt is designated *Le Charme*.

lated with him," says the French envoy, "and even threatened to go to the general assembly myself, and speak my reasons in opposition to his. I told him to reflect and be more circumspect in his conduct; that many were in wait to malign and injure him, and that, without more prudence, he would lose the power to do the good which he had at heart." Jeannin continues:—"The pursuit of Barneveldt in this last affair has given much handle to those who envy him: there are even some, not his enemies, who do not approve his conduct; but his credit remains as great as ever: and, for my own part, I cannot imagine any thing else but that he is too passionate, and does not carry himself with that moderation which is requisite in order to diminish the envy that both his equals and superiors have conceived against his overbearing authority and his little agreement with their views: yet nothing can be purer than his intentions."

Barneveldt was driven, no doubt, from the path of moderation, by the efforts and intrigues of the Orange party to continue the war at all hazards. In the latter end of 1608, prince Maurice publicly entered his protest against all pacification, in a letter which he sent as a circular to all the towns of Holland, and which was a continued inculpation of the pensionary and his exertions. Bentivoglio, for the sake of speech-making after the classic fashion, converts this letter into a discourse, and puts in one, in answer, into the mouth of Barneveldt. The latter replied to such accusation by his conduct more than by words, remaining firm himself, and urging the states to remain equally so in not yielding a jot of the contended points. The envoys of Spain and Flanders, accordingly, felt obliged to break off the negotiations altogether, and to take their departure, declaring that a treaty was impracticable.

It was then that the ambassadors of France and England proposed to substitute a truce of long duration for a peace, leaving the disputed points where they were, unsettled and undiscussed. It was evident

that, in consenting to this, Spain would be the country making the real concession; although a truce, being a less perfect acknowledgment of Dutch independence than a treaty, would be likely to be agreeable to the Spanish court, then more alive to vanity and present appearances than to its real power or advantages. Barneveldt, accordingly, grasped at the proposal of a prolonged truce. Prince Maurice, who was already triumphing in the success of his opinion for the rejection of the treaty, found his hopes dashed and his indignation awakened by this renewal of negotiations for peace under the name of a truce. His anger, and that of his partisans, forbidden to be displayed against the envoys of France or England, fell altogether on Barneveldt, whose name was now held up to execration in speeches and in libels, a host of which instantly inundated Holland; for the Dutch had early learned that powerful weapon of party.

"It was wonderful" (we here translate Grotius) "with what heat the matter was discussed at every meeting; and every day new libels appeared to foment discord. Nor were the monarchs (those of France and England) spared, who were to find their own advantage in the depression of the Dutch. But the weight of envy fell upon Olden Barneveldt, as the inventor of this new mode of pacification; a man whose immense influence and renown excited jealousy of his greatness. There were publications at that time which not obscurely hinted at the necessity of shaking off his supremacy by assassination. Barneveldt, therefore, feeling himself the mark for so much hate, rose in the assembly, and declared that the hatred of princes was not new to him; that, on that account, or by the danger attending it, he had never been deterred from his duty or serving his country, relying, as he ever did, on the purity and strength of his conscience. But now he perceived that the great object of peace was likely to be lost, weighed down not only by the aversion borne to it, but to him; and therefore he prayed of the assembly to elect some less odious minister

to execute their behests. So saying, the pensionary left the assembly. The states of Holland, however, instantly sent a deputation after Barneveldt, praying him not to desert them in such an emergency. Returning, in consequence, and resuming his place and arguments, he extolled the sincerity of the mediating monarchs; enumerated the grievances and expenses of war; answered his virulent enemies with temper; and, in spite of the resistance of the deputies of Amsterdam, brought round those of the rest of Holland to agree to the truce, in conjunction with five other states of the union. Zealand alone continued to protest." In the spring of the following year, 1609, the labours of Barneveldt for peace were brought to a close, by the conclusion of the truce, Zealand at length withdrawing its dissent. The pensions and other advantages which he enjoyed during the war, were continued to prince Maurice.

Now came the difficult and perilous part of Barneveldt's career. He had embarked with his country in their very first struggle for independence; and no one, not even the foremost warrior, had more promoted its success. He had achieved the great task of its independence, having, at the same time, guarded with wary policy against the rising and interested ambition of the house of Orange. One might think that he who had held the helm and steered the vessel through the fiercest political storms might with ease overcome the turbulence of a religious squall; yet in this he was destined to perish.

It is singular enough, that the extremes of religion, as of political rule, are marked by the same character of tyranny and intolerance. The common-place observation, that democracies are the fiercest tyrants, need not be repeated. So, in the church, we find that the sect which chose its place and principles farthest and most averse from Rome, should have approached nearest to popery in rigidness of dogma, intolerance of dissent, and in the wish to raise ecclesiastical authority to a complete supremacy over the civil. No pope ever

struggled more to establish the supremacy of his bishoprick over the rest of Europe, than did Calvin. Geneva was his Rome*: therein and therefrom he was as absolute, as dogmatic, as intemperate, as Gregory VII. himself. In a great degree he succeeded, principally by making Geneva the most famous school of the time. The religious revolutions and wars of divers protestant countries, of England and Holland especially, sent refugees thither from persecution at home; and these, on their return, inoculated their respective countries with a new religious creed.

I shall, as far as possible, here avoid the religious controversy; my aim being to view the party, and their struggle, in a political light. The divines reared at Geneva flocked back to Holland, as soon as it was liberated from the Spaniards, and instantly formed the majority of the church. There was a strong link betwixt them, not only from identity of dogmas, but from having studied in the same schools. The chief novelty in their religious ideas was a belief in predestination,—a doctrine strongly tending to increase spiritual pride, and favouring the project of rendering the clergy the intellectual aristocracy of the country.† This last was Calvin's political maxim, hidden, indeed, and undeclared, even to himself; but it was that on which he acted.

The eminent men among the Dutch, those who had remained at home, and had been employed in expelling the Spaniards, whilst their future pastors were studying at Geneva, entertained those intermediate and undefined opinions by which common sense can reconcile the ideas of God's providence and man's freedom. But the new comers would allow of no such laxity of creed, and they soon drew the people over to them by their eloquence, and by the argument, that sound doctrine must be that which is most distant from those of Rome.

* Beza owned to Casaubon that Calvin was in every respect a bishop at Geneva, and that he proposed the same to him (Beza). See Brandt, vol. ii. b. 19.

† The ancient Egyptians realised this idea. The French St. Simonians hope to do so.

But the religious dogma was but a pretext of difference. The true question was a political one betwixt the newly formed church and the state, the former affecting and aiming to throw off the civil authority altogether.

We have seen that, in a very early part of the Dutch revolution, Barneveldt had been called on to interfere and resist these pretensions of the church, which at that time leagued with Leicester, as now with Maurice; in short, with any power that offered it support and the means of opposition. Unfortunately, the resistance, which, as merely political, might have been overcome, was enabled to take the form of a religious quarrel; and the government, in consequence, lost entirely the power of ruling or opposing it.

James Arminius, one of the ministers of the church, was one of those restless spirits that can never let orthodoxy slumber. He had been with the rest of the students of his calling to Geneva; but, from some frowardness, he had been obliged to leave the community of that town in disgust and disgrace. He had not long returned to Holland when he began to question the dogmas of Calvin respecting predestination, received by the Dutch church. These free opinions of his, however, not being spoken very loudly, did not excite much alarm or animadversion, until he was selected by the magistrates of Leyden to be professor of divinity in the university of that town. For a doctor it was the first place in Holland. The churchmen exclaimed against the choice, raked up old proofs of the opinions of Arminius, forced him to dissent, and to become the polemical champion of free-will.

The intolerance of the Dutch church may be presumed from the fact that no Lutheran house of worship was allowed to the states-general of Holland and West Friesland; and that, in consequence, those who followed the confession of Augsburg were, as oppressed dissenters, ready to second the first powerful voice raised against the majority of the church. In the year 1604, Barneveldt was engaged in endeavouring to still this quarrel.

When he heard the declaration of the Calvinistic divines against the Lutherans, he observed, "You are a strange kind of people; you bear harder upon those that differ little from you, than upon those who differ much."*

When Arminius upheld the doctrine of free-will, however, the whole weight of the church's ire fell upon him. Gomar, another doctor of Leyden, stood forth as his chief opponent, and gave his name to the church party. The states were soon called upon to interfere; and Barneveldt's opinions and influence then predominated. By his advice, the states recommended the church to call a synod, in order to revise the national confession and catechism, so as to satisfy all parties. The church were indignant at being told to revise. They had meetings, debates, and quarrels, preparatory to the synod, which they refused to convene for such a purpose. They prayed to be allowed to call a preparatory assembly, wherein they intended to feel their way, and discover the sentiments of the several ecclesiastics. The states refused. They were just then, in 1607, commencing the negotiations with Spain, and accordingly set the religious question aside, bidding the ministers of the church remain at peace and tolerate each other.

The word toleration inflamed the Calvinists, who insisted on a rigidly defined creed, and the ejection of all who refused to subscribe it. On the other hand, the Arminians begged to be allowed "to suspend their assent to human writing;" adding their opinion, "that it had been better for Christendom if no formularies, or at least very concise and general ones, had been made use of." In the midst of important negotiations, the states were so wearied with the importunities of the contending parties, that, in 1608, both Arminius and Gomar were called before the great council to explain their differences. Gomar declined, and protested against their jurisdiction. Such affairs, he said, belonged to the

* Brandt, Hist. of the Reformation in the Low Countries.

synod of the church, and should be treated not civilly, but ecclesiastically. Nevertheless, he stated his opinions; Arminius his. A report of them being made to the states, Barneveldt rose in their name, and "thanked God that there was no material difference betwixt them, at least not respecting any of the capital points of the Christian faith; and then required them not to talk of what had been transacted, and to endeavour after peace by all means." Then Gomar rose, and replied, "that Barneveldt was wrong in stating the difference as trifling betwixt him and Arminius; in whose doctrines, for his part, he should be very sorry to die." After this conference, says Brandt, "they did not continue silent; each party zealously propagated their particular opinions; but those of Gomar were most agreeable to the clergy, and those of Arminius to the government.

Arminius died in 1609, and the disputes became still more a political than a religious argument. Despite the entreaties of the states that he should forbear, Gomar published his "Warning," in 1610. "I cannot be silent without wronging the truth," said he to Barneveldt. "Truth above every thing, certainly," replied the latter; "but peace next." Gomar supported the old papal doctrine of the church being independent of the state, not, indeed, by a papal supremacy, but by "a collateral power." Uitenbogaard, a friend of Arminius, replied, upholding the power of princes and civil authorities in ecclesiastical matters. Barneveldt and the states, however they might favour this doctrine *, deemed it wiser tobe silent, than excite opposition by discussing it. They issued a decree enjoining peace, and forbidding publications either about predestination or about the power of government in church matters. Such mandates proved as vain as Canute's to the sea.

In 1610 appeared the famous remonstrance addressed by the Arminians to the states, from which they obtained the name of *Remonstrants*. It was drawn up by

* They showed this by appointing Uitenbogaard to the embassy then setting out for Paris.

Uitenbogaard, aided, it is said, by Grotius. In the year following, a counter-remonstrance came from the Gomarists. Vorstius succeeded Arminius in the divinity chair at Leyden, as well as in obnoxiousness to the church. The polemical quarrel still raged, and king James of England thought fit to take part in it, writing a book against Vorstius, in which he loaded him with most unroyal abuse, recommended him to be burned, and demanded at the least his expulsion. This added to the embarrassment of the states, who put Vorstius on his defence, and found nothing to condemn in his conduct; but still endeavoured to show deference to the opinions of the English king. The ambassador of James at the Hague, Winwood, thought it necessary to participate in his master's hate. Writing to the king upon occasion of the sudden death of Elias Van Olden Barneveldt, brother to the advocate of Holland *, he used these expressions, "Olden Barneveldt, the pensionary of Rotterdam, lately one of the ambassadors of this state to your majesty, and one of the deputies to the states of Holland, went yesterday well to bed, and was found dead this morning in his brother's house, where he resided. The judgments of God are inscrutable. This event occasions much discourse; for he was not only a patron of Arminius and a defender of Vorstius, but likewise a persecutor of those of the reformed religion. The divine justice has leaden feet, but iron hands."

A more dangerous enemy to the Arminians, or rather to the advocates of the state's independence of the church, — the political question being more important than the religious, which was put foremost, — was prince Maurice. As to the theological dispute he cared little; he was even on terms of friendship and intimacy with Uitenbogaard. But, it was enough for Maurice to find a party opposed to Barneveldt and the authority of the states; and he accordingly leaned to the cause of the Gomarists or anti-remonstrants.

* Barneveldt was succeeded as pensionary of Rotterdam by his brothe Elias, upon whose death Grotius was promoted to that situation.

With such potent adversaries to contend against,— although James soon came round to the political doctrines of the Arminians,— the states conducted themselves with exemplary firmness and moderation. It was not possible for common sense to mediate with more impartiality betwixt the contending parties. Barneveldt, however, insisted on the supremacy of the civil power; and, through his suggestion, the church constitution of the year 1591, based upon this principle, was enforced. The controversy raged fiercer from year to year, despite the exhortations and commands of the states that the clergy should remain at peace. At length, in 1616, the anti-remonstrants broke forth, and in the town of the Hague itself declared that they could no longer pray in the same churches or receive the sacrament with the Arminians. A schism was the consequence; and the government was necessarily called upon to decide which should be the national church.

Just as these heats were breaking into open contention, Barneveldt was labouring under a severe illness, taken whilst attending the marriage of the count Brederode. One of his first acts, upon his recovery, was to try the temper of prince Maurice. The pensionary told him " that he had hitherto spared his excellency, being unwilling to engage in such disputes; but now, since all was tending to open faction, he perceived the states would find themselves obliged to beg of him to assist in supporting the public authority." To this the prince returned an evasive answer, not wishing, he said, to be drawn into these quarrels. However, when pressed, he gave it as his opinion that there should be an accommodation; that he saw no harm in each party having a distinct church; and, at any rate, the differences should be decided, not by authority, but accommodation. This was directly adverse to Barneveldt's opinion; and the latter was reduced now to a sad dilemma; since, in supporting the authority of the states over the church, he could rely but on the armed force of the land, and this was completely in the hands of Maurice.

Delay and address were necessary. Amsterdam stood forth as the most zealous in behalf of the Gomarists. The states sent deputies to expostulate and negotiate with the magistrates of that town; and Grotius, the spokesman of the deputation, expended all his eloquence and learning on the occasion. But the Gomarists answered only by demanding a national synod: this the states objected to; well aware that the synod would soon take matters into its own hands, and place itself in opposition to them.

A circumstance occurred in 1616 to widen the breach betwixt prince Maurice and Barneveldt. The cession by England of the towns formerly given to Elizabeth, and still held by James, had just been negotiated: it forms one of the most brilliant memorials of Barneveldt's talents as a negotiator and statesman. The English troops were, upon a certain day, to depart from the Brill: prince Maurice, from sudden whim or design, left the Hague, and arrived unexpectedly at the Brill. The council of Holland and West Friesland were considerably alarmed at learning this expedition, as well as at hearing that Maurice had ordered thither his brother's regiment. They sent off a despatch to Barneveldt, who happened to be absent, but who instantly directed certain measures of precaution.

The states at length, obliged to take one side or the other of the religious factions, avowed their preference of the Arminians. The Gomarists at the Hague, rather than join in divine service with their opponents, demanded a separate church; and this being denied, they assembled at the house of an officer of prince Maurice's to hear prayers. The government applied to the prince for a guard to prevent the meeting, but this he declined; and a state of universal anarchy and discord, amounting in many places to civil war, agitated, through the course of the year 1617, all the towns of Holland. The attempts of Barneveldt, of Grotius, and of others, to bring about an accommodation, or to pacify certain disputes, were attended with no success. The Gomarists took

possession of the churches where they predominated, and even at the Hague they seized the Cloister church. Their triumph was complete, when prince Maurice, attended by count Louis of Nassau and a suite of nobles, attended the service at this church, thus openly declaring himself in opposition to the states: he at the same time gave general orders to the soldiers by no means to interfere or lend their aid in the repression of riots raised by these religious disputes.

This order might have been wise in principle, and would certainly have been so if the government or municipalities possessed any civil force which might preserve order. They had none, however; the municipalities having merely a night watch resembling the old guardians of the London streets. In the month of August, Barneveldt proposed and carried a decree in the states, enabling the towns to arm their watch, and form regiments therewith; the regular troops being at the same time ordered to obey the state's officers under pain of dismissal. Ere proceeding to relate how Maurice and the Gomarists parried this legislative blow, it will be well to throw some light on the supposed views and characters of the parties.

The English ambassador at the Hague at this time was sir Dudley Carleton. As Carleton favoured the Gomarists, and prince Maurice, whilst the French ambassador leaned to their antagonists, his testimony cannot be considered as biassed in the Dutch statesman's favour. He thus writes home at this time: —

"If I should now enter into the discourses and rumours of these free-spoken people upon this subject, I should never end; they going so far, both on the one side and on the other, as to lay to the charge of the adverse party a design to change the government: the remonstrants imputing to his excellency (prince Maurice) *Leicestriana consilia*, as they state them, and the anti-remonstrants imputing to Barneveldt and his party the bringing in of popery. For my part, I cannot wade so far in my conjectures; but think his excellency's aim

to be, besides the maintenance of the common cause of religion, rather *ad destructionem* than *edificationem*, in opposition to M. Barneveldt's authority, which he hath long practised with much diligence to increase, by introducing these new opinions, and creating magistrates in places that way affected, and exclusive of others, which I think to be his greater scope. Yet this may be noted, in confirmation of the vulgar opinion, that in those places where popery is most frequent,—as Utrecht for a province, and Rotterdam for a town, — the remonstrants are absolute, and generally the papists hold with that faction. Some conjecture (and this is his excellency's opinion) that all this is done by M. Barneveldt, by way of preparative against the time when the renewing of the truce, or changing it to a peace, shall be brought into treaty; whereas, it being likely the king of Spain will insist upon mitigation of the first article concerning the sovereignty of this government, and upon toleration of the popish religion in these provinces, the opposition to both which will only grow by the protestant party, he intends to prevent this difficulty by suppressing that faction."

The unfairness of these suppositions will at once be seen, but they show the pleadings of the parties. The attempts of the Gomarists were directed to obtain the majority in the states-general, and thereby crush the supremacy hitherto allowed to the province of Holland, its states, its council, and advocate, Barneveldt. They now clamoured for a national or general synod, in which they were certain of a majority of ecclesiastics; whilst the remonstrants argued in favour of provincial synods, in which the parties would be more balanced. The Gomarists, being the attacking or opposing side, were the most vehement. "We shall soon see," said a petition from the Gomarist ecclesiastics of the Brill, "whose fists are the hardest." Sir Dudley Carleton forgot his character of ambassador so far as to speak a virulent address to the states-general, accusing the Arminians, and reproaching the states of Holland. But the English

envoy had many causes of difference with Barneveldt, who cared little for England, and who despised its monarch; directing his attention, on the contrary, towards France, which country he deemed it essential for Dutch interests to keep well with, since its union and understanding with Spain would bring much more danger than could possibly come from England. This aversion of the Barneveldt party from England naturally threw James and his envoy into the opposing scale. There were many causes of difference; the Dutch prohibiting English cloths at this time, and making complaints of the hostility on the part of the English in the East Indies. Such was the alienation betwixt the governments of the respective countries, that Barneveldt paid no attention to one of the most laudable projects of James's ministers, to clear the Mediterranean of pirates by the united fleets of England and Holland.

The mode taken by prince Maurice and the Gomarists to defeat what they called the *vigorous decree* of the states, enabling the towns to arm their guards, and the soldiers to obey the civil authorities, was to press the matter of the national synod. It was for this that Carleton was urged to exert himself; and the prince,* in order to give weight to the synod, besought that divines from England, as well as the palatinate, might attend it. Holland, notwithstanding the dissent of Amsterdam, resisted, with some other states; but four sided with Maurice, and resolved to proceed with their council.

Soon after the decree, Barneveldt retired in weariness and disgust to Viana and his other possessions about Amersfort, under pretence of a change of air for his health. When he returned to his official duties, it was to meet with insult. A lively altercation took place betwixt him and one of the burgomasters of Amsterdam in the presence of prince Maurice. He had gone, at the head of a deputation of the states, to expostulate with the latter upon his suffering disturbances every where; but was interrupted by the burgomaster, who declared that the late decrees of the states had not the consent of

Amsterdam. Immediately we find Barneveldt again in retirement, Grotius performing his functions. This, according to Carleton, excited much wonder. "Some conceive it is with a purpose wholly to retire himself from the managing of public affairs; others that he doth *reculer pour mieux sauter*. But I conceive his intent to be, to see the uttermost of this difference." The English secretary of state, Winwood, writes in a different spirit from Carleton, of the great Dutch statesman: — "Malice itself must confess that never man hath done more faithful and powerful service to his country than he. But *finis coronat opus;* and for him that hath lived in so great honour, that hath managed the affairs of that state forty years together, and that with a most happy and fortunate success, now being *aux derniers abois*, even, as it were, at the last gasp, to breathe out his own shame and disgrace, cannot but make the subject of much sorrow to his friends, and of scorn to his enemies." The advocate was now seventy years of age; fallen, in his old days, on envious and ungrateful times. The star of prince Maurice prevailed over his. Religious enthusiasm, like all great popular sentiments, is a wind that may blow as strongly towards absolute power as towards freedom: it had rescued the Dutch from the tyranny of Spain, and was now wafting them to that of the house of Orange. As Barneveldt had aided in the first, so he resisted the last with all his might. If Du Maurier, the French ambassador, is to be believed, prince Maurice did not conceal that he aimed at sovereignty; and that he even endeavoured, through his mother, to acquire Barneveldt's support in this undertaking. At any rate, the advocate had reason to distrust the prince's purposes; and, although the independent party which he headed was daily diminishing, from pusillanimity, from lack of union and zeal, still Barneveldt, despite his infirmities, — "he now goeth with a staff," writes Carleton, — never deserted, however he might despair of, the sacred cause of republican independence.

The public discourse and declamation of the English

ambassador to the states-general was a great blow to Barneveldt and his adherents. The French envoy, Du Maurier, in vain endeavoured to counterbalance it, by addressing, in a contrary spirit, the states of Holland. France had not yet recovered, under Richelieu, the discredit into which the administration of the queen-mother and her favourite had thrown that kingdom. The Arminians began to lose even their majority in the states of Holland. The deputies of Amsterdam, Dordrecht, and Delft balanced those of Haerlem, Leyden, and Rotterdam; whilst a middle party, always the offspring of fear in violent times, was soon formed, at the expense of the latter. In this state of things Barneveldt appeared at the assembly of the states, in December, 1617, and craved permission to resign his office of advocate, representing his great age and sinking health as the excuse. But the states would not hear or admit of his resignation; nor did the minister so far prize his ease or safety as to persist in his demand.

The chief supporters of Barneveldt and of his principles were the ancient magistrates of the Dutch towns, many of them appointed by him, all opposed to the usurpation of the prince of Orange,—Maurice had just succeeded to this title by the death of his elder brother, long a prisoner in Spain,—and inclined to the Arminian doctrines in church government and religion. Relying on the support of the clergy and the populace, now universally in his favour, the prince undertook, in the commencement of 1618, to displace those magistrates; and, for the purpose of effecting this revolution, — it was needless, — he took a journey through the United Provinces. Whilst the prince was meditating and commencing the achievement of his purposes, the aged Barneveldt, condemned to inaction, had taken up the pen to vindicate his character from the host of libels that charged him with corruption and crime.

"The Remonstrance, or Apology," which Barneveldt published, and addressed to the states in 1618, is one of the chief sources whence have been derived

the details of this memoir. Being reproached as a stranger, and no Dutchman, he was obliged to go into some particulars of his family; and his probity being called in question, he was obliged to recount all the circumstances of his past life with frankness, and without vaunt. The libels against him called Barneveldt the *great pensionary*, using the term in a sarcastic sense. He commences his apology by a needless refutation of the epithet: posterity more fully vindicated his memory, by retaining the name, and assigning it as the most honourable distinction to the place that Barneveldt had rendered illustrious. Then, after recounting the several actions and employments of his life, he comes to the fatal disputes betwixt the Arminians and Gomar; "neither of which I adopted, neither of which rejected, deeming that both opinions might be suffered in Christian charity and union, without prejudicing truth." If he sided with the Arminians, it was in the great principle of toleration, he said, not in doctrine; except, indeed, where the supremacy of the civil over the ecclesiastical power was upheld. "For your authority" (he is addressing the states) "over ecclesiastical persons and things, I always upheld as the peculiar and necessary privilege of the country, which I was bound by oath and office to do." Such was the opinion of William, prince of Orange. "If, however," winds up the Apology on this head, "when arguments were urged irrationally, or with open and indecent falsehood, I found myself unable to digest them, and answered such impertinence too bitterly, I beg that this may be pardoned to my great age, and to human infirmity." Will it be believed, that even this touching appeal drew down the derision of his enemies? *

Barneveldt then recurs to the charge of his having received a bribe from Spain; and enters, in order to refute it, into an account of his private fortune. "When I espoused my wife, forty-three years back, we had as

* "Ridete supplicem et ingenuum senem," is here the annotation of the Gomarist Holder: whilst that on the mention of his wife by Barneveldt is as follows: we give it as a sample of the Dutch polemics of the time:—"Belle saltem quod bella illa Hecuba in actum prodeat: salve papicola, salve plebicula hera, salve!'

much movable and immovable property as was needful for respectable livelihood: my salary, as advocate of the senate, and my practice, brought me in yearly 4000 florins; but, being appointed pensionary of Rotterdam in 1577, having two children to support at that time, my means were not sufficient. From that period to this, my wife and I have inherited, from one relative or another, 80 measured or 40 Dutch acres of land, worth 2000 florins annually, besides an excellent house in Delft*, buildings here and there, to which may be added 40 more acres that I reclaimed from the mud and waters. If, since this, I have bought property for 100,000 florins, I have, on the other side, sold for 60,000: both are added and computed in my gains by my calumniators. I never trafficked; but, according to the custom of my ancestors, placed my money in soil that the plough tilled: I must except from this 50,000 florins placed in the East India Company." Barneveldt concludes his apology by his opinion of the way to remedy the present disorders, and to procure "a Christian tolerance in matters of religious dissent."

The advocate sent this apology to the states and to Maurice; his son-in-law, Vander Myle, also took up the pen to join in the controversy, but with less simplicity and success than Barneveldt. Carleton insinuates that Grotius was the writer of the advocate's memoirs, but the simplicity and inornate style, written in Dutch too, proves it not to be the work of that elegant scholar. Libels on the other side were only increased in number and virulence by the remonstrants: of them we have given some samples from Holder, who publishes a translation of it in Latin, with annotations. The states of Holland condemned several of these libels, and, by a solemn decree seeking to identify themselves with Barneveldt, declared him to be "under their special safeguard and protection."

In the mean time the prince of Orange was proceed-

* "What a fine house, indeed, his cousin, the beer-brewer, left him!" says Holder to this.

ing gradually with removing the magistrates of the different provinces, by which he was about to secure a majority both in the states-general and the synod. Some of the towns, Haerlem, Leyden, Rotterdam, and chiefly Utrecht, resisted all his manœuvres. Taking advantage of the decree of the states permitting them to arm their watch, they had raised bodies of new troops, independent of prince Maurice, too formidable to be called a city guard. Prince Maurice and his party now used their efforts to cause this body to be disbanded. He represented their levy as nothing less than treason, whilst Grotius argued that it was an ancient privilege and custom of the towns of Holland. The expense, however, was irksome to the good citizens of Utrecht, and they were not easily dissuaded by Grotius from disbanding them. They sent, however, a deputation, at the head of which was Barneveldt, to prince Maurice, to make some agreement with him, offering to disband the *waardegelders*, as the new city troops were called, provided he would remove those troops especially devoted to him from certain neighbouring towns. But the prince refused altogether to listen to their proposals; and, soon after, proceeded himself to Utrecht, accompanied by three or four of the deputies of the United Provinces. He was well received by the populace, whilst, to quiet the factions hostile to him, he declared on the word of a prince, and with his hand on his heart, that he would suffer no one to be persecuted or oppressed for his religious opinions. In vain the states of Holland sent their deputies, with Grotius amongst them, to exhort the Utrechters to remain firm against the prince. He was too strong by the support of the populace, and the magistrates thought it necessary to yield. They dismissed their new city guard, and allowed such changes as the prince deemed necessary to secure and maintain his influence.

It must be confessed that the main cause of the duration and inveteracy of this dispute, and of the impossibility of terminating it by amicable means, lay in a

fundamental defect of the Dutch constitution. This was the law that a majority decided nothing, and that a totality of votes was requisite for any resolution. Holland, Arminian for the most part, resisted the rest of the provinces: these had become Gomarist in a great measure from jealousy of the superior influence of Holland; in resisting which, they fell into the supremacy of the house of Orange. All, indeed, that the Arminians demanded was toleration, that each side should legislate separately in religious matters, and conjointly in political. The states-general, from which Holland had in a measure seceded, declared against this, demanded religious unity, and, in order to establish it, a national synod. The majority of Maurice and of the supporters of these principles increased daily, as extreme and offensive parties ever do over moderate and defensive ones. Town after town fell off from the hands of the Arminians; and even in Holland the greatest towns, though not the greatest number of deputies, embraced the same cause. In this state of things, it would have been wise in Barneveldt and Grotius to have abandoned their resistance, and to have submitted to the majority, rather than hold by the strict letter the fundamental law. Unfortunately, they held out, until their opponents, arrogant from numbers and strength, and irritated by the resistance of one or two statesmen, had their party passions exasperated to that degree that they became incapable of justice as of moderation.

The arts of Maurice were certainly illegal. They were *coups d'état*. But the majority of the states, the voice of the people and of the clergy, legalised them in his eyes. He made himself master of Utrecht in the last days of July, and soon after repaired to the states-general at the Hague. The French government now ordered their ambassador, Du Maurier, to interfere in behalf of Holland and the Arminians. He addressed the states-general in vain. They passed a decree, at Maurice's suggestion, that all the towns of Holland should dismiss their new guards. The states of Hol-

land protested, begged to be allowed to debate and order the matter themselves. This was denied them. The states-general promulgated their decree; and the towns still true to the states imitated the pusillanimity of Utrecht, and submitted.

The Arminian party was by this blow left without support. The states-general proceeded, and, putting aside altogether the fatal article that required totality of votes, they passed a decree without the states of Holland for a national synod at Dordrecht, or Dort.

" Barneveldt now judged," to give the catastrophe almost in the words of Le Clerc, " that longer resistance was idle. Prince Maurice had already resolved to arrest him, although he had no right whatever to do so. Barneveldt, it is said, was warned, on the 28th of August, by counsellor Berkhout, that he would be arrested. He merely replied, that those who meditated such an illegal act were wicked people, and thanked the informant for his warning. On the following morning, the 29th, Uitenbogaard called on him in his cabinet, and found him, instead of writing as usual, with his back against the table, melancholy and meditating. The ecclesiastic thought it necessary to console him, and chid his sadness. Barneveldt only embraced him, and bade him a kind of farewell. The advocate then set out in his carriage for the court-house of the states of Holland, in order to engage them, as he declared, to give over their opposition to the national synod. He would have obtained their consent, had three hours of time been granted to him. But it was too late to conciliate the conquerors. As the carriage passed prince Maurice's lodgings it was stopped; and Barneveldt, as sir Dudley Carleton relates, " was called up by a servant of the prince, under colour to speak with him." He had no sooner entered than he was arrested. Grotius, inveigled in the same manner, was also taken, as well as Hoogerbeets, their friend, and pensionary of Leyden. " This act had not been resolved in the assembly of the states-general, lest the states of Holland

should have warning, but was taken by some of the deputies, and approved only after the blow had been struck."

According to Carleton, "Barneveldt put on a good countenance when arrested, and seemed to take pleasure in discourse with the ensign of the guard, who hath the custody of him, enquiring particularly what was the voice of the people: Grotius was as much cast down and silent. The states being presently assembled, and they entering into consultations touching this business, those of the Arminian faction being demanded their advice, as well as of what was passed as *de agendis*, were much confused. In the end, one of the curators of Leyden excused their silence and distraction, saying, 'You have taken from us our head, our tongue, and our hand, and therefore you must expect nothing from us but to sit still and look on.'" As for the prisoners, they were committed to a room where the admiral of Aragon had formerly been confined. Barneveldt observed this when he was led into it. "Then, lifting up his eyes, he said, with a deep sigh, 'My sonnes, my sonnes!' And then he added this divine sentence, God hath cast downe the high and mightie from their seat and government.'"*

It is needless to point out the illegality of his arrest, the prince only deriving his authority from the states of Holland, as Barneveldt did. These expostulated: but as the deputies of six towns opposed every act and decree, the prince and the states-general made light of their remonstrances. He promised to some that no harm should happen to Barneveldt; but to others he gave way to choler, and made violent menaces. He was naturally exasperated by the conduct of some of Barneveldt's partisans. Two of his friends, MM. de Schuyer and Asperen, nobles of Holland, forced their way to the advocate through his guards, and ordered them to release him, but Maurice disarmed and im-

* Crosse's Continuation of Grimstone.

prisoned them. Placards were scattered about, most menacing to Maurice. One ran thus, —

> " Hollanders, a privilegien end a voyhoit soet
> Werden nu l'eene mael betreden onder voet,
> Eenen Brutus can ons helpen."

" Hollanders, your privileges and freedom are trodden under. A Brutus alone can save you."

The English in Holland were as divided as the Dutch: whilst the ambassador, Carleton, applauded the Dutch minister's arrest, sir John Ogle exclaimed against it, and took part with Barneveldt.

The advocate wrote letters to the prince, to the states of Holland, and to his wife, although it was not without difficulty that he was permitted to send them. His letter to his wife ran thus: —

" My very dear wife, children, sons-in-law, and grand-children,

" I know ye are overcome by the troubles that have befallen me. But I bid you to be rejoiced to God Almighty, and to console each other. I call God to witness that I know no cause why these troubles should have visited me, and I patiently rely upon him to bring me out of them ; knowing, moreover, that all my connections and friends do their utmost by prayers and exertions to help me. Wherefore I commend you, my beloved wife, children, and grand-children, to God's keeping. I have been as yet decently treated, for which I thank his excellency.

" From my prison chamber, the last day of August, 1618.

" Your living husband, father, and grandfather,

" Johan Van Olden Barneveldt.

" P.S. For days have I demanded, and at last obtained, the means of writing."

By the messenger he demanded of his wife a French Bible and Prayer-book. Leydenberg, the secretary of

Utrecht, having been taken, as an Arminian leader, he did not bear his fate with such resignation as the advocate, but tore open his bowels, and cut his throat by most determined suicide. He committed this act, as a letter left by him disclosed, to avoid the torture, and confiscation of his property. Barneveldt was soon after summoned to appear before the states-general; but he refused altogether, declining their authority, and declaring himself amenable only to the states of Holland and West Friesland, from whom he had received his office. Prince Maurice busied himself in completing the work that he had begun, in changing the magistrates, and remodelling the municipalities of the Arminian towns of Holland. He went from place to place; and so far succeeded, during the months of September and October, that, causing a re-election of the deputies for the states of Holland, the prince perceived himself as decided a master over them as the states-general. In consequence of this change in their sentiments and members, the former abandoned its claim to defend Barneveldt, and try him themselves, empowering the states-general to appoint commissioners in order to proceed to the trial of the prisoners.

The advocate was now left without support. "What ought a man to do," writes an Italian legist, "to try whom special judges are appointed by a hostile government?" — "Make his will," answers the same writer. Barneveldt was in this forlorn condition; and he was only informed of his danger by stealth. Some lines written by his wife were enclosed in a quill: this was thrust into a pear, and so conveyed to him. He was bidden no longer to depend on the states of Holland, which had become adverse to him. "The English kindle the fire," was the last part of the intimation; and sir Dudley Carleton, reporting this circumstance, kindly adds, "I hope it will be so kindled." The French envoys, Boissi and Du Maurier, on the other side, did their utmost to stay the proceedings against Barneveldt, and spoke, and remonstrated with the states,

demanding, on their own account, the punishment of Aarsens, the great foe of Barneveldt. This Aarsens had been the Dutch ambassador at Paris; had been superseded; and, from vengeance, had become the chief accuser of Barneveldt, charging him with intriguing to introduce the popish religion into Flanders. This charge, absurd as it was, made an impression on the vulgar, coming from the mouth of one who had been employed in diplomacy. But in his libels, Aarsens had calumniated the French king as much as Barneveldt. For this, reparation was demanded; but the states of Holland, now remodelled in prince Maurice's interest, gave Aarsens letters of naturalisation in Holland. Offended by this, the French envoy took his leave, refusing the customary presents: but an order from his court commanded him to overlook minor matter of offence for the moment, and to return to his post in order to use his exertions in favour of the prisoners.

The first examination of the prisoners took place on the 15th of November. Sir Dudley Carleton writes in November, "Barneveldt hath been examined daily for the space of these eight days past, and so continues still with much diligence and secrecy; the committee for that business being charged not to communicate what passeth, so much as to the states-general, until all be ended; so as all I can yet understand is, that for the manner he doth answer as a criminal, *teste me*, and standing, until from a regard of his age and weakness (which he doth sometimes pretend) he be willed to sit. And for this matter, he doth discharge himself upon his masters of Holland, as their servant, by whose resolutions, which passed by plurality of voices, he saith he governed himself. But there be who tell him, that since, in his printed Apology, he arrogates to himself the honour of all the good actions of this state, he must not cast upon others the reproach of the bad; and that the plurality of voices were rather his instruments than he theirs. He carrieth himself with good assurance, and yet with

humiliation enough, insomuch that he once made the request of the states that they would put his good services in balance with his errors, and pardon that which might proceed rather of weakness than of malice."

It now appeared that Barneveldt's accusers were not able to substantiate any serious or criminal charge against him. His papers had been carried off by his son-in-law, Vander Myle; a circumstance that took away one ready mode of finding articles of impeachment. Barneveldt himself, his wife and friends, claimed speedy justice and immediate trial, pleading the old law of Holland, that criminals should be judged within six weeks or two months after arrest: whereas he had now remained for three months in total seclusion from even his family. The greffier of the states,—no other than the infamous Aarsens—replied, merely by a marginal note on the petition, that "good justice should be awarded;" and in the mean time the commissioners appointed to conduct the trial were obliged to send deputies to Utrecht in order to rake up materials of accusation drawn from Barneveldt's conduct when he went to oppose prince Maurice in the disbanding of the city guard.

On the 10th of February, twenty-four judge delegates were named to try the prisoners: they were chiefly chosen from the states-general, and those added were of the personal enemies of Barneveldt. Amongst them was Aarsens; and him, at least, a sense of shame ought to have removed from such a place. Both Barneveldt and his friends objected to these judges; but their challenge was over-ruled. One judge alone, Junius, refused to sit. But being menaced not only with the loss of his charge, but with a heavy pecuniary fine in addition, he consented. Such was the spirit of menace resorted to by the triumphant party.

"All the prisoners here have now appeared before the judges severally," writes the ambassador Carleton, on the 1st of March. "Barneveldt spent two days examin-

ing the commission and quality of his judges; but this morning he hath submitted himself, and answereth to all interrogatories." He then describes the hall where the trial took place. "The prisoner sits bare upon a stool without a back, which is their manner for criminals. Barneveldt hath a stool with a back, which is all the favour shown him in regard of his age."

The illustrious prisoner, or rather victim, was deprived not only of all legal means and aid in defending himself, but paper and pens, the requisite materials for drawing up his exculpation, were also denied him. The judges confessed their iniquity in banishing all publicity from the trial; so that we are yet left to guess at the heads of his accusation. They teased him with many questions at the same time, to embarrass the enfeebled memory of age, and called him up sixty times in the same day. "These are bitter folk," said Barneveldt, "I have nothing to hope from them." In his prison, however, he contrived to conceal pens and paper; and scraps have been found containing such items of his justification as he could commit to them. He denied having any intelligence whatever with Spain, and his having received from the king of France beyond a friendly present of 2000 francs, which, to one of his station and fortune, could not be called a bribe. His enemies made this amount 20,000 florins. He avowed his having suspected prince Maurice of aspiring to sovereignty, and that he had taken legal measures to guard against such designs. He had counselled the states of Holland and Utrecht to raise soldiers for the defence of their independence, and had urged divers provinces, with the same views, to declare against the proposal of a national synod. He had given orders to the colonels of regiments to obey the states, as their true sovereign, and no other. His aim in policy was the general independence and freedom of the states, the mutual independence and freedom of the provinces: these, with toleration and subordination in religious matters, formed his rule of conduct. He condescended to this expli-

cation, but without prejudice to his right of disclaiming the jurisdiction of the court.*

April the 16th, sir Dudley Carleton writes:—

"The matter concerning the prisoners draws to an issue; and for that I can gather upon all circumstances (the main proceedings being still kept *sub sigillo*), whatsoever becomes of the rest, Barneveldt hath not many days to live. It hath much been debated of late days, whether it were fittest to proceed with him and the rest by sentence of death or perpetual imprisonment; it being taken for granted that, in justice, the cause will bear either. For the whole time of their process till now of late, there was no speech of death; but now the consideration of the opiniatrity of the remonstrants at the synod—of the tumults at Alkmaar and Horn—of the disaffection showed in Leyden and Rotterdam, in publishing the states' letters, by which their fast day of the 17th of the present was commanded—of danger to the prince of Orange's person amongst so many malecontents, which would breed a present revolution, hath much altered the state of the business; and most voices run upon making all sure. Some propose a course between both: that is, to give sentence of death, but to suspend the execution thereof until some new occasion offered by them or their partisans, and, in the mean time, to keep them in the castle of Woerden, or some such like place, with a strong guard in prison. But then the question is asked, How can this provide for the practice against the prince of Orange? And these judges being changed, who have *potestatem vitæ et necis* (as the nature of this government doth necessarily require), upon any new occasion, who shall put their old sentence in execution? Yet how variable these judges are in their temper, his majesty may see by two small circumstances: one, that Barneveldt, rising from his seat in the chamber of judgment, to warm himself by the fire, where some of his judges stood, he was com-

* These scraps of his exculpation are given at length in the "*Leven en Sterven*," the Life and Death of Olden Barneveldt.

manded from thence, as being a criminal not fit for their company; another, that, encountering at the entrance of that chamber with two of his judges, they strained courtesy with him for the door, as if he had been in his wonted greatness. Monsieur Barneveldt's servant was, two days since, taken from him, and threatened with the torture, until knowledge was had of him touching the conveyance of certain letters through a hole made in the roof of his chamber. His two sons, with his son-in-law, Van Hussen, have jointly put up a petition to the states-general to this effect, that, since they find their father criminally proceeded with (the event whereof will light on them and their estates), they require to be made acquainted with the process; which is laid aside as an undue command. His process is perfected, and the rest want little."

In spite of the severity with which he was guarded, and deprived of the means of writing, Barneveldt contrived to draw up several letters,—one to the prince of Orange himself, another to the states, and a kind of will, addressed to his wife and children; which shows that he contemplated civil death, and immurement at least, if not immediate death. Latterly he had demanded several audiences, and had explained divers points to the judges which he expected to be allowed to develope; when, on the 12th of May, Sunday, in the evening, the fiscals entered his chamber abruptly. "We come to tell you, on the part of the states-general," said Leuwen, fiscal of Utrecht, "that you are condemned to death, and shall have your sentence read to you to-morrow."—"Sentence of death!" repeated he twice; "I had not expected that: I thought to have been heard once more; I thought to have altered something in my defence, having been in choler when I spoke it." Leuwen excused himself for his melancholy duty. "It is for my judges to answer before God for their conduct," replied Barneveldt: he then demanded pens, ink, and paper, to write a farewell to his wife. Carleton makes Sylla, the other fiscal, insult him by saying that "the

sentence was grounded upon Barneveldt's own confession. The Dutch narrators give only the observation of the latter: — "Sylla, Sylla, had your father foreseen that you should have come with such a message to me, he would have regretted the birth of such a son!" He then set himself to write, without the least change being apparent in his countenance. Whilst he was thus engaged, Waldæus, a Gomarist clergyman, and member of the then sitting synod, whose theological rancour hastened more than aught else the death of Barneveldt, came into the chamber, — by order of the states, he said, — to console the prisoner. The latter, to get rid of spiritual aid so odious, said, that, at his age, he was prepared to die, and able to console himself, and, at any rate, that he had letters to write." The design of his enemies, in thus sending an ecclesiastic that must be odious to him, and whom he must necessarily repulse, was to corroborate their old calumnies, that Barneveldt was backward in religion, at least in that of the Reformation. However, he suffered Waldæus to remain, and invited him to sup, together with two other ministers, who also came. Their conversation turned more on the legal and polemic disputes of the time than upon the spiritual concerns of a man about to die. Barneveldt exclaimed against the iniquity of his judges, and the illegality of his trial and sentence. He also asked tidings of affairs since his imprisonment — of the acts of the synod, and of the hopes of quelling religious dissension.

He sent Waldæus with a message to prince Maurice, praying him not to continue his vindictiveness towards his children; and stating that the prince was mistaken in attributing either personal enmity or evil designs to him. The prince was obdurate: he was deaf equally to the prayers of the victim himself, of his mother the princess dowager, or of the French ambassador: both of them exerted themselves to the utmost to save the advocate. The princess dowager of Orange sent to the wife of Barneveldt, begging her to throw herself at the

prince's feet, and crave pardon for her husband; but this the proud-spirited woman refused to do, lest it might be supposed to sanction the idea of his guilt, and knowing that the vindictive spirit of Maurice would glean satisfaction from her humility, without being in the least moved to compassion.

The hard-hearted conduct of the prince is, indeed, almost inexplicable. It cannot be supposed that the mere spirit of vengeance should lead him to persist in spilling the blood of an aged and upright minister. The *odium theologicum*, rendered more intense by the disputes of the synod, might have worked up the clergy to demand his head: but the sectarianism, or orthodoxy, which you will, of Maurice was merely policy; so was his cold-blooded act, the judicial assassination of Barneveldt, policy also.

The principle of the house of Orange, from first to last, was to found a sovereignty for itself; and the sovereignty aimed at consisted of Holland and Flanders united. The former country was a low commercial nook, without a capital where a monarch might reside. The prince of Orange looked to Brussels as his fitting capital; and his wish was never to give over war till the Flemish and Dutch provinces had both flung off the yoke of Spain. The house of Orange could have no patriotic feeling nor attachment to Holland. It was, then at least, more Burgundian than Fleming—more Fleming than Dutch: its essence was the selfish pride of blood, unattached to the soil. But Barneveldt was a Dutchman, a Hollander, loving his own province above all, and deeming it quite sufficient if it were happy, rich, free from Spain and from domestic tyrants. In Barneveldt, Maurice saw not only the enemy of his ambition, but the decided opponent of the policy which led to it. The truce with Spain was soon about to expire. Maurice, left alone in the government, hoped to renew the war,—to complete, perhaps, the conquest of Flanders,—to found the sovereignty of his house; but the advocate, whilst he lived, had always the power

to raise a party against this. Moreover, there had been so many iniquities in his arrest and in his judgment, that the Barneveldt party could not fail to recover force with a reaction; as proved the case. To deprive it of its head seemed the only means to paralyse it, to render it powerless, and to strike terror into its inferior partisans: hence was the death of Barneveldt resolved.

The same terror of the power of his party caused the determination to hasten it. Another day was not allowed him to live. He was not allowed to take leave of his wife, and soldiers were placed in his chamber to prevent him from speaking even to his servant. The Spanish inquisition itself, against the arbitrary and bloody jurisdiction of which the first prince of Orange had raised the Low Countries, never conducted a trial and execution with more injustice, more secrecy, or more infamous rigour. Waldæus and the other ministers passed the night with Barneveldt; and to them he addressed his discourses of exculpation. In vain at first they urged him to occupy himself solely with his spiritual welfare. He replied, that his enemies had anticipated and tricked him out of the liberty of making his defence, and that he could not avoid dwelling thereon. At length, however, he lay down, but it was to get rid of the ministers, not to sleep. He wished to speak with his servant; the guards would not permit him, and he then bade him read the Psalms in French. The sentence of death had come so suddenly in the midst of the thoughts and anxieties of his unfinished trial, that he was less able to compose himself to devotion. He was filled with the fever of indignation at such injustice, nor could he resign himself altogether to the thoughts of futurity. He prayed indeed, and listened to the Psalms; but every moment recurred to his sentence, to his past life, and to the fate of his friends. In the mean time his letter of farewell was given to his wife, who was thunderstruck at the sudden tidings that it announced. She had not ex-

pected so severe a sentence, and had had prince Maurice's word from the first that her husband should not suffer bodily harm. All now left her was to demand a last interview with her husband. The states never notified this to Barneveldt; but merely sent to ask him, an hour or two before his execution, if he wished to see any friend. He replied, that such a question came too late; that such an interview could serve but to trouble and unman him in his last moments.

Early in the morning of the 13th of May,—that is, but a few hours after he had been informed of his sentence,—drums and other sounds in the interior of the castle bespoke the preparations for execution. When he was brought, soon after eight o'clock, into the chamber of audience to hear his sentence pronounced, his judges only sat there in authority, such of the states-general as were present standing as spectators. The sentence contained many particularities tending to the change of religion, disunion of the provinces, abrogating the authority of the high court of justice, confusion of the finances, disgracing his excellency, crossing the states' public orders and despatches to their ambassadors abroad by his private letters and directions, abusing some of the best friends and allies of the state, and receiving large presents and sums of money of other princes and potentates: all which he heard without interposing a word, but used many scornful looks. The sentence being ended (which was loss of life and confiscation of goods), "I have served," said he, "the generality thirty-three years as advocate of Holland, and the town of Rotterdam ten years before as pensionary; and, for my fidelity and diligence, deserved better recompence. If you will have my blood, yet methinks ye may spare my goods, without ruining for my sake my wife and children." These last words he uttered with a faint voice and dejected countenance; and the president telling him he had heard his sentence, to which he was to submit himself, he resumed his firmness, and rose from his

seat, and was conducted immediately through the great hall to the scaffold. The hall, as he passed, was full of his friends and acquaintance. He took notice of none, and continued to bear himself with the same grandeur and serenity on his way to the scaffold.

The scaffold, erected in the minor court of the castle of the Hague, was surrounded by the guards of prince Maurice and some companies of English foot. It had been erected in haste that morning; a funeral bier had been prepared, but that was all. Barneveldt advanced firmly, leaning on his staff, and supported by his servant. When he arrived on the scaffold, he said, "Is there no cushion or stool for me to kneel on?" He, however, knelt on the rough boards, and prayed a while; then getting up, he said, "That man need not touch me,"—pointing to the executioner. He then undressed, and, ere kneeling down again, exclaimed aloud, "People, do not believe that I am a traitor. I have administered uprightly and justly; and as a good patriot I die." He then, with his own hands, placed his cap upon his head, and, uttering a prayer, gave the word to the executioner, who struck off his head at one blow. Many of the crowd rushed to dip their handkerchiefs in his blood.

Thus fell, by the hands of the executioner, a statesman who may not unjustly be termed the father of Dutch freedom. "He had stood by its cradle," and it was in the act of still guarding it that he was overthrown and put to death. Shame to the pusillanimity of his supporters, whom subsequent events proved to have had the power, and to have wanted the courage, to defend him. It was an epoch, however, when fortune seemed jealous of political greatness. Thrones it gave over to the most imbecile monarchs, as if preparing the way for their downfall; Raleigh and Bacon in England, Calderon in Spain, Barneveldt in Holland, paid almost simultaneously the severe penalty of having possessed political talent.

Revolutions, though generally fertile in the produc-

tion of heroes and orators, seldom give birth to what may be called a statesman. A pure, a steady, an unambitious patriotism is too calm a sentiment to take the lead in such a time of effervescence and enthusiasm. But Holland forms an exception: it produced Barneveldt. Eminently a civilian, and never losing sight of that character, even though displaying the courage of a soldier, he appears, throughout all the actions and course of the war, vindicating the right of the counsellor and the senator to control the warrior. *Cedant arma togæ* was his motto, as it was that of one of the greatest men of antiquity; and, like Cicero, Barneveldt fell, defending the state's independence of its generals,— the victim of the freedom and of the salutary jealousy which he sought to create.

This was the great principle of his domestic policy, to which he sacrificed his hatred to Spain and his proud friendship to the house of Orange. He was a Hollander, and a republican; whilst Maurice was an ambitious candidate for sovereignty. Barneveldt sought to make Holland the Venice of the north; aristocratic but sage, crushing the too dangerous and froward spirits, those of the army and of the church, in obedience to the sovereignty of the senate. He was Arminian, but indifferent to dogmas, except to that great political one of the supremacy of the civil power.

In his private character, too, as in his public, Barneveldt had a great deal of the Venetian. He prided himself on his birth, and took pains to prove it, styling himself *prisco et nobili stemmate*, of an ancient and noble stem. He was irascible, haughty, and proud of his country. He was averse to England, foreseeing in it the rival of Holland's commerce and naval power; leaning to France, as the true ally, whose military force and position were best calculated to keep either Spain or Germany in awe. He was economical, rigid, honest, not given to opulent display, and wanting in the refinements of courtesy; but this came of the infancy of the land. He appears uncultivated and rude in his writings, although,

in speaking, his warmth and experience gave him eloquence.

Of consummate address as a diplomatist, unrivalled as an administrator, his exertions did more for the success of the war than all the military operations of prince Maurice. With the soundest, the loftiest, and the most patriotic views as a general minister, Barneveldt might challenge the history of any country to produce his equal in talent, in disinterestedness, and in principle. He was, perhaps, the first statesman that made religious toleration one of his maxims. Unfortunately, Holland then produced few characters approaching to his in worth and wisdom. Hence his exclusive influence, and the envy that proceeded from it, and overthrew him, and the unthinking pride, on his part, that in turn drew down and increased that envy. Hence the want of effectual support in the hour of danger, and the sacrifice of a statesman too great, too honest, and too formidable, even at the advanced age of seventy-two, to be allowed to outlive the wrongs inflicted on him.

Barneveldt left two sons and two daughters. The sons were as unfortunate as their father. The youngest, Van Stoutenberg, joined in a conspiracy against prince Maurice to avenge his father, and perished on the scaffold, involving in the same fate his elder brother, who disapproved the design, but who did not reveal it.

SULLY.*

1560—1641.

There can be no fitter introduction to the life of Sully than the genealogy of his family. He was himself amazingly proud of his ancestry, and made it a principle of his creed that there could be no worth in a *villain*. Although a prejudice, this feeling is to be admired, when inspiring, as in Sully, honour and virtue. The pride of the gentleman was indeed the essence of his character, the key of his actions, his uprightness, and his faults: and, indeed, it was the only sound principle of morals that the age admitted. A man merely religious must have been a bigot; and as to morality, such as thinkers then endeavoured to establish it independent of dogmas, it was epicurean in private and selfish in public life. The good old stable feeling of feudal honour was Sully's creed; and in this respect he stands alone. There have, first of all, been few high-born ministers who remained true to the proud feelings of their caste. They either merged them in the intriguing habits of the courtier, the narrow views of the churchman, or the crooked ways of the mere politician. But Sully was in the cabinet what Bayard was in the field, a chevalier without stain. He represents the order of gentlemen in the gallery of statesmen.

Sully was of the noble family of Bethune, descended from the Coucis, and, through them, from the first emperors of Austria.* In stating this, he begs the reader not to confound the Austrian dynasty, from which he claims descent, with the modern house of Hapsburg.

* The history of the house of Bethune has been written at length by André du Chesne, historiographer to Louis XIII.

The name of Bethune, given to the family from a town on the borders of France and Flanders, is to be met in all the glorious pages of French history, in the taking of Constantinople, in that of Jerusalem, and in the conquest of Naples.* Its wealth did not, however, remain equal to its lustre. Guy count of Flanders espoused the heiress of its elder branch in the 13th century. A younger lord somewhat restored the influence of the name by marrying the heiress of Couci; and this heritage, together with the famous old castle of Couci, was held by John of Bethune, grandfather of Sully. John married Anne, heiress of Rosny, but, after her death, having married a second wife of low birth, he was degraded by the *mesalliance*, became spendthrift, and sold all his property, except that of Rosny, settled on the posterity of his first wife. His son Francis succeeded to the barony of Rosny, adopted the reformed religion, and followed the fortunes of the prince of Condé, being made prisoner at the battle of Jarnac.

The subject of this memoir was the second son of François de Bethune, and was born on the 13th of December, 1560, at the paternal château of Rosny, on the banks of the Seine, in Normandy. He was called Maximilian from his maternal relative, the count de Gand. His elder brother, Louis, having infirmities which left him without hope of making his fortune in the world†, their father paid double attention to Maximilian,

* A younger son of the family of Bethune, being obliged to quit France, founded the family of Beton, or Beaton, in Scotland.

† The Mémoires de Sully, here quoted, are the original memoirs, drawn up by the secretaries of Sully under his own eye. They are addressed to himself in a tone of narration, the writers acquainting him, as it were, with his own acts. The secretaries, of whom there were twelve, must have been frequently left to their own guidance, having but the facts given them, since they frequently indulge in panegyric, addressing Sully as "Your Grandeur," in a tone ludicrous enough for this age. On one occasion the writer mentions his having been separated from Sully as an excuse for a breach in the narrative; and throughout it appears that, in the compilation of the memoirs, his servants, followers, and friends were as much consulted for anecdotes and matter, as Sully himself.

The public is, however, little acquainted with the memoirs of Sully in their original state, the memoirs most read being a *rifacimento* by the abbé de l'Ecluse, in which the first person and the continuity of narrative are preserved. But these spurious memoirs want altogether the *naïveté*, the honest and genuine air of truth, and the picturesque of the original ones.

who would have, in all probability, to support the honour of the family, without its heritage. He accordingly placed him under the care of a celebrated preceptor named La Brosse, who not only instructed him in the learning of the time, but pointed out to him the path that he should follow, and the prince to whom he should attach himself.

Maximilian pursued his early studies at Rosny, whilst his father was combating in the army of Condé. As soon as the latter was released from the captivity which he incurred on that occasion, and had got rid of the hostile garrison that occupied his château, he meditated again rejoining the huguenots, who had rallied, after their disasters, under the banner of the young prince of Navarre. Catherine of Medicis, seeing them so formidable even after defeat, had determined to effect by treachery what open force had failed in. She, therefore, sought the amity of the huguenots, offered the young king's sister in marriage to the prince of Navarre, and, relying on this pledge of sincerity, the chiefs of the huguenots consented to appear at court. It was then that the baron de Rosny set forth to join them, accompanied by his son. He previously called the latter into "a chamber of his high tower," and, after a brief paternal lecture, told him that he was about to enter the service of the prince of Navarre, and that he should be prepared with a proper harangue to utter on the occasion of being presented. He was accordingly introduced to that prince at Vendôme, was embraced and complimented by him for his *gentillesse*, and, being taken into his service, soon after accompanied him to Paris. The future Sully was at this time eleven years of age, the future Henry IV. about nineteen.

The father of Maximilian did not approve of the confidence of his friends in intrusting themselves to the power of Catherine of Medicis. He disliked the marriage; thought the queen of England a preferable match for the prince; and said of the approaching espousals

at Paris, that "the liveries on the occasion would be right vermilion." The events of St. Bartholomew's eve, 1572, justified his foresight. Young Rosny, it appears, took advantage of his stay at Paris to enrol himself in the university, and profit by its lectures: for this purpose he lodged in the quarter of Paris called the *Pays Latin*. On the morning of the 24th of August he was awakened by the cries of the populace and the tolling of the church bells: his governors and his valet, roused by the noise, went out to see what was the matter, but neither returned, nor were they ever after heard of. What was passing was but too evidently a general massacre of the protestants. The master of the house where young Rosny was lodged endeavoured to draw him along to mass, as the only safeguard; but the boy, "putting on his scholar's robe, with a book under his arm," sought rather to find the way to his college, that of Burgundy. He was thrice stopped by patrols of assassins; but his book, being one of catholic devotion, saved him. He witnessed the work of slaughter going on as he passed, and heard the cries of "Slay—slay the huguenots!" At length reaching the college portal, he knocked, was twice denied admittance; but, by means of four silver pieces, persuaded the porter to acquaint the principal of the college. This chief had compassion on the young scholar, and not without danger to himself; two ecclesiastics being in his chamber at the time, insisting on the expediency of slaying all heretics, even down to children at the breast. The good man took the boy and put him into a place of concealment, where he remained three days. The massacre having ceased, he was sought by two old soldiers of his father's company, and restored to liberty. A letter from his father now reached him, advising him to pursue his studies as before; to remain at Paris, where the prince of Navarre was detained, and to attend mass as a measure of safety. The prince himself had been obliged to conform to the king's order in this respect, and yet his obsequiousness scarcely bettered his condition. At times he was considered free,

and his domestics had liberty to approach him; a permission of which Rosny never failed to take advantage. At other times he was treated as a criminal, and his followers excluded. But, in whatever position Rosny found himself, he always devoted his time to study, especially to that of history (making extracts as much with reference to morals and manners as to events), and mathematics

The catastrophe of St. Bartholomew thus proved of no small advantage to Rosny. It weaned him, at a dangerous age, from the life of courts or camps, and compelled him to devote several years to the cultivation of his mind. But the huguenots soon raised their heads after the massacre. Early in 1576, the young prince, now king of Navarre by his mother's death, made his escape from court: he took advantage of a hunting party to effect this. Rosny was one of his companions, and he was sent back to court to demand the liberation of the princess of Navarre, which was granted. In the desultory warfare that ensued, the young student learned to be a soldier; he fought on foot, like Bayard, the better to become acquainted with his duty, enrolling himself in the ranks of a regiment, and never failing in his turn to stand sentry. After this apprenticeship to arms, during which he was often reprimanded for his unseasonable valour, Rosny became ensign of his regiment, and was at the attack of Villefranche. "Here," say his secretaries, "we have heard from La Trape, your valet, who was himself a brave soldier, that you ran very great danger. For, carrying your colours to the assault, you were overthrown by the pikes of the besieged from the top of the embankment into the fossé, and then were so entangled in the silk of the colours amidst the depth of water and mud, that you were near once drowned: extricated, however, by La Trape, you mount the again to the assault, and, the town being taken sacked, you gained by good chance 1000 crowns in d was an old man, holding his purse, being pursued by s tiation, flung himself into your arms, begging of you himself

his pursé and save his life." War was at this time a gainful profession. Sully says that now he had not touched his revenue for several years (his father, we learn from this, was dead), living "on his pay, and war-profits;" so that he was enabled to give up his ensigncy, and attach himself, with a "very pretty equipment" of servants and horses no doubt, to the king of Navarre. Negotiations for peace now led to a short truce, spent by Henry and his warlike band in feasts and gallantries at Nérac. Sully mentions that he here first began to learn the life of a courtier; and paints, by a single trait, the gay freedom of the little court of Henry. The king of Navarre's sister, in want of personages for a ballet, undertook herself to teach Rosny to dance the necessary steps, in which both marvellously succeeded.

The peace, patched up by Catherine of Medicis, in 1577, renewed and increased this gaiety. Catherine, journeying to the south with her suite of damsels, interrupted Sully's plans of advancement as a soldier: a rude reprimand, addressed to him by the king of Navarre, not without reason, somewhat estranged for a time the affections of his follower. The duke of Anjou had been about that time chosen sovereign of Flanders: he needed officers to support his claim, and he induced many of those who had fought under Henry to enter his service. Rosny, amongst others, acceded to the duke's request: he had been called Maximilian, after his mother's brother, the count de Gand, who had shown intentions of rearing up his godson, and making him his heir; difference of religion had proved an obstacle and a cause of quarrel. Sully was in danger of losing the inheritance, and hoped by his presence, and the interest of the duke of Anjou, to improve his prospects. Henry could not retain his follower; but the latter promised to rejoin his standard should war break out, and, in the mean time, not to swerve in his attachment to the reformed religion.

In 1581, Rosny took leave of Henry, and proceeded

to his seat in Normandy to make preparations for his expedition. Here he discovered that the duke of Anjou had divers claims and debts due to him in the neighbouring country: these the careful baron obtained, equipped therewith a troop of eighty followers, and marched to join the duke near St. Quentin and Cambray. The prince of Parma retreating, the French took Château-Cambresis by assault. On this occasion Rosny met an adventure which alarmed him. A girl fled into his arms, to escape from the brutality of some soldiers: he prepared to protect her, and conduct her to a church as a safe asylum; upon which she cried, that, alas! they would not permit her to enter, because she was known to be plague-stricken. "Pardieu," cried Rosny, "thou art a wicked woman, and shalt seek refuge elsewhere than with me!" So, leaving her there, he departed in a panic, which lasted four days, feeling his pulse every hour, and haunted by fears of the plague. In the following year Rosny accompanied the duke of Anjou to England, whither the prince went to pay his court to queen Elizabeth. It is greatly to be regretted that this visit is merely alluded to in the memoirs. Returning to Flanders, Rosny became discontented with his new patron, who showed no disposition to aid him in his views upon the inheritance of his uncle, and whose distrust of his huguenot followers became every day more manifest. During the rest of his stay with the army, the baron attached himself to the prince of Orange, until the unlucky attempt of the duke of Anjou upon Antwerp broke up the enterprise and expelled the French from the Low Countries. He took the opportunity, however, of visiting some of his Flemish relations, whom he succeeded in persuading that, though a huguenot, he was not altogether an infidel. But his eloquence could not persuade them to restore him any part of the property of which he had been disinherited.

Rosny now returned to the king of Navarre, and was despatched by him to Paris, first on some negotiation, and afterwards with the hopes of ingratiating himself

with Henry III., through the means of his two young nephews, De Bethune, for whom that king had shown some favour. He was to do this in the interest of the king of Navarre, "in order to discover divers things," and warn the latter thereof. It is sufficiently characteristic of the age, that the proud Rosny here betrays not the least shame or reluctance to play the part of a spy: but the plan failed, owing to the inconstancy of the French monarch.* Sully next thought of love, and showed therein more coldness and calculation than became a *preux chevalier*. He first became the admirer of Mademoiselle de Saniet Mesmin; and "with good cause, for she carried away the palm of beauty from the most renowned of the time." But "reason predominating, and the maxim, that he who seeks glory and honour must sacrifice his pleasures to them," Sully turned his attention to a lady of higher rank and greater wealth: this was Mademoiselle Anne de Courtenay, to whom, without hesitation, the baron made proposals, which were accepted. This marriage took place; and, in the love and gallantries consequent on it, Rosny spent the year 1584. Economy, however, shared his thoughts with love: he kept order, and a marvellous *ménage;* looking into his receipts and expenses, writing down all *par le menu*, and making all the world stare at so much splendour with so little means. "But none knew," says Sully, "of my industry, nor of the horses that I bought cheap in Germany, and sold dear in Gascony."

The following year, 1583, is the first epoch of the famous League, concluded betwixt the king of Spain, the Guises, and the leading French catholics, for the destruction of protestantism, and preventing the succession of the king of Navarre to the throne of France. It took Henry III. completely by surprise. He despatched Joyeuse to take the defence of Normandy. Joyeuse passed by Rosny, and demanded the services of its master, and it was then only that the latter

* "Mais toute cette nouvelle mignonnerie dura si peu, vous en avez depuis sceu les causes."

learned the accession of his master to the League; Henry, by a stroke of address, having put himself at the head of that party. The king of Navarre was accordingly left alone to combat his enemies. Joyeuse asked Rosny how he could risk his fine estate and stud, a great object of his admiration, in so desperate a cause? Rosny replied, not as the hero of a tragedy might do, by protestations of loyalty, and willingness to die in its defence, but with this argument, that a certain astrologer, La Brosse, had predicted the future fortunes of the king of Navarre and of himself, which were linked together and destined to brilliant success.

Rosny accordingly joined his master in the south, but was soon sent back by Henry, to sell his timber and raise funds for the support of their cause. He did not hesitate: he set out forthwith, reached home, mortgaged or sold his forests, and then set forth to return through the royal armies with the supply. By passing for his younger brother, and feigning himself of the catholic party, he succeeded, but not without hair-breadth escapes, in evading the vigilance of the enemy, and arriving safely in the camp of the king of Navarre, who was quite unable to keep the field. The produce of the woods of Rosny, however, purchased cannon and other requisites for defending the several towns in which the huguenots now shut themselves up. In the midst of the war, Henry III. betrayed an inclination to abandon the League for the alliance of his relative of Navarre; and Rosny was sent to take advantage of this fickle mood. He found the monarch drolly habited, "with a basket strung *en escharpe* round his neck, like those carried by the venders of cheeses, and in this basket were two or three little dogs not bigger than a man's fist." Nothing came of an interview so ludicrous. The war continued during the years 1586 and 1587; Sully making two journeys, during that time, to Paris, and to his estates. On the first occasion it was the plague that had devastated the village of Rosny, and driven its baroness from her château to take refuge in

the woods: at another, it was the pregnancy and delivery of the same lady, which her husband came to witness at very great risk; concealing his name, and skulking through Paris at a time when several were burned for the crime of being huguenots. He rejoined the army in time to assist at the battle of Coutras, where Joyeuse was slain, and Henry gained a glorious victory. The artillery, of which Sully had the direction, was mainly instrumental in this success.

The king of Navarre was too weak to derive any material advantage from his success. Affairs rested almost in the same position, until the *barricades*, and the expulsion of Henry III. from Paris, took place, under the influence of the League. The death of Guise followed. Henry III. was obliged to fling himself, seriously and sincerely, into the alliance of his late antagonist: Sully was the envoy who brought about the treaty betwixt the monarchs, although illness deprived him of the honour of finally signing it. The two Henries met in Tours, and defended it together against Mayenne. In their subsequent approach towards Paris, Sully was engaged in a severe skirmish; and, soon after, tidings reached him that his wife was dangerously ill. Taking the king of Navarre's physician, he hurried to Rosny, but found his château shut against him by his brother. Sully, without hesitation, procured ladders, resolving to storm his own abode, when the drawbridge was let down, and he was at length admitted. He found his wife "in such a state that she died in four days after. The husband's regrets were proportionate to her merits and good nature; which expresses them enough without saying more." *

The assassination of Henry III. on the 1st of August, 1589, made Henry IV. king of France, but deprived him of every resource. The catholic royalists all deserted his standard; the combined army that

* Such is Sully's laconic epitaph upon his first wife, which the abbé de l'Ecluse, in his Memoirs of Sully, swells out into a long and touching burst of grief and lamentation.

besieged Paris separated; and Henry, with his little band of followers, retired into Normandy, even to its very verge. The leaguers followed with overwhelming forces: on the sea-shore, Henry made a forlorn stand, fighting like a desperate man, and defending, as it were, the last inch of his kingdom. An officer of the League, who had been taken prisoner and brought to Henry, counted the three or four thousand that composed his little army with contempt, considering that 30,000 marched against them. "You do not see all my auxiliaries," replied the king; "you forget to count God, and a good cause." Rosny, as usual, had his share in the victory that ensued, and enabled the royalists to march again towards Paris. They attacked the suburbs, or *faubourgs*, Rosny leading that against the faubourg St. Germain: two of their troops having surrounded a body of Parisians in one of the streets, "there were 400 of them slain within a space of not 200 steps." The soldiers then fell to pillage, and Sully got 3000 or 4000 crowns for his share. War was carried on in those days with much caprice and cruelty.

On the 14th of March, 1590, was fought the battle of Ivry. Henry had written the day before to summon Sully, and the latter arrived a little before the action. He was opposed in several charges to the count of Egmont, and had the worst of it, his men fleeing, himself overthrown and wounded, "a great blow of a lance carrying away the calf of his leg, and ripping up his horse's belly." Sword-wounds in the head and hand, and "a pistol-ball entering the side, and coming out at the lower part of the stomach," came to complete his disasters. The heat of the battle had, however, moved off in another direction, and Sully after defending himself successfully against a straggler, succeeded in purchasing a horse, and mounted it to get to some place of safety as well as repose. In this condition, he was met by seven of the enemy, one bearing the white flag or cornet of the duke of Mayenne. These, instead of assailing him, surrendered for the sake of protection, at

least four of them, whose horses were jaded; so that not one of the most successful cavaliers gained so much honour, or such a prize, as the discomfited Sully. In the mean time, the king had pushed on to sup and sleep at the château of Rosny, whilst its baron was getting his wounds dressed, and was reported to have been killed. It was, therefore, with extreme joy that, on the following day, Henry met in the woods a kind of triumphal procession, got up by one of Sully's followers, of which he himself, borne in a litter, and surrounded by his prisoners and trophies, formed the principal figure. Henry laughed at the vanity of the valet, embraced his friend with tenderness, and congratulated him upon his escape, and even upon his wounds. "You have not to complain for your spilled blood," said Biron to him: "you have got prisoners enough there, whose ransom will pay for your slain horses, fee your chirurgeon, and buy you good wine to make new blood."

On his being sufficiently recovered to attend the king, Sully forgot not to plead his services; but the monarch was as yet obliged to bribe the catholics to be his friends, and these, in consequence, obtained every government and office. This was sadly vexatious to Sully, who vented his humour freely, and had many "big words" with Henry, so much so that he even quitted the army for a time. He had scarcely rejoined it when he was unfortunate enough to fall into an ambuscade, in which a pistol ball, "striking his upper lip, entered the mouth, and came out behind his neck." This disabled him for two months more. The war dragged on without effect. When Henry laid siege first to Paris, then to Rouen, the prince of Parma each time marched from Flanders, compelled him to raise the siege, and retreated without being forced to a battle. Sully was engaged in all these skirmishes and marches, and especially in the siege of Rouen, which he recounts in detail. In the midst of these feats, Henry made acquaintance with the fair Gabrielle d'Estrées, and Rosny, "remaining at Mantes, saw Madame de Châteaupers, and fell in love

with her, as she, perhaps, with him; so that in a few days they agreed to marry." Their espousals, however, did not take place until the following year, 1592; the lady, who had previously been catholic, embracing the religion of her husband.

After his marriage, Rosny, troubled with his wound, and mortified at the king's neglect in not rewarding him with some command, retired to his château, "where he passed his time solacing himself in gardening, arborising, economising, making extracts from the best books, and getting read to him what his secretaries had written of these his memoirs." He received several messages from Henry, but in his anger refused to listen to any, until at length, wearied with idleness, he set out once more with his armed followers. It was Rosny's fortune here to surprise some emissaries, and get possession of their papers, which were important, containing the terms of alliance betwixt the League and Spain. These he brought to Henry, and they produced a reconciliation betwixt them. It was about this time, in 1592, as it appears, that Henry, wearied with the war, and the obstinacy of his enemies, began to meditate other means of terminating it than force. He consulted, or rather sounded, Sully, who has recorded his advice in very ambiguous terms, as if, indeed, he were somewhat ashamed of it. "I will add to my counsels," said he, addressing Henry, "that in truth catholicity becoming agreeable to you, and being adopted well and rightly *à propos*, would be of the greatest utility, and would prove a cement betwixt your catholic subjects and you." In another conversation he says, that "it would be impossible for Henry to reign in peace so long as he remained in the external observance of a religion odious to the majority of great and little in the kingdom."

Henry at length abjured the reformed religion at St. Denis, in July, 1593. Rosny was engaged, the greater part of the ensuing year, in negotiating with the duc de Villars, who held Rouen, and offered to surrender it upon certain advantages. After an infinity of trouble,

and some amusing scenes, which are recounted in his memoirs, he brought Villars to terms, whilst Henry on his side had made equal progress towards reducing Paris to obedience. The king wrote to him, in March, 1594,—"After you have finally settled the treaty, come and join me at Senlis, or at St. Denis, in order that you may help to cry *Vive le roi* in Paris; and we will afterwards go to raise the same cry in Rouen." Rosny accordingly set out, and was just in time to witness the entry of the sovereign whom he had so long served into his capital. Rouen and Lyons soon followed the example of the capital, and little remained in the way of war to absorb the king's attention. In 1595 he formed a council of finance, of which Rosny became a member: but so disagreeable were his strict and economic views to his colleagues, that they combined to shut him out from any influence in the management of affairs. Unable to injure him in his master's opinion, they sought to remove him from court, and obtain his being sent to England as envoy. But Rosny saw through their schemes, and defeated them, by peremptorily refusing to quit France. In the following year, an attempt made by Henry upon Arras failed, and he found himself balked in all his enterprises, through the wretched management of his finances. He wrote, in consequence, to Rosny, complaining of the dilapidations of the council, in words of untranslatable force:—"Ces messieurs là, et cette effrénée quantité d'intendans, qui se sont fourrés avec eux par compère et commère, ont bien augmenté les grivelées, et mangeant le cochon ensemble; consommé plus de quinze cens mille écus, qui étoit somme suffisante pour chasser l'Espagnol de France." "Here I am," wrote Henry, "near to my enemies, and without a horse on which I can combat, or a suit of armour to put on my back; my shirts are all in rags, my *pourpoint* out at elbows, and my soup pot so often upset, that I am obliged to shift for my dinner, now with one, now with another." The gist of the letter being to intrust the finances to Rosny,

he set off without loss of time, and travelled with the fair Gabrielle to the king's quarters.

When he arrived, however, the king's thoughts and anxieties were already turned to other objects, especially to the marriage of his sister. Sully was immediately employed in this affair, and, in spite of his address, was outwitted and abused by all parties, the king included. There is no part of the memoirs of Sully so amusing and instructive as that chapter which recounts the slow degrees by which he arrived at the post of minister of finance. They paint admirably the good nature and good sense of Henry, and at the same time the extreme difficulties of his station, which forced him to dissemble, and even trick. In order to keep his promise to Rosny and secure his services, Henry first proposed to combine the latter with the council of finance, and begged of him to be compliant, and amicable for a time with its members. Rosny flatly refused to feign an amicable feeling towards men who had not long since expelled him; and on this the idea was abandoned for the time. Henry, in fact, as well as his counsellors, had a dread of the unconciliating temper of Rosny, and wished, for this reason, to put him in the first place, in order to temper his rigidness with the obsequiousness of others. Where he principally feared Rosny's interference was in the funds which he destined to his pleasures, and especially his mistresses. Standing in absolute need of Rosny, however, the king told his minister that, on the solicitation of the fair Gabrielle, he determined to employ him, even at the risk of offending the other counsellors. This was a trick to soften the new keeper of the revenue towards the royal mistress. Rosny's brevet was, accordingly, made out. But, in the delay occasioned by a journey, Henry's scruples returned. He saw his other financiers, who promised amendment, and represented Rosny as ignorant and pretending: so that the king, instead of handing the already prepared brevet of minister to Rosny, gave it to an officer to keep, pending his irresolution.

The officer warned Rosny, and on the following day a petition was adroitly put into the king's hand, revealing a certain instance of embezzlement on the part of his present financiers. Henry summoned Rosny, and bade him look into the matter. Rosny refused. He had not authority, he urged. "What!" exclaimed Henry, dissembling, "have you not yet got your brevet, that I ordered to be given to you?" The brevet was produced, the officer chidden for his supposed negligence, and Rosny became again one of the council.

The new minister instantly proposed a general reform; but, knowing his own authority not to be as yet strong enough to prevail, he advised the calling of the states-general, after a certain interval, which allowed time for the commissioners to make a tour of enquiry in the provinces. Sully was one of the commissioners. He instantly began to perform the functions that fell to his department, and returned with the first-fruits of his exertion, in the shape of seventy cart-loads of specie. Great altercations and envy ensued. Rosny gave the treasure, taking care to keep the receipts of the receiver general for the entire sum. When asked for them, he declared that he had destroyed them. A little time after, the king having need of a sum from the treasury, sent, and found not a livre. Rosny asserted that there ought still to remain 90,000 crowns, and proved it, to the confusion of some of his colleagues.

The states met at Rouen in 1596. Determined, with good reason, that the nobles should form no separate estate where the taxes and revenue were the points in discussion, the commons constituted themselves into an assembly of notables. At this the noble blood of Sully is indignant. Their pretensions against the royal authority were equally bold. They demanded the formation of a council chosen by their own body, which was to have the management of one half the revenue, to be employed in paying debts, arrears, public works, &c., the other half remaining at the king's private disposal. On these conditions they offered to the crown

a tenth of all provisions and commodities. The courtiers were indignant at such pretensions and arrogance; Rosny himself not less so; still, he had advised the king to grant the request of the commons, promising that the commons should soon be disgusted with their new council. Accordingly, in the division of the revenue, Rosny took care that all those taxes which were of sure return, and easily levied, should form the royal portion, leaving to the council the odious *taille*, that weighed upon the poor, and the new tenth, equally odious and difficult to levy. The consequence was, that the council, unable to raise the revenue assigned to it, resigned in disgust, and the commons, or notables, after demanding too much control at first, ended by abandoning all. This is but a too true specimen of all French attempts at liberty. Had they always had to do with a Sully, had kings always possessed such a minister, the history of France would have lost some of its most scandalous pages.

In reward of his dexterous management, Rosny was intrusted, in 1597, with the sole management of the finances. The state debts amounted, at that time, to 300,000,000 livres. The war continued with the Spaniards, who had just taken the important town of Amiens. Economy alone could not suffice. The financial measures of Sully, to meet this distress, must not pass without censure. These were, not merely a loan and an increase of taxes, that on salt especially, but the sale of offices in the revenue, and a commission for enquiring into the fortunes of the financiers. The latter might have proved the occasion of much injustice, had not the objects of the investigation deprecated its severity by an immediate restitution of 1,200,000 crowns to the treasury.

The year 1598 restored peace to France by the treaty of Verviers. Henry was not allowed to conclude it without expostulations, and offers from the government of England and Holland, who promised to aid him with an army of 10,000 men, in subduing Spain. But,

as the monarch observed to Sully, those countries "were well defended with seas, rivers, and marshes, whilst France was open to every invasion;" the kingdom was, moreover, internally ruined, and full of disorders, and the minds of the French as much bent upon innovation, and wild ideas of liberty, and religion, and so forth, as those of the English and Dutch were settled and contented. "Wherefore he made peace, although from humour much more inclined to don a harness, prick a steed, or give a good sword-stroke, than to make laws or sit in council, signing ordonnances and reasoning accounts of finance."

The monarch's mind was thus allowed to turn towards domestic matters: his private happiness and the succession to the crown became the first object of his own thoughts and his consultations with his favourite minister. Henry, it will be remembered, had been married to the sister of Charles IX.: their espousals were the decoy which brought the huguenots to Paris, and involved them in the massacre of St. Bartholomew. The felicity of the marriage had been proportioned to its inauspicious commencement; and Margaret, princess and queen of Navarre, was, in life and morals, the worthy daughter of Catherine of Medicis. She was abandoned in every respect: Henry could not live with such a consort. "I am a king without a kingdom," said he at one time, "a general without an army, and a husband without a wife." The king now meditated procuring a divorce from Margaret, and, when at liberty, espousing Gabrielle d'Estrées, his beloved mistress, by whom he had already many children. He consulted Sully, and began by passing in review and disparaging all the princesses of Europe. "The infanta of Spain, to begin, ugly and old though she be, still could I espouse Flanders along with her, the match would answer; and you, Rosny, should have your Flemish county of Bethune. Queen Elizabeth was too old; a German princess too unlucky; a Florentine probably too like Catherine of Medicis;" and, in fine, Henry adroitly stooped to dis-

cuss the merits of Mademoiselle de Guise, whose rank was somewhat humble. She was said, indeed, to be gallant; "but as for that," quoth Henry, "although I believe it false, I had rather have a wife that made love a little than your choleric and vexatious one." In fine, he asked Sully to name his choice. The grave finance minister refused, and parried the question; talked of making a collection of damsels to choose, and observed, very prophetically, that great kings might have imbecile children: "witness Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Trajan, Constantine, and Charlemagne." Henry was somewhat out of patience at this display of learning, and avowed his ideas of espousing Gabrielle. This was combated by Sully with the utmost earnestness. He represented all the disadvantages of the match; of illegitimate children born and to be legitimised; of the pope's interference; of the League's revival; and, in short, fairly expelled the intention from Henry's mind. His advice was, first to effect a divorce from Margaret, and then look around for a princess. Rosny undertook the former task, and set about it in a crookedly politic way, by a letter to queen Margaret, affecting to attempt "to reconcile her to her royal husband sincerely and with good faith." The queen wrote back her disposition to a reconciliation; but in time the subtle correspondent brought her to answer more to his real wishes, and to this effect:—"that she was disposed to promote the wishes and contentment of the king, and longed so ardently to see heirs to the crown, that she did not object to see another in her place, provided she was of high lineage; but to further or lend herself to a dissolution of her marriage in favour of a low-born woman, and of reproachable and wicked life, was what she would never consent to do."

Gabrielle now saw that she had an insurmountable obstacle in Rosny to her views of marrying the king. An open quarrel took place betwixt them, because the minister refused to pay the fees for the baptism of her

son by Henry on the same scale as for a legitimate prince. These are called, in court language, *enfans de France* (children of France). When the bills were presented to Rosny under this title, he refused to pay them, observing that "there was no child of France." On this occasion took place the famous interview between Henry, Rosny, and Gabrielle, so well known, and so often illustrated by the pencil and the pen. The king at first sent Rosny to pacify his mistress; but, being repulsed, the latter returned to the Louvre: whereupon Henry, getting without delay into his minister's carriage, drove with him to Gabrielle's lodgings, saying, "Come along with me: I will show you that women do not possess me altogether like evil spirits, as folks say." When they arrived, Henry took his mistress by the hand, and, drawing her and Rosny into a private room, addressed her thus:— "See madam: he! true God! what is all this? What! you set about being angry in order to try my patience. These be the fine counsels people give you: but, mark me,— if you continue such ways, you will find yourself far from your hopes. Think you, for your silly whims, I must send away the best servant I have? No, madam: henceforth you must listen patiently to him; and if you would consult him, you would find yourself the better for it. Know that I have loved you for your gentleness, graciousness, and complaisance; and that, if I find you become suddenly cross and obstinate, I must believe that your former behaviour was merely feigned, and yourself but like the rest of women."

The fair Gabrielle endured the brunt of this rebuke without yielding, and burst into tears and sobs, and bitter complaints against Rosny. "Pierce my heart with your poniard, and you will there find your image engraved," said she, "but do not come to reproach and menace me—to abandon me, rather than part with a valet that has insulted me. What has he not said in contempt of my children and me? and yet you suffer him. Oh, God!" cried she, flinging herself on her

bed, " there is nothing left me but to die after such disgrace, when I see that you love more a servant who is hated by every body than a mistress whom none can reproach."

The king replied to this with inflexibility, bidding Gabrielle be reconciled to Rosny; but she refused, continued to call him a valet, and to express her indignation at his being preferred to her.

" You are determined, then," cried the monarch, " that I should drive away a servant with whose aid I cannot dispense; but, pardieu! such a thing will I not do: for know, since you are so obstinate as to disturb my peace, and oppose the welfare of the state, that, if reduced to the necessity of choosing betwixt you both, I would prefer losing ten mistresses like you, rather than do without one servant like him." At this poor Gabrielle was overcome, and fell at the monarch's feet.

In the following year Rosny was delivered of all enmities and fears on account of the duchess of Beaufort (as Gabrielle was titled), by her sudden death at Fontainebleau. She was much given to astrologers and diviners; and her death is supposed to have been hastened by some secret communing with these people, acting either upon her nerves, or, more mysteriously, upon her frame. Sully insinuates as much, and reproves her feminine indulgence in superstition, forgetting his own belief in his tutor's prophecies and in the man with the black cloak who foretold his immediate advancement. The financier's epitaph upon Gabrielle is, indeed, somewhat unfeeling. Henry, in the paroxysm of his grief, summoned Rosny to console him; and this office the latter performed by " recalling to his memory some couplets of what, in his days of protestantism, he called psalms, and which he hoped his conversion had not erased from his memory." Nor were the consolatory couplets of Marot disdained by the now orthodox Henry.

Immediately after the death of the duchess of

Beaufort, Rosny resumed his correspondence with queen Margaret, in order to bring her to consent to a divorce. An ample pension and the payment of her debts were the conditions offered and grasped at. Margaret replied that, since that *descriée bagage* (that naughty baggage) was no more, she would submit to any arrangement that might be agreed on. The cardinal d'Ossat was accordingly commanded to negotiate with the pope for a divorce: but Rosny, in spite of his haste and zeal in this matter, found that the king's amorous disposition hurried him into another connection. Henry became enamoured of Mademoiselle d'Antragues,—a lady not of the soft and disinterested temper of Gabrielle, but strong-minded, spirited, and intriguing. It went to the finance minister's heart to see 100,000 crowns—a portion of the three or four millions which he was preparing for the renewal of the Swiss alliance—given to this damsel; and yet Henry remained still as far from the accomplishment of his wishes. Mademoiselle d'Antragues acted the prude, and, in addition to the royal ducats, demanded a promise of marriage. She said, indeed, that it was merely to content her parents—a "vain formality"—that she prayed him to grant it. Henry, incited, moreover, to gratify her in this by "tous les porte-poulets, cajoleurs, et persuadeurs de débauches qui étoient tous les jours à ses veillées," wrote this promise of marriage, and then called Rosny to consult him on the subject, wishing to premise and record that it was not intended to be serious. Rosny took the paper, and read it gravely, but refused to give any opinion on the subject, until Henry pressed him, and promised not to be angry, however harsh or contradictory that opinion might be. Upon this, Sully, holding the promise of marriage, tore it in two, as the best reply, and the only one that he could give. "How, *morbleu!*" exclaimed the king, "what are you doing? I do believe you are mad!"—"It is true," replied Rosny, "I am both fool and madman; and I wish I were so much so as to be the only fool and madman in France."

There were few affairs to occupy the government in 1599. The duke of Savoy was the only potentate with whom Henry the Fourth had differences at that time. The marquisate of Saluzzo was the object of dispute; and the duke, relying on the strength of fortresses, seemed determined to brave all the anger of the French king rather than yield. The latter was equally resolved to force him; and, foreseeing a war of sieges, he already thought of preparing artillery. He had been hitherto very badly served in this department: his letters from the siege of Amiens were full of complaints: yet, as peace came soon after, his kind and easy nature refused to deprive M. d'Estrées, the father of Gabrielle, of that office. It now became necessary to place an active and skilful person at the head of the arsenal, and Henry instantly fixed upon Rosny: still he did not wish to dismiss d'Estrées, proposing to Rosny to take upon him the duties and greater part of the emoluments, without the title, of grand master. The minister peremptorily refused to act in even apparent subordination "to a man from whom he could learn nothing, and whose commands he could not receive without shame." He at the same time pleaded his own insufficiency. "It is not that which prevents you," retorted the king, somewhat offended: "you do not want a perfectly good opinion of yourself, nor ambition to aspire after the first place; but, since you prefer your own pride to my wishes, we will speak no more on the subject." Henry, nevertheless, spoke to d'Estrées of the necessity of his giving up his place; and Rosny took care, through the means of a lady of his acquaintance, who governed d'Estrées, to dispose that personage to resign by means of a promise of 3000 crowns. Rosny, was, in consequence, declared grand master of the artillery, in 1599, obtaining, in the same year, the title (having previously been in possession of the power and functions) of superintendent of the finances.

He immediately established himself at the arsenal

(or arsenac, as he calls it), and set himself about making cannons, bullets, carriages, and buying all kinds of metal, and ingredients for powder. The duke of Savoy soon after came to Paris, and, amongst other sights, visited the arsenal. Rosny, too recently installed to show him formidable stores, brought him to the workshops and forges, where twenty pieces of cannon were in process of manufacture. "What is all this for?" asked the duke. "To take Montmélian," replied the blunt Sully, smiling nevertheless. "You have never been there, or you would not say so," rejoined the duke. "Perhaps so; yet, methinks, if put upon the task, I would not fail of accomplishing it: but there will be no need of such trial, as your highness is here treating amicably with the king."—"It is my intention to end matters well: and they may do so, if you do not prevent it." The duke of Savoy did all that might be expected of an Italian politician to cajole the king and win Rosny. He sent the latter his portrait, enriched with diamonds, which was not accepted; and, failing in this, his friends endeavoured to exclude the stubborn minister from the council in which the affair of Saluzzo was to be decided;—the patriarch of Constantinople, who was one, professing that he could not, without scruple, sit down with a huguenot. But their subterfuges failed them, and the duke of Savoy left Paris with no more advantage than he entered it.

Towards the end of 1599, the dissolution of the king's marriage was accomplished, and the Florentine match resolved on: it was soon concluded; and, no sooner was the treaty signed, than Rosny hastened with it to the monarch, saying, as he came into the royal presence, "We have just married you, sire." Thereupon the king sat for about a quarter of an hour musing, scratching his head, and biting his nails, without saying a word;" but at length he started up, exclaiming, "Let it be, though I fear less any kind of political or warlike rencounters than that with a cross and contentious wife."

Matters had, in the mean time, not been accommodated with the duke of Savoy. Rosny pressed for war, against the advice of all the other ministers: and, in truth, the grand master displays, in his memoirs, his extreme eagerness to try the power of his new batteries against the duke's fortresses. The war was, accordingly, undertaken, Savoy invaded, and Rosny was gratified to his heart's desire by being intrusted with the sieges of Charbonnières and Montmélian. He has recounted at considerable length, with much humour, and in a tone of vaunt, his skill and prowess during these enterprises, in both of which he succeeded, in spite of the contradictions and impediments thrown in his way by his brother officers and the courtiers. He transported the artillery over rocks and precipices, and was so harassed and wet, as to be afflicted with what he calls an "évolution de sang." Henry was always interfering, thrusting his head into danger, and counteracting the cautious plans of his general. On one occasion, the king played Rosny the same trick that the commissaries of the convention played Buonaparte at the siege of Toulon: they ordered a masked battery to be opened before its time upon the enemy, and thereby nearly paralysed its effect. Rosny would not undertake the siege of Montmélian until he had Henry's promise not to come there or interfere with him. He narrates the singular manner in which he reconnoitred that place. A small hut was built, during the night, by his orders, very near one of the bastions, but so that the cannon did not command it. On the following morning, "mistress Hut, as soon as she was perceived from the fortress, was saluted by a shower of balls;" but, after two days' firing, the besieged, seeing no one enter the hut, deemed that it was erected merely to make game of them, and accordingly ceased firing. Rosny himself took care to occupy it on the third day, with a musket-proof shield, and reconnoitred the weak parts of the fortress. Notwithstanding his promise, the king could not refrain from coming to the

siege, and would ride to see the works; but he was saluted with such a volley of cannon that he crossed himself devoutly. "Ha!" quoth Rosny, "I perceive your majesty is a good catholic at last: you make the sign of the cross in pious earnest."

The success of the war in Savoy proved to Rosny's content the great improvements which he had made in the artillery. Its termination recalled his chief attention to finance. He had reflected and matured his ideas on this subject, and now entered upon the system, which he followed ever after. His maxim was, that agriculture was the chief and true source of a nation's prosperity; and to lighten the burden upon it became, henceforth, his principal aim. With this view, he gradually diminished the tailles, a tax upon agriculturists, abolished the *sou per livres* upon the passage of provisions, and did away with all the private levies by the great lords in their districts. The diminution of revenue, consequent upon this, Sully made up, partly by economy, and strict and equal administration, but in a greater part by throwing the burden on the monied and commercial class. These employed their wealth chiefly in the purchase of judicial and other places sold by the crown. Sully diminished these places, not from any objections to the venality, but because he considered them in the light of a tax, raised on the peasant for the benefit of the wealthy and non-noble. The revenue of these places he taxed, moreover, by the poulette, or annual fine, paid for its renewal. Should the wealthy or commercial man purchase land, Sully taxed him there too, for the permission extended to the non-noble to hold immovable property. He favoured the nobility, and the tenants who tilled the earth for them. In these Sully saw the nation; all other species of industry appeared in his eye mean and pernicious. He opposed the laying on a duty in French ports, corresponding to that levied upon French vessels in English ports. He resisted the introduction of manufactures, of that of tapestry for instance, which Henry IV., more liberal,

insisted upon supporting in spite of his minister; and treated merchants and commerce as something to be tolerated rather than favoured or protected. These narrow views, begotten of aristocratic prejudice, are pardonable in that age, and more especially when we find, from subsequent history, that principles more sound were afterwards rendered inefficient by the want of that economy which was Sully's leading maxim. Severe as he was, he was too politic, not to relax, when popular feeling, blended with a kind of justice, demanded it. Thus, in his attempt to pay off the funds or rents on the Hôtel de Ville, in 1607, which was opposed as most grievous by the influential citizens, from the great depreciation of gold and silver, the minister desisted. He was much criticised, even in that day, for his hoarding system. But it is to be remarked that he began to amass gold in the cellars of the Bastile for an especial object, viz. the great war which was to humble the house of Austria, with a provident foresight of two evils, either over-taxation or borrowing, of both of which he had an utter horror. Even at that early time he foresaw that the funding system would raise up the middle classes on the ruins of the lowest and the highest; and perfectly right he was in his reasoning, though not, perhaps, in his regrets.

In 1601, Henry IV. visited Calais whilst queen Elizabeth was at Dover. A meeting was difficult, consistently with the dignity of both; and though Henry might have waived his, out of compliment to the sex of his neighbour, the jealousy of Spain would have been too forcibly excited by their interview. Sully, however, went across, as if for his amusement, and saw and spoke with the English queen. There can be no stronger testimony to the superior abilities of Elizabeth than what is to be found in the memoirs of Sully. It appears from them that many of the extensive projects of Henry IV. were inspired by that queen. In him, too, they appear more as the dreams of an ambitious adventurer, of a young and restless conqueror, influenced

by trifles, by vanity and superstition, rather than by profound and well-weighed policy. On Elizabeth's side, the motives are grave and rational, uninfluenced by astrology or whim, and so truly wise, that they have never since ceased to be the rule of English policy as to Europe. The political *desiderata* laid down by her and Sully were these: — an alliance of England, France, and the powers of the North, to humble Austria by giving freedom to Germany, and to secure toleration to the three prevalent religions of Europe; but Elizabeth expressly stipulated that the seventeen provinces of the Low Countries were to be equally independent of Austria, France, and England. Then she proposed that Alsace and Franche-Comté, as well as the Tyrol, should make part of the Swiss confederation, which would have been the true means of arriving at what she had at heart, viz., that Europe should be parcelled out amongst its sovereigns in as equal parts as could possibly be. What a noble monument is this to the genius of Elizabeth!

Soon after Sully went upon a similar errand; but as an avowed envoy, to a very different personage, the queen's successor, James. He was charged to form with the new monarch the same intimate alliance meditated with Elizabeth, for the humbling of the house of Austria, and limiting it to the dominions of Spain alone. Sully himself drew out a memoir of what he considered most expedient to propose. His plan was, that Europe should form one republic, consisting of fifteen sovereign powers, all of an equal extent of territory, — to restore liberty and power of electing their ruler to the states of Germany, to form a kind of congress which should decide all differences between European princes, who, guaranteed in mutual peace, should unite their powers and efforts against the infidel. Such is the plan that Sully represents as his own. It differs little from the secret instructions finally given him by the king, except that these gave precision to some of the immediate measures for carrying the great project into execution,

such as the alliance of England and France with Denmark, Sweden, and the Low Countries, to act by a naval expedition against the Indies, whilst an army reduced Flanders, entering it by the Meuse and the Moselle.* A proposal of lesser extent and import, in case the new king of England was found lukewarm, was confined to the liberation of the Low Countries.

Charged with this embassy, the marquis of Rosny, as he was now entitled, set forth for the court of James. In crossing the Channel, he was fired at by the English cruisers, who were indignant at some flag improperly hoisted. The ambassador ordered it to be hauled down, not wishing to risk, by a quarrel on an insignificant point, the success of an important negotiation.

The French ambassador was received by the mob of Dover, Canterbury, and London, with the most joyous and noisy welcome. The Spaniard was then our national enemy. But the good citizens were not so complaisant as to receive willingly the gentlemen of Rosny's suite into their houses. At Rochester they effaced the marks of the royal sergeants on their doors; and in London it became a matter of extreme difficulty to procure lodgings for Rosny's suite contiguous to his own residence. There even ensued a serious quarrel betwixt some French and English gentlemen, in which one of the latter was killed. But Rosny showed such readiness to make reparation, threatening to hang the aggressor, that the tumult was allayed. On the day of his arrival, Cecil visited the French envoy. "Whatever it may be, I find in this Cecil," wrote Rosny to his master, "a mind inclined to peace; and it appears to me that he has not well considered the conditions inseparable from it, such as the abandoning of the states to the mercy of Spain, or the forcing of them to throw themselves into your arms, the loss of the Indian traffic, &c.' From this, and from the whole course of the negotiation, indeed, it appears that the spiritless policy of James

* It is remarkable that Henry's plan of campaign was that since allowed and proved to be the best for an invasion of the Low Countries.

was not altogether his own, but proceeded from, at least was applauded by, the ministers of Elizabeth, who had not caught the spirit, or did not possess the sagacity, of their late mistress.*

Rosny was presented to king James at Greenwich, and received with kindness and great condescension. He made what he himself calls a short and soldierlike speech, but censured, he says, for its brevity by the pedants. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently adorned with compliment, the envoy declaring himself to want "a voice truly celestial," in order to do justice to the virtues of James. The latter replied, that "he had not left behind him in Scotland the affection which he had ever borne towards his brother monarch." James then asked about divers petty particulars, as to whether Rosny had addressed the pope as "holy father" or not, how the dispute with Du Plessis had terminated, and such like trifles. The weighty matters of state seemed too gigantic for the little and pedantic mind of the English king, who could not remove from his imagination that the Dutch were rebels, and by consequence that it was wrong for them to resist, or for others to aid them. He was, moreover, somewhat prejudiced against Henry, who, he learned, had been wont to call him "a captain in erudition, and a clerk in arms." Rosny, however, succeeded in doing away with these impressions. The English ministers, indeed, he never could bring to hearken to his political proposals; their efforts were merely directed to extract money from France, as payment of the debts due to Elizabeth; and, in return for payment, they promised to employ the money in private succours to the Dutch. Peace at any price was their maxim, relying on the invulnerable condition of England, surrounded by the sea. They were, in fact, incapable of any high or great resolve. Rosny gives an

* "Je n'aye pas trouvé en ces gens-cy ensemble, ni en tous les autres avec lesquels j'aye eu à traitter choses de conséquence, cette vivacité d'esprit, fermeté de jugement, ni généreuse résolution aux hautes entreprises, esquelles excelloit votre royale et loyale sœur, la brave Elizabeth d'Angleterre."

amusing account of Cecil, who, "as it is his custom to affect subtlety, and take advantage of every word, endeavoured to persuade the deputies of the states and myself, that we had said what we never thought of; and it produced much gaiety, when Cecil, by his embarrassed and tortuous mode of speaking at last became utterly incomprehensible." During his first interviews with the English monarch, Rosny found him, by the advice of his ministers, yielding, indeed, and assenting, but still not inclined to break with Spain, or to take a resolution. So much was this so, that the French envoy was astonished to hear him break forth at a dinner "where his majesty put no water to his wine," and wish prosperity to the double marriage betwixt the royal families of England and France. At length Rosny won upon James in a long and secret interview, in which he, with complete frankness, opened forth his whole views and plans, representing catholicism throughout Europe universally leagued, and aiming under the king of Spain at universal domination, the Jesuits serving this their sacred cause with intrigues and poniards; and on the other side picturing the protestant powers and France as called upon to unite for their common liberties. James was won upon by the eloquence and earnestness of the envoy, and at once gave his adhesion with enthusiasm to the plan of alliance. He called in some of his courtiers to witness his consent, and bade Cecil peremptorily and without discussion prepare the necessary documents. Rosny, however, was without full power to conclude a treaty to the full extent of what he wished, and what he here set forth. But a defensive alliance was immediately concluded, and understood to be a kind of preliminary to one that was to follow. Rosny soon after took his leave of the English court, and, crossing to Calais, posted to meet the king at Villes-Côterêts.

A letter from Monsieur de Beaumont, the ordinary ambassador of the French king at the court of London, gives an account of the rivalry that existed, during

Rosny's visit, betwixt him and Cecil. It is, of course, favourable to the French statesman, and allowance must be made for its partiality. It represents Cecil as "proposing things quite uncivil and out of season, in order to put Rosny in anger and to trouble his judgment; and, on another hand, giving the king quite a different view of the affairs treated by Rosny, so as to divert him from his opinion, and to force him to draw back from measures already agreed upon in their interviews." Beaumont writes that "Cecil was a little annoyed at the reports circulated to his disadvantage, touching what passed betwixt him and Rosny;" and that, as Cecil had regained much ascendency over James, it was advisable to soften him by a present. The ambassador further says, that "although James still adheres to his declarations to Rosny, yet, that he, Beaumont, fears much the delays and subtleties of the little sophist." Cecil's anti-Gallican policy finally prevailed; and it became evident, by the treaty concluded betwixt Spain and England, in the ensuing year, that Rosny had lost his pains.

One of the defects and virtues of Rosny, for it proved both, was his rudeness. He could conciliate no one that stood in his way; for a rival in his master's favour, or in any object that he had in view, he could feel nothing but contempt. The category of his likings was exceedingly limited. He detested all the low-born, and even some of the respectably born, such as legists and financers; the *gens de plume et de robe* were his utter aversion. Thus he contemned Cecil and Villeroi, and did his king and country bad service by entering into rivalry with the former. At his own court his scrupulous honour and soldierlike rudeness was of great advantage: he was the terror of mere courtiers and petitioners, who surprised the king's goodness into the granting of some unadvised favour. For this reason, Rosny was ever at enmity with the mistress for the time being, and with the princes of the blood. One of these, the count of Soissons, begged of Henry, in the

year 1603, to grant him a duty of fifteen sous upon every bale of cotton entering or leaving the kingdom. It is a strong proof of the king's ignorance in these matters, and his dependence on Rosny, that he granted the request as trivial, supposing it not to amount to more than 10,000 or 20,000 crowns a year. On consulting his minister, the duty was estimated as amounting to 300,000 crowns. Accordingly its registry was stopped. The count of Soissons, not mistaken in the quarter whence came the impediment, tried to bend Rosny to gratify him, craving his signature, a "Maximilian de Bethune, fairly signed at length," to the ordonnance; but the minister was inexorable. The marchioness of Verneuil, the mademoiselle d'Antragues previously mentioned, and now the acknowledged mistress, came on the same errand; for she was to share in the profits of Soissons, and, no doubt, had aided him with her influence in obtaining the grant. She met Rosny coming out of his cabinet with a roll of paper upon which was written a list of a score of edicts, containing grants of different kinds. He told her what it was, and that he was going to remonstrate with the king on the subject. "He will have little to do to listen to you," observed the marchioness, "and to make enemies of so many people of quality for your fantasies. Whom would the king oblige if it were not his cousins, relatives, and mistresses?"—"All very just, madam, if his majesty took the money out of his own pocket. But to be obliged to levy all this over again upon merchants, artisans, and labourers, is a thing not to be permitted; for it is they who feed both the king and us, and who content themselves with one master, without having cousins and ministers to provide for." This rudeness drew down a serious quarrel, which Henry had, as usual, the trouble of appeasing.

Rosny at the same time opposed with all his might the introduction of silkworms and mulberry trees, which Henry was bent on, saying that such *babioles* did not suit a grave people, and would work the degeneracy of

a warlike one. The king used an argument that ought to have been powerful with the minister, viz. the quantity of money that went out of the kingdom annually for these *babioles*. Rosny proposed to remedy this evil by a sumptuary law, forbidding the use of silk, of plate, and other extravagances.* "Go to!" cried the monarch, "I tell you I had rather fight three pitched battles against the king of Spain than face the army, first of lawyers, financiers, and burgesses, then of dames and damsels, that you bring down upon me, angry and armed, by your nonsensical regulations and prohibitions of dress." The proposition of a colony in Canada was no more to Rosny's taste than that of a silk manufacture. He was haunted and terrified by the languishing condition of Spain, which no statesman of that day could very well account for. He looked upon luxury and colonies as amongst the causes, and was accordingly suspicious of both. Feudal proprietors and peasants, convertible at need into officers and soldiers, appeared to him the only desirable components of a nation.

Rosny had now arrived at the highest pitch of prosperity. He held two of the most important offices of government,—the finances and the artillery,—the latter rendered more eminent from the king's granting to none the high military dignities. With the fruits of his economy the minister had purchased Sully, an estate south of Paris, on the Loire. His daughter was sought in marriage by the first families of the kingdom, those of Rohan and Laval. Henry gave him now a new and signal proof of his trust and esteem, the government of Poitou. This was the head-quarters of the huguenots, whose leaders, De Bouillon and Du Plessis, were intriguing and disaffected. To give the province to a huguenot was a bold act of confidence, tending to conciliate the protestant population, whilst a governor of that religion would have more authority over the province. The difficulty was to trust a huguenot in the place; and had there not been one of tried fidelity in Rosny, the experiment would have been too hazardous.

But he was as loyal to his king as true to his religion, equally removed from the zealots of either party, from the protestant bigotry of Du Plessis Mornay, as from the catholic inveteracy of the old leaguers. This, too, is sufficiently proved in the affair of the Jesuits, who were now labouring for permission to re-establish their fraternity in France. Henry wished to exempt him from giving any opinion upon these questions; but his colleagues insisted on having the advantage of his wisdom and advice, intending to throw the blame, of either granting or denying the request of the Jesuits, upon Rosny. After some hesitation, the latter gave his consent, and voted for their re-establishment, which was accordingly granted, though not without strong protestations on the part of the parliaments against so dangerous a concession.

The year 1604 passed in miserable intrigues, in quarrels betwixt the king and his wife on the one hand, and with his mistress on the other. Rosny exerted himself to rouse Henry from pleasures and expenses to those great designs which they had meditated together for reducing the power of Spain and modifying the state of Europe. When Henry detailed, in a gay and careless tone, his losses at play, his gifts to his mistresses, his outlay in building, and encouraging manufactures, concluding with a half wish, half order, that his prime minister should increase the sums allowed for the royal expenses, with an item of 6000 crowns for the minister's self, Rosny, deaf to the gaiety, as well as to the bribe offered to his honesty, protested, and shrugged his shoulders. "There, again," cried Henry, "you do not consider all the hardships of mind and body that I have gone through, and that I have a right to make up for by a little pleasure." Then, if Rosny frowned at the free morals of the king, and his too great obsequiousness to the marchioness of Verneuil, his mistress, Henry would reply, "Yet I cannot hurt her. She is such agreeable company: when she likes, always a *bon mot* in her mouth to excite a laugh, and that is what I never

find at home, my wife being to me neither company, nor consolation, nor joy, taking no pains to be kind or complaisant, and receiving me with a cold and disdainful mien, when I return home, and seek to kiss, caress, or joke with her; so that I am obliged to quit her of necessity, and seek my recreation elsewhere."* Rosny repeated these complaints to the queen, with the hope of persuading her to alter her humour and manners, begging her not to receive her husband as "if he was an ambassador." Yet, notwithstanding these friendly relations with her, Rosny was obliged to be as rigid with her as with others, in opposing her demands of money and edicts. There is a very humble and pressing letter, written by Mary de Medicis, on one occasion, to Rosny, begging of him to pay a gratification of 600 francs, which the king had made to her gardener, on whose merits she thinks it necessary to expatiate. Negotiations with the royal mistress during squabbles betwixt her and her lover was another employment of Rosny, and one that he felt to be of such extreme difficulty and peril that he carried it on as much as possible by writing, never allowing a verbal message to pass between them, and never writing an account of a conversation without submitting the letter for her revision.

In spite of all Rosny's precautions on this and other occasions, a league, formed to destroy Henry's confidence in him, found sufficient circumstances to be worked on, and presented to the monarch as causes of suspicion. All the convivial companions of Henry, the mere courtiers, were enemies of Rosny, as were equally his colleagues Villeroi and Sillery. The mistresses, the bastards, the noblesse, even the huguenots, joined in enmity to him; so that Henry, in whatever society he found himself, heard it continually repeated that Rosny was a dangerous man. His foes depicted him as resembling the famous Coligny in firmness, uprightness,

* It may be observed, in answer to Henry's complaint, so often met with in the world, that his own irregularities may have been the chief cause of the cold and disdainful reception that he was in the habit of experiencing from the queen.

and high character, and ready, like that personage, to stand up as the head of a formidable opposition, as soon as his plans were ripe. They represented these plans as far more profound than Coligny ever conceived; for the most suspicious part in Rosny's conduct, they pointed out to be his friendship with the family of Guise, and with those who had been inveterate leaguers. These accusations were placed before Henry's eye continually, and in a hundred forms; in letters, always anonymous, warnings thrust under his pillow, or thrown in his way. At length, a full accusation was handed by one Juvigny to the king, accusing Rosny of conspiring to take away his crown, and raise himself on the ruins of his master.

Henry combated these unworthy suspicions and denunciations with the frankness of his character, when a trifling circumstance of a sudden occurred to give weight to the mass of calumny. This was the reconciliation of Rosny and the duke of Epernon. It took place upon the discovery by the duke of a signal benefit done him by Rosny. But the monarch, not aware of the cause, was struck by the unaccountable friendship that had started up betwixt his minister and his old enemies, the houses of Lorraine and Henry III.'s partisans. He vented his suspicions openly before the court. But, soon ashamed of them, he endeavoured to bring Rosny to volunteer a justification of his conduct. The minister was too proud; and, although informed of all the unkind words of the king, he refrained from taking any notice of them, until Henry should utter them in his presence. At length an explanation took place. Rosny entering the royal cabinet, the king rose and saluted him under the formal title of Monsieur. After much hesitation on the part of Henry, who put off his accustomed ride for the purpose, he at length called Rosny, and asked him had he nothing to say; and on receiving a negative answer, he added, "then have I something to say to you." Thereupon taking him by the hand, Henry drew him into "the alley of white mulberries, surrounded by water,"—the scene took

place at Fontainebleau,—and, placing two German sentinels at the entrance, he handed to Sully papers containing the denunciations against him. Rosny defended himself with spirit, with pride, and with a force of eloquence, which his position and loyalty supplied to him. He was about to throw himself at the king's feet as he concluded his exculpation, but Henry prevented it, saying, "Do not kneel, Rosny; the courtiers yonder might think you had committed some fault that required such an act of submission." The interview ended in a perfect reconciliation. The monarch was surprised to find that it had lasted four hours. "I see how it is," said he, "Rosny wearies others more than me; but, to console them, I would have ye all know, that, henceforth, it is between us a friendship of life and death: and you, my friend, get you to dinner. Love and serve me, as you have ever done; for I am well contented with your conduct."

Rosny was employed during the greater part of the year 1605 in negotiating with the huguenots, and presiding at their assembly, held at Châtelherault. Nor was there a character or a part of his various employments in which he was more useful to his master than in this. Staunch to his religious tenets, yet totally setting them aside in his politics, at least in administration, Henry could not have been represented by one more true to his interests, and at the same time more welcome to the huguenot body.

On his return, he found Henry tormented by some intrigues and machinations of Spain. That monarchy, on which both in its monarch's person and its political state, the feebleness and caducity of age had strangely and unaccountably fallen, was neither able to strike a blow, nor yet to remain quiet. Its ministers and agents were ever weaving some base intrigue, the only signs of life, indeed, which they gave, and the only feats or achievements which they seemed able to attempt. Rosny proposed his usual remedy,—a coalition, and a war to humble the house of Austria. But Henry

hesitated. He had begun to love his quiet and his pleasures, although the idea of a great enterprise, in prospect, flattered his fancy, and offered a brilliant future to his dreams. The queen, Mary of Medicis, however, whom Henry did his utmost to content, was strongly opposed to these schemes. She was allied with the house of Austria, and reverenced its antique grandeur; and she already leaned to the marriage and connection betwixt that family and France which she lived to complete.

For the present, therefore, to Rosny's advice Henry replied, "Let us begin by taking this thorn of Sedan out of our side." The duke of Bouillon, an intriguing and malecontent noble, aiming at heading the huguenot interest, held Sedan. It was Henry's plan to send an army immediately to besiege and reduce that fortress, and to intrust the command to Rosny. Previous to his setting out, Henry prepared to bestow upon him the highest dignity in the monarchy. When Rosny was about to go as ambassador to James, his master had proposed his elevation to the titles of duke and peer. But the new rank was declined, as imposing an expense for which the ambassador's fortune was not yet prepared. Some years' economy had, however, swelled his income to the requisite amplitude; and accordingly, in 1606, Henry bade Rosny choose one of his estates to be erected into a *duché-pairie*. He selected Sully, a late acquisition, by purchase, of which he became henceforth duke. All the high nobility and princes of the blood accompanied him on this occasion to court; and when Sully returned with his guests to the arsenal, where a banquet was prepared, he found the king there before him. "Grand master," said Henry, "I am come to the feast without an invitation: shall I be ill served?" — "That may be the case, sire, since I did not expect so excessive an honour." — "Then I will dare to say no," said the king; "for I have visited the kitchens, whilst I was waiting for you, and have seen the finest fish possible, and the ragoûts that I love, and the little

(*huistres de chasse*) hunting oysters; nay, have already tasted of your wine of Artois, which I declare excellent."

The much noised expedition against Sedan passed without any glory to Sully, who longed to wreathe his new title with laurels. As soon as the royal army appeared before the town, the duke of Bouillon thought fit to submit. Sully, mortified at being obliged to roll back his fine artillery to the arsenal without firing a shot, proposed to the king the siege of the county of St. Pol, upon which he had some claim. But Henry was not so ambitious as to disturb peace for a trifle, and would not hear of it. On his return to the capital, he ordered Sully to fire his cannon in token of rejoicing for the submission of De Bouillon. The grand master refused to fire a shot in honour of such a bloodless expedition; and when at last peremptorily ordered, showed his spleen by pouring out all the thunder of the arsenal to astonish the Parisians.

There is not a monarch in history whose character and position are more to be admired and envied than those of Henry IV. Yet in the very memoirs which portray his heart and inmost thoughts, as well as the feats and events of his reign, we learn the painful necessities and vexations that "do hedge a king." Frank as Henry naturally was, how often do we find him reduced to indispensable dissimulation! Confiding, kind, and generous as he was, and to a minister who fully deserved all this from him, still we see suspicions arise from time to time to mar a friendship, which betwixt humbler individuals could have known no such coldnesses and interruptions. In spite of all that had passed between them, Henry had doubts of Sully's fidelity. These doubts were suggested and enforced by many courtiers and ministers, all jealous of his ascendency, and hurt by his rude and somewhat vain honesty. A multitude of circumstances combined gave some consistency to these reports. Sully's friendship with the Guises and the house of Lorraine, the effect of gene-

rosity on his part, and of an innate love for high and sovereign blood, Henry could not account for. Epernon he had also been reconciled to; and, in short, he stood so well with all the catholics, that two popes had successively despatched briefs, or letters of thanks and friendship to the huguenot grandee. These circumstances, pointed out to Henry, made a deep impression on him, and produced the coldness and the explanation heretofore detailed. There was one step, however, important in that day, about to be taken by Sully, which Henry closely observed; this was, the marriage of his son. The king was afraid lest this youth might marry one of the house of Lorraine; and thus uniting his father's power, both as a statesman and a huguenot chief, with the surviving heads of the league factions, a party might be formed as powerful as that which had long kept him from the throne. To obviate this, Henry in plain terms forbade the duke of Sully to marry his son to the daughter of any sovereign house: the minister, in compliance, formed an alliance for him with a daughter of the house of Crequi. On reflection, the monarch found that he had done his minister wrong in this respect, wounding him in a point the most important, the elevation of his house: he therefore altered his opinion; and, calling Sully, told him that "he had been overhasty in the conclusion of the alliance with Crequi; that he had more honours and dignities in store for him, provided that Sully, on his part, would come forward and show himself obedient on one important point. As an enticement to this, Henry promised his own daughter by the duchess of Beaufort to his son, with large pensions, and the governments of Berry and the Bourbonnois, that of Poitou to his son-in-law, the duchy of Rohan, and Normandy, in lieu of Poitou, to himself: the staff of constable was also to revert to Sully. In return for all this, Henry demanded his minister's conversion to the catholic religion. Sully took time to consider of this brilliant offer, so tempting to all his passions; but he finally refused: and, in recounting it, he deems

it a trap laid by his enemies for his downfall, which they thought more easily achieved when he had reached to the highest pinnacle of favour.

The last year of Sully's administration, which may be said to close with the death of Henry, was almost exclusively occupied with that great scheme for remodelling Europe, which was the darling project of both. With the king, indeed, it was cherished more as a flattering dream, one pleasant to recur to, than as a thing to be realised; but Sully's mind was more practical, and pushed straight to realisation: he had amassed millions in coin; and his resources in preparations of all kinds, not to reckon alliances, were as considerable. There is little doubt that this mighty project was conceived in the head of queen Elizabeth; it bears the strongest marks of her sagacity. Sully, indeed, allows her the honour of it. But what stamps it hers, is, that the project is for the interest of England especially. France was to gain no accession of territory: although her armies set Germany free, she was not to approach the Rhine; Alsace, linked to the Swiss confederacy, was to separate her from this boundary. One is not surprised to see the generous Henry applaud this scheme of self-denial; but that Sully should have the same moderation is astonishing. It was in opposition, and by way of contrast, to Charles V., that these French statesmen and soldiers, so unlike their successors, adopted the principle of refusing further aggrandisement. Their great accusation against the house of Austria was its past aim at universal dominion: to keep away from themselves any such reproach was the aim of Sully and of Henry.

As history scarcely condescends even to sketch a plan that was destined to remain unexecuted, its outline may best find a place in a work devoted to general politics. Europe was to contain fifteen powers, of different kinds of government; — the latter a proof that the originators of this scheme were no political bigots, seeking to enforce their own ideas of domination: — six hereditary mon-

archies, — France, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy; six elective monarchies, — Germany, brought back to the rules of the golden bull, Bohemia, Hungary, each increased by surrounding territories, Poland, and the popedom, which included Naples; four republics,— those of Flanders, of Switzerland, of Venice, and of Italy. The last was, indeed, a generous thought, the forming a federation of those noble cities, Florence, Mantua, Modena, Parma, Bologna, with Genoa for their seaport, leaving the internal government of each what it might be. The part of the plan most to be regretted is that concerning Italy: it alone could have preserved that noble country from the state of dissension and languor into which it fell, and in which it still hopelessly continues. Germany, too, might have been long since more civilised and free; her capital and central point, being brought nearer to the west, might have kept France within her limits, communicated to her the freedom of an elective empire, whilst she imbibed in return the refinement that she most needed. Spain herself might, nay, must, have been benefited by a violence that shut her up to husband her peninsular resources; whilst a national war, had it been necessary to defend the Spanish soil, would have proved the most effectual means of reviving the national spirit. The defence of one's country on its own soil is a war almost always successful for a great people, and is the true medicine for a nation's languishing and decayed spirit; whilst warfare carried on abroad, for distant or foreign possession, such as Spain carried on for Flanders, is the most unsuccessful, pernicious, and wasting.

The hand of the assassin Ravaillac cut short this noble plan, together with the life of Henry, on the 14th of May, 1610. Sully was indisposed at the arsenal, else he would have already taken his departure for the army. The king was going thither when stricken. St. Michel, soon after the catastrophe, arrived at the arsenal, bearing the news, and, at the same time, the

fatal knife*, in testimony. Sully exclaimed, "This is what the unfortunate prince so long apprehended. Oh God! have compassion, then, on us and on the state: this is a judgment upon France, now about to fall into strange hands!" Dressing himself, soon after, in haste, he went out on horseback, accompanied by a numerous suite. The entire capital was in commotion, and at each step Sully met some of his own followers or those of Henry in tears and consternation—all of opinion that the assassination of the king was but part of a plot against him and his faithful servants. Sully received many warnings,—one or two in the form of notes handed to him, bidding him beware of entering the Louvre, as he too was to be sacrificed. The memory of St. Bartholomew recurred to his recollection; and he accordingly turned back somewhat in a panic, and, instead of returning to the arsenal, shut himself in the Bastile, and laid in a provision of bread, in case of siege.

The queen, on her side, was equally terrified at Sully's distrust, and despatched some of the principal courtiers to summon him to her presence. But as this mandate was accompanied with the injunction to bring few followers, it served but to increase the suspicions of Sully; and, instead of obeying, he went to bed. His conduct in this instance has served as a fertile matter of reproach for his enemies, both against his courage and his fidelity. On the following day, however, he appeared at the Louvre; and Mary de Medicis was so affected by his burst of sorrow, that, for the first, and, perhaps, the only time, she then fully felt the loss she had experienced. Sully took the young king, Louis XIII., in his arms; and it was with difficulty that the prince was taken from his embrace.

By the death of Henry, there was a necessary cessation of all his great designs; for Mary de Medicis, even during her husband's lifetime, was in commu-

* It is preserved at the Musée d'Artillerie, in Paris, and is a black-handled dagger, without a guard, somewhat wavy.

nication with Spain, and betrayed the secrets of that meditated hostility, which she could not prevent. Now, of course, a renewal of friendship betwixt the two countries was to be expected. Sully, however, protested, arguing that this, at least, should be slow; that the uppermost and manifest designs of the late king upon the duchy of Clèves ought at least to be completed, and the army not be disbanded until the allies of Henry were secure from the vengeance of Spain: but Mary de Medicis was impatient. She resolved to fling the nation at once into the alliance of the house of Austria; and it was resolved, in a secret council, to send some envoy to Spain upon this mission.

Sully was not only thwarted in his political views, but he considered himself personally menaced. "Mamie," exclaimed he to the duchess, "we are about to fall into the power of the Jesuits. It is time for all good Frenchmen and huguenots to look to themselves. As for me, I shall do like the beaver,—strip myself quietly of all my offices, gather as much money as I can, and employ it in the purchase of some strong fortress in a distant province, in order to await some future tide of affairs." His son and son-in-law, who came in to consult with him on the present extremity, dissuaded him from any such extreme step, arguing that his duty was to disregard personal safety, in order to watch the safety and welfare of the young king. Sully sent to Concini, the Italian favourite of the regent, to sound him. Concini replied, that Sully had more need of him than he of Sully, and that he was resolved to make the utmost of that favour which he enjoyed with the queen.

In obedience to the wishes of his family, and with, perhaps, some hopes of resisting infatuated counsels from prevailing, Sully still held the finances, and appeared at court. The prince of Condé endeavoured to bring the minister of the late king to his side, in order to form a party to awe the regent and her favourites. Sully hearkened willingly to the proposition, but showed

that the only means of making effectual opposition was to be honest, tranquil, disinterested; to shame the queen by forbearance; and, by union betwixt the princes of the blood and the faithful servants of the late king, from a body of personages of weight, whose moral influence must, in a little time, overthrow intriguing and rapacious favourites. Condé had the sense to approve the counsel, but not the steadiness to keep it: a pension and a mansion bought him. The other grandees were all become enemies to Sully, who felt that he was only tolerated for the moment. He still continued to resist pertinaciously the demands and draughts of the courtiers for money,—all countersigned by the queen.—some containing impudent forgeries of the name of Henry. This brought on interminable quarrels. At length, when the court went to the coronation at Rheims, Sully retired to one of his estates at Montrond, resolved to return no more to the capital, at least not to meddle in the details of office. Here he fell into a deep melancholy which he sought to soothe, if we may believe his secretaries, by the occupation of verse-making. One piece, of considerable length, in couplets, contains a comparison betwixt Henry IV. and Cæsar: the other is entitled his "Adieus to the Court," and commences,—

> "Adieu, maisons, châteaux, armes, canons du roy;
> Adieu, conseils, thresors, déposez à ma foy;
> Adieu, munitions, adieu, grand equipages;
> Adieu, tant de rachapts; adieu, tant de menager;
> Adieu, contentions des réfus nécessaires;
> Adieu, peine et envie; adieu, soucy d'affaires.
> Permettez que chez moy en toute liberté,
> Je regrette mon roi, non assez regretté!"

and concludes,—

> "Suppliant ce grand Dieu qu' encore un jour le roy,
> La France, ni l'état n'ayant besoin de moy."

Upon Henry's death, one of the cunning courtiers observed, that "the day of kings was past, and the day of princes and nobles come." Mary of Medicis found this to be the case: all was quarrel and confusion, the

princes leaguing against her favourite, and she herself unable to support the latter. In her distress, she summoned Sully to her aid, and employed his relatives to dissuade him from his present plan of retirement; which was, to sell his places, raise all the money possible, and dispose of it, one third in Venice, one third in Switzerland, and one third in Flanders, as a resource against the religious persecutions that he foresaw. Sully did, however, re-appear at court, and, for a few days, was so graciously treated, that all the old women kissed and hugged him in compliment. It was hoped that he would be more complaisant: on the contrary, however, he was rendered more testy and impracticable by the thousand daily demands on the government. On one occasion, it was proposed to alienate a part of the royal domain. All the voices in the council had been secured, even including that of Sully's own brother. Sully himself made, however, but the longer protest; nay, made a formal one, of which he demanded a copy signed by the secretary of the council, in order that it might be deposited in the registers of the parliament, and thus serve as a document to instruct the young king, one day, of the peculations of his council during his minority.

With such opinions, and such boldness in expressing them, it was impossible that Sully could continue to sit at the council table. In the commencement of 1611, he resigned his superintendence of finance and his command of the Bastile. The queen gave him a gratuity of 300,000 livres, which, it seems, he declined. He preserved the grand mastership of the artillery and the government of Poitou: even these were left him but by a kind of composition, lest he should make use of his influence with the huguenots to embarrass the court. Soon after his retreat, his old enemy, the duc de Bouillon, undertook to obviate all fears on this head, and to bring the protestants to obedience by his address and authority. If he succeeded, he was to be rewarded with the places of Sully. The menace roused this statesman from his

retreat: he attended the assembly of the huguenots at Châtelherault, defeated the designs of Bouillon, and commanded ever after the respect of the court, by proving, upon this occasion, that he could not be insulted or persecuted with impunity. Mary of Medicis consulted Sully on many occasions, after he refused to take part in any cabal against the state. Even when the huguenots rose again in arms, under the prince of Condé, Sully endeavoured to restore peace; and, when war broke out, he served in the royal army in his capacity of chief of the artillery.

With these few exceptions, the last years of the life of Sully were passed altogether in retirement. He survived Henry upwards of thirty years, the greater part of which he passed at Villebon, his seat in Beaune, about fifty miles from Paris. He kept up the establishment and state of a prince, dining alone with the duchess, whilst his household occupied a second table in the adjoining room. He allowed but two *fauteuils*, or arm-chairs: these were reserved for himself and the duchess. He had his band of gentlemen, his officers, and his Swiss guard, and never appeared without them. He retained, in retirement, all the habits of his active life — early rising, reading, writing. His memoirs principally occupied him. Being, by his religion, excluded from any of the royal orders, Sully had made one for himself: he wore around his neck, attached to a gold chain, a medal of Henry IV., which it was his custom frequently to kiss. He visited Sully, Rosny, and his other estates, every year; but never went to the court, unless when specially summoned. On one of these occasions, his antique costume and grave demeanour excited the laughter of some of the young courtiers. "Sire," instantly remarked Sully to Louis XIII., "when the king your father, of glorious memory, did me the honour to consult me on public affairs, he commenced by turning out the buffoons."

Domestic disappointments came to trouble the declining days of Sully: his eldest son was an irretrievable

spendthrift: this alone was sufficient to embitter the reflections of the prudent and economic parent. He endeavoured to remedy it by giving him, but conditionally, a portion of his estates, Sully included; but this very prudence occasioned lawsuits on the part of his son's creditors. The marquis of Rosny dying, a suit was commenced by his son, at the instigation of his mother's relations, against his grandfather Sully; and the circumstance of the judgment going against the latter was supposed to be the immediate cause of his death: he expired some days after being told of it, at Villebon, in the eighty-first year of his age.

A question that may be put and discussed is, which profession or condition in life has produced the most honourable and sagacious statesmen? In general, it may be observed, that, of old, the church produced astute statesmen; official life, mean ones; rank and courtiership, frivolous and intriguing ministers. The lawyer too oft sunk, in the monarch's cabinet, into an obsequious tool: the life even of the great de l'Hôpital, in some measure, is a proof of this. The military class have a powerful example to adduce in Sully; for the soldier was the most prominent part of his character; and it was, moreover, his belief that none but *gens d'épée* (men of the sword) had sufficient probity to be intrusted with the knowledge and management of state affairs.

In this Sully had the best means of judging; and it is probable that he was not far from the truth. The Machiavelian school, imported from Italy by Catherine of Medicis, had banished good faith and honesty, as something beneath the sagacity of a statesman. Such an upright minister as Amboise was not now to be found amongst churchmen, nor such men as the Du Bellays of the reign of Francis; and, although Sully was probably too severe upon Villeroi, Sillery, and his civilian colleagues, as it is proved that he has been towards cardinal d'Ossat; yet these were not very exalted personages; and they showed themselves what

they were, when, under the regency of Mary of Medicis, they trafficked in the honour, the wealth, and the interests of the state.

Amidst the general worthlessness of mere official servants, the most worthless and vile were the financiers: they were generally plebeians; and for this reason, as well as on account of their money dealings, there was a stigma on them similar to that which religious prejudice casts upon the Jews, and which goes so far to realise itself, in making tricksters of those who are believed such. So damning and universal was this opinion of the financiers, that a king had but to condemn one of them, upon any pretext, in order to be applauded.* When Henry IV. succeeded to the throne, d'O, a peculating Italian, was the superintendent of finance; and the monarch in vain endeavoured to ensure honesty by a council, in which he hoped one member might prove a check upon the rapacity of the other. The effect turned out the very contrary; and the only remedy (a hazardous one) was thrusting the soldier Sully into the financier's place. There was a clamour that he was ignorant, and had no knowledge of the duties and mysteries of his office: it was true, perhaps; but honesty, severity, and economy sufficed. He may have been no profound political economist; but the good sense of his master corrected the errors of his theory; whilst his severe inflexibility served as a wholesome check upon the prodigal tastes and easy nature of Henry.

Yet Sully, though rigid, was not a repulsive character: he was stern but in the cause of honesty, of morals, of of his own honour and religious independence. But he was no bigot; he was on friendly terms with all the catholics, with the pope, with the Guises. On his foreign embassy he was flexible and insinuating; whilst in his interior he gave up his evenings to gaiety, and shut the door against business after supper.

When Henry wished to give a fête or represent a play, the large hall that Sully had prepared at the

* Semblançay forms an exception.

arsenal was, in general, the place chosen; and the stern minister himself has danced in a ballet.

There are traits, however, in Sully's character, which might be criticised. His tone of vaunt is sometimes offensive. Much of this may have been, no doubt, owing to his memoirs being drawn up by his secretaries, not himself; and as Sully did not revise the whole, or as, in reading them over to him, they might think proper to slur over such passages, he may not be answerable for all the self panegyric which the volumes contain. Much of it, however, still remains, bearing Sully's stamp, and his high self-esteem.

Sully's love affairs displease also. They are not such as become a *preux chevalier*. He admires one lady, and prefers another better born and endowed, playing rather a scurvy trick when he meets both his flames at the same inn. The keen views, too, which he ever kept towards his personal interest, accords ill with the inflexible pride of the gentleman. He began life comparatively poor, but recruited his finances, as he tells us, by buying horses in Guyenne, and selling them in Paris. What was this but commerce, the pursuit that in his eyes irrevocably degraded a man? When an old man, pursued by his soldiers at some siege, flung himself for safety into the arms of Sully, the latter spared and protected his life, but took his purse of some thousand crowns. This is little reconcilable with modern ideas of soldierlike generosity and honour.* Henry IV., in his early career, had no more exigent claimant; and even to the last, Sully was never backward in accepting pensions and gratuities: and yet this almost avarice, so reprehensible when considered singly, enhances the merit of the man, when we know that its strong impulse never went beyond the bounds of honour and justice; and that, greedy as he was of honours and wealth, he inexorably refused to sacrifice to them an atom of his dignity, his opinion, or his religion.

* Sully esteems his gains in plunder and ransom at 100,000 livres.

DUKE OF LERMA.

1578—1625.

"The more a monarchy approaches celestial (or religious) government," says Aristotle, "the more detestable is its corruption." The Grecian philosopher, in this work a politician, had before him, in Egypt, a striking specimen of a government conducted upon sacerdotal principles, and this he saw to be the worst of all tyrannies, because most calculated to check the progress of civilisation. A European sage might have applied the same remark and the same reasoning to Spain, whose successive monarchs, of exemplary piety, unfortunately adopted this piety as a state maxim, and, by rendering their government "celestial," deemed that they had found an excuse for dispensing with humanity. In Charles V., Philip II., and Philip III., the consideration of religion as a state maxim, and of its ends as the true ends of government, is evident. In the policy of the first, however, this was much modified by cunning and worldly interests. In Philip II. the admixture was in less proportion, whilst it came to compose all the policy of Philip III. Spain was perishing, like a sick man stricken by a mortal though slow disease, and her treatment seemed founded upon this comparison; for her state doctors, despairing of cure, turned all their attention to surrounding the deathbed of the patient with confessors and holy men, in order that she might expire in the odour of sanctity. Such is the view to be taken of the administration of Lerma, and it is only as an amplification of this that the life of one so inept can be worthy of perusal. There are, moreover, but very scanty materials for its composition; the writers of

Spanish memoirs, whether contemporary or subsequent to that time, shrinking in shame from the task of chronicling their country's disgrace, and leaving the reign of Philip III., what it really was, a blank in history.

There was not a house more noble in the Peninsula than that of Sandoval. "It was of the ancients of Spain," says Maestro Gil Gonsalez d'Avila, "so that its origin and descent could scarcely be descried. Its chiefs were amongst the first who seized lance and shield against the Moor; and so rich were they in force and valour, that a considerable volume might be filled with their prudence and exploits." Don Diego de Sandoval had been the faithful servant of the infante don Fernando. The estate of Lerma, within a few leagues of Burgos, was given to him by that prince in 1412, for his military services against the English and French; and when the infante succeeded to the throne, don Diego was created adelantado, or admiral, in addition to his hereditary dignity of grand chancellor of Castile. Don Diego the grandson and namesake of the adelantado, succeeded to the title in 1474. He served Ferdinand and Isabella in the wars against Portugal and in Granada, and in recompense was created marquis of Denia and count of Lerma in 1484. The son and grandson of the marquis were successfully attached to the unfortunate queen Juana, and were amongst the few nobles that adhered to Ferdinand on his difference with his son-in-law, Philip of Austria. Their descendant, don Francisco de Sandoval and Roxas, fifth marquis of Denia, was bred up with don Carlos, the unhappy son of Philip II. "*el qual,*" says the genealogist of the Sandovals, "*murio en sus braços y custodia.*" The reader is left to judge whether the circumstance of the prince "dying in his arms and custody" be for the honour of the marquis of Denia or the contrary.

The son and successor of this marquis of Denia, also called don Francisco Gomez de Sandoval, was early placed "in the chamber" of the infante, the future Philip III., as his father had been in that of don Carlos, but

with better fruit, at least with consequences more beneficial to himself; since such a friendship sprang up betwixt them, that the attendant absorbed all the favour of the prince, as well as subsequently the influence of the monarch. The infante was born in 1578, and his companion was of about the same age. A being more unfit to govern a great empire with absolute power could not be found than the future Philip III. Never was a more imbecile and helpless specimen of the *porphyrogénite*. Wanting the vigour and passions of his father, he wanted too his jealous and suspicious character, and was capable at least of attachment; a humble virtue, very foreign to the heart of Philip II. The latter showed every anxiety and care of his son, giving him a worthy preceptor, who was well contented with his progress in learning. He complained, however, that young Philip was distant and dry of demeanour, silent and timid, neither questioning nor speaking, nor indulging in laughter. The sense of his regal rank was a weight that paralysed his faculties. To develope these, Philip II. formed a junta, or council, which should discuss state-affairs in his presence, in order that he might acquire some degree of knowledge; and, that he might see the world, he conducted him on a tour, to visit certain saints, and bear a part in the ceremony of translating their remains. In 1598, Philip II. expired, recommending to his son the impracticable advice to "reign alone." As a commentary upon this, he left a written paper of counsel, full of good religious precepts, which in the mind of the writer included political wisdom. "When you are about to determine any thing of importance, consult your confessor," saith the testament. The aim of Philip was to perpetuate his own maxims, and to render his son the same bigot and diademed monk as he himself had been.

Philip II. left the government, in as tranquil a state as possible, in the hands of his son. He had concluded peace with Henry IV. and with the United Provinces by giving up Flanders to the archduke Albert. But he

left the state sadly impoverished; and, as a last resource to raise funds, he had sent ecclesiastics from house to house, to gather alms for the government; a measure that he looked on as pious, however his subjects considered it as disgraceful. "In the year 1595, 35,000,000 of gold and silver were discharged at the harbour of San Lucar. In 1596, there was not a real in Castile." Such were the inexplicable consequences, to Spain, of the possession of the Indies.

The late king had bequeathed to his son two intelligent ministers. One, especially, de Morna, marquis of Castel Rodrigo, he had already placed about the prince's person, and set over his household, at the same time that the king kept his services as royal counsellor. This precaution was to guard against the factions that had arisen in the chamber of the infante don Carlos, from there having been no proper control over his household. But this jealous kind of superintendence naturally rendered the prince and his comrades averse to the marquis of Castel Rodrigo; and the first act of the new reign was to order him to honourable exile from court, as viceroy of Lisbon. The other was Idraguez, a more flexible politician, of whom the youths, now advanced to influence, did not stand in so much dread. The marquis of Denia, the favourite, preserved him in power to make use of his judgment, knowing that he would readily conform to the views of those above him, and that the king would be much more tranquil, in many respects, if assured of the support of Idraguez.*

The marquis of Denia, created duke of Lerma, and declared sole and prime minister, was himself, in disposition and talents, a perfect resemblance of the king. Congeniality of mind is the foundation of friendship amongst inferior spirits, contrast amongst higher. There was this difference, however, betwixt duke and king, that the former, accustomed to serve, and to court favour,

* D'Avila.

was more affable and courteous than the monarch. He was prodigal, and loved show; too poor-spirited to have passions, and, consequently, without flagrant vices, except that greatest one in a minister, incapacity. In politics he had but one maxim, devotion to Rome and to catholic orthodoxy. Philip II. had at least stricken that dogma firm and deep into the minds of his son and his loving companions.

The first occupation of the new court was the fêtes for the king's marriage with Margaret of Austria. The court went to meet her at Valencia, and nothing could equal the magnificence of Lerma upon this occasion. "He spent 300,000 ducats," says d'Avila, "in fêtes, galas, and presents at these nuptials." Amongst the masks which gave life to the scene was the famous Lope de Vega.* The archduke Albert, to whom Flanders had been granted by the late king, was present at these festivities, and set sail, as soon as they were terminated, for his dominions. For Lerma, his principal enemies were those of catholicism. The receipt of a papal bull, and the orders issued in obedience to it, first occupied the attention of the minister; and he then turned his mind towards striking a blow against the infidels. A fleet was equipped against the pirates of Africa, and a still more considerable one, consisting of fifty galleons, against "Isabel, or Jezabel, queen of England." Don Martin de Padilla was appointed commander of the expedition, with very minute instructions, not as to how he should conquer, but how he was to dispose of his conquests. He was to build a number of monasteries in England, and to take half the goods of the church; to restore what Henry VIII. had undone. A tempest off the coast of Galicia dispersed the fleet of don Martin de Padilla, and rendered at once the high aims and profound instructions of Lerma useless. In recompense for this disappointment, the chronicle of

* "Ludicra exhibita. In queis Lupus Vega, apis ille musarum, non insulsi morionis personam induit."—*Miniana, Continuation of Mariana.*

Philip III. carefully notes the other triumphs of the year; viz. the capture of one English merchantman and two Turkish vessels off the coast of Portugal, as also the re-conversion to orthodoxy of a native East Indian who had received Christianity from some Nestorian ecclesiastics.

Since the accession of Philip, his ancient preceptor, Loaisa, archbishop of Toledo, had been considered in disgrace: Lerma dreaded his influence and sense, and kept him in consequence at a distance. The chronicler says that he died on this account of "melancholy and sadness," the duke of Lerma giving the primacy of Spain to his own uncle, Bernardo. Although as bigoted in religion as Philip II., and more pusillanimous and absurd in policy, the present monarch and his minister are not chargeable with the ruthless and sanguinary spirit of the preceding reign. The enmity of Philip II. to Antonio Perez is well known. Some said that this secretary rivalled the monarch in the good graces of the countess of Eboli; others, that, having caused Escovedo, the friend of don John, to be murdered, he exculpated himself by betraying his master's orders to that effect. Perez had fled to Saragossa; when the inquisition endeavoured to take him, the inhabitants rose against its officers, and invoked the old liberties of their country; the justiza himself protested against the transferring of Perez from his rightful tribunal. Philip, however, overcame this insurrection by an armed force, and the heads of those who had been foremost in it were still affixed over the gates of Saragossa. Philip III. paid a visit to that town, and ordered, previously, those heads to be taken down, repairing immediately after his entrance to the cathedral, and there swearing to observe the privileges and holy laws of that kingdom. This was the occasion of more festivities, the principal motive of the visit in all probability; "the city, the inquisition, the university, the councils, each kissed the royal hand." The court assisted at the conferring of the degree of doctor on some learned individual, who supported a marvel-

lously subtle and ingenious dispute, "as to whether the emperor was lord of the whole world, or not!"

Some financial arrangements were, however, necessary to the monarch in his pursuit of piety and pleasure. Whether to pay for his fêtes or found his convents, the duke of Lerma was obliged to have recourse to some new measure for raising money. The yearly wasting away of the resources of Spain was inexplicable to the rulers of that country. Are we not pious? asked they. Are we not valiant? Are not the Indies ours? But for stubborn facts, they would still have believed the kingdom to be increasing in prosperity. And, in truth, to comprehend the position of the country, and the causes of its distress, required, considering the political knowledge of the epoch, a financier and a statesman such as Europe had not yet produced. Sully himself, with all his economy, could not have mastered the difficulties, with their complicated causes, that perplexed Spain; and Lerma cannot be considered very culpable for still greater ignorance.

Towards the close of the fifteenth century, when the other kingdoms of Europe began to make rapid strides in commercial industry and prosperity, Spain was distracted from this humble but certain source of wealth by her discovery of America. Henceforth her youth were enticed over the Atlantic, in search of wealth and fame: capital, study, talent, the views of legislators and individuals, took the same direction: agriculture was abandoned. The same effect had been, in part, produced by the political state of Spain, where freedom flourished in towns, feudality and servitude in the country; all the population that could possibly seek refuge in the former taking care to do so. This would have produced and forced manufactures, and repeopled the country with freemen, as was the effect in Italy and France, had not the conquest of America intervened. The union of Flanders and Spain under the same dominion was attended also with pernicious consequences to the latter country: the wool of Spain went to the Low Countries

in its raw state, and returned manufactured. England obviated this in her own case: Charles V., who was himself a Fleming, would not do so. It might have produced advantage in another way, in the forced productions of some commodity of the south, to pay the difference; oil or wine, for instance: but the gold of Mexico and Peru came unfortunately to pay the balance; and manufactures, no longer necessary, were neglected, as agriculture had been.

The suspension of the national agriculture and the manufactures rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to supply even India with commodities: they had recourse to strangers, who soon dispensed with the medium of Spanish merchants, and carried on the trade themselves. Edicts prohibited this, and ordered that Spanish ships and Spanish men only should trade with the Indies. The edicts were eluded; and the Spaniards became not even what they were reported to be, "the carriers of gold for other nations." The cortes of Valladolid thus addressed Charles V. in 1542: —

"An immense number of strangers have entered the kingdom, who, not content with the commerce which they do with your majesty in exchanges, &c., have taken upon themselves almost all the commercial business of the country. Although there is scarcely a corporation, bishopric, dignity, or seignorial property that they have not in farm or pledge, they have set about buying, within these few years, all the wool, the silk, the iron, steel, and other commodities in the realm, such as ought to remain for your subjects to trade with and live by."

They, in consequence, asked Charles to forbid foreigners to traffic in Spain; a proposition which he refused to hearken to. They then petitioned that all the common lands should be sown with flax, and the manufacture of linen forced throughout the country, in order to have wherewithal to exchange with the Flemings. But all these attempts failed. The commerce with the Indies demanded large capitals; the Jews and foreigners had, and monopolised, these capitals; they bought com-

modities for a long time before they actually wanted them, and could wait as long for the payment, in all cases tardy. There were no Spanish merchants who had wealth, or commercial knowledge, capable of entering into such competitions. Thus the three sources of wealth — agriculture, manufactures, commerce, — were lost to Spain, and poorly recompensed by the millions of specie which the crown received, for individuals to amass.

These millions themselves, wasted, as they came in, by Charles and his son Philip, gradually decreased, as a revenue, both in quantity and value. The monarch was obliged to recur to his native kingdom for resources; but these were nowhere to be found: there was nothing on which to lay taxes. The church was inviolable and untaxable. Philip III. would have considered it a crime to take a maravedi from the ecclesiastics; on the contrary, the chief want that he had of money was to bestow it on them. The nobles robbed of the rich commanderies, were themselves paralysed by the extinction of agriculture, and driven to be tax-devourers in lieu of tax-payers. The revenues that remained were the alcavala, or excise; being a tenth upon all sales, the customs, the salt mines. According to Salazar, these revenues of Philip III. did not amount to 14,000,000 ducats, out of which was to be paid the interest of a debt of 100,000,000.

These were but scanty funds for the duke of Lerma's magnificence. The minister marvelled much at the poverty of the kingdom and the revenue: he bethought him of the possible cause, and decided that it was the quantity of the precious metals melted into plate, and in plating, that occasioned the scarcity of money. On this was founded his first financial measure, viz., ordering a registry of plate throughout the kingdom, with a prohibition of making or selling any more for the future. Sumptuary laws were the favourite panaceas of that epoch. Sully, it has been seen, recommended them, and would have banished the manufactures of silk, tapestry,

and glass from France, had Henry IV. permitted him. In the prodigal Lerma, such measures were less consistent. The clergy principally exclaimed against them. Restrict the luxury of laics as you will, argued they, but religion demands wealth and splendour in order to be respected: to forbid the manufacture of golden chalices and silver candlesticks is heresy. Moreover, they feared that a tax or subsidy might follow this registry of riches, of which three fourths must have been ecclesiastical.

Their displeasure prevented Lerma from following up this part of his plan, if he had originally meditated it. In 1603, however, the distress of the government became so great, that it sent round to beg contributions of the clergy, and of the nobility their plate, the distinction marking the respective riches of the classes. The council of state proposed to raise copper money to double value; calling it in, stamping it as current at that rate, and rendering all unstamped coins illegal; "*parecio cosa del cielo,*" the project seemed as if it had come from heaven, so simple was it and productive. It was adopted; and the consequence to the people immediately, and subsequently to the government, were as fatal as may be well supposed.

The Spanish government was then like a patient on a bed of languor and pain, "turning its side," in hopes of finding momentary relief, yet finding none. In 1601 the court removed from Madrid to Valladolid, with the view of procuring more plentiful supplies for itself, and for the purpose of remedying the distress of which the latter city complained. A peculiarity of Spain, arising from its many monarchies, was, that it had no central capital. Madrid, which Ximenes fixed on, had not been for a long time the residence of Charles V.'s court; and, even in Philip II.'s time, its buildings had scarcely assumed the developement and grandeur of a metropolis. At the same time the older capitals, such as those of Castile, were jealous; and it was to gratify this feeling that Lerma now moved the court to Valladolid. On this

occasion he met with considerable opposition from his uncle, the archbishop of Toledo.*

This history of Spain and of Lerma's administration, in 1603, is thus faithfully given by the court chronicler, D'Avila: — "In this period, few notable events occurred throughout the Spanish kingdoms; and yet, by sea and land, they had good successes, such as excite admiration: of these, the greatest was the death of Elizabeth, queen of England."

Well, indeed, might the Spanish historian esteem the death of that princess equivalent to a good success. Her enmity, however inactively exerted, — for it is surprising how a queen of spirit like Elizabeth contented herself with repelling the expeditions of Spain, one of them taking place against Ireland in 1601, without any vigorous attempt at retaliation, — held Spain in awe; and the ambassadors of Philip III. were amongst the first to greet the new English sovereign, and to demand peace. The cession of Flanders to the archduke Albert and his Spanish spouse had not, as was hoped, put an end to the struggle in the Low Countries, nor released Spain from a continuation of those efforts and expenses which had already exhausted her resources. Mendoza, the Spanish commander in the Netherlands, foiled in his chief plans by his antagonist, prince Maurice, had formed the siege of Ostend; and this enterprise was still pending, when James I. succeeded queen Elizabeth.

Spain, however, fallen in power and shorn of her strength, was, still, even under Philip III., the monarchy which inspired most respect in Europe, and

* On the subject of the fittest place for the capital of the Peninsula, Sempere has the following pertinent remarks: —

"Would to God that Philip II had transferred and fixed for ever his court at Lisbon! Already master of the entire Peninsula, of the Americas, and of ample dominions in Italy and Flanders, how much more advantageous would it have been to have fixed the ordinary residence of his court in a populous city, rich, and situated at the junction of the greatest Spanish river with the sea, than in a little town, like Madrid, placed amidst woods and a barren territory, without a navigable river, or any of the requisite facilities for transporting the commodities and provisions requisite for a great population!"

to which all admirers of kingly right and royal grandeur turned, as towards their idol. Thus Mary of Medicis, though wearing the crown of France, still looked towards the Spanish court and Spanish alliance with the admiring worship of an inferior. She deemed it a kind of treason in her husband to compass its downfall. James I., and, more especially, his queen,— for ladies are above all apt to worship past grandeur,— had the same undefinable feelings of respect, which the grandeur of Charles V. must have chiefly inspired. It seemed as if that universal empire which he had failed to establish over the mind and community of Europe, was successfully imposed by him on the creeds of monarchs and grandees. James despised the Dutch as rebels, and was ready to worship the weak and imbecile Philip III. as his superior. Not all the honest and eloquent exhortations of Sully could outweigh this deep-rooted respect for Spain and its monarchy in the breast of the British monarch. This it was that gave some force to that shadow of a kingdom over which Lerma presided: he could not be said to govern. Peace was accordingly concluded with England; a considerable step towards a similar agreement with the United Provinces, which however, did not take place until five years later.

A new general, Spinola, gave fresh vigour to the Spanish arms. Ostend surrendered to the troops of Philip III.: this gave courage to continue the war. Whilst it was carried on in Flanders, Spain herself remained in a state of silent exhaustion: no events mark her annals, except some skirmishes in Africa, the birth of a prince, of a princess, and the coming of an English ambassador, who was imprudent enough to bring two bibles in the Spanish tongue with him. The ambassador himself was well-nigh denied admission to the kingdom for harbouring such profane volumes, but appeased the scruples of catholic orthodoxy by flinging them into the sea. A chapter of the Franciscan order of friars, held at Toledo, is the chief event of 1605.

In the following year, Lerma found the opportunity of proving his political and personal attachment to Rome. The republic of Venice had infringed upon the ecclesiastical immunities; that government, it was argued, but justly supporting its independence and authority over its subjects. Paul V. threatened them with war if they did not desist; and Philip III. wrote to offer the aid of an army, and his royal presence if necessary. But the days of pope Julius had gone by; and Lerma reaped the advantage of displaying his zeal, for the present, gratuitously.

At the very same time, however, the necessity began to be seriously felt at the Spanish court of putting an end to the war with the Dutch. The archduke, at Brussels, acknowledged the expediency of this, and secret negotiations were in consequence commenced. Lerma seemed to wish to get rid of it, like an unpleasant subject, and to yield, in return for that tranquillity which he loved, all except the dignity of the Spanish crown, which it might prove dangerous for him to compromise. The treaty, therefore, was soon signed by Spain, granting independence, — the reality, — but slurring over the word, and otherwise avoiding the usual formalities. The Dutch, however, were punctilious, and might well be so; for their fleet had just destroyed that of the Spaniards in the bay of Gibraltar. Attempts were made by Spanish agents to bribe the republican plenipotentiaries. This proved vain; and, but for the forbearance of Barneveldt, peace might have been altogether broken off. At last, however, Lerma resolved to yield all points of etiquette, but, consistently with his pious maxims, held out in demanding certain terms of indulgence for the catholic subjects of the states. Indeed, he had a difficult part to act; for Philip III. himself would not hear of any thing but the re-establishment of catholicism in Holland. The archduke, more alive to the danger of the war's continuance, sent in vain an ecclesiastic to remove the scruples of the monarch. Lerma himself, in order to overcome them,

was obliged to recommend the plan of a long truce in lieu of peace; and even then it required all Lerma's entreaties, as well as those of the ecclesiastic in his interest, to bring the king to consent.

For this truce of seventeen years, which procured independence to the United Provinces and repose to the Netherlands, and which was signed in 1609, Europe is chiefly indebted to the duke of Lerma, "to whose pacific disposition the name of peace was congenial," says the Spanish commentator of Comines. The author continues his eulogium by adding, that "Lerma's government must universally be lauded, as one without wars, tributes, or odious imposts." Certainly he was not the scourge that he might have been, had the ambition of Alberoni possessed him, or had he been skilled in the financial art of extracting revenue from an impoverished people. But, with more ambition, he would have had, probably, more talent. The quiet inanity which may be esteemed, in default of other qualities, a virtue in a monarch, can scarcely be cited to the credit of a minister.

One act of Lerma's administration and Philip's reign, nevertheless, shows how bigotry can give vigour to the weakest characters. The Moriscoes, or descendants of the Moors, inhabited the maritime provinces of Spain in great numbers, forming the most industrious part of the population. Their want of orthodoxy was a crime unpardonable in the eyes of the prelates; yet they had been baptised in a mass, and laxly followed the Christian profession. They dreaded, however, the scrutiny and severity of the inquisition, and, by means of large gratuities, and the support of the noble landholders whose estates they cultivated and enriched, the Moriscoes had survived the fitful fanaticism of Charles V. and the unswerving bigotry of his son Philip II. In 1604, the new Christians (as the Moriscoes were called) of Portugal obtained a renewal of their exemption; but, as four galleons, with 6,000,000 dollars of specie, were lost about the same time, and attributed to the impiety

of this toleration, its renewal was likely henceforth to be considered inexpedient. In the six years which followed, the clergy exerted themselves so zealously at court, that both the king and Lerma were brought to consent to their expulsion. A very clear and satisfactory account of this is given, from Spanish history, by the continuator of Watson. A million, and half a million, are the greater and lesser computations of the number expelled by this nefarious edict, which gave the last blow to Spanish industry and wealth. The duke of Lerma's brother, the archbishop of Toledo, with Ribeira, another archbishop, were its chief promoters. Philip and his minister, though consenting to what they considered the pious act of expulsion, endeavoured to soften its severity by ordering that the Moriscoes should be safely transported to the coast of Africa. But the expatriation of the exiles proved to be murder, as not one fiftieth part of the number survived. The grandees of Spain acted a generous part, on this occasion, in befriending their wretched tenants, but not a brave one. Had they resisted the imbecile Philip, they might have recovered the independence of their class and the happiness of Spain. But the church, with its inquisition, was too appalling an enemy. The Spanish annotator on Comines who saw the desolation and ruin occasioned by the expulsion of the Moriscoes, remarks of the act, that "its piety could not be greater, or its policy worse." It is said that the Moriscoes offered to Henry IV. to reclaim the barren tracts south of Bordeaux, if they were allowed to settle in that quarter; but he was too open to the accusation of irreligion to grant their request.

The great designs of this monarch might have well filled a Spanish minister with disquiet, and excited him to activity. But Lerma seemed to slumber in expectation of the great blow that was to be struck from the north, when the knife of Ravaillac arrested it by another. The Spanish court, no doubt, considered this as a signal favour of providence: whether its agents

promoted the act must remain a mystery, although it be known that the habit of the Spanish envoys at all courts was to excite and meddle in conspiracies against foreign sovereigns. They held such conduct previously in France, in England, and in Venice. This republic was the great enemy of the Spanish power in Italy, where its viceroys and governors still pursued that phantom of Cæsarean supremacy, which the descendants of Charles V. might have abandoned. What chiefly annoyed Lerma in this respect was the defection of the duke of Savoy, the guardian of the Alps, to the side of Henry IV. The policy handed down by cardinal Granvelle was, ever to consider the friendship of this prince as necessary to the security of Italy: the loss of it was a serious mortification; it turned, however, to the duke of Savoy's own confusion, when the assassination of Henry and the new policy of Mary of Medicis exposed him unprotected to all the vengeance of Spain. He sent his son to Madrid to make submissions, which were haughtily received. Lerma is reported to have said, on this occasion, that "he would treat the sovereigns of Italy on an equality only with the grandees of Spain." When the duke afterwards took his revenge, and, by the invasion of Montserrat, defied Spain, whose utter weakness he alone of all potentates seemed fully to perceive, Lerma was obliged to submit, but refused to sign the treaty that was concluded under the mediation of France. The old *prestige* and glory of the Spanish monarchy still guarded it, after its strength had departed. It was this that dazzled Mary of Medicis, and won her attachment; through which the joint marriages were effected which united the two crowns, and shed a parting ray of lustre and success on the administration of Lerma.

It was in vain, however, that the duke attempted to arrest the commercial decay of the kingdom, or to heal the wound given to agriculture and industry by the expulsion of the Moriscoes. In vain did he offer, by an edict, the rank of gentleman or esquire to such

person as should distinguish himself in agriculture. The desolate condition of the land, and the general distress, remained without a remedy. Cabals began to be formed against him at court, and their insinuations to make an impression on the mind of the king. The favourite himself was, of course, an object of envy: he was of noble birth, affable manners, and generous disposition. But, whatever the indulgence to the duke himself, it could by no means be extended to his favourites; for he felt it necessary to delegate his authority.

This minister of the minister was don Rodrigo Calderon, the son of a Spanish soldier by a woman of Antwerp, at which town he was born. He was flung over its walls when the Spaniards were driven out of it. He then returned home, and became page or follower in the household of the duke of Lerma, who at that time was viceroy of Aragon. He soon insinuated himself into the good graces of his master, and is said to have well merited by his talents the influence which he acquired. On Lerma's elevation he became secretary of state, and married, through the minister's patronage, Agnes de Vargas, lady of Oliva. He was successively created marquis of Siete Iglesias, count of Oliva, and knight of the order of Santiago, and intrusted with a variety of lucrative offices and commands. Not content with these, he aspired to be grandee and viceroy. But accusations are to be credited with caution against one so unfortunate, and to whom his enemies allow all the talents and virtues consistent with their accusations against him.

For some time the duke of Lerma had introduced his son, the duke of Uzeda, to the notice of his master. Philip was that weak prince who leaned upon the nearest person as his friend. But Lerma, who sought to provide himself a support, found a rival, in his son. To counteract this, he, moreover, introduced his nephew the conde de Lemos at court, a youth of far more capacity than Uzeda. The latter was piqued, and resolved

to oust and supersede his father as well as Lemos; and for this purpose he allied himself with Aliaga, the king's confessor.

This friar, according to the marquis Malvezzi, witness and historian of these intrigues, was an ambitious ecclesiastic. "He had been but dust under the feet of Lerma, and as dust stirred by the feet, often settles on the head of him who raises it, so did Aliaga settle on the duke's head." Such is the quaint metaphor of Malvezzi. Aliaga, deeming Uzeda to be a more docile instrument than Lemos, declared for the former, and employed his influence, as confessor, to undermine and destroy the favour of Lerma. He was successful. The favourite perceived his decline, and resolved to provide for himself a sure refuge and protection in adversity. He had, even before his elevation, according to D'Avila, meditated becoming a Franciscan; a profession that was not unsuited to his disposition. Laying claim to this far-dated wish, which he averred that his sovereign's will and the state's good had alone prevented, he sought of the pope the highest dignity of the church. Paul V. accordingly sent the hat of cardinal to Lerma, who, indeed, deserved it at the pontiff's hands.

This act of precaution and mistrust, for such it manifestly appeared, was not likely to restore Lerma to Philip's favour; and another manœuvre, dictated by the same feelings, put an end altogether to his hold of the monarch's affections. This was, an endeavour, on his part, to ingratiate himself with the heir to the crown, the future Philip IV. His nephew, Lemos, then in the prince's household, lent himself to this; but intrigues were going on for the prince's friendship, similar to those carried on to secure the king's; and Olivarez, the rival of Lemos, unable to cope with him in the prince's favour, represented these intrigues to the king, who immediately interfered. With his usual lenity, Philip thought proper merely to remove the intimate friend of Lemos from court. Even this exile was the honourable appointment to the viceroyalty of Aragon.

Lemos, however, a hot and generous man, expostulated too warmly, demanding himself to share the disgrace of his friend; and, by thus imprudently driving the weak character of Philip to the extreme of either yielding, or venting fully his dislike, he precipitated the fall of the duke of Lerma.

The disgrace of the minister was resolved on. Lerma still thought to suspend the blow by craving a reprieve, as a prolongation of his authority might be called. He was mean enough to ask this of his arch-foe, Aliaga: it was refused; and he received a final order, under the king's hand, to retire from court. "He obeyed on the 4th of October, 1618, which happened to be the fête of his patron, St. Francis, as well as that on which took place, in 1611, the death of queen Margaret, whom he is accused of having poisoned." This crime was, however, but an invention of his enemies, urged, too, more for the destruction of his follower, Calderon, than his own. Philip III showed himself still indulgent to his former minister. He seemed to relent as Lerma departed. The monarch went that day to the chace to dispel the gloom of parting with his old servant, and, having killed a stag, sent it on to the village where Lerma slept on the first night of his journey, with a letter of tender adieu.

Lerma survived his disgrace seven years. Philip III. died in 1621. Until that time the still enduring friendship of his master, as well as the influence of his son Uzeda, who had succeeded to the post of minister, preserved him from persecution in his retreat. But when Olivarez became minister under Philip IV., accusations were renewed against Lerma: he was deprived of his pensions, and compelled to disgorge large sums, the price of what he had drawn from the unjust monopoly of corn imported from Sicily. The dignity of cardinal preserved him from imprisonment or death. But this extreme vengeance fell upon his favourite, Calderon, who was tried, condemned, and executed; the chief crime with which he was charged, falsely to all appear-

ance, being the murder of the late queen Margaret by poison. The fate of his patron was scarcely less miserable; all his property being sold, and himself left destitute, on the plea of forcing him to restore the 1,400,000 crowns said to have been derived from his monopoly. He expired in 1625.

The duke of Lerma, as a statesman, scarcely merits a distinct portrait, although favourable traits may not be wanting in the man. Spanish writers have made some singular remarks respecting him. The Spanish annotator on Comines says that "he exemplified and proved the saying of Thucydides, that mediocre genius was the most fitted to administration; and Amelot de la Houssaye adds, that "the government of the duke of Lerma was much better and more fortunate than that of the able Olivarez:" a sad maxim, could it be proved. Lerma seemed to be without a state maxim of any kind, except those of piety and submission to Rome. Cardinal d'Ossat accuses him of reversing the policy of Philip II., in not continuing, like that monarch, to hold the grandees in subjection, and "in admitting several grandees to his council." Although lauded for his generosity, Lerma contrived to increase, during his administration, his family income from 30,000 ducats annually to eight times that sum *; and this, joined with his having endowed seven convents, besides chapelries and other religious establishments. In the midst of all this waste and munificence, Cervantes was allowed to die almost, if not altogether, of want!

* Yanez.

DUKE OF OSSUNO.

1579—1624.

SPAIN seems of all countries the least subject to change of character. Royalty, nobility, religion, are precisely what they were centuries ago; as proud, as blind, as imbecile, yet as respected and revered by the popular mind. This aversion to change, this holding to tradition, seems the only bequest which their Arab conquerors left them, the chief relic of the Oriental spirit. What is peculiarly curious is, that this remark is suggested not merely by the public history of Spain, but by the private history of Spaniards. The sameness and hereditary tradition of character holds true not only of their government and royal race, but of the principal families of the nobles. Each grandee had his peculiarity, his family character it might be called; and we see this handed down from father to son, with so few exceptions as to contradict our received notions of the inevitable variety of moral physiognomy, and to prove how much we are the creatures of education, if it be strictly conducted and long protracted. Thus, in going through the genealogy of the Sandovals, the ancestors of the duke of Lerma, we find one after another to be mild obsequious courtiers, of loyalty unswerving, born chamberlains in fine, inestimable servants to a monarch in the capacity of noble valets, qualities which Philip III. unfortunately imagined might suffice in a prime minister. The same remark holds true of the Girons, whose race bore the title of Ossuno. From first to last, we find them restless, ambitious, engaged always in litigation or war; rebelling where there was occasion, intriguing where there was not, and raising disquiet at last by epigrams and satire at the advanced period when more

active weapons were denied. With this character came, what, indeed, was requisite to support it, talent and great capabilities, ever impatient of that leaden despotism which benumbed and rendered idle such faculties. In England the duke of Ossuno must have at least played the part of the duke of Buckingham; in Spain, he was reduced almost to that of a jester.

The line of the Guises may be traced back to him who first assumed the title, and who was previously a Cisneros, of the same name at least, if not of the race, which subsequently produced the minister, Ximenes. The family of Cisneros was even then illustrious. Don Rodrigo was a valiant knight and noble of the court and camp of king Alfonso VI.*, and took a principal part in the conquest of Toledo. That monarch was not so fortunate towards the close of his reign, being beaten in several battles by the Almoravides. On one of these occasions, when the king was unhorsed, and nearly made prisoner, he was rescued by the obstinate valour of don Rodrigo Cisneros, who was himself made captive. In the confusion of fight, at a time when it was difficult to distinguish betwixt warriors all armed cap-à-pie, don Rodrigo feared that another might bear away the honour of this deed, more especially as he himself must probably remain a captive to the Moors. He, therefore, tore a circular piece, or *giron*, from the garment which the monarch wore; an action remarked by Alfonso as he escaped. When don Rodrigo, accordingly, returned from captivity, he produced the piece of the royal robe which he had torn, was acknowledged by the king as his deliverer, and assumed, in commemoration of the action, the surname of *Giron*. That monarch, moreover, gave him his daughter Donna Sancha in marriage. She was born of a French princess, from whom the Girons claimed affinity with the royal houses of both France and Spain.†

* In the twelfth century.
† These particulars are to be found in the Life of the Duke of Ossuno, by Gregorio Leti, an industrious scribbler, worthy almost of the present age.

The honour of this high descent was well supported by the Girons, who, as counts of Urena, fought in the wars of Ferdinand against the Moors. One, a grand master of Calatrava, perished at Loxa. Of don Pacho Giron, eighteenth in descent from the founder of the family, mention has been made in the life of Ximenes, whose administration he was foremost to embarrass. Having married the daughter of the duke of Medina Sidonia, he claimed the rich heritage of that powerful family, and on this account was engaged in wars or lawsuits throughout his life. Francis I. called him the handsomest man of his time, and he was also one of the wittiest; talents in that day being much vented in epigrams. He defended Navarre against the French, and was highly esteemed and trusted, notwithstanding his turbulence, by Charles V.

His son, don Juan, founded the magnificent church and college of Ossuno, whence his son derived his title and dukedom.

The next in succession, don Pedro, was the friend and counsellor of Philip II., whom he accompanied to the English court, when that prince went to espouse queen Mary. He received a wound at the battle of St. Quentin, and was present at the tournament in which Henry II. received his death-wound. On his return to the Spanish court, Philip rewarded don Pedro, as yet but count of Urena, by exclaiming, "Let the duke of Ossuno put on his hat!" This was the exclusive privilege of the ducal grandees; and the count's elevation to this dignity was implied by the king's words. The new duke, anxious to assure an advantageous match for his son, married him at the age of sixteen to the daughter

He wrote upwards of 100 volumes of history and biography, all in the guise of romance; and was so given to "consult his imagination for facts," that his authority is deemed of no credit whatever. The condemnation of him, however, has been too severe. His works are valuable as chronicles of the reports, the chit-chat, of his day; and these, when sifted and received with caution, may afford some not despicable materials to the biographer and historian. In his account of the ancestors of Ossuno, Leti followed an old and authentic Spanish work; and therefore, I am not afraid to follow or coincide with him.

of the constable of Castile; and from this premature union was born don Pedro Giron, whose life we write. The elder don Pedro was employed by Philip in the negotiations and intrigues that preceded his acquisition of Portugal.

"As a partial compensation for the exorbitant expenses,"—thus writes Giannone,—"made by the duke of Ossuno, in the service of the crown, during the wars of Granada and the conquest of Portugal, Philip II. gratified him with one of the finest governments of Europe, that of our kingdom of Naples. He arrived there with great pomp in November, 1582. His natural reserve, and proud and contemptuous temper, brought him soon into disfavour with the nobility. His zeal made him administer justice with impartiality between the nobles and the people, which much endeared him to the latter."*

In setting out to assume his viceroyalty, the old duke of Ossuno took with him all his family, his son, don Juan, and his little grandson, called, after himself, don Pedro. The boy was then three years old. Leti recounts the improbable tale of pope Gregory XIII.'s having presented the child with a sword in his passage through Rome. The best preceptors that Italy could afford were, of course, employed in the education of the viceroy's grandson, who showed himself, what his life did not belie, a youth of vivacity and rare parts. Andrea Savona, the person principally charged with his education, was as famed for his wit as his learning. He had been obliged to leave Venice, owing to the freedom which he allowed his tongue; and he communicated this faculty and propensity early to his pupil, along, no doubt, with more solid acquirements. The old duke of Ossuno's viceroyalty expired in 1586. He returned to Spain with his grandson, who was soon after sent to the college of Salamanca. Leti says that he was there in 1588, when the Spanish armada, under the com-

* Istoria di Napoli, lib. xxxiv. c. 4.

mand of his relative, the duke of Medina Sidonia, met its memorable disasters. From college young Pedro, after a presentation at court, visited France in the suite of the duke of Feria, who held such close connections with the League. With the leaders of this famed opposition or party the young Ossuno formed an acquaintance, which must have given him early both taste and experience in the pursuits of political conspiracy and personal ambition. From France he returned and visited Portugal; and was about to betake himself thence to Flanders with the archduke, when a severe illness arrested him. The prominent feature of his character at this time was his propensity to repartee and jest, in which he was so little guarded as to cause his being brought before the inquisition. For the same reason he was more feared than liked at court, though he attached himself to the persons of most influence, amongst others to the future duke of Lerma.

At this time he espoused donna Catherina Henriquez, daughter of the duke of Alcala. Notwithstanding this sedate step, finding his friend the duke of Lerma made little haste to give him employment, he resolved to raise a regiment, and take part in the Flemish war. This purpose he put in execution, accompanying, early in 1602, Juan de Velasco, the constable of Castile, to the court of Henry IV. Ossuno is said to have brought about here, by his *étourderie*, a signal revolution in etiquette. It was customary for the monarch, after a reception of ambassadors of rank, to cause the latter to sit down and be covered. Ossuno, though but one of the constable's suite, put on his hat when he saw the constable do so. He pleaded the privileges of all Spanish grandees to cover themselves in the presence of their king. The good-natured Henry, instead of resenting or disputing the point, bade his own nobles imitate the duke of Ossuno, with whose vivacity and agreeable conversation he otherwise confessed himself highly gratified.

Ossuno, soon after his arrival in Flanders, was ap-

pointed, according to his desire, to a military command, and he instantly repaired to the siege of Ostend, then carried on by Spinola. The latter formed a plan for getting possession of the Scheldt, and the general's brother, Frederick Spinola, was charged with the execution of it. He begged Ossuno, with whom he was previously on terms of friendship, to accompany him; and they set sail with eight galleys on the enterprise. They were met at sea by the Dutch, and a fierce engagement ensued, in which the latter were completely victorious, and Frederick Spinola, with more than 400 of his men, slain. Ossuno greatly distinguished himself on this occasion. He was then sent, under the admiral of Aragon, to raise the siege of Grave: he disliked the admiral, as too sanctified a personage for command, and gave him the nickname, by which he afterwards went, of "grand captain of the rosary." However, he obeyed, and was equally unfortunate and equally valiant at Grave as at Ostend, receiving a musket-shot in his thigh whilst engaged in covering the admiral's retreat from an ill-managed assault. That general was wont to fight, having his breast cuirassed with relics, and a piece of the true cross in the hilt of his sword. He was yet very inactive, and the soldiers complained of the tardy pace of the general's horse: "How would you have him be alert," said Ossuno, "with a cargo of saints on the poor animal's back?"

The admiral was sadly perplexed, in 1603, on learning at the same time the deaths of Maria of Austria and Elizabeth of England. He feared to put on the customary mourning for the former, lest he might thereby pay involuntary honour to the memory of the latter. Obliged, however, to assume mourning garments, Ossuno took care to ask him for which of the princesses he mourned. "For Mary of Austria," said the admiral. "And I for Elizabeth," quoth Ossuno. The former instantly made the sign of the cross, and called on our lady of Montserrat, in horror, asking why? "Because," said the duke, "queen Elizabeth did not

half the harm to our sovereign that her power and talents might have done."

His wife, weary of the duke's absence, now journeyed from Spain to meet him. He met her at Paris, where he was well received by Henry, being intrusted with some matters of small importance by the archduke. Ossuno, as usual, entertained Henry by his wit, and left many of his repartees on record. Thence he hurried back once more to the siege of Ostend, and military service under Spinola. He sought danger wherever it was to be met; and yet, in spite of the stirring pastime, he grew weary of the monotony of the siege. James, the new king of England, had lately made peace with Spain; and the duke resolved to profit by his propinquity to that country to satisfy his desire of seeing foreign courts and countries. Refusing the diplomatic character which the archduke of Flanders offered him, he undertook it as a private nobleman. He was well received at the court of James. Leti gives the following account of one of his interviews with the English monarch. The latter summoned the duke to come and talk Latin with him one morning. Ossuno arrived, and found the monarch by the fireside, covered with a cap. It was cold weather. "Had your lordship a cap like mine," quoth James, in Latin, "I would ask you to be covered." —"I see little difference betwixt hat and cap," was the reply of the forward nobleman, putting on his hat, with a Spaniard's sense of the importance of the privilege. The courtiers, equally unwilling to cover their heads before the king, or leave them uncovered before the duke, instantly dispersed on all sides. "Now that we are alone," said James, "to our Latin."—"Willingly," rejoined the grandee; "but the scholar must not remain covered in the presence of his master, however a duke may in that of a king." James was highly flattered by the honour being paid to his learning that was refused to his station. He enjoyed Ossuno's affected scholarship, and sent the duke on a tour to Oxford and Cambridge, dismissing him on his return with civilities

and honours. "What did you gain by your English trip?" asked some one of him on his return to Brussels. "The honour of having been the scholar of a king, and the advantage of brushing up my old Latin."

Ossuno now gave himself up with greater ardour than ever to military enterprises. Spinola was no longer employed in tedious sieges, but had undertaken a daring plan of campaign. Ossuno was his most intrepid and active cavalry officer, distinguishing himself upon every occasion, so as to merit honourable mention frequently, even in the annals of his foes. At the siege of Grool he lost a finger of his right hand by the blow of a sabre. When that of Rhinberg was formed by prince Maurice, Spinola determined to relieve it, and intrusted Ossuno with the task. It was one of the greatest difficulty and hardihood to penetrate into the beleaguered fortress. Ossuno effected it with complete success, at which both armies marvelled, and which the duke himself could scarcely explain. The archduke rewarded him in the only way that he was able, with the order of the Golden Fleece. A truce with the United Provinces being soon after concluded, and negotiations being entered upon for a peace, the duke, after satisfying his curiosity by taking a journey into Holland, resolved to return to his native country.

He had earned a character for valour and capacity, which, he deemed, entitled him to expect some high employment. The recommendation of the archduke could not fail to be warm, and calculated to give him high interest at court. These considerations may be supposed to have more influence in inducing his return, than the perusal of Cardan, to which Leti attributes his resolution. He left Flanders in 1607, both Spinola and the archduke vying to do him honour. He resolved not to tarry in Paris, but hastened over the Pyrenees. Near Pampeluna, a restive mule flung the duchess of Ossuno to the ground, and caused a miscarriage, which detained them for some time at that town. The duke had but an only son, whom he now

beheld again with a father's delight. The court had just returned from Valladolid, whether Philip III. had removed it for some years from Madrid. Ossuno sent forward for permission to enter the city and appear at court; a ceremony required of grandees who had been absent. Having received it, he entered the capital with a numerous attendance, and repaired first to the house of the duke of Lerma, and then to that of his son, Uzeda, who at the time shared with his father the favour of the king. Ossuno, indeed, hoped more from Uzeda's protection than from Lerma's. His audience of Philip was as satisfactory as the taciturnity of that monarch would allow. Lerma bade him make his appearance on the following day at the council, in order to communicate information upon the state of Flanders. This request he complied with so fully and eloquently as to excite the usual share of admiration and jealousy provoked by talent. In spite of the latter feeling, the duke of Uzeda was true to his friend, and procured Ossuno soon after the appointments of chamberlain to the king and member of the council of Portugal.

These employments came opportunely to relieve the anticipated revenues of the Spanish grandee, whose service in Flanders, with a regiment kept up at his own expense, had considerably impaired his fortune. The care of economising his means he now abandoned to his duchess; a custom not usual in Spain, as it seems, since Ossuno remarked that he learned it in the Low Countries, and found the benefits thereof; and a proof that the absolute authority of the Spanish government extended to the private regime of families, whilst Flemish privileges produced a contrary effect in Flanders.

In 1608, the duke of Ossuno desired much to be sent ambassador to France; but Pedro de Toledo, of the famous duke of Alva's race, was preferred to him. Toledo was a stiff, bigoted Spaniard, more given to beard and offend Henry IV. than conciliate him. The French monarch showed him the palace of Fontainebleau which he was beautifying. Toledo, instead of admiring,

remarked, " that he saw a fit chapel for the Lord." Henry, who piqued himself upon his new zeal, was chafed at this, and replied, " We French, sir ambassador, are accustomed to lodge God Almighty in our hearts, rather than within four stone walls, as ye Spaniards do: and yet ye may as well pursue your own fashion ; for Spanish hearts are as hard as the walls they build."

In council, Ossuno, as became a travelled man, adopted always what may be called the *liberal* side. Thus he declared at once for the necessity of acknowledging the independence of the United Provinces; and his opinion had weight, backed as it was by Spinola's, on a subject with which he was necessarily so well acquainted. Another act of Spanish policy afforded him the opportunity of giving even more sage and generous counsel. This was the proposal for banishing the Moors from Spain. It was suggested and pressed by the clergy, to whom had been given large sums for converting the Mahometans, and who had not been able to give any value for their wages. Then the Moors were unprofitable as a religious flock, argued the ecclesiastics. The noble proprietors of the soil replied, that, notwithstanding this, they were far more industrious and useful, as tenants, than the Spanish Christians themselves. But the voice of the priesthood necessarily prevailed with Lerma and with Philip, whilst the inquisition terrified all opposition into silence. Ossuno, however, was amongst those who did not shrink from resisting and remonstrating against the injustice of the Moorish expulsions. " Will your majesty banish a million of peaceful subjects from the least peopled country in Europe, and at a moment when the French king is preparing to make a war of annihilation upon the house of Austria ?" He even dared to hint that the 20,000 servants and officers of the holy Inquisition were not such useful members of society. The inquisition took fire at this, removed its chief tribunal from Toledo to Madrid, in order to strike greater terror by its pre-

sence, and proposed to summon the duke of Ossuno before it. Lerma himself always made one of the council of the inquisition, as we learn; and his interference probably saved Ossuno from trouble and persecution. The advice opposed to his prevailed, and he had only the glory of having protested against it.

For several years the council of Spain had remained in anxious dread of the menacing plans and preparations of Henry IV., which, not knowing how to meet or combat, they discussed merely in stupid dread. No sooner was the assassination of that monarch made known, than the Spanish court passed from pusillanimity to bravado, and many proposed attacking France in its present state, in order to take advantage of its distraction. Ossuno opposed this; and it was through him, according to Leti, that the queen mother negotiated the reconciliation of the two countries, and the seal of their alliance by marriage. Ossuno's chief aim, however, was a viceroyalty, to which he was now every way entitled. That of Sicily was about to become vacant, and it demanded not only a vigorous and able governor, but one skilled in military affairs, to defend it. The Turks had their ambition directed towards it, and were continually making descents, ravaging the sea-coast, plundering the towns, and carrying off the inhabitants captive. Ossuno argued that there were but two alternatives which could put a stop to this state of things, — either to purchase respite from the Turks by paying them tribute, and entering into an agreement with them, or else raising a naval force to combat them. To govern Sicily, as it had been of late, he declared was merely to send a viceroy thither in order that he might be the gazetteer of disgrace, sending home monthly accounts of ravages committed and insults received. The duke described the governor that suited, and the council declared that this was himself. He was accordingly appointed viceroy, both minister and monarch being glad to get rid of a free-tongued and ambitious grandee. Of Philip III.

himself, Ossuno was wont openly to avow his contempt. "What is he," said the duke, "but the *great drum of the monarchy*, from which other arms beat the sound of command?" Ossuno was likewise successful in obtaining the immediate naval command off Sicily for his friend, prince Philibert of Savoy; so that he entered upon his government, however arduous, with great advantages.

In the year 1611, the duke of Ossuno set sail, accompanied by his family and prince Philibert, for his new government. He disembarked first at Genoa, and proceeded thence by the way of Naples to Palermo. He took every care, previous to his setting out, to have ample information respecting Sicily; which he derived from the correspondence of past viceroys in the royal archives. The island was in a state of complete anarchy, produced not only by the Turkish depredations, but by the dissolute conduct of the nobility. The clergy, it seems, had taken possession of the tribunals, and remitted crimes to the great for pecuniary fines, whilst to common criminals the churches afforded a secure asylum. At the commencement of Philip III.'s reign the debts of the Sicilian nobles were so great as to necessitate a royal decree for committing the lands of many of them to royal commissioners for the purpose of payment: and, as the church drew its revenue from judicial fines and the price of the remission of crimes, the nobility lived by protecting and harbouring banditti. Ossuno's first care was to apply remedies to these serious disorders. He was the more emboldened to do this, from the example of pope Sixtus V., who had given lustre to his short reign chiefly by the rigid justice and vigour with which he had put down licence. The new viceroy issued a proclamation, declaring that the criminal judgments of late years should be revised, that the right of sanctuary was taken away, that such barons as "protected or harboured banditti or known delinquents should be punished both in their funds and persons." Moreover, in order to prevent the frequency

of assassinations, he forbade any one to carry a dagger or other arms. Some youths of noble family having thought proper to mock the latter part of the viceroy's order by openly carrying pistols and swords made merely of paper, within sight of the palace, he caused them to be taken and beaten like children, and presented them afterwards with cakes and sweetmeats as a fitting consolation.

He soon proceeded to make a tour of the island, and signalised his coming into each town by the punishment of malefactors, preferring always those who happened to be of the better classes. At Messina the duke thought proper to levy an export duty on certain manufactures of the country, in order to pay the expenses of improving the port *: this gave rise to an insurrection, into the midst of which the viceroy flung himself, sword in hand; intimidating the violent, and using persuasion with the moderate, so effectually, that the tumult was quelled. He spared the populace engaged in it, but punished all of noble rank that had favoured the insurrection. Thus merciful to the people, severe to the nobles, he was equally inclined to be severe towards the clergy, but durst not so rudely castigate them. However, he continued on several occasions to punish even these. On one occasion a friar preached openly against Ossuno, as a Pilate that would send the most innocent to execution. The duke retaliated by ordering his soldiers to devour all the provender of the convent, confining the monks for four and twenty hours to their refectory. During this compulsory fast they fell upon the friar who had caused it, and beat him to the viceroy's content.†

* "Ob novum indictum vectigal, sericum e Messanæ portu asportantibus." — *Fazellus, de Rebus Siculis.*

The same author gives the following character of Ossuno: — "Princeps optimus, literarum promotor, scelerum vindex acerrimus"

† The following anecdote had best be given in the words of Leti. The duke had visited Catania: —

"Visito la chiesa di Santa Agata protettrice della città, qua mentre il vescovo gli dava a baciar le mammelle di questa santa, che si conservano in tanta veneratione, rivolto alla moglie ivi presente, disse, 'Donna Caterina con vostra licenza e senza vostra gelosia' — Facetia che non piacque ai scropolosi."

In 1613, the sultan Achmet fitted out a fleet to subdue the island of Malta. The fleet had already sailed from Constantinople, when Ossuno sent the admiral of Aragon. Philibert of Savoy having not yet arrived in Sicily, with eight galleys and some ships to reconnoitre. He met a division of the Turkish fleet off Chios, attacked it suddenly and defeated it, taking several galleys, and burning the rest. It was the most signal exploit achieved against the infidels since the battle of Lepanto. Ossuno sent his son with the tidings to the court of Spain. Notwithstanding this check, magnified, no doubt, the Turks remained masters at sea, and again threatened Malta, which, however, another expedition of the admiral of Aragon succeeded in liberating. Prince Philibert at last arrived to assume the command, and united for a time the naval force of Spain with that of Sicily. Ossuno urged that this great fleet should sail to attack the Turkish: it obeyed his command, and Philibert found the Ottomans anchored in the harbour of Navarino. After assuring himself of their number, and remarking their position, he deemed it too hazardous to enter the port for the purpose of attack, and returned to the Sicilian seas, to the great mortification of the viceroy. The great fleet was soon after separated; but Ossuno continued with the Sicilian navy to make head against the Turks, aiding the Greeks of the Peloponnesus in their resistance against the sultan, and carrying off spoil when conquests were denied. It was during these years, according to Leti, that the duke allured to his service the boldest officers and adventurers of Italy, whom he peculiarly rewarded and sought to attach. Amongst them was James or Jacques Pierre, the hero of Otway's "Venice Preserved." "It was a known maxim with all Spanish viceroys," says Leti, "to do good justice the first year of their government, to make money the second, and to procure friends the third." He adds, that Ossuno did not follow this routine: the prudent duke knew very well how to do all these together. In

1616, he was advanced from the viceroyalty of Sicily to that of Naples: he assembled the parliament of the latter kingdom (which Leti compares to that of England), and laid before it an account of his administration. In all his acts, popularity and fame seem to have been his first objects.

The duke of Ossuno commenced his government of Naples by the same edict which he had addressed to the Sicilians, abolishing the right of sanctuary in churches, menacing the barons who protected banditti, and bidding the clergy cease to meddle with matters not ecclesiastical. He, moreover, reprimanded the Neapolitan nobles for their arrogance towards their inferiors, to whom he forbade them to apply the word *canaglia*. He repealed several taxes that weighed especially upon the lower orders, and replaced them by a donative, or subsidy, granted by the parliament. This assembly he summoned in February, 1617, and obtained from it upwards of a million of ducats, in return, however, for the royal sanction given to their privileges. On these occasions the Neapolitan parliament were accustomed to represent their grievances in the shape of demands. Amongst those presented to Ossuno were, that he should treat the grandees, the seven officials of the kingdom, and the titled or lesser nobles, on the same terms of respect; that no ecclesiastical offices should be given to strangers, nor Spaniards preferred to Italians for commands in the army; and that the foreign battalions should be disbanded. The viceroy refused the latter request, but granted most of the others.

We now come to the important period of Ossuno's political career, when either his profound or extravagant ambition conceived certain schemes, and led him to certain acts, the true aim of which remains a matter of much mystery and dispute. To proceed first to what is certain; it may be at once asserted, that, in the first or second year of his viceroyalty, the duke aspired to independent sovereignty. This was not altogether a

new or unheard-of scheme: don John of Austria, the conqueror of Lepanto, had entertained such a project, and had once projected the founding of an empire in Africa by naval superiority. Ossuno, who had read over the correspondence of past viceroys, might have seen the scheme of don John in cardinal Granvelle's letters. It was, however, a late thought; as his first efforts in Sicily were patriotically and honestly directed against the Turks. He had found that the common Spanish and Italian seamen were not sufficiently enterprising for his views; and he accordingly replaced them, or at least officered them, by adventurers of daring character. They were mere corsairs in their habits: the above-named Pierre was one; and these captains soon converted the naval war into one of plunder, which, though less glorious, proved most lucrative to them and to the viceroy. About the very period of Ossuno's translation to Naples, captain Pierre had made a considerable capture of vessels.

No habits are more enticing than those of the corsair; and as the Turkish ships, never very rich, grew rare, the lawless sea captains cast their eyes upon the Venetian merchantmen, as offering the richest prizes, and the means of carrying on their plunder. They communicated their sentiments to the viceroy; who, on his part, found in the political state of Italy a fair pretext for indulging the avarice and adventure of his followers. A serious quarrel, amounting to war, had arisen betwixt Venice and Austria, on account of some pirates who had stationed themselves in a nook of Dalmatia, and thence infested the Venetian territories and shipping. In 1616 the Venetians marched an army into Friuli, and besieged Gradisca without success. The Spaniards and the pope interfered as mediators, and leaned towards Austria. Venice, seeing the combination against her, sought to gain the duke of Savoy: this widened the breach and extended the quarrel. The Spaniards succoured the archduke; and Venice, to be avenged, entered into an alliance with Spain's chief enemy,—the

United Provinces of Holland. Here was ample excuse for the viceroy of an Italian kingdom subject to Spain to enter into the quarrel. Ossuno sent his fleet to cruise against the Venetians, and took some of their ships. His captains practised their system of plunder along the Venetian coast and up the Adriatic, whilst a Venetian fleet under the proveditore Gritti did not succeed in bringing the Neapolitan squadron to action. The ships of Ossuno were harboured securely in the port of Brindisi.

In the mean time Spain, however great her resentment against the Venetians, was at that time too pacifically inclined, and the Spanish court too much occupied with domestic intrigues,— the influence of Lerma being then tottering,—to permit it to think seriously of war. The differences in Northern Italy, as well as those betwixt Austria and Venice, were accordingly accommodated by negotiation; and the viceroy of Naples received peremptory orders from his court to desist from naval hostilities in the Adriatic; to recall his fleet and restore his prizes. These commands were not at all acceptable to Ossuno, who prided himself on his naval force, and who was, perhaps, as little able as willing to disgorge his plunder or its price. He dared to disobey the orders of his court. He had powerful friends at Madrid, amongst others, Lerma's son, Uzeda, who was then struggling for power with a competitor, and too much occupied by this to allow of his making an enemy of Ossuno by over-rigidity in enforcing the authority of the home administration. In order to gain him altogether, Ossuno now married his son to the daughter of Uzeda, making him, possibly, a partaker in his gains; at any rate, the latter, who to the last proved himself the duke's friend and protector, even in disgrace, was now able to screen him from the too obvious consequences of his disobedience.

It was a state, however, that could not long endure: Ossuno must necessarily succumb, and be called to render an account at last. To avoid this alternative,

the duke conceived the daring project of rendering himself independent of Spain, and changing his vice-regal authority into absolute sovereignty.

Passing over this circumstance for the present, let us relate that, in spite of the amicable declaration of Spain towards Venice, and its reiterated orders to its viceroys at Naples and in Milan to execute the stipulations agreed on, and to give satisfaction to the Venetians, these viceroys resisted; and made use of all kinds of subterfuges to continue the breach, the Neapolitan squadron still infesting the Adriatic, the Spanish troops in Northern Italy still holding the fortresses to be evacuated; when, in the month of May, 1618, that is, in the following year, broke forth at Venice, or rather was crushed in its birth, a conspiracy, real or pretended, which cost the lives of numbers of men, some drowned, others hanged in the public squares. With the popular account of this conspiracy, the English reader must be well acquainted through the medium of Otway's "Venice Preserved," if St. Real's history of the conspiracy, on which that drama was founded, be not also familiar to him.

According to St. Real, the originator of the conspiracy was the marquis of Bedamar, Spanish ambassador at Venice; who, in concert with the duke of Ossuno and Pedro of Toledo, employed divers foreigners in the service of the republic, captain Pierre, Renault a Frenchman, and others, to surprise Venice by night, seize the arsenal, and deliver the city to fire and pillage. Discovered by one of the conspirators, Jaffier, the conspiracy was crushed at the instant of its breaking forth, and those concerned in it executed.

Of all this the public of Venice had no proof at the moment, but the bodies which they saw hanging. The government of the republic, that is, the senate and the inquisitors of state, preserved a profound silence on the subject, seemed to pay no attention to the public rumours; and merely, in some time after, accredited these rumours by ordering prayers and processions for the delivery of the republic from a great danger. The

popular indignation pointed out the Marquis of Bedamar as the author of this secret conspiracy; of which, however, he denied the knowledge, and even the existence. His protest was little attended to; he was obliged to leave Venice; his culpability, as well as the existence of a plot, became generally credited; and a succinct account of both was published in the "Mercure François" of the same year. The Venetian historian, Nani, has followed this account; attributing to the duke of Ossuno a still greater share in the conspiracy. At length, in 1674, appeared the work of the abbé de St. Real, giving a detailed and finished history of the conspiracy. He had discovered divers new documents, especially in the public library in Paris; and having been himself intimate at an Italian court, he may be supposed to have collected whatever tradition had preserved of the conspiracy.

The beauty of St. Real's style, and the praise bestowed upon it by the most eminent men of genius, gave full vogue to his history of the Venetian conspiracy, which was naturally compared to that of Sallust. Critics, however, were not wanting, who were dissatisfied with the total want of proofs and documents, and who denied the truth of the narration. They discovered several anachronisms in St. Real; the following, for instance:— He makes Jaffier's misgivings and weakness arise upon his witnessing the espousals of the Adriatic by the doge, remorse smiting him for plotting the ruin of such a magnificent empire: but Ascension Monday, in 1618, the day on which the doge was wont to wed the Adriatic, fell some days after the catastrophe, and, consequently, could not have influenced Jaffier in any way. Moreover, St. Real's history, they assert, was a party book, written and published on the eve of a war with Spain; and designed to make that country and its system of administration odious. For the executions and rumours of conspiracy at Venice in 1618, these writers account by saying that it was a scheme, imagined by Fra Paolo Sarpi, to throw odium upon the marquis of Bedamar,

and so rid the republic of the presence of a foreign envoy disagreeable to it.

In his recent history of Venice, the count Daru has employed the united sagacity and research of the historian and the statesman on the elucidation of this contested point. The conclusion which he has come to is altogether at variance with St. Real; and, as it makes the personal ambition of the duke of Ossuno the centre and spring of the whole affair, I shall here relate it in his sense, if not in his words.

Ossuno, on reaching his government of Naples commenced by a rigid execution of justice: he humbled the nobles, and delivered over a considerable number of them "during the first two years," to the hands of the executioner. He was equally severe against the churchmen*, more especially the Jesuits, against whom he gave judgment in many contested suits. He particularly irritated them by resisting the inquisition, which Paul V. proposed to introduce at Naples. This pope, who had created the duke of Lerma a cardinal, expected, at the least, in return, that the inquisition should be established at Naples, and he easily procured a royal missive to this effect. But Ossuno unhesitatingly resisted,—asking did Spain wish to lose Naples, as she had lost Holland. The enmity which this conduct of the viceroy excited against him on the part of the Jesuits, so powerful at the court of Spain, Daru mentions as the cause which first induced Ossuno to meditate and plan the making himself independent. But this is a manifest mistake; since Ossuno, according to him, began to act upon this scheme early, at least in the mid-

* The archbishop of Naples, Caraffa, prosecuted a certain bold seaman on account of his profane swearing and other blasphemies. The prelate's authority not being to be despised, the seaman was obliged to fly the city. He applied to the viceroy, who sent him a safe-conduct, and summoned him to his presence. When he came, Ossuno heard the blasphemies and other crimes laid to his charge, and, considering them for an instant, gave as his sentence, that this seaman should be condemned to serve on board the fleet for the space of three years, with the rank of captain. The archbishop expostulated against a sentence so illusory, and Ossuno is reported to have replied, that God had given the tables of the law to Aaron, the priest, to keep and to honour; whilst it was to Moses, the governor and captain, that he intrusted the task of punishing those who transgressed them.

dle of 1617; whereas his resistance to the inquisition and to the Jesuits was much later. Again, after asserting, with Videl, the secretary of Lesdiguières, that Ossuno communicated his intention to the French court early in that year, 1617, Daru goes on to say that the duke no sooner conceived the project of separating himself from Spain than he altered his mode of conduct towards the nobles and the clergy, cajoled the former, and made presents to the latter, choosing confessors for himself and his wife from the order of the Jesuits. But these acts, and this change of demeanour, were in reality subsequent to the Venetian conspiracy, and occasioned, possibly, by its failure. This historian, therefore, has made a mistake, at least in the immediate motive which he gives to the resolutions of Ossuno.

However, the resolution being taken, the duke naturally communicated it to the enemies of Spain; to France, as Videl asserts, and to Venice, says the same author. It was only by keeping up, or pretending to keep up, the quarrel with this maritime power, that Ossuno, according to Daru, could hope to keep his fleet at sea, and account for his warlike preparations and independent acts, to the enquiries from Spain. Venice, according to the same supposition, entered at once into Ossuno's views, and favoured his scheme of independence by affecting to continue the war. It is thus alone that the fact can be explained of the Neapolitan and Venetian fleets meeting and separating after a mock cannonade. In the mean time, the court of France showed itself not so ardent as some of its commanders for the ruin of Spain, and looked coldly on the project of Ossuno. He was in consequence obliged to look elsewhere for a reinforcement of troops: and he cast his eyes upon the Dutch regiments which had been sent or lent by Holland to the service of Venice. The permission of the prince of Orange was demanded, to allow them to pass to the service of Ossuno: it was granted. But the Venetian government, as well as Ossuno, were too cautious to take advantage openly of

this permission; and it was arranged betwixt them that the viceroy should send emissaries to corrupt or secretly enlist the Dutch soldiers, whom the Venetians retained in different parts and stations for this purpose.

In pursuance of this plan, the duke of Ossuno sent one of his trusty followers, captain Pierre, to Venice, to enlist these Dutchmen. Pierre, however, was not to be trusted with the secret. On the contrary, he was told that these soldiers were required for an enterprise upon Venice herself, and bidden to exert himself with this view. Accordingly, the viceroy feigned a quarrel with Pierre; the latter departed, affecting to fly from the duke's vengeance, whilst his wife and family were imprisoned at Naples. This was enough to give the Venetians a pretext for employing and trusting him; and Pierre, accordingly, reached Venice, and received a commission in the service of the republic.

In a little time there appeared at Venice another emissary of Ossuno, a Neapolitan, named Spinosa, who disclosed to captain Pierre from whom he came, and with what intent, viz. to strike some sudden blow against the republic. Pierre was mortified and alarmed to find that there was another in his secret and in Ossuno's confidence, nay, so much more trusted than himself that this Spinosa was in direct communication with the ambassador Bedamar, to whom he also introduced Pierre. Pierre had a long conversation with Bedamar, in which all the plans and means of surprising Venice were discussed, all parties allowing that Ossuno was the originator of the scheme. The Spanish ambassador seemed to enter into the project with zeal, and to be ardent for its execution. The next morning, Pierre made a full report of the interview and the conversation to the inquisitors of state. This last is at least certain, for the report still exists, and is corroborated by the correspondence of the French envoy. It was drawn up by the hand of one Renault, a follower of the French embassy; which renders it probable that this Pierre, whose conduct is so inexplicable, had communications

with the French embassy, as Spinosa had with the Spanish. There was some rivalry in the affair; for Spinosa, betrayed by Pierre, was soon after sacrificed, and no more heard of.

Fresh emissaries of the duke of Ossuno continued to arrive at Venice, and to employ themselves in recruiting; Jaffier, a Provençal, and others, chiefly Frenchmen. According to Daru, they came, as Pierre did, with the idea that they were preparing a conspiracy against Venice, whilst in reality they were but to bring over the Dutch troops to the service of Naples. But this end is by no means sufficient to account for such a number of emissaries, such secrecy, mystery, and, above all, such peril to Venice from a troop of unprincipled, and avowed conspirators. It is, indeed, almost incredible, that the Venetian government should tolerate such complicated artifice, and risk its own security so far, merely to procure a few thousand Dutch troops for the duke of Ossuno.

On his part Pierre wrote to the viceroy, reporting the progress that he made in the plot, saying that he had made the Dutch his for certain sums, and that they were impatient for the moment of action. Ossuno sent no answer to his emissary, but still left matters in suspense. He did not want the Dutch until he had declared himself independent; and this he was not prepared to do as yet, until he had received promise of immediate succour from France, which he hoped to obtain. In the mean time, the conduct of the viceroy began to excite the suspicions of the Spanish court. His augmentation of the army and fleet, his hiring foreign troops, and his replacing the Spanish regiments with them. The nobles of Naples protested, and demanded the disbanding of the French troops; this Ossuno found means to elude. He was anxious for the return of his son, don Juan, from Spain. His absence was one pretext of delay with the viceroy. On his arrival, the duke seized the occasion to give a fête, in which he distributed food and presents to the people.

That at the palace was unusually splendid, and all means were employed to render it so, in honour of the young don Juan's spouse, the daughter of Uzeda. Amongst the diversions of the day, Ossuno proposed to show the crown jewels to this lady. In examining them, the duke, in half seriousness, half jest, placed a crown upon his head, to observe the effect that it would produce. Some say that he showed himself with it at the balcony before the people; others, that the frowns and remarks of the nobles present prevented him from advancing.

Accounts of these acts of rashness, in short, of his great design, soon reached not only Spain, but the powers whose alliance he sought. These, especially the duke of Savoy, entertained at once so low an opinion of the viceroy's prudence and of his success, that the duke deemed it best to absolve himself of participation in it by revealing all that he knew to the Spanish ministry. Venice, on her part, drew back at the same time, and, in order to destroy utterly all proofs of her being an accomplice of Ossuno, not only cancelled her secret treaty, but resolved to destroy all the emissaries of Ossuno then in her territory, as men possessed of dangerous secrets. The Venetian government, therefore, seized the pretext of the mock conspiracy, pretended that it was real, and threw into the sea, or caused to be assassinated or hanged, all who were concerned in it. Amongst these was Pierre himself, Renault, and others, for the most part Frenchmen. The plot being attributed to Ossuno and Bedamar, the latter was obliged to leave Venice under the weight of the public indignation. Such is, in substance, the account given of this famous conspiracy by Daru, who thus, it is perceived, reduces the whole to a mere trick.

Now, it must be owned, that, if the account of St. Real be unsatisfactory, and improbable in many points, the opposite one of Daru is as much so in almost as many others. It is, in fact, as much a supposition and a romance as that which it contradicts; nor does it make

less free with the dates and order of history. All the events that Leti and other historians spread over the entire space of Ossuno's viceroyalty, Daru is obliged to crowd into the narrow space of the end of 1617 and the beginning of 1618. The playful assumption of the crown, for instance, Leti places so far forward as 1620; and from Grimaldi * and Giannone we know that the Capuchin friar, Lawrence, who, according to Daru, was despatched by the Neapolitan nobles to the Spanish court to complain of Ossuno previous to the conspiracy, was, in reality, not sent till towards the close of the duke's viceroyalty; that is, two or three years after. Ossuno held a parliament in 1619, and it was here that one of the *grazie*, or graces, asked was the disbanding of the *battaglione*, or French regiment. The same is the epoch of that change of conduct towards the nobles and clergy, which Daru places anterior to May, 1618.

In this discredit attached to both accounts of the conspiracy, where is truth to be looked for? The historians of that day believed in the existence of both projects, — of Ossuno's plot against Venice, and of his aspiring to sovereignty. Are they so incompatible as Daru says they are? To me, Ossuno's first scheme seems to have been that of a corsair: his whole attention was directed to his fleet, and he disregarded the land. He crushed the nobles, mocked the clergy, and sought to make no party in Naples except that of the populace. He dismantled the fortresses of the city, and sent his soldiers on board his ships. This does not look like a design of holding the kingdom against Spain. His money was expended in building ships: the fleet thus provided he called his own; he called it also his *capital*, and hoisted a flag with the arms of his house. From these and other circumstances, I am led to conjecture that Ossuno, though meditating to make himself independent of Spain, did not hope at first to erect the standard of his independence at Naples: that he rather sought some port in the Adriatic, where, with his ships,

* Storia delle Leggi e Magistrati del Regno di Napoli.

and the bold adventurers attached to him, he might erect a kind of corsair's kingdom. He had before him a recent example. A band of pirates, scarcely 1000 strong, the masters of one petty town, had resisted the whole power of Venice; and, though disobedient to the Austrians, on whose territory they had their stronghold, they still succeeded in making themselves respected and befriended by that power. Ossuno might hope the same. We know that he had a design of taking possession of a fortress on the Etruscan shore, named Marano, and that this was one of Pierre's suggestions.

But Venice was a prize much richer, a seat of naval empire far more commodious. It was full of discontent, of mercenary troops, of all the materials for undermining it; its lagoons were comparatively open; and the attempt to gain possession of it by force, however untenable, was just the enterprise that had attractions for the daring and extravagant Ossuno: Spain herself might be brought to pardon the achiever of such a conquest, and to respect his sovereignty. Such views as these, opened to Uzeda, might have the support of that influential person, and lead the court of Spain to suffer so long a line of conduct so unaccountable in a viceroy, without recalling him.

Some deceit, however, was requisite towards Venice and her allies, viz. France and Savoy; and to these, accordingly, Ossuno disclosed a design of rendering Naples independent of Spain: an idea which they more or less grasped at. Captain Pierre was sent from Naples with the full knowledge of Ossuno's real project; in furtherance of which, he commenced by avowing half—the requisite half—first to the duke of Savoy, then to the government of Venice: his account tallied with Ossuno's own communications, and Pierre was received into the service of the republic. At the same time the ambassador, de la Cueva, marquis of Bedamar, heard from Spain of Ossuno's designs against Venice; and, like a zealous agent, resolved to further or anticipate

them. He employed Spinosa to bring Pierre to him; and Pierre, who was willing to destroy Venice for Ossuno's and his own interest, but who was not prepared to undertake the same for merely Spanish interests, betrayed at once Bedamar and Spinosa to the Venetian police. By this means he himself acquired the full confidence of the governor of Venice, and was employed in the fleet: he immediately sent word, in a letter still preserved, to Ossuno of the success of his machinations. It may be remarked, that the person chosen by Pierre to draw up his reports to the inquisitor of state was Renault, the Frenchman already named, known at the French embassy; which Pierre wanted to confirm in the opinion that his employer's design was to render Naples independent of Spain: and this accounts for the continued incredulity expressed, as to the real plot, in the correspondence of the French envoy; an incredulity upon which Daru founds the greater part of his argument.

As Pierre, however, advanced towards the completion of his true object, viz. a kind of corsair's *coup de main* upon Venice, he was compelled to be less circumspect, to make more accomplices, and to show such a discrepancy betwixt his conduct and his confession to the inquisitors of the state, as at last to be perceived by the latter. Pierre bribed the Dutch troops, telling them that they were to aid an attack upon Venice: to the inquisitors he avowed that he used this pretext for engaging them in the service of Ossuno. Throughout all his acts, the same double line of conduct was necessary. In March, 1618, Pierre began to hold meetings of the officers whom he had gained over; and to these he disclosed his real intention of taking Venice by surprise, setting fire to it, and, in the confusion, massacring all the leading senators. An account of Pierre's conduct and words was soon conveyed to the inquisitors of state, who saw in them something more than a pretext for raising troops for the service of Naples. A person named Moncassin first made these disclosures; but another, named Jaffier, more intimate with Pierre, made

afterwards still more important and conclusive discoveries.

The Venetian government instantly perceived that it had been tricked; and that, under colour of conspiring to make himself independent sovereign of Naples, the duke of Ossuno had been allowed to introduce his emissaries, and to carry on plans with no other view than that of making himself master of Venice itself. They accordingly gave instant orders for the arrest and execution of all concerned in the conspiracy. Many of the foreign troops were already in Venice, awaiting the signal: they were seized, to the number of 200. Those of the conspirators taken at Venice, were some tortured, and hung up, the greater part drowned. As to Pierre, he was at the time with the fleet: an order was sent that he should be drowned. The order was executed.

Amongst those seized at Venice was Renault. This unfortunate man had been the mere instrument, the hand which had drawn up Pierre's confessions, now proved false. He was considered an accomplice of Pierre's true and final plot, which he evidently was not; that conspirator merely revealing to him all that he judged fit for the French and Venetian governments to know. But the inquisitors, in their rage at being not only endangered but duped, seized Renault even in the precincts of the French embassy, and applied the torture to him, without extracting a single confession of guilt. At length they hanged him with the rest. Moncassin and Jaffier at first received the stipulated reward for having betrayed the conspirators, but both perished soon after, by order of the government. Daru insists upon this circumstance of the wish of the inquisitors to destroy all traces of these events. There is no doubt of the wish on their part. But, instead of attributing this, as the French historian does, to the desire of doing away with all proofs of the secret understanding betwixt the republic and Ossuno, — a wish, by the way, that nowise contradicts my supposition, — this conduct of theirs may be as well attributed to their wish to

destroy all living testimonies of their having been so egregiously duped.

This strikes me as the only mode of considering these events which can at all be reconciled with probability and historic testimony. For it is not possible to imagine, with Daru, that the conspiracy was altogether a fiction. Had it been so, the Venetian government would have taken some pains to substantiate and give a colour to a supposition groundless in itself. On the contrary, their conduct shows that it was too true, and the records would make it appear that the senate thought so. Crafty and perfidious as the Venetian government might have been, it is impossible to accuse it of sacrificing so many lives for the mere purpose of concealing an intrigue with a Spanish viceroy, and without any crime on the part of the victims. On the other hand, it is certain that the French envoy believed the conspiracy to be merely a pretence; and his obstinacy in this opinion can be well accounted for by considering that he was acquainted with Pierre's mock purpose and confession, which must have seemed to the ambassador irreconcilable with his real guilt.

The duke of Ossuno heard the failure of his great scheme without appearing sensibly touched by it. He held the viceroyalty of Naples for two years after, and marked these two years by many of the acts which Daru places much earlier. His resistance to the Jesuits and the inquisition, the marriage of his son, the festival at which he put on the crown, were all subsequent. This period of his government Leti mentions as that in which he aspired to render himself independent sovereign of Naples. He may have entertained or shown some vague inclination towards acting such a daring part. He still cherished his fleet, and consulted his popularity. But it appears as if the failure of his attempt upon Venice had paralysed his energies; for his present scheme, if really entertained, was irresolutely and fitfully followed up. We hear of no alliances attempted, no succours stipulated for, no endeavour to

obtain friends, except a trifling report of his having practised some civilities towards the Turks. It is asserted, indeed, that he made these concessions to the nobles and the clergy mentioned before; and it is certain that to the demands of the parliament in 1610 he showed himself more obsequious than in 1617; allowing, amongst other concessions, that the nobles were to be exempt from the quartering of troops and payment of contributions. But other acts of his are adduced, which favoured the populace at the expense of the higher orders; and it is certain, whatever may have been his efforts, that he never succeeded in regaining the good will of the latter.

His credit declined at Madrid after the fall of Lerma; and, if we may judge from an article of impeachment against him on his trial, which accuses him of having sent bribes to Calderon, and of having been connected with this secretary, he lost an influential friend in this favourite of the minister. The Venetians exerted themselves against an enemy that had nearly occasioned their ruin, and disclosed through their agents, to the Spanish court, Ossuno's proposal to make himself independent at Naples. The Jesuit party joined the viceroy's enemies; and the Spanish court resolved to recall its viceroy. The manner in which he was superseded showed that apprehensions were entertained of his resisting. His successor, Borgia, was ordered to proceed from Rome without notice, and enter Naples in spite of Ossuno, or without his knowledge. Borgia did the latter, and Ossuno was dethroned like a Turkish pacha when the firmân of his successor is displayed.

Nevertheless, the accounts given by Leti of Ossuno's resistance would make it appear that his debts and disorderly conduct were as much the cause of his reluctance to depart as any treasonable design. He had besought the court of Austria as well as of Spain to allow him to prolong his government for some months, wishing, perhaps, to put the affairs of Naples, more especially its treasury, in some order, or, it may be, with more

criminal views. Leti reports that his request had been allowed, and that a messenger, bearing the permission to prolong his government, was on the way to Naples, at the same time that Borgia hastened thither to supersede the viceroy. Hence might proceed the reluctance and resistance of Ossuno. However the barons of Naples, who detested the duke, and had solicited his recall, joined the standard of Borgia; and Ossuno was obliged to embark for Spain. After the customary delay, which obliged all grandees, returning from their governments, to ask permission before they re-appeared at court, Ossuno made a splendid and triumphant entry into Madrid. He displayed a pomp worthy of an ancient procession; the equipages of the influential grandees came to grace and attend his entry, that of the duke of Uzeda amongst others; and the ambassador of Venice wrote to the republic, that their old enemy seemed to have as much authority in Spain as he had had in Italy. Daru acknowledges that this reception of Ossuno appears to him inexplicable: it is no longer so, if we suppose that the duke, in his enterprise upon Venice, and in his private machinations, meditated his own elevation indeed, but never at the expense of Spain.

Whilst Philip III. lived, Ossuno remained unchallenged, and apparently in favour, indulging in his shrewd sarcasm, his ambition, and his extravagant dreams. He in vain, however, sought to be again intrusted with a government. Bassompierre, envoy from France, relates that he heard the duke declare his intention of presenting himself to the new sovereign, Philip IV., and of thus addressing him:—"Sire, there are now three great princes in Europe,—one of sixteen years of age, one of seventeen, and one of eighteen; that is, your majesty of Spain, the king of France, and the sultan. Of these, whoever wears the best sword, and is the bravest, shall be my master."

The new reign, and the influence of Olivarez, proved fatal to all the favourites and ministers of the last.

Uzeda was disgraced, and Ossuno arrested, in the month of April, 1621. This blow was said to have been hastened by a letter written by Ossuno to the duke of Lerma, in which he reflected on the present changes, as well as upon the talents and character of Olivarez. Soon after the duke's arrest, the guards of his prison were doubled, in consequence of a report that he was to be rescued. Here closed the career of the restless Ossuno. His trial was commenced, and lasted for a considerable time, a commission being sent to Naples to collect evidence. The Sicilians interfered, and petitioned in his favour; the grandees of Spain who composed the council were inclined to spare him: but the rancour of Olivarez prevailed. After three years and a half of imprisonment, Ossuno died in the castle of Almeida according to some, of apoplexy, according to others, of poison, taken to avoid being executed. But as no sentence was passed upon him, the latter report is probably the last of the thousand falsehoods of Gregorio Leti's memoir.

LORENZO DE' MEDICI.

1448—1492.*

THE merits and demerits of the family of Medici have been the subject of much difference of opinion among modern writers. But the difference is more a matter of taste and sentiment than of fact and reason. He, in whose mind literature and the arts predominate as objects of interest, looks to Lorenzo and to Leo as munificent patrons and collectors — as appreciators of talent, and endowers of institutions to develope and advance it. The politician, on the other hand, considers the freedom which they stifled, and the system of tyranny which they established upon its ruins. To him it seems a poor recompence that the new state of bondage was rendered illustrious by all the glories that genius could achieve; nor can he admit the fame of Michel Angelo and Raphael to be an equivalent for the free institutions of Florence, crushed and scattered by the Medici at the very moment when the growth of intelligence and civilisation on every side might have been expected to improve and consolidate them. Florence, indeed, at the commencement of the fifteenth century, afforded prospects of reaching a state of rational and equal freedom. The popular party was too strong for the nobles: the political fate of Venice was, therefore, not to be feared. It was requisite only that the heads of the popular party should remain true to their principles, and not mar, by selfish ambition, the hopes and the struggles of the

* This life, it will be observed, does not occupy its proper place in the order of time. The deviation is not material, and the accidental cause would be uninteresting to the reader.

lovers of freedom. Now the latter, unfortunately, was the part played by the Medici.

When, however, one has fully admitted a heavy censure against the family, and shared the regret and resentment occasioned by its career, one may portion out the demerit amongst its different princes; and find that some, at least, may plead necessity in excuse, generosity and mildness in extenuation. Giovanni, or John of Medici, for example, the true founder of the grandeur of his race, was a patriot of the most unimpeachable character, of the wisest and the noblest stamp. He it was who led the citizens, for the first time successfully, against the nobles; and who deprived the latter of their absurd and unjust prerogatives, of at once monopolising the government of the state, and on this plea considering themselves exempt from taxes. Unfortunately, the Florentine people were as unable to keep as to recover this liberty without a leader. They had not many leaders, whom they could change as the Athenians and the Romans changed their chiefs. The ancient republics cherished and preserved great popular assemblies, not only for political but for judicial purposes; and this enabled them to create, to support, and to render dependent upon their voices, the leaders of the republic. Eloquence as well as military talent amongst them led to eminence. But Florence was merely a commercial republic, characterised by the narrowness of the municipal system, and looking to wealth as the only symbol of power. There was no enlivening spirit in her institutions. They consisted in mechanical balloting and routine, rather than in those spoken appeals to reason and the passions, which constituted, after all, the safety as well as the grandeur of the old republics. Popular eloquence is the thunder of the political atmosphere. It alarms much, but hurts rarely, and is the great means of purification and salubrity. But Florence knew it not, and her people consequently were obliged to look to wealthy protection. They, in fact,

chose themselves an hereditary tribunate in the family of Medici.

Cosmo, the son of Giovanni, was a political character far less pure than his father. But, then, he was bred up a witness to the struggles of faction. He it was who founded openly the despotic power of his family, and, from the representative and champion of the people, rendered himself their virtual sovereign. Cosmo, like all usurpers, had his excuses for this conduct. He might plead that he could combat the aristocratic faction only by raising himself above their level. A conspiracy overthrew, took captive, and exiled Cosmo and his family. A reflux of fortune brought him back to power, which he then secured, with the instinct and necessities of a tyrant, by cruelty and artifice. When expostulated with on such unusual rigour, "Better thin the city than lose it," was his selfish reply.* His sagacity in arranging anew the government of Florence, under the guise of free institutions, is sufficiently proved by his never after being disturbed in his authority. His return from exile took place in 1434. With Cosmo must chiefly rest the honour and the disgrace of having elevated his family to supreme power in Florence.

The family of Medici are indebted to Cosmo for even more than this. He not only raised his house to princely rank, but communicated to it the peculiar bent and taste which then distinguished, and since immortalised it. He it was who first displayed that passion and munificence for literature and the arts, which his descendants inherited with their political influence. It was during the short period of his exile at Venice that Cosmo developed and indulged a taste so novel in that rude age; and so great a source of pride and solace did he find in it, that, after his return and re-establishment in Florence, he may be considered to have devoted his life and wealth to the pursuits of a patron and a collector. Cosmo is said to have been a rude and illiterate man, more skilled in public affairs and in commerce

* Ammirato.

than in any arts more refined: his conduct might have proceeded in part from shrewd calculation. Cosmo and his family were the representatives of the monied great; of the class ennobled by wealth rather than birth: his competitors were the nobles born. To show himself more refined than they, and to prove that the mind of the citizen could rise to a level with, if not above, the feudal noble, might have been one of the aims of Cosmo: and it cannot be denied that he succeeded. History will prove that a commercial aristocracy has ever produced the best patrons of the arts, if not of literature. The rich Athenians are an example. Where was the taste of European monarchs and nobles until awakened by the bankers of Florence?

In the palace of Cosmo, ever thronged with the distinguished in arts and letters, was born and reared his grandson Lorenzo. Piero, the father of the child, though not without the taste and refinement, still wanted the capacity and prudence of his race; but all that a parent's example and care could supply young Lorenzo experienced from his mother Lucretia. Cosmo, too, must have been most anxious to give his intended successor an education befitting the political rank and intellectual superiority of the family. A distinguished preceptor was chosen for Lorenzo; and the youth was taught to unite princely with literary accomplishments. Anecdotes are recounted of his early generosity, as well as aptitude in learning. His precocity soon displayed itself in love and verse-making; and the efforts of his early muse earned the approbation of the gravest critics of the time. Lucretia of the Donati family was Lorenzo's early love and muse; her charms proved the most efficient means of calling forth in the youth those shining qualities which adorned him. He became not only a poet but a cavalier; and although, as Valori says, "nature was somewhat a stepmother to his exterior *,"

* "Lorenzo," says Valori, "was low of stature and broad of shoulders, more robust than graceful, of a deep olive colour, with nose depressed and weak eyes, and with more dignity than beauty of countenance."

he redeemed such defects by martial and knightly exercises, so as to carry off the palm in many a tournament.

Lorenzo was sixteen years of age at the period of his grandfather's death, in 1464. Piero de' Medici, who then succeeded to influence, was far from possessing the strength of character requisite for government; and he seemed so conscious of it as to resort thus early to the aid and advice of his son. Lorenzo was accordingly diverted from love and platonism, from the lessons of Ficinus the philosopher, and the companionship of the poet Pulci, to the weightier affairs of state and government. In order to study this science where it then alone existed, in living courts, Lorenzo left Florence in the year after Cosmo's death for a tour through the several states of Italy. He had previously met Frederick, the heir to the crown of Naples; but this first interview between the princes had been chiefly employed by them in designs for a collection of Tuscan poetry; a circumstance which sufficiently depicts the prevailing taste of both, and of the age.

In 1466 Lorenzo visited Rome, and afterwards Naples, where he was splendidly received by king Ferdinand; he also visited Bologna, Ferrara, Venice, Milan; and may be supposed to have studied closely the learning, interests, and prospects of the several states of Italy. Whilst his son was thus engaged, Piero de' Medici was acting imprudently at Florence. Cosmo, even in his most triumphant days, had found it unadvisable to monopolise the supreme authority. Capponi first, and Pitti afterwards, assumed the appearance of equality with him. By this means, as well as by indulging the Florentine people with the forms of liberty, Cosmo had succeeded in establishing his supremacy: but Piero was so vain as to seek to limit exclusively to himself even the appearance of authority, and so imprudent as, at the same time, to alienate the especial dependents upon his house by calling in his commercial debts. A conspiracy was formed, in consequence, against him by his aristocratic rival

Pitti, who associated himself with the true friends of liberty in Florence. Lorenzo de' Medici returned to his native city whilst the plot was in progress; he endeavoured to allay the evident discontent of many of the citizens by fêtes and tournaments: the conspiracy broke out nevertheless. The foreign enemies of the Medici put troops in motion towards Florence; within or adjoining the walls of which a force was organised to take the lives, or, at least, to seize the persons, of Piero and his son. The design was frustrated, however, by an activity and address so little in unison with the general character and conduct of Piero, that the honour may well be attributed to Lorenzo, who now accompanied him. Seductive promises of reconciliation and alliance gained over Lucas Pitti from his popular associates; who, thus deprived of their chief, shrank from the hazards of a trial, and submitted to defeat.

This victory enabled Piero de' Medici to assume the dictatorial authority which his father had acquired by his dexterity and good fortune, but which the jealous and independent spirit of the Florentines did not yet permit to descend as an inheritance. By the ancient constitution of the republic, its chief magistrates were chosen by lot. In difficult times, in epochs of war or faction, such a system of perfect equality was insupportable: capacity then became requisite, as well as identity of opinion, between the magistrates and the people. For these occasions, which the Florentine legislators anticipated only as rare exceptions, the people reserved to themselves the right of suspending the choice of the magistracy by lot. They assembled and named a certain number of citizens in whom they confided; and these, called the *balia*, were entitled, not indeed to name the actual magistrates, but to compose lists from which they were to be chosen by lot: this was tantamount to naming the very magistrates, and constituted a completely dictatorial power in the *balia*, or, rather, in him under whose influence it was composed. It was by means of these *balia* that Cosmo had

established his power—punished and exiled his foes. But they had now expired. Piero de' Medici was too much despised to be permitted to renew them, until his impatient foes, seeking to precipitate, rather than wait, his fall, afforded him, by their rash and unsuccessful enterprise, the means of calling an assembly of the people favourable to him, and of once more nominating *balia.**

Nothing could have occurred more opportune for the Medici, who, under Piero's rule, were rapidly losing both wealth and influence. But now, endowed with a firm hold of power, young Lorenzo resumed his gaiety and tournaments, and gave those *giuochi* which inspired the muse of Pulci and Politian. He soon after married Clarice, of the great Roman family of the Orsini,—an ambitious match, which had formed one of the accusations against Piero. Lorenzo, soon after, in the year 1469,—then twenty-one years of age,—succeeded, by the death of his father, to the station of supreme arbiter of the republic: not a voice was heard to dispute his elevation.

The politics of Italy, from its subdivision and the different forms of government, must have ever presented a complexity of interests. But at this period, before French interference came to derange them utterly, there was need of little more than common prudence to maintain a certain regularity. At the accession of Lorenzo de' Medici to power, the western states of Italy appeared to be leagued in peaceful amity. The princes of Milan and Naples hailed the rise of a sovereign house in Florence, and all joined in jealousy against the Venetians. The latter, however, were supported by the lesser lords of Romagna, and this formed a kind of balance, which depended mainly on the neutrality of the pope. To preserve this state of affairs, and counteract the intrigues of the Florentine exiles, was

* The observations of Machiavel upon this crisis, and of the superior advantages to be derived from moderation, are worthy of being studied:—"Perchè tal lascia cadere uno che cade da se, che s' egli è spinto d' altri, lo sostiene." Such is his conclusion.—*Istorie*, lib. vii.

necessarily the aim of Lorenzo. The chief obstacle to the stability of this state lay in the character of the Roman government and of the popes, each of whom came to the pontifical chair with peculiar predilections for their family or native towns. Paul II., for example, the actual pope, was a Venetian. He intrigued to obtain Rimini for himself, or to transfer Bologna to Venice. Lorenzo's interference was employed to counteract his views. Upon the death of Paul, in 1471, Lorenzo hoped to ingratiate himself more with his successor, Sixtus IV., and for that purpose went in person as ambassador from Florence to the new pontiff. The greatest amity prevailed between them at that time. Sixtus seemed to have drawn largely from the funds of the wealthy chief of the Medici. Nor did Lorenzo, in his political career, forget the old commercial habits of his family. He purchased of Sixtus a collection of precious gems, which he sold advantageously to other princes; and obtained the appointment of one of his relatives to the lucrative office of papal treasurer. But if thus studious of amassing, Lorenzo was proportionately generous in princely expenditure. He soon after founded the university of Pisa, and endowed it richly. The sum of his charities, as given by Fabroni, is of enormous amount.

The friendship between Lorenzo de' Medici and pope Sixtus was not of long duration. Most historians attribute the breach, and the consequent war throughout Italy, to the rapacity and despotism of Sixtus. But Lorenzo seems to have given some cause. Even Valori owns that he had entered into an agreement for purchasing Imola, before Sixtus, roused by this attempt, bid for it himself, and obtained the town for his nephew. It was another Florentine capitalist, Francis de' Pazzi, who furnished the pope with the money, and who, in fact, outbid Lorenzo at the court of Rome. He was made treasurer of that court in lieu of the relative, whose elevation to that office had been procured by Lorenzo: and here, in fact, commenced that rivalry

betwixt the Pazzi and the Medici, which put an end to the overwhelming resources of the latter, and drove the crushed rival to seek revenge in the memorable conspiracy about to be related.

The pope supported the Pazzi, and sought to raise them up into the position of rivalry with the Medici, formerly held by the Pitti. The king of Naples seconded the design. This led to a league betwixt the Venetians, Milanese, and Florentines, and divided Italy, in a hostile sense, into north and south, in lieu of into east and west. The archbishopric of Pisa, generally possessed by one of the Medici, becoming vacant, was given by Sixtus to Salviati, a follower of the Pazzi. But these were merely measures of annoyance; the Medici could not be openly competed with; and a conspiracy, similar to that which had lately proved so successful at Milan by the assassination of the reigning duke, seemed the only mode of rescuing Florence from their sway. Pope Sixtus was said to be the originator, he was at least an approver of the design. His son, the cardinal de Riano, came to Florence to direct the enterprise. Salviati, the new archbishop of Pisa, was another leader. The brothers Pazzi were to be the principal instruments with Poggio, son of the famous scholar of that name, Bandini, and Montesicco, a captain of condottieri in the papal service.

The first intention of the conspirators was to attack the brothers Medici in their country house at Fiesole; but the uncertainty of surprising them together caused this plan to be abandoned. The church of the *Reparata,* where Lorenzo and Giuliano were to attend on the following Sunday, was then fixed upon as the scene. It was resolved to stab them in the crowd; Pazzi and Bandini undertaking to slay Giuliano, whilst Lorenzo's fate was intrusted to the experienced hand of Montesicco. The condottiero, however, had qualms; he shrank not from murder, but from murder in a church. Two ecclesiastics undertook to despatch Lorenzo. These substitutes, chosen in haste, wasted the *animo grande e*

fermo, — the grandeur and force of soul, as Machiavel says, — requisite for the task. Whilst Giuliano was stabbed, and even mangled, by Pazzi, Lorenzo received merely a slight wound in the throat, was able to draw and defend himself, and made a safe retreat into the sacristy of the church. The archbishop of Pisa, in the mean time, with Poggio and other conspirators, attempted to get possession of the palace. The archbishop himself penetrated to where the gonfalonier Petrucci and the ostensible members of the government were sitting. But, unequal to his purpose, which was to surprise and awe Petrucci into submission, he hesitated, revealed his own treachery, and was arrested. The gates of the palace were secured. Poggio was hanged from one of the windows. This act of summary punishment was so highly applauded, that the archbishop Salviati was brought out and put to a similar death. The adherents of the Pazzi throughout the city were every where dispersed, massacred, or hanged. Francis Pazzi, disabled by a wound inflicted by himself in his eagerness to slay Giuliano, was taken, dragged to the palace, and hanged by the side of Poggio and the archbishop. James, the aged father of the Pazzi, underwent the same fate. The affection of the Florentines for the Medici amounted, on this occasion, to frenzy. In vain were they called on by the conspirators to re-assert their liberty. The name, says Machiavel, was unknown.

Thus did the foes of the Medici work more effectually for the elevation of the family, than could either itself or its supporters. This second conspiracy completely established Lorenzo's power, by exciting in the people towards him a personal interest, which amounted to loyalty. This was increased by the inveteracy which the Italian powers now manifested. The pope indulged in the most indecorous resentment, excommunicated Lorenzo, and offered peace to the Florentines on condition of their expelling the Medici. This being refused, the troops of Rome and Naples advanced into the Florentine territory. Lorenzo felt that he himself

was equally endangered by this open hostility: it was not that he feared the arms and valour of the combined powers, but that his fellow-citizens or subjects were peculiarly impatient of war and its expenses. These they now incurred apparently on Lorenzo's single account; for the pope and the king of Naples professed to make war solely and personally upon him. In order to obviate the dangerous effects of his position, Lorenzo, according to Machiavel, assembled the citizens, and addressed to them a moving speech, to this effect, — that neither he nor any of his family had sought to impose their authority, but had wielded it merely by popular consent; and that now, if they deemed the war personally caused by him, they had but to shake him off, and liberate themselves from its pressure. The assembly replied by acclamations; determined to carry on the war; and even appointed a domestic guard to attend upon Lorenzo, and defend him from any attempt at assassination.

The war that now commenced betwixt northern and southern Italy attracted the attention of all Europe. It speaks in favour of Lorenzo, that it was he who won, in preference to his foes, the sympathies of almost every foreign prince and state. The pontiff of letters and of the arts attracted more respect than the pontiff of the church. No war, indeed, could have commenced in a cause more calculated to stir the blood; but military heroism seemed dead in the breasts of the Italians, and the actions which ensued are more worthy of burlesque than of history. The papal troops ran away from their enemies at Thrasymene, frighted, it is said, by the ill omen of the name, — as if the cravens might be allowed to plead sympathy or affinity with their glorious predecessors. The balance of victory and merit was restored, however, by a similar panic befalling the Florentine army, which, at Poggibonsi, was opposed to the troops of Naples. They fled in causeless and disastrous rout, leaving Florence itself exposed to hostile inroad, had not the victor been as incapable of seizing an advantage, as the vanquished of defence.

Now recommenced those rumours, that fickle weariness of the war, on the part of the Florentines, which Lorenzo had at first dreaded. He felt that, in spite of the love of which he had not long since received such profuse tokens, the people would sacrifice him rather than much longer support the burden of war upon his sole account. Murmurs already arose, urging the necessity of a peace. Amidst the lukewarmness of allies, there was no way of procuring this but by conciliating at least one of the chief enemies. According to Machiavel, Lorenzo hesitated to which he should address himself, — the pope or the king of Naples. He decided for the latter, to whom he had been long known. As the negotiation was one in which his private interest was chiefly concerned, Lorenzo resolved to undertake it himself, and to proceed to Naples as the envoy of the republic. He was warned of the danger of thus placing himself in the power of an enemy; but he resolved to incur the risk.

Towards the close of 1479, Lorenzo embarked for Naples. The magnanimity of his resolve, as soon as it was known, already softened the enmity of the king; and, on approaching Ferdinand's capital, Lorenzo found that every preparation had been made to give him honourable welcome. If the fame of his coming had produced this respect, his presence commanded still greater, and the king could not withhold his admiration and friendship. Yet, if we are to believe Machiavel, these demonstrations of amity were not unmingled with sinister intentions. "The king deferred letting him depart for some time, in order to see if some tumult might not arise in Florence; but as affairs remained quiet in that quarter, he dismissed Lorenzo on the 6th of March, with every proof of affection, and after concluding a perpetual league of amity betwixt their respective states."

This was the kind of triumph which the Florentines loved,—the bringing back of peace. No conqueror, after winning victory by the sword, was ever more triumph-

antly welcomed in ancient Rome, than Lorenzo was in modern Florence, for having achieved peace by his personal merit and address, with whatever loss of dignity and spirit. Politian poured forth his gratulations in verse, and all writers have echoed the applause.

His success in this negotiation obtained Lorenzo, indeed, a high degree of eminence. It secured him not only a Florentine, but an Italian supremacy. Roscoe fixes on this period as the time when he conceived the plan of maintaining the tranquillity of the peninsula, by the great principle of supporting the balance of power. But this was a principle long known, and one upon which, indeed, Lorenzo had always acted. Nor was he singular; for the very obvious idea is perceptible in the conduct of preceding princes. There was only this difference in Lorenzo's adoption of it, that, in other princes, the maxim was every moment forgotten and set aside by the whims and projects of selfish ambition; whereas the pacific and even-tempered Lorenzo saw the interest of Florence, not in her aggrandisement, but in sedulously preserving the present state of her own and her neighbours' strength and frontiers. He first recovered Sarzana, and restored it to the republic. This important frontier town was necessary for the security of Florence. With this exception, he looked more towards preventing the mutual encroachments of other princes than meditated any himself. Whilst the Venetians, the princes of the house of Naples, and the successive popes, were each bent upon petty and individual aggrandisement, Lorenzo cajoled or resisted, now the one, now the other, as necessity required, acting himself with seeming disinterestedness, but unfailing prudence.

The political scene now changed. It was no longer the pope and Naples against Florence, but the pope and the Venetians who united against Ferrara. Lorenzo flew to the assistance of the weaker side, and brought Naples into his views. Here was the principle of the balance of power in complete action. The death of pope Sixtus brought another change and new aspect

of affairs. Lorenzo, as formerly, on the accession of Sixtus, directed all his efforts to gain the good will of the new pope. Fortunately, he was one not disinclined to amity with Lorenzo. But yet, in the very commencement of his pontificate, this same pope Innocent, having resolved to encourage the disaffection of the Neapolitan barons, and by their means destroy the reigning house of Naples, Lorenzo engaged himself and Florence in defence of that kingdom, and succeeded in checking the designs of the ambitious pontiff. The Florentine prince employed argument and insinuation, rather than open menace, and succeeded not only in preserving Naples from oppression, but even in acquiring Innocent's friendship. It was this pontiff who made Lorenzo's son, Giovanni, a cardinal, and thus laid the foundation of the ecclesiastical grandeur of the Medici. This young Giovanni, or John, was the future Leo X. His foreign policy, however, formed the bright side of Lorenzo's character as a statesman. At home, he not only continued the despotism of his father and grandfather, but erected it into an open and avowed system. The failure of the Pazzi plot, although it had raised his popularity, yet at the same time gave rise to a war which proved distressing to the Florentines. Whilst it lasted, Lorenzo showed himself humble, and did not appear to meditate any thing against the freedom of his country. But when he returned from Naples with peace in his hand, he resolved to make a selfish use of his triumph and of his popularity. Not only relying on this, but also representing the imminent danger of fresh war, unless the state were governed by less popular and fluctuating counsels, he obtained from the people not merely a temporary *balia*, but a regular senate of seventy chief citizens, his friends, charged with the power of forming the electoral lists. This was a death-blow to the liberties of Florence.

From this dark part of Lorenzo's character and acts we turn hastily to the virtues by which he partially redeemed his despotism. Thus, if he checked civilis-

ation in one path, he certainly accelerated its progress in another. From his earliest youth a poet, the friend of Politian and of Pulci, he cultivated literature with ardour.

Like most poets, with whom the muse is more a companion and a solace than a guide to fame or profit, Lorenzo vented his amatory feelings and philosophic thoughts, rather than attempted narrations. For this reason he is less popular and known, as well as less influential, than those chroniclers of fable, Pulci, Boiardo, and their school. But he has far sweeter touches for those who are content to search into his Platonic mysticism. The literary taste and patronage of the prince, however, are of more importance than his genius and productions. Lorenzo's fostering care protected men of learning, and procured them every aid. Manuscripts he collected from all sides; he founded the famous library which bears his name; he encouraged the study of Greek, and founded schools for its cultivation. In short, Lorenzo de' Medici did all that an individual mind could do, to elevate and enlighten, not only his country, but the world.

The details of criticism, as well as the friendships, merits, and quarrels of the literati whom he protected, and amongst whom he chiefly lived, can be allowed to occupy but little place in the history of the statesman. Politian was, perhaps, the person for whom Lorenzo had most regard; and their correspondence affords amiable proof of the terms of kindness and equality upon which the poet and his patron lived. The poet afterwards undertook the tuition of Lorenzo's sons; a task for which he was more fitted by his learning than his temper. He squabbled continually with the mother of the boys, and appealed querulously to Lorenzo. At length his friend allowed the scholar to retire to the more fitting and peaceable company of his muse.

The absorbing and important pursuits of politics and letters rendered Lorenzo de' Medici less prudent in the management of his commercial affairs and fortune than

his ancestor, Cosmo, had been. Indeed, Piero had brought disorder into the private finances of the family. Many of the wars which Florence had undertaken were personally directed against Lorenzo; and he, sensible of this, had borne the expense of some expeditions out of his private funds. The consequences involved him in serious difficulties, from which he was enabled to extricate himself by the gratitude of the Florentines, who placed the state revenues at his private disposal. Lorenzo, thenceforth, gave up the pursuits of banking and commerce, withdrew his wealth from them, and placed it in land, as more durable, and more suited to the prince and man of taste. He took delight in the country, and devoted himself, in his old days, with zeal, to agriculture. He had a number of villas, and a farm, of which he has left a beautiful description. But their charm to us must ever be their having been habitually frequented by such men as Politian, Pico of Mirandola, and Lorenzo himself.

In the year 1492, Lorenzo, at the height of power, fame, and happiness, and still in the prime of manhood, —for he was but forty-four,—was taken with one of those low and languid fevers endemic in the country. He was removed to his favourite villa at Careggi, and was soon attended by his favourite friends, Politian and Pico. The fatal nature of the disorder soon became evident. Lorenzo prepared, with the resignation of a Christian and the magnanimity of a philosopher, for his death. His last moments are minutely and affectingly described by Politian; and they well correspond with the dignity of his life.

The crime of having riveted the chains of his country did not perhaps weigh upon him as upon us, although the celebrated Savonarola, whom he summoned to his bedside, is said to have reproached him with it as a sin, and to have refused him absolution until he repaired the wrongs of Florence by restoring to the republic its ancient freedom.

Such was the career of this truly great, and, except

in one important respect, this estimable man. Notwithstanding the general censure which hangs over the Medici, for having suppressed the liberties of Florence, it is difficult not to except, in some degree, Lorenzo from its weight. He found a certain political state established, and to continue it might have been imperative upon him. The only security for himself, his family, and his numerous partisans, containing, perhaps, half the city, lay in his domination. This, however, is but a personal and insufficient defence. Yet if the crime of ruling without right can be redeemed, it was redeemed by Lorenzo. The people's love hailed and followed his every act, and his death was lamented as a public calamity. The physician who fruitlessly attended him threw himself into a well, and perished in despair. This one example depicts the consternation and grief experienced by his friends.

His loss as a patron of literature and the arts would have been irretrievable but for the son, whom he had brought up in his own pursuits and tastes. As a politician, holding and watching over the balance and the peace of Italy, Lorenzo's place could not be supplied. No sooner had death removed him from the helm, than Italian interests and unity went to wreck. The princes of the country became divided: each followed his petty and short-sighted aim, till at length, the French being called in, there was an end for centuries to the peace, and for ever, at least up to this day, to the freedom of Italy.

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